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11 15 March 1971

AGDA - A (M) (8 Mar 71)

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th  
Infantry Division ~~...~~ (U) 8

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15. (12) 140 p.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

⑨ Operational rept. for  
quarterly period ending 31 Jul 71  
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*Verne L. Bowers*  
VERNE L. BOWERS  
Major General, USA  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCMH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

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Location: Cu Chi Base Camp (XT647153), Cu Chi, RVN.  
Reporting Officer: Major General Edward Bautz, Jr.  
Prepared By: Major Carter Morey, 18th Military History Detachment.  
Map References: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series: L7014, Sheets: 6131 I, II, III, IV; 6132 I, II, III, IV; 6229 I; 6230 I, II, III, IV; 6231 I, II, III, IV; 6232 I, II, III, IV; 6329 IV; 6330 I, II, III, IV; 6331 III; 6430 I, II, III, IV.

1. (C) OPERATIONS: Significant Activities.

a. General: During the previous quarter, the 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division were successful in reaching their proposed objectives. Through the employment of small unit tactics, comprehensive use of electronic surveillance, snipers and combat patrols and the timely pursuit of targets developed from intelligence information, every enemy plan was pre-empted and 1,414 of his soldiers were killed. Through combined operations, training and close coordination, South Vietnamese soldiers were assisted to undertake a larger role in the defense of their homeland. The Pacification Program has continued to expand and strengthen the bonds between the Vietnamese people and their government. The failure of the enemy to launch a significant coordinated offensive during the quarter attested to the success of these programs.

The 1st Brigade's area of operations was extended to include the area around Dau Tieng (XT4947) with the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division to the United States in March 1970. The combat effectiveness of the 1st Brigade was significantly strengthened by the move of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry from the 2nd Brigade to the 1st Brigade AO. The 1st Brigade has pre-empted all enemy attempts to initiate an offensive in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces, prevented the enemy from freely using the cave-strewn slopes of Nui Ba Den as a refuge and stop-over point for infiltration groups and successfully restricted enemy infiltration into Tay Ninh Province from Cambodia. The enemy was forced to resort to attacks by fire as his primary offensive tactic.

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Task Force Two (2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division) became OPCON to II FFV on 2 March, 1970. The combat effectiveness of the 2nd Brigade was strengthened by the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry.

The 3rd Brigade continued to prevent the enemy from using the An Ninh Corridor as an infiltration route, forced main force units taking sanctuary in Cambodia to remain there and disrupted local force activities through increased use of small unit tactics, combat patrols and snipers. The 3rd Brigade was also tasked with the responsibility for the defense of Cu Chi Base Camp and designated one battalion as Division Ready Reaction Force. The most significant contact of the previous quarter occurred in the first week of April in the Renegade Woods involving elements of two battalions of the 3rd Brigade. Enemy losses in the contact were 101 killed, one captured and two Hoi Chanh received.

Operations of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division accounted for 711 enemy KIA (BC), forced Sub-Region 3 units to operate in dispersed groups to escape Allied detection, disrupted Sub-Region 6 local and main force plans for attacks on Saigon and greatly expanded the pacification program in Long An Province. With U.S. Naval forces, 3-9 Inf Div units disrupted the enemy's ability to operate along canals and rivers within Long An Province, prevented enemy reinforcements of men and supplies to local guerrilla forces and reduced the effectiveness of the Viet Cong Infrastructure by continuous monitoring of the enemy's routes of movement.

Prisoner-of-war interrogations and the large number of Hoi Chanh in the previous reporting period, indicated the low morale of the enemy. This was primarily due to the relentless pursuit and destruction of enemy units, and enemy inability to resupply his units or evacuate his wounded due to denial operations and population and resource control measures. The enemy had continued to sustain heavy casualties, was driven from many of his "secure" areas and was critically short of food and supplies. Pre-emption through saturation surveillance, reconnaissance and immediate reaction of massed fire power has dealt the Communist insurgency in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong and Long An Provinces another one-sided defeat.

The enemy's planned Winter/Spring offensive failed miserably during the previous reporting period. Enemy efforts during the Winter/Spring offensive were designed to wear down the American desire to continue the war by inflicting heavy casualties on American and Allied forces. Particular emphasis was placed on disrupting the GVN Pacification effort and annihilating the Revolutionary Development Cadre.

The 25th Infantry Division continued Phase IV of Operation TOAN THANG in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces during the previous quarter. Planning guidance stressed operations designed to pre-empt enemy initiatives, interdict main force movement, destroy local force units, capture/destroy enemy supplies and disrupt his logistical activities, and exploit intelligence from Hoi Chanh and prisoners-of-war with raid or airmo-

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bile operations. Emphasis was placed on pacification activities within the Division's TAOI; concentrating particularly on the upgrading of contested and VC villages to include operations to upgrade security; preparation to counter interdiction of the MSR networks; continuance of upgrading LOC's in assigned TAOI's; review and updating of all contingency plans; conducting Traffic Control Points (TCP) in conjunction with Navy elements in assigned TAOI's where applicable; continuing overwatch responsibility to include inspections on assigned bridges and preparing to support Ranger operations within respective TAOI's.

To counter the enemy's dispersed formations, the Division maneuver elements and the 2nd Squadron, 34th Armor (OPCON to II FFV but worked with various 25th Infantry Division units in April) targeted small groups with increased use of small unit day and night operations, and employed small maneuver elements (platoons and reinforced squads) oriented towards pre-empting and destroying the enemy rather than merely reacting to his activity. Continued emphasis was placed upon preparation to reinforce when a contact was established. Planning guidance also called for increased night operations to include ARVN/FF/RF participation.

The 1st Brigade operated in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces with four battalions and was responsible for security on Highways 4, 13, 22, and 26, for combined operations with South Vietnamese units around Tay Ninh City and for coverage of the area around Nui Ba Den. The 1st Brigade was given the mission of conducting day and night operations to locate and annihilate enemy threats to Tay Ninh City and reinforce RF/FF or ARVN Airborne contacts within the city and destroy enemy elements within the city; conduct dawn and dusk surveillance within the TAOI; plan for and conduct VCI operations in conjunction with GVN forces in Phu Khuong, Hien Thien, Phuoc Ninh, Khiem Hanh, and Tri Tam Districts; prepare to react to activity on the road in the vicinity of An Thuan (XT2824); conduct combined operations with ARVN, encouraging them to conduct small unit operations and establishing a goal of one-third of the total operations conducted to be during non-daylight hours.

The 1st Brigade was composed of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry; 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry; and the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry. The 1st Brigade was supported by the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery. Enemy units in the 1st Brigade area were the D1 Battalion; the D14 Battalion; the 271 VC/NVA Regiment; the 272 VC/NVA Regiment; and the 95C Regiment.

The 3rd Brigade operated with four battalions conducting extensive combat patrol, ground and mounted reconnaissance, and combat assault operations in the central portion of the Division's TAOI and conducted security along sections of Highways 6A, 7A, 8A, 10, 1, and 253 and the pacification program in the Bao Trai area. The 3rd Brigade was directed to conduct offensive mechanized, infantry, and airmobile operations and combined operations with the 5th ARVN Division in the Ho Bo Woods and Filhol Rubber Plantation area and with the 25th ARVN Division in the Citadel and Trung Lap areas, with emphasis on small unit operations and destruction of SR-1 and local force

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units; conduct offensive operations to counter enemy interdiction of MSR's; continue VCI and military pacification and consolidation operations in conjunction with GVN forces in Trang Bang and Cu Chi Districts; encourage GVN forces to conduct small unit operations; and be prepared to secure and control Rome Plow operations in the Brigade TAOI. The 3rd Brigade was also tasked with the responsibility for the defense of Cu Chi Base Camp and designated one battalion as Division Ready Reactionary Force.

The 3rd Brigade's maneuver battalions were the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry; 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry; and 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry. The 3rd Brigade was supported by the 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery. Enemy units in the 3rd Brigade's area included the 268 VC/NVA Regiment, 101 NVA Regiment, the Quyet Thung Regiment, 269 VC Battalion, 2642 VC Battalion, 267 Battalion, D16 Battalion, 308 Battalion, and the 6 Local Force Battalion.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division operated with three battalions in Long An Province with responsibility for the security of Highways 4, 18, and 23 and the local pacification program. Planning guidance for the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division emphasized conducting extensive combined operations with Long An ARVN and PF/RF units using small unit tactics and night operations; conducting VCI and military pacification and consolidation operations in Long An Province; conducting Bushmaster, checkerboard and air-mobile operations to detect and destroy enemy infiltration; continuing over-watch responsibility on MSR's and bridges within the TAOI and coordinating with the USN to conduct riverine/Eagle Float operations within the TAOI.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division's maneuver battalions were the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry; the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry; and the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry. The Brigade was supported by the 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery. Major enemy units in Long An Province were the 1 NVA Regiment, 506 Battalion, 508 Battalion, 520 Battalion, 265 Battalion, Dong Phu Battalion, 3 Artillery Battalion, 211 Copper Battalion, the N10 Battalion, and the N13 Battalion. (See Inclosure 3 - Enemy Main Force Unit Identification)

A precedent-breaking move of far reaching consequences occurred on 1 May 1970 when American military forces crossed the Cambodian border to join ARVN forces who had entered Cambodia on 28 April 1970, to destroy enemy supply and personnel bases in the Parrot's Beak, the Angel's Wing and the Fishhook Region. The first American forces into Cambodia were the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), including the 2nd Bn (M), 47th Inf and 2nd Bn, 34th Armor, which became OPCON to the 1st Cav Div (AM) on 29 April 1970, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment which attacked enemy Base Areas 352 and 353 in the Fishhook Region (See Inclosure 4 for location of Base Areas). The 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division began Operation TOAN THANG 44 on 6 May 1970 at 0330 hours and 0430 hours when a commando vault insertion took place on the far side of a bridge vic WT967752 in Cambodia. The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry was air assaulted into Cambodia at 0710 hours vic WT917755, WT955750 and WT915755 to provide security for the construction of a float



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bridge across the Rach Beng Go River which forms the boundary between Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam. The 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry provided security on the near side of the river. The float bridge was completed and became operational by 2315 hours on 6 May. Ground contact with enemy units was light that day, only two contacts reported. The most significant occurred at 1030 hours on 6 May when Companies A and D, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 1 kilometer east of Tasuos (WT922750) resulting in two US soldiers killed and three US wounded. A/D/3-22 Inf returned fire with organic weapons and a Light Fire Team (LFT) with unknown results.

The most significant contacts on 6 May were initiated by helicopter gunships from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry and 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry which resulted in 43 enemy soldiers killed. At 0850 hours on 6 May, a Light Scout Team (LST) from D/3-4 Cav engaged an estimated 30 enemy 1.5 kilometers southeast of Tasuos (WT928740) with organic weapons resulting in nine enemy killed. The most significant contact of the day occurred at 1106 hours when helicopter gunships from D/3-4 Cav engaged 30-40 enemy 200 meters south of the 0850 hours contact (WT926740) with organic weapons resulting in 20 enemy killed. At 0830 hours on 6 May, helicopter gunships engaged three enemy 500 meters south of Thnal Peam (WT860718) with organic weapons resulting in three enemy killed. An Aero Rifle Platoon (ARP) was inserted in the contact area and killed two more enemy soldiers with organic weapons. Seventeen individual weapons were evacuated along with  $\frac{1}{2}$  pound of documents. B/3-17 Air Cav engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers 1 kilometer northeast of Kam-pot Amreak (XT105275) at 1200 hours on 6 May with organic weapons resulting in eight enemy killed.

On 7 May, the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry and 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry crossed the Rach Beng Go River vic WT967752 to continue the offensive around Tasuos. Also, two companies and the Reconnaissance Platoon of 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry conducted a combat assault into the Parrot's Beak region (XT270030, XT255034, XT277028) on 7 May and began working with ARVN forces already in the region. There was scattered resistance in both operations with light contacts reported.

There were eight ground contacts in Cambodia on 7 May, five were significant. At 1300 hours on 7 May, A/1-5 Inf (M) engaged an unknown number of enemy 6.5 kilometers northeast of Kampong Trach (WT905670) with organic weapons resulting in 11 enemy killed and eight prisoners-of-war captured. Six individual weapons were evacuated. The enemy force returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons until 1310 hours when contact was lost resulting in one US soldier killed and one wounded. At 2050 hours, a combat patrol from Recon/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 6 kilometers northeast of Kampong Trach (WT911666) resulting in one US soldier killed and one US wounded. B/1-5 Inf (M) reacted to the contact and the US forces returned fire with organic weapons, killing four enemy soldiers. A/2-22 Inf (M) received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 7.5 kilometers northeast of Kampong Trach. A/2-22 Inf (M) returned fire with organic weapons and a LFT resulting in four enemy

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killed. At 1700 hours, Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery engaged eight enemy soldiers 2 kilometers west of Ba Thu (XT242043) with artillery resulting in eight enemy killed.

Air actions by Troop C, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav and 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav resulted in 46 enemy killed on 7 May. The most significant action occurred at 1415 hours on 7 May when a LOH from A/3-17 Air Cav received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy in a village 400 meters north of Kuok Tek (XT204004) in the Parrot's Beak. The LOH landed and was destroyed in place. The crew of the LOH escaped unharmed. The enemy force was engaged with helicopter gunships and airstrikes resulting in 36 enemy killed.

Enemy initiated activity within the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI was light and scattered during the week (1-7 May) but showed an increase over the previous week. Offensive activity by enemy forces was confined to limited harassment of Allied installations and positions by the use of attacks by fire. There was continued movement in Tay Ninh Province, the An Ninh Corridor and in SR-3 as enemy units conducted reconnaissance of future targets. Mining activity also increased slightly in the Division's TAOI during the week.

There were nine shelling incidents reported in the Division's TAOI during the week, only three were significant, all in the 1st Brigade's AO. Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1651) received four rounds of 122mm rocket fire at 1005 hours on 2 May resulting in three US soldiers wounded and light damage to one 2½ ton truck and to a tank engine and transmission. Fire was returned to the west by artillery with unknown results. At 2200 hours on 2 May, 2nd Bn, 12th Inf at Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT4947) received 15 rounds of 120mm mortar fire (two rounds impacted inside the base camp) resulting in one US soldier wounded and light damage to one AH1G Cobra and one UH1H helicopter. Fire was returned with artillery and mortars to XT5456 (Q4 radar pick-up) with unknown results. Dau Tieng Base Camp received two 122mm rockets on 4 May at 0715 hours resulting in one US soldier killed and three wounded. Fire was returned by artillery to XT499535 with unknown results.

Enemy activity in the Division's TAOI remained at a low level during the first week of the reporting quarter (1-7 May). The offensive into Cambodia by US and ARVN forces seriously disrupted the enemy's logistics system and reduced substantially his offensive capabilities in the Division's TAOI. With the movement of the 1st Cav Div (AM) and the 1st Brigade into Cambodia during the week, there were important changes in the Brigades' areas of operations. The 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division moved from its AO north to the western portion of War Zone C (vacated by the 1st Cav Div on 1 May). The 3rd Brigade assumed responsibility for the 1st Brigade's AO. The 2nd Brigade, which was OPCON to II FFV, reverted to control of the 25th Inf Div on 7 May and moved up into War Zone C, vic Thien Ngon, for operations against Base Area 707 in Cambodia. The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued to operate in its AO in Long An Province.

The most significant ground contact in the Division's TAOI occurred on 1 May at 1342 hours when A/2-22 Inf (M) with flame tracks and 132 PFs engaged 11 enemy soldiers 8.5 kilometers northeast of Cu Chi (XT696179) with organic

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weapons and a flame track resulting in 11 enemy killed. Five pounds of documents were evacuated.

The Assistant Chief of Staff of the Quyét Thang Regiment, Senior Captain Le Phat Nguyen, rallied to the 25th PF Company 4 kilometers northeast of Cu Chi (XT664140) on 1 May at 0125 hours. The Hoi Chanh stated that the Quyét Thang Regiment was composed of three battalions and a headquarters section, which includes the rear service section, a reconnaissance unit and a medical section. The 1 Quyét Thang Battalion was usually located southeast of the Filhol Rubber Plantation, vic XT7514; the 2 Quyét Thang Battalion operated in the area of Trung An, vic XT7515; and the 4 Quyét Thang Battalion, formerly Gai Dinh 4 Sapper Battalion, was located in the Binh My area vic XT8012. At the present time, the units' strength figures are low, each battalion having a strength of approximately 60-65 men. The most important mission of the Quyét Thang Regiment was to intensify military operations to disrupt the GVN Pacification Program but due to the Regiment's strength, this capability was limited. He stated that the Regiment would only attack Saigon with numerous other VC/NVA units because of the presence of US troops around the capital district. He also stated that if the ARVN forces are allowed enough time to develop into an effective fighting force, the VC/NVA will have no chance for victory. The source divulged information concerning other units in SR-1 which have been out of contact for a time. He stated that the 8 and 9 Artillery Battalions were low in personnel and armaments. A sapper company and reconnaissance company make up the Bach Dang Battalion located in the Ben Chua and Thanh An area. The unit's mission was to locate and ambush gunboats traveling on the Saigon River. The source stated that SR-1 was divided into 12 sections, each handling a logistical portion of SR-1. He further stated that the morale was very low and logistics at the present time were quite inadequate.

Colonel Sam C. Holliday, Commanding Officer (Designate), 2nd Brigade visited Cu Chi Base Camp and other base camps and fire support bases in the 25th Inf Div's TAOI from 4-10 May for an orientation on Division activities.

There were 106 contacts with enemy forces in Cambodia during the second week of May (8-14 May) resulting in 557 enemy soldiers killed and 28 prisoners-of-war captured.

On 8 May, the 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 44 and concentrated on searching Base Area 354 with the 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf and 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf while the 6th Bn, 31st Inf of the 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div conducted airmobile operations in the Parrot's Beak. Contact was light, most action was initiated by US helicopter gunships. There was one significant shelling incident reported by 1st Bde forces on 8 May. At 1100 hours, C/2-14 Inf received small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire on an LZ 4 kilometers northeast of Kampong Trach (WT912630) from an unknown number of enemy resulting in four US soldiers wounded. The most significant ground contacts on 8 May occurred at 1352 and 1430 hours in an area 800 meters south of Chantrea (vic XT184007) in the Parrot's Beak when A/B/D/6-31 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons resulting in seven enemy killed. US casualties in the three engagements were four killed and 10 wounded.

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Air actions by Troop D, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav and 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav resulted in 31 enemy killed in eight separate contacts on 8 May. At 1545 hours, a LOH from D/3-4 Cav received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 5 kilometers northeast of Kampong Trach (WT9165). The LOH returned fire with automatic weapons resulting in four enemy killed. The LOH suffered light damage from two hits. There were no US casualties. C/3-17 Air Cav engaged 20 enemy soldiers 12 kilometers northwest of Kampong Trach (WT799709) with automatic weapons resulting in five enemy killed. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no casualties or damage. At 1040 hours, C/3-17 Air Cav engaged 15-20 enemy soldiers 5 kilometers west of Popel (WT809752) with automatic weapons resulting in six enemy killed and two AK47 rifles destroyed. The enemy force returned fire with small arms, there were no US casualties. An LOH from C/3-17 Air Cav received small arms fire from five enemy soldiers 500 meters southwest of Popel (WT846736). The LOH returned fire with automatic weapons resulting in five enemy killed.

There were two caches found on 8 May. At 1315 hours, B/2-14 Inf located and evacuated 40 bicycles, 16 motorcycles, one SKS rifle and 10 pounds of documents in a field 2.5 kilometers southeast of Kam (WT964640). The Reconnaissance Platoon, 6th Bn, 31st Inf located an ammunition cache 3.5 kilometers east of Samraong (XT272030) in the Parrot's Beak. They evacuated 24 homemade booby trapped AP mines, 21X81mm fuses, 24 ChiCom booby trapped hand grenades, 20 booby trapped butterfly bombs, six 81mm charges, 24X60mm charges, two RPG rounds, three 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, one AT mine and six ICM bomblets.

The 1st Brigade continued searching in Base Area 354 on 9 May, light contact was reported and no significant caches found. The 2nd Brigade began Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase II, attacking into Base Area 707 with the 1st Bn, 27th Inf, 4th Bn, 9th Inf and 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav. The two Infantry Battalions were air assaulted into objectives, vic XT028922, XT040907, XT022934, and WT976917 while 3-4 Cav screened on the southeast flank. In the Parrot's Beak, the 6th Bn, 31st Inf met strong resistance during the day. One significant shelling incident was reported on 9 May when A/2-14 Inf and B/3-22 Inf received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar at 1925 hours at FSB Mini (WT971751) resulting in one US soldier killed and 18 wounded.

In two actions by elements of 1-5 Inf (M) on 9 May, 21 enemy soldiers were killed. At 1130 hours, A/B/C/1-5 Inf (M) engaged an estimated enemy platoon 1 kilometer northeast of Trapeang Pikar (WT8568) with organic weapons and a LFT resulting in 17 enemy killed. Enemy small arms fire killed one US soldier and wounded 14. R/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 1 kilometer southeast of Sre Russei (WT903665) resulting in one US soldier killed and one wounded. Four enemy soldiers were killed by organic weapons fire from R/1-5 Inf (M). A total of four AK47 rifles, 15 pounds of clothing, eight small arms magazines, one RPG round, one RPG booster, 10 rounds of 60mm mortar, three ChiCom hand grenades, five pounds of explosives, 75 pounds of rice, five pounds of medical supplies, and 10 pounds of documents were evacuated.

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Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry located a large weapons cache 5 kilometers northeast of Kampong Trach (WT917642). Sixty-two AK47 rifles, 12 unknown type assault rifles, 80 K54 pistols, 13 SKS rifles, six M16 rifles, six .51 caliber machine guns, one RPD light machine gun, one 120mm mortar tube, three 75mm recoilless rifles, one 7.62 light machine gun, one PPS 43 machine gun, 21 cases of C4 explosives, one 100 pound shape charge, four cases of AK47 ammunition, 40 AT mines, 100 holsters, 20 rolls of barbed wire, 29 AK47 magazines, one 120mm mortar round, 90 NVA uniforms, three cases of K54 ammunition, 500 shovel heads, 100 claymore mines, 10 KW generators, 80 cases of assorted food and clothing and one and one-half tons of rice were evacuated.

In actions by B/C/2-22 Inf (M) east and northeast of Kampong Trach (WT-959621, WT940682, WT953688) on 9 May at 0630 and 0800 hours, 310 bunkers, 123 buildings, 1500 NVA uniforms, six fighting positions, six rounds of 60mm mortar, nine 81mm mortar rounds, three ChiCom stoves, 20 ChiCom hand grenades, four sewing machines, 150 gallons of gasoline and 50 gallons of kerosene were destroyed. Twelve hundred pounds of rice, 250  $\frac{1}{4}$ -pound blocks of C4, two SKS rifles and two damaged RPG launchers were evacuated.

At 1025 hours on 9 May, A/1-27 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 3.2 kilometers northwest of Trapeang Phlong (XT022934) in Base Area 707. A/1-27 Inf returned fire with organic weapons resulting in 12 enemy soldiers killed. One US soldier was wounded in the engagement. A large rice cache was located by D/4-9 Inf 4 kilometers west of Trapeang Phlong (XT015917) in Base Area 707 at 1700 hours on 9 May. Fifty tons of rice, 2,400 pounds of salt, one motorbike and one pound of documents were evacuated.

Nine enemy soldiers were killed and one prisoner-of-war was captured by elements of the 6th Bn, 31st Inf in five separate contacts in the Parrot's Beak region. The most significant contact occurred at 1100 hours when A/6-31 Inf engaged three enemy 1 kilometer west of Chantrea (XT176017) with organic weapons resulting in three enemy killed.

Air actions by Troop D, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav and 3rd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav on 9 May resulted in 96 enemy soldiers killed and one prisoner-of-war captured in nine separate engagements. A LST from D/3-4 Cav received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 3.5 kilometers south of Krek (XT-018985) on 9 May at 0910 hours. The LST returned fire with automatic weapons resulting in 11 enemy soldiers killed. An ARP was inserted and engaged three enemy with organic weapons, killing two and capturing the third man. One K54 pistol, one SKS rifle and one AK47 rifle were evacuated to Tay Ninh. At 1500 hours, D/3-4 Cav engaged 20 enemy soldiers with automatic weapons and a FAC 8 kilometers southwest of Krek (WT968956) resulting in eight enemy killed. At 1505 hours, a LST from D/3-4 Cav engaged 20 enemy soldiers 1.6 kilometers northwest of the 1500 hours contact (WT955964) with automatic weapons resulting in eight enemy killed. The most significant engagement of the day occurred at 1530 hours when D/3-4 Cav engaged an unknown number of enemy 6 kilometers west of Trapeang Phlong (WT995898) resulting in 58 enemy killed. Four enemy were killed by C/3-17 Air Cav 40 meters north of Ta Am (WT922898) at

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0745 hours on 9 May. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties.

The 1st Brigade continued a detailed search of Base Area 354 on 10 May and found two caches and a training site. Contact was light throughout the day. The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase II evacuating rice and locating caches in Base Area 707. The 2nd Brigade received OPCON the 2nd Bn(M), 22nd Inf; the 2nd Bn, 27th Inf; 2nd Bn (M), 47th Inf; and one tank company for operations against the suspected COSVN headquarters area, vicinity XU1210 to begin 11 May (see Inclosure 4). The 6th Bn, 31st Inf continued searching in the Parrot's Beak, moderate contacts were reported.

Co B, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf located an enemy weapons and munitions cache 5 kilometers east of Tasous (WT964745) on 10 May. They evacuated 85 ChiCom handgrenades, 325 pounds of explosives, one RPG launcher, one light machine gun, one ChiCom machine gun, one M2 carbine and one SKS rifle. A large training site was located and destroyed, the training site 2.5 kilometers north of Tasous (WT922769) consisted of 200 buildings, ten mess halls, 15 bleachers and wooden mock-ups of tanks, helicopters, and jets. Ten tons of rice and two pounds of documents were evacuated. An ammunition cache was located by B/2-14 Inf 5 kilometers northwest of Kampong Trach (WT902654) on 10 May at 1055 hours. One RPG launcher, seven RPG rounds, four 60mm mortar rounds, 12 ChiCom handgrenades, five rifle grenades and two boxes of blasting caps were destroyed. Three rice caches were located by A/4-9 Inf on 10 May. At 0500 hours, A/4-9 Inf evacuated 7½ tons of rice from a cache located 3 kilometers southwest of Trapeang Phlong (XT028907) in Base Area 707. At 1030 hours, a cache consisting of 20 tons of rice and one ton of barley was evacuated from a spot 800 meters north of the earlier find (XT030913). Ten tons of rice were evacuated from a site 600 meters southwest of the first find (XT021906) at 1115 hours.

Elements from 6th Bn, 31st Inf killed 28 enemy soldiers and captured seven prisoners-of-war in 11 separate contacts on 10 May. A/C/6-31 Inf killed 12 enemy soldiers and captured three prisoners-of-war 2.4 kilometers northwest of Kaoh Kban (XT214102) in the Parrot's Beak in three separate contacts at 1445, 1500 and 1608 hours. The prisoners identified the following SR-2 elements: the Light Regiment, the Supply Section of the Rear Service Section and the 82mm Mortar Company of the 269 Regiment. One of the PW's stated that the Light Regiment consisted of the 267 Battalion, 269 Battalion and an artillery element containing a 57mm recoilless rifle and a 82mm mortar section, a medical section and a headquarters section which operated out of Dia Gai, Cambodia until attacked by Cambodians, at which time the Light Regiment moved to Ba Dai (XT214102). SR-2 HQ and the 128 Artillery Battalion were located in Ba Thu. Another PW revealed that the mission of the Supply Section, Rear Service Section was to purchase medicine, clothing and other supplies from Ba Phlong and Dia Gai, Cambodia for distribution within SR-2. Three sections subordinate to SR-2's Rear Service Section were identified: Special Border Section, which frees VC captured by the Cambodians; the Quartermaster Section, which procures clothing; and the military Health Section, which runs a combination hospital and training school located in Ba Thu, capable of handling 100 people. D/6-31 Inf located 15 enemy killed 2 kilometers north of Chantrea (XT179037) and destroyed one AK47 rifle, 1000 small arms rounds, nine RPG rounds and seven ChiCom handgrenades.

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The 1st Brigade continued searching Base Area 354 on 11 May. The 2nd Brigade continued limited search operations in Base Area 707 and initiated an attack into the suspected COSVN headquarters area, vicinity XU1210 with the 4th Bn, 9th Inf and 2nd Bn, 27th Inf which were air assaulted into the objective (XU158160, XU085148, XU094155). While the assault took place, the 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf; 2nd Bn (M), 47th Inf; and 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav completed a cordon around the suspected Base Area. The attack was preceded by B52 airstrikes, vicinity XU1412, XU1312 and XU1513 which resulted in 151 enemy soldiers killed. The 6th Bn, 31st Inf continued its search in the Parrot's Beak, a few caches were found and only light contact reported.

At 0222 hours on 11 May, B/2-27 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers 1.4 kilometers southeast of Krasang (XU090145) resulting in five enemy killed. Three AK47 rifles, one SKS rifle and one machine gun were evacuated. Enemy small arms and automatic fire killed one US soldier.

Co A, 1st Bn, 27th Inf located 15 tons of rice, one classroom and one aid station 5 kilometers east of Trapeang Phlong (XT001932) on 11 May at 1040 hours. Five enemy soldiers were killed and one prisoner-of-war was captured in two separate contacts on 11 May at 0850 hours and 1035 hours by D/1-27 Inf 6.5 kilometers northwest of Trapeang Phlong (WT996950). Two carbines were evacuated from the contact site. At 1630 hours on 11 May, R/6-31 Inf with a 3-9 Inf Div Avn UH1H received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 1 kilometer north of Knok Tek (XT2010). Fire was returned with organic weapons, a LFT and TAC airstrikes resulting in seven enemy killed. US casualties were one killed, one wounded and moderate damage to one UH1H.

Air actions by D/3-4 Cav and 3-17 Air Cav resulted in 25 enemy killed in four contacts on 11 May. The most significant contact occurred at 1640 hours when C/3-17 Air Cav engaged 30-50 enemy soldiers 2.4 kilometers southwest of Ta Am (WT9085) resulting in 20 enemy KIA (BC). At 0840 hours on 11 May, a LST from D/3-4 Cav received unknown type ground fire 3 kilometers northwest of Treak (XU1412). An AH1G Cobra was hit and crashed, wounding the two-man crew who were evacuated by a LOH. The AH1G Cobra was a combat loss.

On 12 May, the 1st and 2nd Brigades continued their search in Base Areas 354 and 707. There was heavy contact in Base Area 354 due to the movement of a security force from the 95C Regiment Headquarters Company into the area. Several caches were found in both Base Areas. The 6th Bn, 31st Inf withdrew from Cambodia and returned to the 3-9 Inf Div's AO in Long An Province.

Co C, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf received small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire from an unknown number of enemy 8.6 kilometers northeast of Kampong Trach (WT928682) at 0545 hours on 12 May resulting in five US soldiers killed, 44 wounded (30 minor wounded) and the destruction of six armored personnel carriers (APC). C/1-5 Inf (M) returned fire with organic weapons, aerial rocket artillery (ARA), a LFT and one artillery battery (211 HE rounds) resulting in 13 enemy soldiers killed.

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A large vehicle depot was located by C/2-22 Inf (M) at 1700 hours on 12 May 4 kilometers west of Treak (XU124114). Three 2½ ton trucks, eight 5 ton trucks, four small tractors, one Land Rover and 12X55 gallon drums were evacuated and 32 bicycles, two ¾ ton trucks, one VW sedan, one bulldozer and 200 pounds of bicycle parts were destroyed. A/2-22 Inf (M) located a large cache 100 meters northeast of the C/2-22 Inf (M) find (XU125115) at 1700 hours on 12 May. They destroyed 3100 AK47 rounds, 100X.22 caliber long rifle rounds, 18 RPG rounds, 20 ChiCom hand grenades, five AT mines, 80 tons of rice, three tons of wheat, one ton of barley, 1¼ tons of canned milk, two bicycles, four motorcycles, one ¼ ton truck, one 1.5 KW generator, one 8.5 KW generator, 550 gallons of kerosene, 10¼ tons of NVA uniforms, two civilian phones and two switchboards. Fifty-five pounds of medical supplies were evacuated to Tay Ninh.

Troop A, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav located a large weapons and munitions cache 2.5 kilometers southwest of Treak (XU138100) at 1610 hours on 12 May. Sixty-six rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition, nine RPG launchers and nine boosters, 69 ChiCom hand grenades, eight AT mines, 15X3.5 inch rockets, 10,280 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition, 62,640 rounds of AK47 ammunition, 1550 rounds of carbine ammunition, 27X51mm rocket grenades, 10 flares, two cases of Russian grenade mines, 100 feet of detonating cord, 30 blasting caps, six pounds of TNT, eight RPD machine gun drums, 800 rounds of RPD ammunition, five pancake magazines, 20X.30 caliber machine guns, three BAR's, one RPD machine gun, one AK47 rifle, 86 M1 carbines, one 3.5 inch rocket launcher, two 81mm mortar tubes, one 60mm mortar tube, 17 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, nine RPG rounds and one mimeograph machine were evacuated.

An Air Force Forward Air Controller (FAC) with D/3-4 Cav engaged an unknown number of enemy at 1345 hours on 12 May with automatic weapons and airstrikes 1.4 kilometers northwest of Prey Samraeuy (WT865997) resulting in eight enemy soldiers killed. The enemy force returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties.

At 1030 hours on 12 May, C/2-47 Inf (M) engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers 1.3 kilometers west of Treak (XU150105) with organic weapons, a LFT and one artillery battery (141 rounds) resulting in nine enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured. One AK47 rifle, one SKS rifle and one K54 pistol were evacuated. A large cache was also discovered by C/2-47 Inf (M) at 1620 hours the same day 3.8 kilometers northwest of Treak (XU128115). Six cases of packs, 54X120mm rockets, 250 bangalore torpedoes, 190 claymore mines, 18 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition, 692 ChiCom hand grenades, 43 AT mines, 19X3.5 inch rockets, two Thompson sub-machine guns, 57,300 small arms rounds, 15 cases of land mine detonators, one case of telegraph keys, 2000 pounds of explosives, 10 pressure-type detonators and 72 flares were evacuated.

A helicopter gunship from C/3-17 Air Cav engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers 1.4 kilometers northwest of Prey Samraeuy (WT865998) with automatic weapons at 1200 hours on 12 May resulting in 14 enemy killed.

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Duong Van Hung, a member of the 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, 2nd Company, 44th Signal Battalion, J3 Signal Regiment, LBN86200, rallied to D/4-9 Inf at 0615 hours on 12 May 4 kilometers northeast of Saam (XU144150). He revealed that the COSVN Staff is made of 10 J Regiments: J1-Staff Section, J2-Military Intelligence, J3-Signal Section, J4-Personnel, J5-Engineer, J6-Recon, J7-Records, J8-Coding, J9-Rear Service, and J10-Chemical. The area of operations for all J elements is the entire Republic of South Vietnam. Hung stated that the J3 Signal Section consisted of three battalions, 40, 42 and 44 Signal Battalions. All COSVN Staff elements in Mimot District, Cambodia were connected to all units on the COSVN Staff. The 40 Sig Bn was responsible for wireless telegraphic communications between COSVN and VC/NVA units in South Vietnam and North Vietnam. The 42 Sig Bn's mission was to provide radio communications between COSVN elements and VC/NVA units in South Vietnam only. The 44 Sig Bn was responsible for sorting the mail and for telephone communications within the COSVN Staff elements. His unit, the 2nd Company, 44 Sig Bn had a strength of about 120 men and was equipped with a US TP-10 telephone which was used by the Company for communications with other elements of the Regiment and three model 252B ChiCom Field Switchboards which were used to maintain communications between different J elements. The location of the HQ sections of the J elements was on the Vietnamese/Cambodian border near Katum, South Vietnam and had been there since 1966 when he joined the 44 Sig Bn except from April 1969 to December 1969 when word was received from the J2 Military Intelligence Section that there would be possible B52 airstrikes on their location. Consequently, the J elements moved approximately 40 kilometers along the Cambodian border to avoid the strikes. In April 1970, word was again received from J2 MI about possible ground attacks against the Katum area so the J elements moved deep into Cambodia to Sa Son 3 Jungle, Mimot District, Kompong Cham Province. On 10 May, the units left this location and headed for Tuc Tum District, Khat Kham Chet Province, Cambodia. He stated that the J2 MI Section knew at least 24 hours prior to all B52 strikes and Allied ground attacks, that the attacks were coming and thus, the J elements could always leave the targeted area in time.

The search of Base Areas 354 and 707 and the suspected COSVN HQ area continued on 13 May with scattered contacts reported and limited rice and munitions caches located. There were two changes in task organization on 13 May. The 2nd Bn, 27th Inf went to the 3rd Brigade from the 2nd Brigade, and the 2nd Sqdn, 34th Armor left the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and was assigned to the 3rd Brigade.

At 1200 hours on 13 May, A/2-14 Inf located a 250-bed hospital 5.5 kilometers east of Tasous near the border (WT964725). Three hootches, two bunkers and one tunnel complex were destroyed.

Co C, 2nd Bn (M), 47th Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 3.8 kilometers northwest of Treak (XU128122) at 1530 hours on 13 May. C/2-47 Inf(M) returned fire with organic weapons and artillery resulting in five enemy killed. US casualties were two wounded.

A large rice cache consisting of 170 tons of rice in three hootches and

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three ChiCom carbines was located 4 kilometers southwest of Treak (XU124099) on 13 May at 1055 hours. The rice was evacuated to Thien Ngon and Tay Ninh.

At 1020 hours on 13 May, C/3-17 Air Cav engaged five enemy soldiers 5.5 kilometers northeast of Ta Am (WT958936) with automatic weapons resulting in five enemy killed.

On 14 May, the 1st Brigade withdrew from Base Area 354 and moved to Katum to relieve the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and begin operations in Base Area 353. The last elements withdrew from Base Area 354 at 1925 hours and Operation TOAN THANG 44 was terminated at 0600 hours on 15 May. The 2nd Brigade continued searching Base Area 707 and the suspected COSVN HQ area during the day and made preparations for executing Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with the 1st Brigade, to begin at 0600 hours on 15 May. The most significant activity of the day occurred at 0925 hours on 14 May when a UH1H from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company received .51 caliber machine gun fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 1.6 kilometers east of Tasak (WT967691). The UH1H caught fire and crashed, killing four US soldiers. The UH1H was completely destroyed.

Enemy activity in the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI remained at a low level during the week (8-14 May) as main force units avoided contact. SR-1 main force units experienced critical supply shortages due to the US/ARVN operations in Cambodia and were forced to rely on previously cached supplies to maintain offensive capabilities. Entry into Cambodia by Allied forces apparently necessitated those SR-2 subordinates in Cambodia to abandon their border sanctuaries and seek refuge deeper in that country. SR-2 units in South Vietnam were forced to remain there with their logistical lines severed rather than follow SR-2 HQ and Rear Service personnel into Cambodia and risk confrontation with Allied units there. This split of SR-2 forces should seriously hamper command and control of any contemplated offensive in the Republic of Vietnam. SR-3 forces continued to avoid contact during the week to conserve ammunition supplies that have been seriously reduced by Allied operations in Cambodia. The only offensive activity initiated by the enemy was small scale actions targeted against GVN Pacification Programs and limited attacks by fire against Allied installations. Eleven enemy soldiers were killed and one prisoner-of-war was captured in 13 separate contacts in the Division's TAOI during the week.

There were two shelling incidents reported in the Division's TAOI during the week. At 1825 hours on 8 May, Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT4947) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from the northwest resulting in five US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned with a LFT and artillery with unknown results. The 2nd Bn, 12th Inf in Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT492475) received 10 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire from suspected grid XT512429 on 13 May at 1924 hours. Fire was returned by artillery with unknown results. Three US soldiers were wounded, one building suffered heavy damage, one UH1H suffered light damage and one LOH suffered light damage.

A UH1H helicopter from the 25th Avn Bn received small arms fire from an

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unknown number of enemy 5 kilometers south of Bau Tram in War Zone C (XT496-714) at 0510 hours on 8 May. The UH1H crashed and was destroyed, killing three and wounding one US soldier.

Special Colonel Chulsawasdi Sumon of the Royal Thai Army visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 9 May to discuss and observe prisoner-of-war operations in the 25th Infantry Division. On 12 May, the Gerbert Special Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee visited Cu Chi Base Camp to converse informally with Field Grade Officers and Enlisted Men assigned to combat units to determine the effect of the Song My Trial and sentence on the morale of the Officer Corps and discipline within the Army. Mr. David R. Israel (GS-18), Deputy Director for Engineering Defense Communications Planning Group visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 14 May to coordinate DCPG matters.

There were 48 contacts with enemy forces in Cambodia during the third week of May (15-21 May) resulting in 67 enemy soldiers killed and four prisoners-of-war captured.

The 1st Brigade began Operation TOAN THANG 43, Phase III with four battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province on 15 May. The 11th ARVN Abn Bn went from the 3rd to the 1st Brigade and the 1st Sqdn, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment became OPCON to the 1st Brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) on 15 May. The 2nd Brigade began Operation TOAN THANG 43, Phase III and continued to search Base Area 707 and the suspected COSVN HQ area. Contact was light but there was an increased number of mining incidents reported in the 2nd Brigade's area. There was one significant shelling incident reported on 15 May. At 2155 hours, an NDP of Trp B, 1st Sqdn, 11th ACR 100 meters north of Kantout (XU361144) received an unknown number of 82mm mortar and RPG rounds from an unknown number of enemy to the south of the NDP resulting in three US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons until 2210 hours when contact was lost with unknown results.

The most significant contact of the day occurred at 1540 hours when the 1st Bn, 27th Inf with the 65th Engr Bn received an unknown number of RPG rounds from an unknown number of enemy 3 kilometers south of Xa Mat (XT076869) resulting in two US soldiers killed, six wounded and heavy damage to one 5 ton truck, one 2½ ton truck and one ¼ ton truck. Fire was returned with organic weapons with unknown results. A 200 ton rice cache was located by Trp B, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav 2.5 kilometers west of Treak (XU136105) at 1030 hours on 15 May. The rice was evacuated to the 3-4 Cav's CP.

There was light contact reported by 1st and 2nd Brigade forces in Cambodia on 16 May. Airstrikes and B52 strikes were flown against the suspected COSVN HQ area during the day.

The most significant action on 16 May occurred at 1340 hours when B/1-5 Inf (M) engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers with organic weapons, airstrikes, ARA, artillery and a LST 7.5 kilometers southwest of Mamit (XU247007) resulting in seven enemy killed. One sub-machine gun and three AK47 rifles were evacuated. US casualties were two killed and six wounded. A large training site and base area was located by A/3-22 Inf 9 kilometers

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southeast of Memut (XU372007) at 1130 hours. Eighteen bunkers, 12 structures, 2½ tons of rice, 100 pounds of salt, seven bicycles, six 60mm mortar rounds and three ChiCom hand grenades were destroyed. C/3-17 Air Cav destroyed a cache consisting of an estimated eight tons of bagged rice 2 kilometers north of Choam Khsang (XU228178) with organic weapons and airstrikes at 1130 hours on 16 May.

The 1st Brigade continued operating in north central Tay Ninh Province on 17 May. Light contacts were reported and a few small caches were located. The 2nd Brigade continued to operate in northwest Tay Ninh Province with light contacts reported and a few small caches located.

Two large communications equipment caches were located 7.5 kilometers southwest of Memut (XU245008) by A/1-5 Inf (M) on 17 May. At 1230 hours, a cache consisting of two US generators #65, four US generators #EW-58-14, two US generators #6-43-6, one unknown type US generator, 17 ChiCom generators #641, one US generator #G-JB/TRC-7, 20 generator seats, 23 ChiCom AM radios, two US radios #PY/88/GRD, two ChiCom UHF radios, nine ChiCom radios of an unknown type, 10 radios #BC-1356, two automobile batteries, three US PRC-25 radios, 30 US PRC-10 radios, 209 radio cases, 61 radio receivers FM monitors, 100 pounds of commo wire, 47 five-gallon cans of miscellaneous electrical equipment and parts, two TA312 telephones, one intercom set with six stations, eight ChiCom field tables, 10 ChiCom field telephones, 33 ChiCom voltage meters, 75 telephone hand sets, one set of scales, one tape recorder with ½ reel of tape containing patriotic songs, one metal lathe #21280, six EE8 field phones, nine AN/GRG-9 receiver transmitters, two ChiCom D81 dry cell batteries, one ChiCom D63 dry cell battery, two bags of sending keys, one bag of headsets, one ChiCom claymore mine, five pounds of documents and 16 tons of rice was evacuated to Katum. The cache had been in place from two to three years and about 50% of it was in useable condition. One hundred and thirty-five bunkers, 57 hootches, 10 classrooms and four bicycles were destroyed. Five enemy soldiers were killed by A/1-5 Inf (M) in the cache area. At 1400 hours, a weapons and munitions cache was located 400 meters southwest of the earlier find (XU242007) by A/1-5 Inf (M). Ninety pounds of documents, one Olympia typewriter in poor condition, six rifle grenades, 14 crimp cartridges, six machine gun canisters, 100 small arms rounds, 13 rubber stamps with pads, four 7.62 RPD machine guns, 10 pounds of medical supplies, one Russian sub-machine gun and three pounds of peanuts were evacuated. The cache was approximately two to three months old and was in excellent condition. Twenty-five bunkers were also destroyed.

Co C, 1st Bn, 27th Inf located and destroyed 10 houses which appeared to be used as a hospital 6 kilometers north of Ta Am (WT923957) at 1426 hours on 17 May. Evacuated to Thien Ngon were two books with names of personnel and patients treated, one booklet of medical receipts and 9½ tons of rice. D/1-27 Inf received small arms fire from five - six enemy 6.5 kilometers northeast of Ta Am (WT970940) at 0930 hours on 17 May but there were no US casualties. Fire was returned with organic weapons until 0940 hours when contact was lost resulting in one Hoi Chanh with an AK47 rifle received. The Hoi Chanh led D/1-27 Inf to a 60-ton rice cache which was located 300 meters northwest of

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the contact site. The rice cache was evacuated to Thien Ngon.

Another small cache in good condition was located by D/4-9 Inf 3 kilometers southwest of Treak (XU134096) at 1530 hours on 17 May. Five ChiCom radios, three hand-powered generators, 20 pounds of documents, 4000 small arms rounds, one ChiCom hand grenade, two tons of rice, two barrels of fish, one RPG round, 10 miles of commo wire and one ChiCom telephone were evacuated to Thien Ngon. Six bunkers were also destroyed.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued to operate in north central Tay Ninh Province and a portion of Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia on 18 May. Light contact was reported and two large caches were located. On 18 May, the 2nd Bn, 12th Inf and the 2nd Bn, 14th Inf exchanged places, with the 2-14 Inf moving to the 3rd Brigade and the 2-12 Inf moving to the 1st Brigade.

At 1330 hours, Sct/1-5 Inf (M) located a cache 400 meters northwest of Romeas Chol (XU249016). Forty bunkers, 10 hootches and two mess halls were destroyed. Four tons of rice, 60 pounds of documents, two SKS rifles, two US carbines, one M60 machine gun, one ChiCom sub-machine gun, one AK47 rifle, 25  $\frac{1}{4}$ -pound blocks of TNT, 3500 small arms rounds, 10 ChiCom AT mines, five machetes, one voltmeter, two hand grenades, one field phone, nine pressure fuses, five rolls of plastic, four sub-machine gun magazines, two carbine magazines, eight shovel heads, five pick heads, and one protective mask were evacuated. The captured documents identified the H19 Signal School Office, Military Staff Dept., COSVN. The destruction of this school, which provided trained signal personnel to a variety of units, adversely affected the Communist signal capability throughout the II FFV AO.

B/1-11 Arm Cav Regt located a hole 9.5 kilometers northeast of Memut (XU370127) at 1345 hours on 18 May, containing one Thompson sub-machine gun, one BAR, six SKS rifles, 719 small arms rounds, one RPG round, and 75 pounds of rice. The weapons, well oiled, wrapped in plastic and in good condition, were evacuated to Katum.

At 1420 hours on 18 May, A/4-9 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 3 kilometers east of Saam (XU144032) with organic weapons and airstrikes resulting in three enemy killed. Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier. Three hootches and one .51 caliber position were destroyed. A/3-4 Cav and D/4-9 Inf, led by a Hoi Chanh, located a cache covered with tin sheets 3.2 kilometers northwest of Treak (XU133124) at 1230 hours. They evacuated to FSB Daon 385 RPG rounds, 368 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 690 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, 163 rounds of 122mm rockets, 309 sticks of ChiCom TNT, 509 rifle grenades, 13X75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 720 small arms rounds, 20 ChiCom machine guns and one heavy duty welder. A possible grenade factory was also located.

The most significant ground contact of the day occurred at 1725 hours when C/2-22 Inf (M) engaged an unknown number of enemy 8.5 kilometers northwest of Krek (WU945053) with organic weapons, a LFT, a flareship, Shadow, two airstrikes and three artillery batteries (162 rounds of

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illumination, 578 rounds of HE) resulting in seven enemy killed and one RPG launcher evacuated. The enemy returned fire with small arms, RPG and mortar fire until 1935 hours when contact was lost. US casualties were three killed, three wounded and light damage to one APC.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching for enemy caches in Base Areas 707 and 353 on 19 May. Contacts were scattered that day with a few caches located and buildings destroyed.

Co B, 2nd Bn, 12th Inf destroyed 93 bunkers, 15 fighting positions, miscellaneous cooking utensils and clothing, 120 small arms rounds, one NVA helmet, one briefcase, one shovel, one pick and 300 feet of commo wire 2.8 kilometers southwest of Memut (vic XU287036) in three separate finds at 1330, 1500 and 1530 hours on 19 May.

A hospital complex consisting of 130-150 bunkers, 50 hootches and three kitchens was located by A/1-5 Inf (M) 4 kilometers west of Sotey (XT233986) at 1015 hours on 19 May. The complex was destroyed and 10 pounds of documents and 900 pounds of bagged rice were evacuated. Another hospital complex, consisting of 10 bamboo hootches and five bunkers, was located 9 kilometers southeast of Memut (XU370001) at 1840 hours by B/3-22 Inf. The complex was destroyed and 25 pounds of documents and 10 pounds of supplies were evacuated.

Two caches were located by SCT/1-5 Inf (M) between the villages of Khley and Romeas Chol (XU243016 and XU235020) on 19 May. At 0900 hours, a cache was located in bunkers and hootches consisting of 545 pounds of rice and 10 pounds of documents. The documents and 365 pounds of rice were evacuated. Twenty bunkers, 15 hootches and 180 pounds of rice were destroyed. At 1300 hours a cache consisting of 30 pounds of commo wire, two intercom control boxes, one ChiCom field phone, one US EE8 phone, 10 pounds of miscellaneous pieces of cookware, two propaganda banners, two US claymore mines and 11 tons of bagged rice was located and evacuated. Four hootches, five bunkers and three bicycles were also destroyed.

The most significant contact of the day occurred at 2145 hours, when a NDP of C/4-9 Inf 1 kilometer east of Aaam (XU125030) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy resulting in two US soldiers killed and eight wounded. The US forces returned fire with organic weapons, Shadow, LFT and artillery with unknown results until 2155 hours when contact was lost.

At 1310 hours on 19 May, a helicopter gunship from C/3-17 Air Cav observed an NVA motor pool 5 kilometers northwest of Treak (XU125137). The helicopter engaged the site with organic weapons resulting in the destruction of five 2½ ton trucks, three hootches and one bunker.

On 20 May, the 1st and 2nd Brigades continued their search operations in Base Areas 707 and 353. Contact was light and scattered and there were a few small caches discovered.

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Co A, 2nd Bn, 12th Inf located four hootches and three bunkers 3 kilometers southeast of Chan Mul (XT381984) at 1230 hours on 20 May. One sewing machine, 10 pounds of medical supplies, one roll of screen wire, 100 pounds of copper, 610 rounds of small arms ammunition, two pounds of documents, 19 rolls of plastic, 40 pounds of salt, 100 pounds of rice, seven bicycles, two rifle grenades, and six shovels were evacuated and the hootches and bunkers were destroyed. At 1250 hours, A/2-12 Inf located and destroyed 20 hootches and two messhalls 1.1 kilometers southwest of the 1230 hours find (XT373976). Three tons of bagged rice, 100 pounds of sugar, one SKS rifle,  $\frac{1}{4}$  pound of C4, six hand grenades, 20 blasting caps, three AT mines, one electric blasting cap, 120 small arms rounds and five pounds of documents were evacuated. A/2-12 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy at 1330 hours on 20 May with organic weapons and a LFT 300 meters north of the 1230 hours cache site (XT381987) resulting in three enemy killed. One RPG launcher and one AK47 rifle were evacuated. The enemy force returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties.

The most significant contact of the day occurred at 0955 hours when A/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy in bunkers 4 kilometers southeast of Dar (XU223003). Fire was returned with organic weapons, LFT, Flame Eath, airstrikes and artillery resulting in six enemy soldier killed. US casualties were two killed and five wounded. One SKS rifle, seven RPG rounds and  $\frac{1}{4}$  pound of documents were evacuated. In a contact at 1545 hours on 20 May, D/4-9 Inf killed one enemy soldier and captured one prisoner-of-war and one civilian detainee 4 kilometers northwest of Treak (XU128124). One .30 caliber machine gun with 2000 rounds and one 7.62 machine gun with 2000 rounds were evacuated.

Recon/1-27 Inf, reacting to civilian intelligence, located a weapons cache 2 kilometers west of Xa Mat (XT053899). One .50 caliber machine gun, one 7.62 Russian machine gun, one .30 caliber machine gun, one box of mortar fuses, 160 ChiCom hand grenades, four unknown type land mines, 75X57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 35X60mm mortar rounds, three 82mm mortar rounds, 2750 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition, 74 RPG rounds, 51 RPG boosters and 18 ChiCom claymore mines were evacuated.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching for enemy caches and training sites in Base Areas 707 and 353 on 21 May. Contact was light and there were several small caches located. On 21 May, 1-5 Inf (M) and 4-23 Inf (M) switched Brigades; 1-5 Inf (M) moving to the 3rd Brigade and 4-23 Inf (M) moving to the 1st Brigade.

Co A, 2nd Bn, 12th Inf destroyed 15 buildings, 25 bunkers, 100 small arms rounds, two ChiCom hand grenades and five tons of rice in three separate locations (XT369979, XT374923, XT374973) approximately 8 kilometers northeast of Katum at 1130, 1135 and 1150 hours on 21 May. Two pounds of documents, 800 pounds of rice, 1500 small arms rounds and three ChiCom hand grenades were evacuated to Katum. B/2-12 Inf destroyed 46 barracks 1.6 kilometers south of Memut (XU303044) at 1145 hours on 21 May. Two RPG rounds with boosters, three pounds of documents, one shovel, eight ChiCom hand grenades

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and 1500 rounds of AK47 ammunition were evacuated to Katum. At 1810 hours on 21 May, A/1-27 Inf destroyed 30 hootches with barracks, two ChiCom claymore mines, 8800 AK47 rounds,  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton of rice and two training charts 2 kilometers west-southwest of Xa Mat (XT057891).

There were three significant contacts reported on 21 May in Cambodia. HHG/2-22 Inf (M) received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers at 0855 hours 200 meters southeast of Ta Am (WT923895) resulting in four US soldiers wounded and one Kit Carson Scout wounded. The US force returned fire with organic weapons until 0915 hours when contact was lost resulting in five enemy KIA (BU). Two RPG rounds and  $\frac{1}{4}$  pound of documents were evacuated from the contact site. A helicopter gunship from C/3-17 Air Cav received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers in five vehicles 1.3 kilometers north of Kouk Srok (WU902226) at 1200 hours. The gunship returned fire with organic weapons resulting in 15 enemy soldiers killed and two  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks, two  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks and one  $3/4$ -ton truck destroyed. Also, a secondary explosion was observed in a hut near the contact site. At 1530 hours, an OH6A helicopter from D/3-4 Cav received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 500 meters east of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT395945) while traveling at an altitude of 50 feet and a speed of 50 knots. Fire was returned with helicopter gunships and Mini Cav with unknown results. The OH6A helicopter incurred heavy damage and was shot down resulting in one US soldier killed and two wounded.

Enemy initiated activity in the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI remained at a low level during the week (15-21 May) as main force units tried to conserve their supplies which were difficult to acquire due to Allied operations in Cambodia. Indirect fire attacks were extremely light and scattered throughout the TAOI, probably due to a loss of easy access to resupply points in Cambodia. Enemy movement was detected in the area north of Trung Lap and along the MR-2/SR-2 boundary from the Parrot's Beak down into SR-3. Also, there was a decrease in the number of mines and boobytraps detonated by the 25th Infantry Division soldiers during the week.

Activity in SR-1 during the week was at an extremely low level as main force units successfully avoided contact while continuing their efforts to replenish logistical and personnel losses and in some cases redeploy their units. Activity within SR-2 continued at a low level this week as main force units were forced to split into smaller groups to evade US/ARVN penetrations into Cambodia. Units within SR-2 chose to evade US/ARVN operations rather than redeploy deeper into Cambodia. In SR-3, enemy activity remained at a low level during the week as Allied operations in Cambodia disrupted rear services and headquarters activities and forced the movement of SR-3 Headquarters.

There were 20 contacts with enemy soldiers in the Division's TAOI during the week (15-21 May) which resulted in 13 enemy soldiers killed and three prisoners-of-war captured. Two significant shelling incidents were reported during the week. The 2nd Bn, 12th Inf at Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT4947) received 16 rounds of 120mm mortar fire from XT478529, XT484517 and XT490511 at 1930 hours on 17 May resulting in light damage to one  $3/4$ -ton truck and heavy damage



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to one low boy truck. Fire was returned with a LFT and artillery with unknown results. There were no US casualties. At 0145 hours on 18 May, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf FDC 2 kilometers west of Bao Trai (XT527044) received two 107mm rockets resulting in heavy damage to one building. Fire was returned by artillery with unknown results. There were no US casualties.

An LST from D/3-4 Cav engaged five enemy 4 kilometers southeast of Ben Suc (XT611318) with organic weapons and artillery at 1105 hours on 17 May resulting in one enemy killed. The enemy soldiers returned fire with small arms but there were no hits to the helicopters and no US casualties. One AK47 rifle and four pounds of clothing were evacuated.

D/5-60 Inf located an old cache uncovered by a 16 May airstrike 13 kilometers west of Minh Thanh at 1525 hours on 17 May. Five 60mm mortar rounds, 1500 small arms rounds, 402X82mm mortar rounds, 11 cans of fuse devices, and 11 B40 rocket rounds were destroyed. One SKS rifle was evacuated.

Recon/2-60 Inf engaged four enemy 2.5 kilometers north of Tan Tru (XS680652) with organic weapons and a LFT at 1950 hours on 20 May resulting in three enemy killed. Two AK47 rifles were evacuated. The enemy force returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties.

11C Nguyen Van Nang, Deputy Commander of SR-2, rallied to the GVN in Tay Ninh Province on 20 May. He stated that the communists were planning a general offensive in SVN similar to that of Tet 1968 (possibly the enemy's aborted X Campaign) but that with the change of government in Cambodia, SR-2 was ordered by COSVN to divert offensive activity to Cambodia with the objective of restoring Sihanouk to power. SR-2 forces were to attack Cambodian installations in Svay Rieng Province on 1 May, while the 9th Division was to occupy the Province capital and the 7th Division was to occupy Prey Vieng Province by the end of the day. The two divisions were to seize all vehicles and move to attack Pnom Penh and the area to the north on 3 May. The initiation of Allied cross-border operations on 29 April to 4 May forced the abandonment of this plan and the assumption of a defensive posture. During the first phase of the Allied attacks, COSVN had ordered the Sub-region to remove all caches from Ba Thu, Cambodia and avoid contact with Allied forces. Neither of these missions were completed successfully as Nang stated that 100% of the caches were captured while Sub-region forces suffered serious losses. Nang further stated that word was passed from COSVN to subordinate units to expect an Allied offensive into Cambodian sanctuaries and that approximately 30% of the NVA soldiers assigned to SR-2 began to openly agitate about returning home. Eight hundred men refused to fight, including six battalion commanders and four company commanders, and COSVN directed that they be sent back to rear echelons at the end of April. Also, prior to 19 May, the 2642 Battalion Commanding Officer left his unit and returned home while eight NVA cadre at battalion and company level deserted during 10-20 May, stating that they wanted to return north.

There were 78 contacts with enemy force in Cambodia during the fourth week of May (22-31 May) resulting in 82 enemy soldiers killed and one prisoner-

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of-war captured. Many enemy caches were located in searches of Base Areas and contact sites.

The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with four battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province and a portion of Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia on 22 May. The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with five battalions operating in northwest Tay Ninh Province and a portion of Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia. The 2nd Bn, 60th Inf went from OPCON to 3-9 Infantry Division to OPCON to the 1st Bde on 22 May. Base Areas 707, 353 and the suspected COSVN HQ area were searched by 1st and 2nd Bde forces during the day with light contact reported.

Snipers from the 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 9.5 kilometers east of Memut (XU396059) at 1850 hours on 22 May. The snipers returned fire with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed and two AK47 rifles evacuated. A/4-23 Inf (M) received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 9 kilometers southwest of Memut (XT236995) at 1052 hours on 22 May resulting in three US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery resulting in three enemy killed and one wounded prisoner-of-war captured. One ChiCom light machine gun with three magazines, three AK47 rifles, two ChiCom hand grenades, 120 rounds of K54 ammunition, six ChiCom canteens, one pound of medical supplies, seven pounds of documents, two machetes, 18 pounds of clothing and 1½ tons of rice were evacuated to Katum. A small food and weapons cache was located by C/4-23 Inf (M) in hootches and bunkers 800 meters southwest of the A/4-23 Inf (M) contact site (XT230990) at 1230 hours on 22 May. Eight hootches, four bunkers, and 300 pounds of rice were destroyed. They evacuated 24X40 pound bags of cloth and clothing, one sewing machine, a small amount of medical supplies, one bicycle, one set of hairclippers, 300 pounds of bagged rice, one ChiCom sub-machine gun, one RPG round and six rucksacks.

The most significant action of the day occurred at 0655 hours when C/2-22 Inf (M) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 2 kilometers south of Ta Am (WT920875). Fire was returned with organic weapons, a LFT and an Air Force FAC resulting in two enemy killed. Six US soldiers were killed, nine wounded, two APC's were a combat loss and one APC was heavily damaged in the contact. In another contact, two enemy soldiers were killed by an OH6A helicopter from A/3-17 Air Cav at 0820 hours 2 kilometers north of Trapeang Srange (WU927221).

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 707 and 353 on 23 May. There were two significant contacts reported and one cache found.

Small arms and RPG fire were received by A/C/4-23 Inf (M) at 1745 hours on 23 May 9.4 kilometers southwest of Memut (XU225005). Fire was returned with organic weapons and a LFT resulting in five enemy killed. The contact ended at 1910 hours with one US soldier killed, nine wounded and one APC damaged by an RPG round. An LOH from B/3-17 Air Cav received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 1.5 kilometers west of Kandaol Chrum (WU8407). Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in eight enemy soldiers killed.

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A cache was located by A/4-23 Inf (M) at 1550 hours on 23 May 2 kilometers south of Kley (XT225998). Fifty barrels and 20 hootches were destroyed. Miscellaneous cooking utensils, two tape recorders, 6.8 tons of rice, IBM printout sheets, 30 pounds of documents and unknown type equipment were evacuated.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 707 and 353 on 24 May. Contact was light and scattered during the day with three significant caches located.

A/4-23 Inf (M) received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 100 meters south of Khley (XU225014) at 1105 hours on 24 May. Fire was returned with organic weapons, a LFT, two artillery batteries (375 rounds) and a flame track resulting in eight enemy KIA (EC). A flame track detonated a mine during the contact resulting in heavy damage. At 1030 hours on 24 May, A/4-9 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 4 kilometers south of Ampuk (XT100990). Fire was returned with organic weapons and a LFT resulting in three enemy soldiers killed. Contact was lost at 1040 hours with two US soldiers wounded.

A large amount of rice in barrels, 600 shirts, 200 pants, one civilian truck and one motorbike were evacuated by C/2-60 Inf from two locations 3.5 kilometers northeast of Memut (XU323084 and XU327085) at 0930 and 0950 hours on 24 May. A/2-22 Inf (M) located a rice cache 400 meters north of Krabau (WT327085) at 1510 hours on 24 May. Thirty-six tons of rice were destroyed and six tons of rice were evacuated to Thien Ngor. Three large engines of unknown type weighing approximately 600 pounds each were located by C/2-22 Inf (M) 2.2 kilometers south of Anlung Chrey (WT909833) at 1340 hours on 24 May.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching for enemy caches in Base Areas 707 and 353 on 25 May. Contact was scattered with four significant caches located.

D/3-22 Inf engaged three to four enemy with organic weapons and a LFT 7.5 kilometers northeast of Memut (XU371090) at 0720 hours on 25 May resulting in two enemy killed. The enemy returned fire with small arms until 0730 hours but there were no US casualties. One AK47 rifle, 150X.51 caliber rounds, three RPG rounds, assorted clothing, one pound of medical supplies, one NVA shovel, three ChiCom hand grenades, one poncho and  $\frac{1}{4}$  pound of documents were evacuated to Katum. Two enemy soldiers were killed by A/2-60 Inf 500 meters south of Memong (XU287103) at 1420 hours on 25 May. Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier. B/1-27 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 6.5 kilometers east of Trapeang Phlong (WT989907) at 1050 hours on 25 May resulting in two US soldiers killed and 10 wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons, LFT, helicopter gunships, FAC and an LST with unknown results.

Two significant caches were located by B/2-12 Inf on 25 May in an area approximately 1.2 kilometers north of Choam, Cambodia. The first cache was in the vicinity of XT384975 and contained nine five gallon cans of medical supplies,

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21 cans of vitamins, 10 pounds of documents, 11 tons of rice in 100 kilogram bags, two medical masks, 25 pounds of plastic medical tubes, 160 M60 rounds, one 18 inch ChiCom claymore mine and five steel pots. The munitions were destroyed while the rest of the cache was evacuated. The second cache was in the vicinity of XT385977 and contained 150 five gallon cans of assorted medical supplies, two boxes of vitamin C tablets, seven cans of unknown type powder, two sewing machines, one NVA rucksack, one circular type saw, one US entrenching tool, one large shovel, one hoe, one pistol belt with harness, one ammunition can with medical books inside, nine five gallon cans of documents, four surgical masks, 10 pounds of surgical instruments, four measuring vials, five 100 pound sacks of gauze pads, 25X100 pound bags of bed linen, 14X100 pound bags of bandages, one 100 pound bag of medical patches with unknown type ointment, 100 pounds of tobacco, 200 pounds of rolled cotton, 100 pounds of 3' by 5' plastic bags, 125 one gallon cans of assorted plastic sheets, 1000 feet of commo wire, 25 pounds of assorted pots and pans, seven bicycles, three bike tire pumps, eight rolls of black plastic, 20 M16 magazines, one microscope, two AP mines, two ChiCom hand grenades, 20 tons of rice and miscellaneous documents and medical supplies. The munitions were destroyed while the rest of the cache was evacuated to Katum.

A small cache was located by A/2-60 Inf 1 kilometer southwest of Memong (XU282103) at 1415 hours on 25 May. Eight AK47 rifles, 3200 pounds of rice, eight sandals, one .22 caliber rifle, five ponchos, six hammocks, and 15 ChiCom hand grenades were evacuated. Another cache was located at 1310 hours on 25 May in an area approximately 1.5 kilometers south of Khley (XU2201) by C/4-23 Inf (M). Six tons of rice in bags, three ChiCom carbines, two SKS rifles, two British Enfield rifles, one M14 rifle, three unknown type rifles, one ChiCom light machine gun, one carbine rifle barrel, 12 M14 magazines, 260 small arms rounds, three RPG boosters, one hand grenade, one rifle grenade launcher, three light machine gun magazines, one back pack in fair condition, one medical bag, 20 pounds of documents and five pounds of medical supplies were evacuated.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 707 and 353 on 26 May. Contact was light and scattered with one significant cache located.

Small arms fire was received by D/3-22 Inf from an unknown number of enemy 1.5 kilometers north of Khcheay (XU394087) at 0700 hours on 26 May. Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery with unknown results until 0710 hours when contact was lost. Contact was regained at 0930 hours when D/3-22 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy. Fire was returned with organic weapons and LFT resulting in seven enemy killed. One US soldier was wounded in the action. A NDP of A/2-60 Inf located 200 meters southwest of Memong (XU288106) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy at 0440 hours on 26 May resulting in four US killed and 21 wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, aerial rocket artillery (ARA), a LFT, Shadow and a Night Hawk with unknown results. B/2 12 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 1.2 kilometers north of Choam (XT394975) at 1715 hours on 26

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May resulting in one U.S. killed and five wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, a LFT, and a Command and Control ship with unknown results.

A cache consisting of three ammunition boxes of documents and maps was located by 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry with CIDG forces 5 kilometers west of Trapeang Phlong (XT033884) at 16:00 hours on 26 May. The documents identified the 180th Armored Security Regiment. A/1-27 Inf destroyed 7 bunkers, three hootches, one messhall and one classroom 4.5 kilometers west of Trapeang Phlong (XT033884) at 0730 hours on 26 May.

On 27 May, the 1st and 2nd Brigades continued Phase III of Operation TOAN THANG 43 in northwest and north central Tay Ninh Province and Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia. Contact was scattered and light with three caches located.

At 1645 hours on 27 May, Recon/2-12 Inf engaged three enemy soldiers 1 kilometer south of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT392936) with organic weapons resulting in two enemy killed. Two AK 47 rifles, three AK47 magazines and one ChiCom sub-machine gun were evacuated from the contact site. A convoy from II FFV Artillery received small arms and RPG fire while passing through the 25th Infantry Division's AO about 1.7 kilometers northeast of Khcheay (XU-407085) at 1810 hours on 27 May. Fire was returned with organic weapons and tanks with unknown results. Three U.S. soldiers were wounded and two tanks and one 5-ton truck suffered heavy damage in the attack. The most significant contact of the day occurred at 0815 hours when B/3-17 Air Cav with an Aero Rifle Platoon engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers 1.2 kilometers east of Kampong (WT795746) with organic weapons and an Air Force FAC resulting in six enemy soldiers killed (four BC to AF FAC). Enemy small arms fire wounded one U.S. soldier. An OH-6A helicopter from B/3-17 Air Cav suffered moderate damage when hit by automatic weapons fire 1.3 kilometers southwest of Popel (WT8473) at 1445 hours on 27 May.

One 1/2-ton truck (NVA) and one British Landrover were evacuated by HHC/3-22 Inf from a spot 400 meters southeast of Chan Mul (XT365993) at 1700 hours on 27 May. Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry destroyed a classroom, 23 RPG rounds with 10 boosters and six ChiCom hand grenades 2 kilometers southeast of Trapeang Rumseng (XT093963) at 1705 hours on 27 May. An unknown amount of documents and blackboards were evacuated from the site. B/3-17 Air Cav evacuated one U.S. .50 caliber machine gun with ammunition from a spot 2.8 kilometers west of Trapeang Pikar (WT832678) at 0905 hours on 27 May. B/2-12 Inf located eight bunkers and 29 tons of rice (7.5 tons had been destroyed by an air strike) 1 kilometer north of Choam (XT394975) at 1601 hours on 27 May. B/2-12 Inf destroyed the bunkers and evacuated the 21.5 tons of useable rice.

The search of Base Areas 707 and 353 was continued by the 1st and 2nd Brigades on 28 May with scattered contact reported. Many enemy bunkers were located and destroyed and four caches of significance were located.

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Three enemy soldiers were engaged in a woodline 4.5 kilometers northeast of Xa Mat (XT097933) by D/4-9 Inf at 0615 hours on 28 May with organic weapons, artillery, a LFT and airstrikes resulting in three enemy killed. Three AK47 rifles and five pounds of documents were evacuated. Enemy small arms fire killed two US soldiers and wounded seven. B/2-47 Inf (M) engaged 10-15 soldiers 6 kilometers northwest of Treak (XU131160) with organic weapons and artillery at 1745 hours on 28 May resulting in four enemy killed and two AK47 rifles evacuated.

Two caches were located by B/4-23 Inf (M) on 28 May. At 0846 hours, a number of bicycle trailers were destroyed and .2 tons of rice evacuated from a spot 4.5 kilometers west of Memut (XU260049). At 1000 hours, B/4-23 Inf (M) destroyed one mess hall, 12 hootches with tin roofs, five dud artillery rounds, four picks, two tables, one chicken house, one hog pen, one stove, six baskets, two batteries, one US claymore mine, 1 $\frac{1}{4}$  pounds of TNT, five ChiCom claymore mines, three rolls of ChiCom wire, one box of AK ammunition, one US hand grenade, four magazines, two NVA backpacks, two buckets, 200 rounds of AK ammunition, three US blasting caps and 12 pots and pans at a spot 300 meters north of the previous find (XU260052). Also, 45 tons of rice, two ponchos, one NVA shirt, one mosquito net and 10 pounds of documents were evacuated. Another cache was located by D/2-60 Inf 2 kilometers northeast of Memut (XU289078) at 1300 hours on 28 May. Destroyed were four hootches with plumbing and lighting, one bunker, an unknown amount of commo wire, medical supplies, 160 pounds of 60mm mortar, one 100 rifle rack, one battery, one bath tub, one toilet, a diagram of "How to Shoot Down an Aircraft", two generators, two mounts for a .50 or .51 caliber machine gun, 12 AP mines, 15 ChiCom hand grenades, eight AK magazines and 40 AK rounds. Three British Enfield rifles, one 7.5mm French rifle, one 16 gage double-barrel French shotgun, 10,000 small arms rounds, 40 pounds of documents, a VN I.D. card and an unknown amount of propaganda papers were evacuated. A/4-9 Inf destroyed 30 bunkers 1.7 kilometers east of Trapeang Rumseng (XT090963) at 1230 hours on 28 May. One .22 caliber rifle, 17 ChiCom rifle grenades, 60 rounds of SKS ammunition and four rounds of 60mm mortar were evacuated. Four bunkers with connecting wires were located by B/1-27 Inf 7 kilometers west of Xa Mat (XT010890) and destroyed at 1515 hours on 28 May. Evacuated from the site were one TA-312, one civilian radio, one PRC-9, one GRC-9, one metal case, one dial telephone, one case of terminals, two overlays of Tay Ninh, two rolls of film, one roll of recording tape, three cases of AK47 ammunition, .6 tons of rice and a small amount of flour and corn meal.

C/3-22 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 1.4 kilometers east of Phum Romduol (XT205984) at 1520 hours on 29 May resulting in four US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, a LFT and airstrikes with unknown results until 1552 hours when contact was lost. A/2-47 Inf (M) had two wounded at 1445 hours when an unknown size enemy force attacked with small arms and automatic weapons 2 kilometers west of Chamkor Caoutchouc Tabei (XU158161). US forces returned fire with organic weapons, artillery, a LFT and airstrikes resulting in one person detained. A UH1H helicopter from Co B, 25th Avn Bn received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 3.5 kilometers north of Memut (XU295098) at 1100 hours.

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One US soldier was wounded and the UH1H suffered light damage.

Forty bunkers with connecting tunnels, one roll of wire, three kitchens, one trench and a sapper training infiltration course were destroyed by A/2-12 Inf 1 kilometer south of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT393937) on 29 May at 1100 hours. Twelve bunkers and two kitchens 700 meters from the 1100 hours find (XT397943) were destroyed at 1250 hours by A/2-12 Inf. C/2-12 Inf destroyed 12 bunkers, 60 AK47 rounds, eight ChiCom hand grenades, one 60mm mortar round, three RPG rounds with two boosters, 12 magazines, 41 pounds of clothing and one bangalore torpedo 1.3 kilometers southeast of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT398-934) at 1430 hours on 29 May. Also, two tons of rice were evacuated. Thirty-five bunkers, two hootches, four ChiCom hand grenades, three 82mm mortar rounds, five RPG rounds, .1 ton of rice, 15 pounds of salt, one NVA helmet, one US claymore mine, and 40 practice grenades were located and destroyed by D/2-12 Inf at 1700 hours 800 meters southeast of the C/2-12 Inf find (XT402-931). Later, at 1830 hours, D/2-12 Inf located a rice cache 1 kilometer northwest of the 1700 hours find (XT392938). Ten tons of rice and three unknown type telephones were evacuated. Recon/2-12 Inf destroyed three bunkers at 1345 hours 600 meters north of the 1700 hours find by D/2-12 Inf. Also, 100 AK47 rounds, three ChiCom hand grenades,  $\frac{1}{2}$  pound of medical supplies, one RPG round,  $\frac{1}{2}$  pound of documents and one ton of rice were evacuated. Recon/2-12 Inf also destroyed 28 bunkers with connecting commo wire, 200 AK47 rounds, six ChiCom hand grenades, and one RPG round with boosters at 1740 hours 230 meters southwest of its previous find (XT400936). One K54 pistol with 30 rounds, 1.6 tons of rice,  $\frac{1}{2}$  pound of medical supplies and  $1\frac{1}{2}$  pounds of documents were evacuated.

A/4-23 Inf (M) destroyed 15 bunkers, two classrooms, two pounds of clothing, 10 AK47 rounds, one NVA canteen, 4.3 tons of rice and one ChiCom hand grenade and evacuated 6.4 tons of rice at 0920 hours on 29 May from a spot 1.4 kilometers south of Khley (XU224005). A hospital complex, four bunkers, 12 hootches, 550 small arms rounds and miscellaneous items were destroyed by B/4-23 Inf (M) 1.6 kilometers south of Romeas Chol (XU224007) at 1210 hours on 29 May. Also, an unknown amount of cooking utensils, two NVA backpacks, one flight helmet, eight machetes, one ChiCom field phone, one hammock, five pounds of medical supplies, and 60 pounds of documents were evacuated.

On 30 May, the 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base areas 707 and 353. Contact was light and scattered, while four significant caches were located.

An OH-58A from C/3-17 Air Cav received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 600 meters southwest of Long Phu (WT979585) at 1130 hours on 30 May resulting in three US soldiers wounded and heavy damage to the OH-58A helicopter. B/2-22 Inf (M) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 3 kilometers southeast of Saar (XU128-000) at 1325 hours on 30 May resulting in one US soldier killed, three wounded and heavy damage to one APC. Fire was returned with organic weapons and a LFT until 1335 hours when contact was lost with unknown results. Recon/3-22

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Inf, while pulling security for the 65th Engr Bn, received small arms fire from 25-35 enemy soldiers 1.8 kilometers northeast of Khcheay (XU407085) at 1520 hours on 30 May resulting in four US soldiers killed and two wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and a LFT resulting in five enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured. The enemy fled south on bicycles at 1550 hours when contact was lost. US materiel losses in the contact were one  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck heavily damaged, two M16 rifles missing in action and one M16 rifle destroyed.

At 1125 hours on 30 May, C/2-12 Inf evacuated one US .50 caliber machine gun, one .50 caliber machine gun barrel, one M60 machine gun barrel and one ton of rice from a site 500 meters north of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT390950). Recon/2-12 Inf destroyed 11 RPG rounds, four ChiCom rifle grenades, six 60mm mortar rounds, five ChiCom hand grenades and 75 pounds of unknown type explosives and evacuated one ChiCom sub-machine gun with 100 rounds of ammunition at 1330 hours 1.2 kilometers southeast of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT401939). C/4-23 Inf (M) evacuated 26 tons of rice and two pounds of documents at 0900 hours on 30 May 1.4 kilometers southeast of Khley (XU219007). At 1330 hours, B/1-27 Inf located a cache in bunkers and hootches 6.3 kilometers west of Xa Mat (XT013898). Ten bunkers and 20 hootches were destroyed. Two ChiCom hand grenades, one 3.5 rocket launcher, two ponchos, 25 pound of NVA uniforms, one clip of .30 caliber ammunition, 50 AK47 rounds, one sewing machine, .1 tons of rice, 50 pounds of bicycle parts, a small amount of chemistry equipment, two US packs, one VC pack, one US transistor radio and one set of dog tags were evacuated.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued their search of Base areas 707 and 353 on 31 May with only scattered contacts. There were three significant caches located during the day in Cambodia.

An artillery raid by 25th Infantry Division and II FFV artillery, one of the largest massed artillery barrages of the war to date, was fired on 31 May against 9th NVA division forces in their base camp in Base Area 354. For the operation, 16 howitzers from 1st Bn, 27th Arty (II FFV), 3rd Bn, 13th Arty (2nd Bde) and 7th Bn, 8th Arty (II FFV) road marched to a location  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles northwest of Thien Ngon (XT030784), while two sections from Battery C, 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty (II FFV) fired from their position at FSB Blaster. The firing lasted from 1000 hours to 1500 hours resulting in the expenditure of 3722 rounds. With the withdrawal of US troops from Base Area 354 on 14 May, elements of the 9th NVA Division moved back into the area. The artillery raid was conducted to prevent the enemy from re-establishing base areas and supply points along the border area, replenishing his lost supplies, and to annihilate as many enemy in the area in order to pre-empt any attacks against US troops in South Vietnam.

A/3-4 Cav engaged 15-20 enemy soldiers 2.5 kilometers northeast of Khcheay (XU375087) at 1706 hours on 31 May with organic weapons and a LST resulting in two enemy killed and two AK47 rifles evacuated. The enemy force withdrew to the northwest without returning fire. B/2-22 Inf (M) received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy at 1430 hours on 31 May 3.4 kilometers southeast of Saam (XT129993) resulting in

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three M16 rifles, three M79 grenade launchers, two ChiCom sub-machine guns, and one ChiCom light machine gun evacuated.

A training site was located by C/2-12 Inf 2 kilometers east of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XU408942) at 1515 hours on 31 May. Twenty bunkers, 25 hootches, .11 tons of rice, two blackboards, 24 magazines, eight 12 inch ChiCom claymores and four rifle grenades were destroyed. Evacuated were one SKS rifle, one M1 carbine, one .45 caliber pistol and 50 pounds of documents. B/2-60 Inf located two trucks in two separate locations (XU303110 and XU303107) about 5.2 kilometers south of Memut at 1125 and 1135 hours on 31 May. One  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton dark green truck with Chinese writing and one  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton blue-grey civilian truck, both well camouflaged and not recently driven, were destroyed. Recon/1-27 Inf located a bunker complex 500 meters southwest of Trapeang Phlong (XT0592) at 1745 hours on 31 May. Sixty-three bunkers, 15 FRC-25 batteries, one US canteen cup, one NVA canteen, two sets of fatigues, one US rain jacket and one detonating device were destroyed.

Enemy initiated activity in the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI increased slightly during the fourth week of May (22-31 May). Indirect fire attacks continued to be sporadic and were targeted against Allied fire support bases (FSB's) in Cambodia and northern War Zone C. Movement detected throughout the TAOI was light during the week. However, the most consistent movement was detected in the area north of Trung Lap and along the MR-7/SR-2 boundary. The number of mines and booby traps detonated by US troops showed a slight increase over the previous week.

Enemy activity in SR-1 was at a low level during the week as main and local force units attempted to avoid contact in order to obtain supplies which were increasingly hard to come by, due to Allied cross-border operations. Activity in SR-2 remained at a low level during the week as main force units split into smaller groups in order to evade ARVN units in the area. Main force units in SR-2 were forced to rely on local caches for food and supplies because of the Allied operations in Cambodia. Enemy activity within SR-3 remained at a low level during the week as main force units continued to operate in platoon-size elements in an effort to counter the GVN Pacification Program in Long An Province.

There were 31 contacts with enemy soldiers in the Division's TAOI during the week (22-31 May) which resulted in 17 enemy soldiers killed and two prisoners-of-war captured. Three shelling incidents were reported during the week. Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT491473) received nine 75mm recoilless rifle rounds from vic XT526479 at 1920 hours on 22 May. All nine rounds landed inside the wire causing four US soldier to be wounded. Artillery and a LFT returned fire to the suspected enemy position with unknown results. At 0125 hours on 29 May, Dau Tieng Base Camp received eight-nine 120mm mortar rounds from vic XT481513 resulting in one US soldier wounded. Fire was returned by artillery and helicopter gunships (Infant) with unknown results. B/2-14 Inf received six 82mm mortar rounds at 1930 hours and 15X82mm mortar rounds at 1950 hours on 31 May 8.5 kilometers southeast of Dau Tieng (XT570455) resulting in one US soldier killed and four wounded. Artillery and a LFT returned fire with unknown results.

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Two  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks from B/2-14 Inf received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 7 kilometers east of Go Dau Ha (XT461249) at 1010 hours on 22 May. The US forces did not return fire and suffered one wounded and light damage to one vehicle. A/2-27 Inf received two hand grenades from an unknown number of enemy soldiers 5 kilometers southeast of Trung Lap (XT629197) at 1935 hours on 22 May. The enemy force was engaged with organic weapons and a LFT resulting in one enemy killed. There were no US casualties.

On 24 May, an Air Force FAC engaged two enemy soldiers with an airstrike 9 kilometers north-northwest of Tan Hiep (XS436632) at 1323 hours resulting in two enemy KIA (BC). Co E (Ranger), 75th Inf swept the area and located a small cache. Sixteen bunkers were destroyed while three AK47 rifles, one RPG launcher, two backpacks, miscellaneous cooking gear, 1100 AK47 rounds, one pound of documents and two RPG rounds were evacuated to Tan An. One enemy soldier was engaged in a bunker near the cache site with organic weapons and killed. A UH1C helicopter from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company received small arms ground fire at 1427 hours on 24 May while inserting A/2-27 Inf 4 kilometers west of Ben Suc (vic XT555300). Fire was returned by organic weapons to the enemy's position. A sweep of the area located three enemy killed and ammunition. Ten hand grenades, 15 RPG rounds, three ponchos, 60 AK47 rounds, two hammocks and a small amount of documents were evacuated.

One prisoner-of-war was captured by A/2-27 Inf after an engagement on 25 May at 2055 hours with three to four enemy soldiers 4 kilometers south of Ben Suc (XT559300). The PW was evacuated to Cu Chi.

At 0120 hours on 27 May, A/2-27 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy soldiers 3 kilometers south of Ben Suc (XT567303) with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed. One AK47 rifle, one flashlight, one AK vest, one poncho liner, one ChiCom hand grenade and  $\frac{1}{4}$  pound of documents were evacuated. Later, at 0850 hours, A/2-27 Inf destroyed one CBU bomb,  $\frac{1}{4}$  pound of C-4, one vial of penicillin, and three NVA ponchos in a spot 1.3 kilometers southwest of the earlier find (XT555299). Team 22, Company E (Ranger), 75th Inf was inserted on an intelligence target 12.5 kilometers northwest of Tan An (XS461-737) at 1630 hours on 27 May and engaged four enemy soldiers with organic weapons and a LFT resulting in one enemy killed and one bunker and one cooking pot destroyed.

Two fire support bases in the Division's TAOI were the targets of enemy probes on 28 May. At 0135 hours, FSB Smith (XT563487) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers from the east and north-east resulting in six US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, a LFT, Night Hawk, Shadow and an Infant with unknown results. At 1838 hours, FSB Jamie (XT483716) received two RPG rounds resulting in one US soldier killed and one bunker destroyed. Fire was returned by mortar and a LFT with unknown results.

An F100 fighter plane from the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing located at Phan Rang received .51 caliber machine gun fire from an unknown number of

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enemy soldiers in an area just north of the Angel's Wing along the border (XT188267) at 1445 on 29 May. The plane crashed but the pilot ejected and was extracted from the crash site.

Colonel Harold B. Gibson, Jr., Commanding Officer, Saigon Support Command, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 28 May for an update briefing on the 25th Infantry Division's activities. On 29 May, Colonel James M. Connell assumed command of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

The 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division killed 999 and captured 49 of the enemy during the month of May, accounted for 499 individual weapons, 89 crew-served weapons and 1,414.56 tons of rice captured or destroyed. Division soldiers destroyed 68 mines and booby traps (not including those destroyed in caches) while detonating 73, resulting in two US soldiers killed and 99 wounded. In the area of pacification, the Division conducted 1080 MEDCAPs, ICAPs, NITECAPs and DENTCAPs during the month of May in which 40,296 patients were treated. The Division disseminated 4,050,00 leaflets in psychological operations during the month of May.

There were 49 contacts with enemy forces in Cambodia during the first week of June (1-7 June 1970) resulting in 48 enemy killed and seven prisoners-of-war captured.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III in north central and northwest Tay Ninh Province and a portion of Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia on 1 June 1970. The 1st Brigade operated with five maneuver battalions in Base Area 353 while the 2nd Brigade operated with four maneuver battalions in Base Area 707. There were nine ground contacts reported during the day but only five were significant. Two significant caches were located also.

Co C, 2nd Bn, 12th Inf engaged 10-15 enemy with organic weapons, artillery and a LFT at 1335 hours on 1 June 2 kilometers east of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT410947) resulting in one prisoner-of-war captured. One 60mm mortar round and two ChiCom hand grenades were destroyed. There were no US casualties in the engagement. Later, at 2230 hours, C/2-12 Inf engaged 6-7 enemy at the same spot as the earlier contact site with organic weapons resulting in one prisoner-of-war captured and one AK47 rifle evacuated. Contact was lost at 2235 hours with one US soldier wounded. A/3-4 Cav received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy at 1200 hours on 1 June 2.4 kilometers north of Khcheay (XU385095) resulting in one US soldier killed and four wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons and LFT until 1215 hours when contact was lost resulting in two enemy killed. At 1900 hours, A/3-4 Cav captured two prisoners-of-war 2.1 kilometers east-northeast of the 1200 hours contact site (XU403105). One .45 caliber pistol, one ChiCom hand grenade, one NVA pistol belt, one NVA helmet, one US protective mask, 70 small arms rounds, four backpacks, 5000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition and two tons of rice were evacuated. B/2-47 Inf (M) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 5.8 kilometers northwest of Treak (XU127149) at 1300 hours on 1 June resulting in three US wounded. Fire was returned with organic

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weapons and LFT until 1320 hours when contact was lost with unknown results. An OH58A helicopter from C/3-17 Air Cav received small arms fire from 8-10 enemy and made a forced landing 3 kilometers east of Koki (WT977656) at 1450 hours on 1 June. An LST returned fire on the enemy positions with unknown results. The OH58A was secured after landing and suffered only light damage. There were no US casualties.

A small communications cache was located by A/3-22 Inf at 1450 hours on 1 June 3.8 kilometers southwest of Khley (XT208982). Thirty bunkers, 20 hootches, and two 82mm mortar rounds were destroyed. Eleven unknown type field phones, 10,00 feet of commo wire, two intercom speakers and eight Chi-Com claymore mines were evacuated. A/4-9 Inf destroyed 17 bunkers, one typewriter, four NVA uniforms, eight dud 105mm rounds, 50 pounds of barley, 10 pounds of rice and six bicycles at a spot 4.2 kilometers south of Saam (XT106983) on 1 June at 1730 hours. A previously destroyed shower and latrine were also located. C/4-23 Inf (M) located 58.3 tons of rice in a cache 800 meters southwest of Khley (XU221010) on 1 June at 1200 hours. The rice was evacuated to Katum.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III on 2 June 1970. Contact was scattered with three significant caches located.

An unknown size enemy force was engaged by A/3-4 Cav at 0720 hours on 2 June 3 kilometers north of Kcheay (XU400105) with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed. Three bandoliers, 270 small arms rounds, five RPG rounds, three ChiCom hand grenades and two backpacks were evacuated from the contact site. At 1345 hours, B/2-60 Inf received small arms, RPG, 60mm mortar and .51 caliber machine gun fire from an unknown number of enemy in bunkers 2.2 kilometers northwest of Tumper (XU324137) resulting in four US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, LFT and air strikes with unknown results. The contact ended at 1400 hours but sporadic firing continued until 1800 hours that evening. Two US soldiers were killed and four wounded when B/2-22 Inf (M) received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 4 kilometers southeast of Saam (XT135993) at 2020 hours on 2 June. Fire was returned with organic weapons until 2025 hours with unknown results.

Nguyen Van Tao, a VC squad leader with the 3rd Plt, 87th Co rallied to HHG/4-23 Inf (M) on 2 June 2 kilometers northwest of Mimot (XU293077). The 87th Co was a newly formed unit which consisted of Cambodian soldiers and was responsible for disseminating propaganda throughout Mimot District. These newly formed units were probably subordinate to the Border Area Section of the Political Staff Department, COSVN which were charged with local force organization in border areas. He stated that the 87th Co consisted of approximately 125 personnel, of which only 75-80% were armed with AK47 rifles. The company had provided two platoons to act as a security element for the K71B Hospital which was located in the vic of XU329250 as of 23 May 1970 and contained about 500 wounded VC/NVA soldiers. He also stated that the new HQs area for the 7th VC/NVA were there. Part of this group was the 6th Gia Dinh Artillery Regiment whose mission was to provide security for the 7th

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Division HQ. He also identified the 82nd Rear Service Group which transported the rice for the men of the 7th Division. The 82d RSG carried enough rice for a three month supply and were forced to move all of it 400-600 meters every day to avoid Allied detection.

Troop B, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav located two small caches 2 kilometers north of Chan Mul (XU375014) on 2 June. One dud 500 pound bomb, 20 AK47 rounds and one ChiCom claymore mine were destroyed at 1050 hours. Thirty five bunkers were destroyed and three entrenching tools, 1000 feet of commo wire, two bicycles and  $\frac{1}{4}$  pound of documents were evacuated at 1137 hours. D/1-27 Inf evacuated one AK47 rifle, seven magazines, seven ChiCom hand grenades, 15 pounds of medical supplies, two ruck sacks, one pair of sandals, one five pound mine and one ChiCom mine from a site 5.5 kilometers east of Ta Am (WT955937) at 1028 hours. Fifteen bunkers, five hootches, 25 fighting positions and three magazines were destroyed. At 1845 hours, B/2-47 Inf (M) located 12 enemy killed 5.6 kilometers northwest of Treak (XU125148). Twenty five RPG rounds, 578 small arms rounds, 10 ChiCom hand grenades, one M1 carbine, 300 bottles of iodine and 10 pounds of documents were evacuated.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 in Cambodia on 3 June. Enemy movement remained at a low level in Cambodia thus contacts were light and scattered with four significant caches located.

Recon/2-12 Inf received small arms and RPG fire from 8-12 enemy 1.6 kilometers east of Choam (XT416958) at 1155 hours on 3 June resulting in two US killed and two wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons and LFT with unknown results. C/2-60 Inf received small arms, RPG and .51 caliber machine gun fire from an unknown number of enemy 2.2 kilometers east of Memong (XU321104) at 1028 hours on 3 June resulting in four US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and LFT until 1035 hours with unknown results. Later that day, at 1450, 1520 and 1730 hours, C/2-60 Inf received enemy small arms and mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force in an area about 1.2 kilometers southwest of Angkam (XU3214) resulting in five US soldiers wounded. A MEDEVAC helicopter sent in for a dustoff during the 1730 hours contact received small arms fire but took no hits. B/2-60 Inf engaged four enemy 400 meters north of the C/2-60 Inf's afternoon contact site (XU322144) at 1655 hours resulting in one enemy killed and one AK47 rifle evacuated. There was no enemy return fire and no US casualties. Recon/2-47 Inf (M) killed one enemy soldier with organic weapons at 1245 hours 4.5 kilometers southeast of Saam (XU155005) on 3 June. The contact had been initiated by 10 enemy using small arms but there were no US casualties.

D/2-12 Inf destroyed 606 chickens in cages, one bicycle, and 200 feet of nylon rope in a spot 3 kilometers east of Choam (XT416958) at 1130 hours on 3 June. They evacuated seven pounds of writing paper, two overlays of US units AO's, a notebook with artillery fire instructions and letters of commendation from 96th Artillery Regt, 69th Artillery Co. C/4-23 Inf (M) located a large rice cache in tin hootches 2.2 kilometers north of Memong

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(xu320123). They evacuated three M1 carbines, two Thompson sub-machine guns, 1000 AK47 rounds, two magazines, 20 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition and four 82mm mortar rounds from the site. At 1730 hours, B/2-47 Inf (M) destroyed 12 fighting positions, 126 small arms rounds and 150 vials of medicine at a spot 5 Kilometers northwest of Treak (XU126143). They evacuated 15 pounds of documents and one civilian radio.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 along the Cambodian border on 4 June 1970. Contact was light during the day with US units locating four significant caches.

At 1815 hours on 4 June, A/2-12 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 1.5 kilometers southeast of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT403940) resulting in two US soldiers killed. Fire was returned until 1935 hours with organic weapons, LFT and artillery with unknown results. An AH1G Cobra from A/3-17 Air Cav received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 700 meters south of Anlung Chrey (WT905849) at 1130 hours on 4 June. Fire was returned by an LST with unknown results. An OH58A helicopter in support of the operation, crashed and was destroyed resulting in two US soldiers killed. The cause of the crash was unknown. The most significant contact of the day occurred at 0850 hours when B/2-47 Inf (M), located 3 kilometers northeast of Treak (XU191120), received small arms, RPG and 60mm mortar fire from an unknown number of enemy resulting in seven US soldiers wounded and one APC heavily damaged. The US force returned fire with organic weapons, artillery, LFT and airstrikes resulting in three enemy killed.

From 0800 to 1300 hours on 4 June, C/4-23 Inf (M) apprehended one detainee with an unknown amount of ammunition; evacuated 2.2 tons of rice, five British Enfield rifles, and parts for an RC-292 antenna; and destroyed one hootch in an area 2 kilometers northwest and west of Memut (vic XU289071). D/2-60 Inf, while working in an area about 400 meters southwest of Memut (vic XU 296057), located three enemy arms and munitions caches and one detainee with a pack filled with a large amount of medical supplies. They evacuated 75 pounds of medical supplies (from a plantation building), six 3.5 inch rocket rounds, five ChiCom claymore mines, 500 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition, 15 ChiCom hand grenades, 273 rifle grenades, two 57mm recoilless rifles and three 60mm mortar rounds. They destroyed one hootch, two AT mines, four 60mm mortar rounds, four 82mm mortar rounds and 11,000 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition. B/4-9 Inf destroyed 38 bunkers, 38 structures, three wells, four chicken coops, three pig pens, one shower, one print shop and 55 gallons of ink at 1705 hours on 4 June 3.6 kilometers east of Trapeang Rumseng (XT108971). Five pounds of documents, one duplicating machine, a rheostat and radio chassis were evacuated from the site. B/1-27 Inf located a large enemy cache in bunkers and hootches 2.6 kilometers northeast of Ka San (WT961911) at 1500 hours on 4 June. They destroyed 20 bunkers, 40 structures, five bicycles, 300 small arms rounds, two RPG rounds, four hand grenades, three NVA rucksacks, 1500 meters of commo wire, one civilian transistor radio, one guitar, two SKS rifles, 1200 pounds of rice, two five gallon cans of gasoline and one 55 gallon drum of gasoline. Three pounds of medical supplies and 50 pounds of documents were evacuated.

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On 5 June, the 1st and 2nd Brigades continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III and searched Base Areas 353 and 707 looking for enemy supply depots and cache sites. Contact was heavier than the previous day with four significant caches located.

Two US soldiers were killed on 5 June at 1330 hours when A/2-12 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 4.3 kilometers east of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT433945). Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery with unknown results. A UH1H helicopter in the area received small arms fire but suffered no damage. B/4-23 Inf (M) engaged two enemy soldiers with organic weapons 2.8 kilometers north of Memong (XU288137) at 1430 hours on 5 June resulting in two enemy killed. They evacuated one RPG launcher, one AK47 rifle, three RPG rounds, two sets of web gear, two NVA uniforms in packs and  $\frac{1}{2}$  pound of documents. A NDP of A/2-12 Inf (M) 2.5 kilometers west of Krak (WU997017) received small arms, automatic weapons and fifty 60mm mortar rounds at 0445 hours on 5 June resulting in five US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, LFT and one artillery battery (71 rounds HE) resulting in four enemy killed. Later, at 0635 hours, the same NDP received small arms, automatic weapons and 30 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in three US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery with unknown results.

C/4-23 Inf (M) destroyed 45 hootches, 15 bunkers, one stretcher and one splint 800 meters south of Khley (XU228010) at 1401 hours on 5 June. They also evacuated 7.1 tons of rice. At 0940 hours on 5 June, B/2-60 Inf located a small arms and munitions cache 2 kilometers southwest of Angkam (XU322131). They evacuated one 82mm mortar tube, nine Enfield rifles, one BAR, two ChiCom hand grenades, 400 rounds of ammunition and 20 magazines. C/1-27 Inf destroyed 19 bunkers, eight fighting positions, 15 structures, four wells and eight tunnels 5.7 kilometers west of Trapeang Phlong (WT996913) at 1001 hours on 5 June. The state of this complex showed that there had been recent enemy activity in the area. D/1-27 Inf located a number of bunkers in three separate locations 6.4 kilometers northeast of Ta Am (WT954934). Three bunkers, two hootches, one well and 1.1 tons of rice were destroyed at 1035 hours. At 1120 hours, three bunkers and three structures, destroyed by airstrikes, were located and one bunker was destroyed. Six bunkers, one hootch, two messhalls and one classroom were destroyed at 1540 hours. Two pounds of documents were also evacuated.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 on 6 June. Contacts with enemy forces were light and scattered with five significant caches located.

Co D, 2nd Bn, 12th Inf received small arms and RPG fire at a pick-up zone 2.5 kilometers east of Chosam (XT416966) at 1205 hours on 6 June. Fire was returned with organic weapons and helicopter gunships with unknown results. Two UH1H helicopters from the 187th AHC received small arms fire resulting in moderate damage to one (not flyable) and light damage to the other. At 1448 hours, A/3-4 Cav located one destroyed hootch and four dead enemy soldiers killed by an airstrike 1.2 kilometers west of Chan Mul (XT358991).

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D/2-60 Inf engaged five enemy soldiers with organic weapons and artillery 1.8 kilometers northwest of Angkam (XU317159) at 1740 hours on 6 June resulting in two enemy killed. The enemy force returned fire until 1816 hours when contact was lost. One backpack, two pistol belts, two ChiCom hand grenades and one wallet were evacuated. Documents taken from the enemy bodies identified the U/I element of the Military Staff Department, COSVN and the 52d Artillery Battalion, 96 Artillery Regiment. B/2-47 Inf (M) received small arms fire 4 kilometers northwest of Treak (XU141141) at 1430 hours on 6 June resulting in one US soldier wounded. US organic weapons fire killed one enemy soldier in the contact.

C/2-12 Inf located a small commo cache in a bunker 800 meters south of Baphloam (XT433953) at 1125 hours on 6 June. One bunker was destroyed and one telegraph key, one microphone, one headset and one switchboard, all in good condition, were evacuated. D/3-4 Cav destroyed 25 bunkers and one bicycle in an area 3.4 kilometers east of Choam (XT424962) at 1530 hours on 6 June. One ton of rice, 40 AK47 vests, 200 pounds of medical supplies, 500 bandages and seven respirators were evacuated. C/4-23 Inf (M) evacuated 13.75 tons of rice, 10 pounds of medical supplies, 30 pounds of clothing and 10 pounds of documents (which identified the K30 Hospital) from a site 2 kilometers southeast of Chom Tuk (XU329010) at 1000 hours on 6 June. Recon/1-27 Inf evacuated two generators, one transformer and two pounds of documents from a spot 4.8 kilometers northeast of Ta Am (WT965914) at 1550 hours on 6 June. One bunker was destroyed and two 82mm mortars, 30X82mm mortar rounds, one M1 carbine, 50 pounds of TNT and propaganda pamphlets were evacuated by 1st Bn, 8th Arty 1 kilometer north of Xa Mat (AT073905) on 6 June at 1640 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 on 7 June. Contact was light with four significant caches located.

Three US soldiers were wounded when B/2-12 Inf, 1.5 kilometers northeast of Baphloam (XT441968), received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy at 1310 hours on 7 June. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, LFT and airstrikes until 1425 hours with unknown results. C/2-12 Inf received small arms, RPG and 60mm mortar fire at 1230, 1250 and 1340 hours on 7 June 2.6 kilometers east of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT415940) resulting in four US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and LFT with unknown results. A UH1H MEDEVAC, on a dustoff, received small arms fire at 1450 hours but took no hits. Fire was returned with organic weapons with unknown results. B/4-23 Inf (M) captured one prisoner-of-war with an AK47 rifle 3.2 kilometers north of Memong (XU288141) at 1345 hours on 7 May. The PW identified his unit as the 1st Company, 3rd Battalion, 70 Rear Service Group, 95C Regiment, 5 NVA Division and stated that the Battalion consisted of 180 men armed with AK47 rifles and RPG launchers. D/2-60 Inf received small arms, automatic weapons, RPG and twenty 82mm mortar rounds from an unknown sized enemy force 1.8 kilometers northwest of Angkam (XU317159) at 0900 hours on 7 June resulting in one Kit Carson Scout killed and one Kit Carson Scout wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, LFT and one artillery battery (54 rounds) resulting in five enemy killed. At 1002 hours, a Jump CP of HQ/2-22 Inf (M) 1.2 kilometers west of Kranhung (WU957042) received small arms, automatic weapons and unknown type mortar fire from an estimated two -



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three enemy platoons resulting in one US soldier killed and 12 wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery and L/T with unknown results. An LST from D/3-4 Cav observed one individual 2.8 kilometers east of Boen Chroung Kraom (XT415940) at 1510 hours. Upon close inspection, an OH6A helicopter received small arms fire and force landed. An AH1G Cobra returned fire with organic weapons with unknown results. C/2-12 Inf secured the aircraft. The two crewmen were wounded and the OH6A suffered moderate damage.

D/2-12 Inf located the most significant cache of the day at 0930 hours 3.4 kilometers east of Choam (XT423963). Nine bunkers were destroyed. Ten RPD machine guns, 13X107mm rockets, four US hand grenades, 140 ChiCom hand grenades, 94 rounds of 82mm mortar, 20 RPG rounds, 62 rifle grenades, 98 rounds of 60mm mortar, 1000 blasting caps, 300 pounds of C-4, one US bangalore torpedo, three 30 pound ChiCom claymore mines, two 10 pound ChiCom claymore mines, 4½ cases of small arms ammunition, 91 ammunition magazines, three US LAW's, 200 feet of time fuse, 37 pairs of wire cutters, 10 respirators, one sewing machine, seven bolts of cloth, 43 gallons of grease, 140 waterproof bags, two bicycles, 19 cases of dried salmon, 89 cans of Foremost milk and 74 cans of mackerel were evacuated. Two other large caches in excellent condition were located at 1045 and 1400 hours 1.4 kilometers west of Khley (XU213014). Thirty rounds of 60mm mortar with six fuses were destroyed. One unknown type sight, 30 pounds of machine operators manuals, 10 pounds of small tools, 15 pounds of bicycle parts, 350 porcelain resistors, 10 electrical fuses, one oil filter, one voltage regulator, one transformer, one 60mm sight, 26 magnetic coils, 113 light bulbs, one counter-balance scale, 1500 AK47 rounds, one can of paint, 20 pounds of nails, 105 blank tablets of paper, 28 rolls of copper wire and five tires were evacuated. Recon/1-27 Inf located a cache under the floor of a hootch 3.4 kilometers northeast of Ta Am (WT955908). Four unknown type generators, 40 feet of wire and two amplifiers were found at 0930 hours on 7 June and evacuated. At 1300 hours, C/2-47 Inf (M) destroyed 10 bunkers 5 kilometers southeast of Saam (XT148992). At 1730 hours, another bunker and tunnel complex was located 800 meters northeast of the 1300 hours find (XT149000). Fifteen bunkers with connecting wire and one tunnel complex were destroyed. They evacuated one bicycle, one typewriter, three pounds of medical supplies and 10 pounds of documents.

Enemy initiated activity within the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI decreased slightly during the first week of June (1-7 June) as main and local force units avoided contact with Allied units. Activity within SR-1 remained at a low level during the week as Sub-regional units devoted most of their time to resupplying logistical losses suffered when Allied forces destroyed Cambodian sanctuaries. SR-2 forces continued to evade US/ARVN operations in the Sub-region, accounting for the low level of activity during the week. Enemy activity remained at a low level in SR-3 also as main force units avoided contact. In all, there were 21 contacts with enemy forces during the week resulting in 21 enemy soldiers killed. Also, the number of mines and booby traps detonated by US troops was down from the previous week. The main areas of activity in the 25th Inf Div's TAOI during the week centered in the Citadel, Trapezoid and Michelin areas where Allied forces attempted to disrupt operations by the 101, 268 and Quyet Thang Regiments.

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Two shelling incidents of significance were reported in the Division's AO during the week. D/2-14 Inf at Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT491473) received nine 82mm mortar rounds from an unknown number of enemy at 2115 hours on 5 June resulting in one US soldier wounded. Fire was returned by artillery with unknown results. Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1651) received four 120mm mortar rounds from northeast of the camp at 0010 hours on 6 June resulting in one US wounded and heavy damage to one 2½ ton truck, one ¼ ton truck and two buildings. Fire was returned with mortars to vic XT1756 with unknown results.

At 0715 hours on 1 June, a Hoi Chanh led Recon/2-14 Inf to an enemy position 11 kilometers northeast of Dau Tieng in the Michelin (XT584539) where they engaged two enemy soldiers with organic weapons. One enemy was killed and one AK47 rifle and one K54 pistol were evacuated. A/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 11 kilometers south of Dau Tieng in the Boi Loi Woods (XT473368) at 1400 hours on 4 June resulting in four US killed and 18 wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, LFT and airstrikes until 1500 hours. On a sweep of the contact area, they located seven enemy killed, 15 bunkers, one RPG launcher, one NVA poncho liner and an unknown number of M16 magazines, all destroyed by an airstrike. An OH6A helicopter from 3rd Brigade Aviation received .51 caliber machine gun and RPG fire from an estimated 50 enemy soldiers 4.8 kilometers east of Dau Tieng (XT543480) at 1115 hours on 6 June and crashed. The pilot of the OH6A escaped from the downed craft and engaged with organic weapons an unknown number of enemy who attempted to get near the aircraft, resulting in three enemy killed. A/2-14 Inf was inserted to secure the aircraft. US casualties in the action were one killed, one wounded, one missing in action and one OH6A a combat loss. A convoy of the 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf and 2nd Bn, 34th Arm received small arms and RPG fire on Highway 22 at 1150 hours on 6 June 5 kilometers north of Trai Bi (XT103750). Fire was returned with organic weapons and LFT with unknown results. US casualties were one killed and three wounded. An OH58A helicopter from C/3-17 Air Cav received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy in four huts 3 kilometers north of Ben Suc (XT566363) at 0710 hours on 7 June. The enemy soldiers were engaged with an LST resulting in two enemy killed and four huts destroyed. A 2½ ton truck from Company C, 725th Maintenance Battalion received one RPG round on a road 4.5 kilometers west of Ben Cui (XT406438) at 1840 hours on 7 June resulting in two US soldiers killed, heavy damage to the 2½ ton truck and two M16 rifles lost.

Mr. Ronnie Thompson, Mayor of Macon, Georgia visited Cu Chi Base Camp and three fire support bases on 2 June for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities and to talk with troops in the field. Major General Walter J. Woolwine, CG, 1st LOG COMD, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 4 June for an update on 25th Infantry Division activities. Colonel (P) Wallace K. Wittwer, USARV Provost Marshal and CO, 18th MP Brigade visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 7 June for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities.

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There were 35 contacts with enemy forces in Cambodia during the second week of June (8-14 June) resulting in 45 enemy soldiers killed.

The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with four battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province and a portion of Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia on 8 June. The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with four battalions operating in northwest Tay Ninh Province and a portion of Kampong Cham Province on 8 June. Contact was scattered during the day with only a few caches located. There was one shelling incident reported during the day. At 0330 hours, a NDP of A/4-23 Inf (M) 3.6 kilometers west of Memong (XU255101) received 87X107mm rockets resulting in one US wounded. Fire was returned with artillery and mortar with unknown results until 0425 hours.

At 1050 hours on 8 June, an LST from D/3-4 Cav engaged two enemy with organic weapons 2 kilometers north of Kampong Damrei (XU322248) resulting in two enemy killed and one bunker destroyed. B/4-23 Inf (M) received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 800 meters west of Choam Khsang (XU280155) at 1538 hours on 8 June. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and LFT with unknown results. At 1615 hours, B/4-23 Inf (M) received an unknown number of mortar rounds from the west until 1643 hours. US casualties in the contact were four wounded and light damage to two APC's. An OH58A from C/3-17 Air Cav received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 8.5 kilometers north of Kandaol Chrum (WU-875155) at 1000 hours on 8 June but suffered no damage or casualties. Fire was returned by artillery resulting in six enemy killed.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching in Base Areas 353 and 707 on 9 June. Contact was light and few caches were located. There were two significant shellings on 9 June. At 0410 hours, a NDP of B/3-4 Cav 1.2 kilometers east of Krabas (XU302197) received eight HE rounds resulting in eight US wounded. Fire was returned by artillery with unknown results. Later, at 0550 hours, the NDP received two additional rounds of HE which caused light damage to one APC. D/2-12 Inf at FSB Denny (XT336897) received one round of 122mm rocket at 1150 hours and two rounds of 122mm rocket at 1300 hours resulting in light damage to two UH1H helicopters and one US soldier wounded.

B/3-4 Cav received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 1 kilometer southeast of Rumchek (XU345175) at 0345 hours on 9 June resulting in three US soldiers killed and 15 wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, LFT, Night Hawk and Shadow with unknown results. D/1-27 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons 2.4 kilometers east of Xom Giua (WT994698) at 1112 hours on 9 June resulting in three enemy killed and three AK47 rifles evacuated. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. A Hoi Chanh was received by A/2-22 Inf (M) at 1354 hours on 9 June 1.6 kilometers south of Kranhung (WU959030). He identified his unit as the 4 Company, D2124 Transportation Battalion, 82d Rear Service Group which was last located vicinity WT887865.

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C/4-23 Inf (M) evacuated 12.2 tons of rice and miscellaneous clothing from a spot 1.6 kilometers north of Sala (XU212108) at 1612 hours on 9 June. A/2-27 Inf (M) evacuated one SKS rifle, one M16 rifle, 100 pounds of rice, 100 pounds of printers type and destroyed 20 fighting positions, four 55 gallon drums and 20 pieces of sheet metal at 1415 hours on 9 June 2.5 kilometers south of Saam (XU130005).

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 on 10 June. Contact was scattered with few caches located.

A/4-23 Inf (M) received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 2.3 kilometers northeast of Choam Khsang (XU270165) at 1545 hours on 10 June. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and LFT resulting in one enemy killed. One AK47 rifle, one poncho and one M16 bandolier with empty magazines were evacuated. There were no US casualties. A/3-4 Cav received RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy at 1905 hours on 10 June 8 kilometers southeast of Memut (XU375019) resulting in four US soldiers killed, four wounded and one Sheridan Tank and one APC destroyed. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and LFT resulting in one enemy killed.

C/2-12 Inf destroyed 33 bunkers, five bicycles, 200 pounds of rice and three ChiCom hand grenades 1.8 kilometers east of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT406-940) at 1250 hours and 1300 hours on 10 June.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 on 11 June. Contact was light with a few caches located. One shelling incident was reported. At 0125 hours, A NPD of B/3-4 Cav 1 kilometer east of Rumchek (XU346176) received 20-25 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in five US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, Night Hawk and Shadow resulting in one enemy killed and one RPG launcher and two RPG rounds evacuated.

C/2-47 Inf (M) received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 1 kilometer southwest of Samraong (XU220044) at 1653 hours on 11 June resulting in three US soldiers killed and 17 wounded. One enemy soldier was killed by US organic weapons fire, LFT, airstrikes, and artillery. An OH58A helicopter from C/3-17 Air Cav received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 4 kilometers northwest of Banghek Tey (XU000265) at 1430 hours on 11 June. An AH1G cobra returned fire with organic weapons resulting in five enemy killed. There were no US casualties and no damage to the helicopters. At 1647 hours, a helicopter gunship from C/3-17 Air Cav engaged five enemy soldiers with organic weapons 1.3 kilometers south of Kouk Srok (WU908200) resulting in four enemy killed. There was no enemy return fire.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 for enemy caches on 12 June. Contact was scattered and light with few caches located.

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C/4-9 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 2 kilometers southeast of Ta Am (WT938883) at 1615 hours on 12 June. Fire was returned with organic weapons and LFT with unknown results. A sweep of the area located a small bunker complex. Ten bunkers and three AK magazines were destroyed. One medical bag, three pounds of books and documents, a small amount of supplies, one rucksack with mess kit and black pajamas, 300 pounds of rice, 25 pounds of meat, one machete, one entrenching tool, assorted cooking utensils, three bicycles, one clock and 78 rounds of .51 caliber ammunition were evacuated.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 for enemy food and munitions caches on 13 June. Contact was light with two significant caches located.

A convoy of HHC/E/2-60 Inf received small arms and RPG fire on a road 800 meters west of Damnak Sleng (XU363035) at 1240 hours on 13 June resulting in one US soldier wounded, one tracker dog killed and moderate damage to two  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks. Fire was returned with organic weapons and LFT with unknown results. D/2-60 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons 8.4 kilometers north of Memut (XU307145) at 0800 hours on 13 June resulting in two enemy killed. A small amount of documents, two packs, one ChiCom hand grenade, 600 pounds of rice, one set of web gear, two pair of NVA boots, small amount of claymore wire, one set of mess gear and one protective mask were evacuated from the contact site.

B/2-60 Inf located a large weapons cache 2.4 kilometers southwest of Angkam (XU313133) at 1050 hours on 13 June. They evacuated 54 Enfield rifles (model 1903), 15 M1 carbines, two SKS rifles, 11 Soviet carbines, five Thompson sub-machine guns, two Soviet sub-machine guns, one Bren MK-11 machine gun, one RPD machine gun, one French MAS 36, 200 small arms rounds, 21 ChiCom hand grenades, 14 rifle grenades and two bugles. B/4-9 Inf located a cache 3.4 kilometers south of Ta Am (WT922860) at 1008 hours on 13 June. A two ton printing press with type and ink, two AK magazines, one NVA pistol belt, one US bayonet, one US canteen, one US ammo pouch, two ChiCom hand grenades, two NVA entrenching tools and one hammock were destroyed.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching for enemy caches in Base Areas 353 and 707 on 14 June. Contact was light and one significant cache was located.

At 1615 hours on 14 June, B/3-17 Air Cav engaged 40-50 enemy in their base camp 2 kilometers east of Tasua (WT937749) with organic weapons, artillery and airstrikes resulting in five enemy killed by air and one enemy killed by artillery. Two structures were also destroyed.

C/4-23 Inf (M) located a large rice cache 2 kilometers west of Sotey (XT252986) at 1553 hours on 14 June. They evacuated 57 tons of rice and destroyed three tons of rice. C/4-9 Inf destroyed 20 bunkers 2.4 kilometers southeast of Ta Am at 0955 hours on 14 June. The area showed signs of recent enemy activity.

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Enemy initiated activity in the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI increased slightly during the second week of June (8-14 June). The contacts with 7 NVA Division elements in the Cambodian border area of the Fishhook accounted in part for the increase, along with contacts in SR-1. Activity in SR-2 and SR-3 also increased slightly but aggressive offensive activity was lacking throughout the TAOI. There were 22 contacts with enemy forces during the week resulting in 18 enemy killed and two prisoners-of-war captured. Mines and booby traps detonated by the Division's soldiers increased to 29 from the 21 incidents of last week. Two significant shelling incidents were also reported. A/2-14 Inf at Dau Tieng Base Camp received 11 rounds of 82mm mortar at 1850 hours on 8 June resulting in heavy damage to a five ton truck. Fire was returned by artillery to XT490550 and XT485525 with unknown results. Tay Ninh Base Camp received one 122mm rocket from the west at 1957 hours on 11 June resulting in one US soldier wounded and one hutch lightly damaged. Fire was returned by artillery with unknown results.

The most significant ground contact of the week occurred on 11 June. Team 17, Co E (Ranger), 75th Inf engaged two enemy at 1505 hours 3 kilometers east of Tan Tru (XS697624) with organic weapons resulting in two enemy killed. Later, at 1515 hours, three enemy soldiers were engaged with organic weapons resulting in three enemy killed. There was no enemy return fire. One AK47 rifle, one unknown type weapon and one pound of documents were evacuated. The documents identified the 2nd Bn, 1 NVA Regt. The Battalion had last been identified on 6 June by three PW's captured south of Ben Luc vic XS598-715 and normally operated throughout Tan Tru District where it was dispersed into smaller groups targeted against the GVN Pacification Program. A helicopter gunship from C/3-17 Air Cav received small arms fire from three enemy 3 kilometers southwest of Trai Bi (XT113670) at 0745 hours on 11 June. Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in two enemy killed. Team 31, Co E (Ranger), 75th Inf engaged eight enemy with organic weapons at 1155 hours on 12 June 8 kilometers north of Tan Hiep (XS456628) resulting in two enemy killed. D/6-31 Inf swept the area with no results. B/2-27 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 3 kilometers northeast of Trung Lap at 2150 hours on 13 June resulting in one US soldier killed and four wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons, LPT and Infant with unknown results. D/2-27 Inf engaged two enemy with organic weapons 4 kilometers south of Ben Suc (XT568296) at 1745 hours on 14 June resulting in one prisoner-of-war captured. The PW identified himself as the XO of Transportation Group, SR-1. One K54 pistol and a small amount of documents were evacuated.

Recon/2-27 Inf located a cache 7 kilometers north of Cu Chi (XT633195) at 0750 hours on 14 June. One AK47 rifle, one RPD light machine gun and 1½ pounds of documents were evacuated. Three tunnels, five pairs of sandals, three US pistol belts, assorted clothing, some small bags of rice, one US ammunition pouch and canteen cup, eight flashlight batteries, eleven AK47 magazines and two ammo vests were destroyed. The tunnels were interconnected and showed signs of recent enemy activity. C/2-27 Inf located one enemy body 5 kilometers south of Ben Suc in the Ho Bo Woods (XT588289) at 1015 hours on 12 June. One K54 pistol, one wallet, an unknown amount of piasters, three pounds of documents and miscellaneous clothing and food were evacuated.

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Documents taken from the body consisted of an envelope sent by the Quartermaster Section, C401 (Rear Service Staff of SR-1) Rear Service Office, SR-1 to Tien Giang (8 Artillery Battalion, SR-1) and Quu Long (Militia Section, SR-1) Groups concerning the organization of distributing rice and salt. The C401 Rear Service Staff had last been identified on 23 April by documents captured in the vic XT554298.

A number of notable figures visited the 25th Infantry Division during the week. Colonel George K. Webb, Deputy Chief of Staff (Designate), II FFV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 8 June for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities. Brigadier General Bertram K. Gorwitz, Deputy Chief of Information, DA visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 8 June to observe the conduct of information activities with regard to drugs, dissent, racial tensions, disciplinary matters and relations and problems with the press corps. Also, Brig. Gen. Gorwitz traveled to units in the field to observe and be informed on the progress of the Vietnamization Program in the four corps tactical zones and to provide CINFO with first-hand information by which to evaluate the impact of these activities on US information operations worldwide. Major General C.A.E. Fraser, CBE, Commander Australian Forces, Vietnam visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 10 June to obtain information on 25th Infantry Division current operations. The Reverend George W. Cummins, Director, Chaplains Commission, Southern Baptist Convention visited Cu Chi Base Camp and two FSB's on 10 and 11 June to obtain information on Chaplain's activities and to visit troops in the field. Brigadier General M.J.L. Greene became Acting Commander of the 25th Infantry Division on 10 June while Major General Bautz was away on leave.

The level of combat activity decreased in Cambodian operations during the third week of June (15-21 June). There were 26 contacts with enemy forces resulting in 37 enemy killed.

The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with three maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province and a portion of Kampong Cham province, Cambodia on 15 June. The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with four maneuver battalions operating in northwest Tay Ninh Province and was responsible for security along Highways 7, 22 and 78. Contact was light with no significant caches located.

A Command and Control helicopter from 2nd Bn, 12th Inf engaged two enemy 15.5 kilometers west of Minh Thanh (XT484717) with organic weapons at 1150 hours on 15 June resulting in one enemy killed. Later, at 1315 hours, D/2-12 Inf engaged three enemy with organic weapons at the same spot as the 1150 hours contact resulting in three enemy killed and three AK47 rifles evacuated. Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III on 16 June with seven maneuver battalions operating in Base Areas 353 and 707. Contact was light with one significant cache located.

The most significant contact of the day occurred at 0900 hours when a convoy of Co A, 65th Engr Bn and the 588th Engr Bn received small arms and RPG

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fire 3 kilometers southwest of Chan Mul (XT345972) resulting in 13 US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, LFT, LST, FAC and C/3-4 Cav reacted with unknown results. One five ton truck was a combat loss, two five ton trucks suffered heavy damage and one five ton truck suffered light damage. Three Cambodians were detained but later released as innocent civilians.

A/4-9 Inf located a small bunker complex 3.5 kilometers southeast of Anlung Chrey (WT934837) at 1550 hours on 16 June. One Russian .30 caliber machine gun, 30 pounds of documents and one two ton generator were evacuated. Seven bunkers were destroyed.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching in Base Areas 353 and 707 with seven battalions on 17 June. Contact was light with no caches located.

The most significant activity of the day occurred at 0950 hours when a CH47 Chinook helicopter from the 205th AHC received .30 caliber machine gun fire from an unknown number of enemy 12 kilometers southeast of Katum (XT-4486) resulting in light damage to the CH47 (5 hits) and the loss of one 9000 pound pallet containing 105mm rounds and fuses which dropped from the helicopter sling. There was an immediate search for the pallet and it was later found.

On 18 June, the 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 with seven battalions. Contact was scattered with few enemy caches located.

C/4-23 Inf (M) received three RPG rounds from an unknown number of enemy 2.5 kilometers southwest of Sotey (XT249961) at 0745 hours on 18 June resulting in three US soldiers killed and three wounded and light damage to an APC. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, mortars and FAC with unknown results. B/4-9 Inf destroyed 15.4 tons of unpolished rice at 1000 hours on 18 June 1.4 kilometers southwest of Anlung Chley (WT896846). The area showed signs of recent enemy activity.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 on 19 June with seven battalions and two Squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment which became OPCON to the 25th Inf Div on that day. The 1-11 ACR operated out of FSB Nodak (XU449032) and the 3-11 ACR operated out of FSB Susan (XU473141) on 19 June in Cambodia. Contact was light with few caches located.

A/4-9 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 400 meters southwest of Ta Am (WT918897) at 1235 hours on 19 June resulting in one US soldier killed. Fire was returned with organic weapons, LFT and FAC resulting in three enemy killed. M/3-11 ACR received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 3 kilometers southeast of Khcheay (XU421059) at 1328 hours on 19 June resulting in one US soldier wounded and heavy damage to an M-48A3 tank. Fire was returned with organic weapons, LFT, artillery and airstrikes with unknown results. A/1-11 ACR received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 1.4 kilometers

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northwest of Choam Kravien (XU452023) at 1600 hours on 19 June resulting in three US soldiers killed and two wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons, LFT, ARA and airstrikes resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one RPG launcher, a small bag of medical supplies, one telegraph key and a small amount of documents which identified the C-19 Medical Co, 69th Arty Command. One secondary explosion was also observed.

Two significant caches were located during the day in Cambodia. B/1-11 ACR evacuated 3000 pounds of medical supplies from a site 1 kilometer north-east of Choam Kravien (XU469020) at 1225 hours on 19 June. The medical supplies were mostly plasma and transfusion kits. Later, at 1600 hours, an Aero Rifle Platoon from the 11th ACR located 220 shovels, 56 bicycles and a small amount of documents 6.7 kilometers north of Stoeng Srei (XU537098). The equipment was evacuated.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 with seven battalions and two Squadrons of the 11th ACR on 20 June. Contact was light with no caches located.

At 0830 hours on 20 June, a NDP of B/1-11 ACR and the 984th Engrs received 10-15 rounds of 107mm rocket, 40-50 rounds of 82mm mortar, RPG and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 1.4 kilometers southeast of Choam Kravien (XU481004) resulting in three US killed, 23 US wounded and two ARVN wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, LFT, artillery, mortar, ARA and Shadow resulting in two enemy killed. A sweep of the area turned up one destroyed 107mm (B-20) rocket. At 0910 hours on 20 June, B/1-11 ACR received one RPG round and small arms fire vic XU484004 resulting in one US soldier killed and one wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and LFT with unknown results.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued searching Base Areas 353 and 707 with seven battalions and two Squadrons of the 11th ACR on 21 June. The heaviest enemy contact occurred in the 11th ACR area, as 7th VC/NVA Division elements continued their moderately heavy probes against NDP's.

A tank from A/2-34 Armor hit a 40 pound mine that was command detonated and received small arms fire on Highway 4 from an unknown number of enemy 6 kilometers north of Tay Ninh City (XT225565) at 0800 hours on 21 June resulting in four US soldiers wounded and moderate damage to the tank. Fire was returned with organic weapons and a LFT with unknown results. The most significant contact of the day occurred at 0830 hours when K/3-11 ACR received 25 RPG rounds and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 1.2 kilometers west of Lovea (XU435135) resulting in three US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery resulting in 20 enemy killed. B/1-11 ACR received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy at 1230 hours 3.6 kilometers southeast of Choam Kravien (XU494002) resulting in three US soldiers wounded, two ARVN soldiers wounded and moderate damage to a Rome Flow from the 948th Engr Bn. Fire was returned by organic weapons and airstrikes with unknown results.

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Enemy activity in the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI decreased slightly during the third week of June (15-21 June). However, 7th VC/NVA Divisional elements in the Fishhook and the 101 Regimental elements in the Saigon River Corridor and Michelin areas were responsible for several significant attacks by fire against Allied units during the week. Enemy elements were in the process of returning to their old areas of operations, vacated when the Allied forces began cross-border operations several weeks ago. Mines and booby traps detonated by US soldiers increased to 34 incidents over the 29 recorded the week before. Enemy activity in SR-1 was at higher levels during the week than it has been recently. This increase was probably attributable to the redeployment of the 101st Regiment and the movement of units attempting to re-establish logistical lines within the sub-region. Related to this, sensor readings increased along the Saigon River south of Dau Tieng and the Michelin. The mission of the 101st Regiment was to conduct attacks on Allied river and road traffic in the area. The other units of SR-1, Quyet Thang and 268 Regiments, avoided contact to concentrate on resupply activities. Activity in SR-2 remained at a low level during the week as main force units attempted to avoid contact while re-establishing communication routes and re-organizing for future activity. Enemy activity in SR-3 was at a moderate level during the week as contacts were with small units conducting counter-pacification activities. The most active unit in SR-3 was the 1 NVA Regiment but heavy losses sustained by the K4 Battalion during the month should decrease future enemy activity there.

There were 27 contacts during the week (15-21 June) in the 3rd Brigade and 3-9 Inf Div's AO resulting in 55 enemy killed and two prisoners-of-war captured. Three shelling incidents were reported in the 3rd Brigade's AO during the week. A NDP of B/1-5 Inf (M) 5 kilometers west of Ben Suc in the Boi Loi Woods (XT528352) received small arms, RPG and 20 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar at 2340 hours on 18 June resulting in 17 US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery, mortar, Shadow and LFT resulting in six enemy killed and one enemy wounded (PW) who was a member of the 20 Plt, 3 Co, 2 Bn, 101 NVA Regiment. Three RPG launchers and two AK47 rifles were evacuated from the contact site. HQ/2-34 Arm at Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1651) received two rockets fired from vic XT126474 and XT127480 at 2000 hours on 20 June resulting in 10 US soldiers wounded and light damage to one OH6A and one  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton truck. B/2-14 Inf at FSB Byrd (XT573502) received RPG, small arms and 30X82mm mortar rounds at 0005 hours on 20 June resulting in 16 US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, LFT, and artillery resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of a small amount of documents.

The most significant contact of the week occurred at 2105 hours on 15 June when Tms 21, 22 and 24, Co E (Rgr), 75th Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 8 kilometers north of Tan Hiep (XS440627) with organic weapons, LFT and Night Hawk resulting in 10 enemy killed. The enemy force returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons but there were no US casualties. Snipers from A/1-5 Inf (M) engaged 10 enemy with organic weapons at 2045 hours on 17 June 1 kilometer west of Ben Suc (XT562339) resulting in three enemy killed. Tm 11, Co E (Rgr), 75th Inf engaged six enemy 7 kilometers

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northwest of Tan Hiep (XS448613) resulting in three enemy killed and one secondary explosion. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. A/2-14 Inf received small arms fire from three enemy 3.4 kilometers north of Dau Tieng (XT504505) at 1810 hours on 21 June resulting in one US soldier killed and two wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed. A/6-31 Inf engaged four enemy at 1600 hours on 21 June with organic weapons and Navy gunships 7.5 kilometers south of Trang Bang (XT501116) with unknown results. Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier and two Kit Carson Scouts. A MEDEVAC helicopter, sent in for the wounded, went down due to mechanical failure but was secured by two ACV's and Navy gunships.

Colonel Joseph R. Matoski, 2nd Bde Commanding Officer (Designate) visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities from 17 to 20 June. Colonel Howard W. Greer, Assistant J3, MACV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 17 June for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities. Group Captain P.G.T. Bates, British Defense Attache to Laos and Colonel B.J. Coombe, British Defense Attache to the Republic of Vietnam visited the 2nd Bde Jump CP at Thien Ngon on 18 June for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities in the area. Colonel (P) Edward F. Gudgel, CO, II FFV Artillery, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 18 June for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities. On 18 June, Major General Edward Bautz, Jr. resumed command of the 25th Infantry Division. Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey, DCG (Designate), USARV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities on 19 June.

There were 38 contacts with enemy forces during the final week of the Cambodian operation (22-30 June) as US forces began returning to South Vietnam to be out by the 30 June deadline set by President Nixon on 1 May 1970. Forty eight enemy soldiers were killed and one prisoner-of-war captured in Cambodia as US forces attempted to destroy remaining enemy caches before withdrawal.

The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with three battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province and Base Area 353 in Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia on 22 June 1970. The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III on 22 June with four battalions operating in northwest Tay Ninh Province and was responsible for security along Highways 7, 22 and 78. Two Squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued operations in the Fishhook region of Cambodia on 22 June. Contact was light.

At 0920 hours on 22 June, K/3-11 ACR with the 31st Engrs received small arms and RPG fire 1.2 kilometers northwest of Lovea (XU439141) from an unknown number of enemy soldiers. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and ARA resulting in 10 enemy killed. US casualties in the contact were 10 wounded. A CH47 Chinook helicopter from L/3-11 ACR received small arms fire 4 kilometers northeast of Khcheay (XU428093). L/3-11 ACR returned fire with organic weapons with unknown results. Later, at 1425 hours, L/3-11 ACR received small arms fire resulting in one US soldier wounded. Fire was returned

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with organic weapons, one artillery battery (89 rounds) and airstrikes resulting in seven enemy killed and one three-day old body located. D/3-4 Cav, while inserting mini-cav, received small arms fire 2 kilometers east of Boeng Chroung Kracm (XT409949) from an unknown number of enemy resulting in two US soldiers killed, one wounded, light damage to one UH1H, moderate damage to one UH1H and heavy damage to one UH1H. Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results.

The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III in Base Area 353 and north central Tay Ninh Province on 23 June. The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III on 23 June with four battalions operating in northwest Tay Ninh Province and was responsible for security along Highways 7, 22 and 78. Two Squadrons of the 11th ACR continued their operations in the Fishhook region on 23 June. Contact was light.

B/1-11 ACR located one enemy killed, the result of a contact in which one US soldier was killed and one ARVN wounded at 1110 hours on 22 June, 4 kilometers southeast of Choam Kravien (XT497997) at 1345 hours on 23 June. One unknown type machine gun, a large amount of documents and a small amount of medical supplies were evacuated. A small amount of medical supplies, 50 RPG-2 rounds, one case of ChiCom hand grenades and five 60mm mortar rounds were destroyed. The most significant contact occurred at 1950 hours when K/3-11 ACR at FSB Susan received 40-50X60mm and 82mm mortar rounds, 40-50 107mm rockets and RPG and small arms fire resulting in one US soldier killed, four wounded, and heavy damage to one M-113, one M-551 and one 5 ton Low Boy.

The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with three battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province on 24 June. The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with four battalions operating in northwest Tay Ninh Province and was responsible for security along Highways 7, 22 and 78. Two Squadrons of the 11th ACR continued operating in their assigned AO in the Fishhook region on 24 June. Contact was light.

C/1-11 ACR received small arms and RPG fire at 1130 hours on 24 June 3.3 kilometers east of Khcheay (XU426064) resulting in three US wounded and moderate damage to one M-551. Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery, LFT and airstrikes with unknown results. B/1-11 ACR received one RPG round and small arms fire at 1330 hours on 24 June 3.6 kilometers southeast of Khcheay (XU427053) resulting in one US killed, three US wounded and light damage to one M-113. Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results.

A/1-11 ACR evacuated 15 pounds of documents, 10 cases of used medicine bottles and a large unknown number of cases of pills from a site 400 meters north of Choam Kravien (XU457015) at 1850 hours. They destroyed 50 bunkers, 50 structures, three tons of rice, 15 bicycles, one typewriter and assorted generator parts.

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The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III on 25 June with seven battalions operating in north central and northwest Tay Ninh Province. Two squadrons of the 11th ACR continued operations in the Fishhook region on 25 June. There was no significant contacts reported nor any significant caches located during the day.

On 26 June, the 1st and 2nd Brigades continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with seven battalions operating in north central and northwest Tay Ninh Province. Two squadrons of the 11th ACR continued operating in their assigned AO in the Fishhook region. There was one significant shelling incident reported during the day. HHT/3-11 ACR at FSB Susan (XU473141) received 8-10 rounds of 60mm mortar at 1400 hours resulting in four US killed and seven US wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery, LFT, FAC and ARA with unknown results. In the only action of the day, A/3-17 Air Cav destroyed one camouflaged 2½ ton truck 3.4 kilometers north of Stoeng Srei (XU531063) at 1120 hours. At 1800 hours, AF FAC located five enemy bodies and numerous bunkers and hootches destroyed by an airstrike 3 kilometers southeast of Khcheay (XU418054).

The 1st and 2nd Brigades continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with seven battalions operating in north central and northwest Tay Ninh Province on 27 June. Two squadrons of the 11th ACR continued operating in their assigned AO in the Fishhook region on 27 June. Contact was light. An LST from B/3-17 Air Cav received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 7 kilometers east of Kampong Trach (WT941589) at 1115 hours on 27 June resulting in moderate damage to an OH6A helicopter and heavy damage to an AH1G Cobra. There was no return fire.

On 28 June, the 1st and 2nd Brigades continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with seven battalions operating in north central and northwest Tay Ninh Province. Two squadrons of the 11th ACR continued operating in their assigned AO in the Fishhook region on 28 June. The most significant contact of the day occurred at 1310 hours when B/2-60 Inf received small arms and RPG fire from about five enemy 800 meters south of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT389936) resulting in six US wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons, LFT, FAC and artillery with unknown results. D/3-4 Cav engaged three enemy with organic weapons 12.8 kilometers west of Kampong Trach (WT751645) at 1600 hours on 28 June resulting in two enemy killed. There was no enemy return fire.

The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with six battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province on 29 June. The 2nd Brigade withdrew from Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III and moved to a new AO vicinity Xuan Loc (YT458090) on 29 June. The two squadrons of the 11th ACR that had been operating in the Fishhook on 28 June moved to Quan Loi (XT820907) on 29 June and prepared for future operations. There was no significant ground activity in Cambodia although scattered air activity was reported. An Aerial Combat Team from the 11th ACR with helicopter gunships from 3-17 Air Cav engaged two enemy with organic weapons 600 meters northeast of Boeng Chroung Kraom (XT394947) at 1500 hours resulting in two enemy killed.

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At 1600 hours, an AH1G Cobra from A/3-17 Air Cav crashed 4 kilometers east of Khcheay (XU435068) due to unknown causes resulting in one US soldier killed and one wounded with the AH1G being destroyed. An Aerial Rifle Platoon from the 11th ACR was inserted to secure the aircraft and men.

The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III on 30 June with six maneuver battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province. The 2nd Brigade continued preparations to assume control of a new AO on 1 July. The 11th ACR reverted to the control of II FFV on 30 June. There was only one significant contact reported by the 1st Brigade during the day. A/3-17 Air Cav engaged six enemy 3 kilometers south of Anlung Chrey (WT911-825) at 1620 hours with organic weapons resulting in four enemy killed.

Enemy activity in the area of operations of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was light and scattered during the fourth week of June (22-30 June) as main force and local force units sought to avoid Allied contacts to replenish supplies interdicted by Allied cross-border operations. The most active enemy unit was the 101 Regiment in the Saigon River/Michelin area as it continued its offensive actions against Allied river and road traffic in the area. The two other main force units in SR-1, the 268 and Quyet Thang Regiments, avoided Allied contacts to engage in resupply missions. Enemy tactical emphasis in SR-1 was on small unit sapper raids and ambush operations to conserve his limited resources while attempting to inflict heavy casualties on Allied units. Enemy activity in SR-2 and SR-3 remained at a low level as both main and local force units concentrated on the disruption of the CVN Pacification Program, propaganda activities and disruption of the National Elections held on 30 June. Incidents involving mines and booby traps were down this week to 28 from 34 the previous week. There was one shelling incident reported during the week. Dau Tieng Base Camp received 13 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from vic XT4851 at 1420 hours on 26 June resulting in one US soldier killed, four wounded and heavy damage to the mess hall, bunkers and officers quarters (BOQ). Fire was returned by LFT with unknown results.

There were 18 contacts with enemy forces during the week resulting in 36 enemy killed and four prisoners-of-war captured. Team 21, Co E (Rgr), 75th Inf engaged 15 enemy 7.5 kilometers northwest of Tan An (XS488693) at 2025 hours on 25 June with organic weapons, Navy LFT and Night Hawk resulting in six enemy killed. Enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire wounded one US soldier. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 2215 hours on 27 June when 2-14 Inf at Dau Tieng Base Camp engaged an estimated 25-30 enemy with organic weapons and LFT resulting in five enemy killed (credit to 229 Avn Bn). One AK47 rifle, three entrenching tools, 18 satchel charges, two bags of blasting powder, one protective mask, 46 ChiCom hand grenades and a small amount of documents were evacuated. A/2-14 Inf engaged 10-20 enemy 4.5 kilometers north of Dau Tieng (XT498519) at 0750 hours on 28 June with organic weapons, LFT and artillery resulting in the capture of two wounded prisoners-of-war. One AK47 rifle, one RPG launcher, one K54 pistol, a small amount of documents and a small amount of medical supplies were evacuated. They destroyed five B-40 rounds, four boosters, one demolition kit, seven one-pound satchel charges, two canteens, eight ponchos, two cooking pots, 50 pounds of

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miscellaneous food, two pairs of sandals and 120 AK47 rounds. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. An OH58 from D/3-4 Cav received small arms fire from 8-10 enemy 8 kilometers northeast of Cu Chi (XT693175) at 1835 hours on 28 June. Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in four enemy killed. Two AK47 rifles, 10 pounds of documents and 100 pounds of rice were destroyed. C/3-22 Inf engaged six enemy at 1110 hours on 29 June 11 kilometers east of Dau Tieng (XT599498) with organic weapons, LFT, airstrikes, artillery and FAC resulting in one enemy killed. Enemy small arms and RPG fire wounded four US soldiers. One AK47 rifle, a small amount of documents, eight rounds of B40 rocket, nine B40 boosters, four ChiCom hand grenades, 200 AK47 rounds, 75 pounds of rice, a small amount of medical supplies, five rucksacks, and one rubber stamp were evacuated. C/2-14 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 8 kilometers north of Dau Tieng (XT518549) at 1010 hours on 30 June resulting in six US wounded. C/2-14 Inf returned fire with organic weapons and LFT resulting in one enemy killed.

Lieutenant General Frank T. Mildren, Deputy CG, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 25 June for an Honors Ceremony and dinner. Seven Public Affairs Officials, USIA visited FSB's in the 25th Infantry Division on 25 June. Major General Hugh Foster, CG (Designate), 1st Signal Brigade visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 25 June for an orientation on 25th Infantry Division activities. Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey, DCG (Designate), USARV visited Tan An Base Camp for an orientation on 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division activities on 29 June.

The 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division killed 309 and captured 15 of the enemy during the month of June, accounted for 188 individual weapons, 34 crew-served weapons and 235.4 tons of rice captured or destroyed. Division troops destroyed 98 mines and booby traps while detonating 100, resulting in six US soldiers killed and 140 wounded. In the area of Pacification, the Division conducted 783 MEDCAPS, ICAPS, NITECAPS and DENTCAPS treating 36,746 patients. The Division dropped 4,200 leaflets during June.

Enemy initiated activity within the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI during the first week of July (1-7 July) was greatly reduced from the previous week as US forces began operating exclusively in South Vietnam. The Katum area in northern War Zone C and the Saigon River and Michelin area were the most active during the week. Also, there was a general rising trend in enemy movement throughout the northern TAOI from Base Area 354 east to the Saigon River Corridor and north to the Cambodian border. Recent contacts in the Dau Tieng and Razor Back areas strongly indicated that a battalion or larger unit, possibly from COSVN Higher Sapper Command (16th Armor/Sapper Office) which was identified by documents captured on 28 June in the area, was newly in that area. The number of mining incidents decreased by half from the previous week to 15.

The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG 43 Phase III with six battalions operating in the northern central part of Tay Ninh Province until

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3 July when the Brigade began Operation TOAN THANG IV. There was one significant shelling incident reported during the week. Tay Ninh Base Camp received five rounds of 75mm recoillees rifle fire at 2110 hours on 6 July resulting in two US wounded and light damage to one M548. Fire was returned by artillery with unknown results.

There were three contacts with enemy forces in the 1st Brigade's AO resulting in 13 enemy killed and three PW's captured. The most significant contact occurred at 0155 hours on 3 July when B/4-23 Inf (M) with the 588th Engr Co at FSB Denny (XT336894) received 10-12X82mm mortar rounds, small arms, RPG and a ground probe by 16 enemy with satchel charges (eight penetrated the wire) resulting in two US soldiers killed, 27 wounded, two TA 312's destroyed, heavy damage to two generators and a  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trailer, moderate damage to a  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton truck and light damage to a 5 ton truck and two APC's. Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery, LFT, Night Hawk, and Shadow until 0240 hours resulting in six enemy killed and three PW's captured. The PW's identified their unit as the 429th Battalion which is a recon/sapper unit. Ten RPG rounds, 10 ChiCom hand grenades, two RPG-2 launchers, two AK47 rifles and three boosters for RPG-2 rounds were evacuated. C/2-60 Inf engaged five enemy with claymores 11 kilometers northwest of Minh Thanh (XF534716) at 0930 hours on 6 July resulting in five enemy killed. Three AK47 rifles, a small amount of documents, three ponshos, one backpack, 15 pounds of rice and three AK47 magazines were evacuated. The next day, 7 July at 1610 hours, C/2-60 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons 12 kilometers northeast of the 6 July contact (XT543728) resulting in two enemy killed. One K54 pistol, five pounds of documents and a small amount of medical supplies were evacuated. There were no US casualties.

The 2nd Brigade assumed control of a new AO around Xuan Loc (YT474086) on 1 July and resumed Operation TOAN THANG IV. There was only one significant incident reported by the 2nd Brigade during the week. A Command and Control helicopter from the 187th AHQ received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 7 kilometers southwest of Ong Que (YS349946) at 1450 hours on 4 July and crashed resulting in one US wounded and heavy damage to the UH1H. The aircraft was secured by Thai elements until extracted at 1630 hours.

The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the first week of July (1-7 July) with five battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces with responsibility for security along Highways 4, 13, 19, 22 and 239. Enemy activity in the 3rd Bde's AO was reported to be moderate during the week as the 101 Regiment was the most active unit in the 25th Inf Div's TAOI. There were two significant shelling incidents reported in the 3rd Bde. HHC/2-14 Inf at Dau Tieng Base Camp received 12X120mm mortar rounds at 2105 hours on 6 July resulting in seven US and one ARVN soldier wounded. Fire was returned by artillery and helicopter gunships with unknown results. HHC/2-14 Inf at Dau Tieng Base Camp received 10X82mm mortar rounds at 2100 hours on 7 July resulting in 12 US wounded. Fire was returned by mortars with unknown results.

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There were nine contacts with enemy forces in the 3rd Brigade's AO during the week resulting in seven enemy KIA and one PW captured. In two separate engagements by D/3-4 Cav at 1035 and 1400 hours on 1 July 4 kilometers southwest of Ben Suc (XT558305), three enemy soldiers were killed and one structure was destroyed. One AK47 rifle, one K54 pistol, one RPG launcher and three ChiCom hand grenades were evacuated. A/2-4 Inf engaged two enemy with organic weapons 4 kilometers north of Dau Tieng at 0945 hours on 2 July resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles and a small amount of assorted web gear. There was no enemy return fire. B/2-27 Inf engaged two enemy 2.5 kilometers south of Ben Suc (XT575313) with organic weapons at 1813 hours on 4 July resulting in the capture of one wounded PW who was evacuated to Cu Chi along with a small amount of documents. There was no return fire. At 1130 hours on 5 July, B/2-27 Inf received one Hoi Chanh with one AK47 rifle and a small amount of documents 3 kilometers south of Ben Suc (XT577307). The Hoi Chanh identified himself as a sapper leader with the 401 Battalion. Later, at 1330 hours, B/2-27 located a small bunker complex 100 meters north of where the Hoi Chanh rallied (XT577308). Two bunkers, one tunnel, one smoke grenade and a small amount of TNT were destroyed and a small amount of medical supplies were evacuated. An NDP of B/2-27 Inf 3 kilometers south of Ben Suc (XT568306) received automatic weapons, RPG and mortar fire from an unknown number of enemy at 0001 hours on 6 July resulting in 14 US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons and LFT with unknown results. A sweep of the contact area at 0810 hours on 6 July resulted in the evacuation of two RPG-2 boosters, one AK47 magazine, two 60mm mortar rounds, one flashlight and one ChiCom hand grenade.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued operating with two battalions in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces with the responsibility for security along Highways 4, 6A, 7A, 8A, 10 and 23 and the local pacification program. One battalion operated in Ngon Trach District. Enemy activity in the 3-9 Inf Div's AO was light during the week as main and local force units avoided contact. There were four contacts with enemy soldiers in the 3-9 Inf Div's AO during the week resulting in 14 enemy killed and one PW captured. B/6-31 Inf engaged three enemy 5.6 kilometers west of Duc Hoa (XS537976) at 2359 hours on 2 July with organic weapons and mortar fire resulting in one enemy killed and one captured. There was no enemy return fire. At 0740 hours on 3 July, an AP from C/6-31 Inf, while being extracted by a Navy Kenner boat 5 kilometers northwest of Ben Luc on the Vam Co Dong River (XS587797), detonated a claymore mine located on the river bank resulting in seven US soldiers wounded, one missing and one Kenner boat destroyed. Recon/2-47 Inf (M) engaged an unknown number of enemy 15 kilometers east of Moc Hoa (XS168860) at 0017 hours on 7 July with artillery, Shadow, Infant, Night Hawk and FAC resulting in 11 enemy soldiers killed.

Lieutenant General Michael S. Davison, CG, II FFV visited Cu Chi Base Camp for a consultation with 25th Inf Div officers on wet season strategy. The Honorable Luis Ferre, Governor of Puerto Rico, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 6 July to meet with his constituents in the 25th Inf Div. Major General Robert B. Shira, Assistant Surgeon General and Chief, Dental Corps visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 6 July to evaluate the effective utilization of Dental

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Corps personnel, to observe dental facilities and equipment accountability, and to discuss future assignments, career planning and other matters pertinent to the Corps and its assigned mission. Brigadier General Verne L. Bowers, Deputy Chief of Staff, P&A, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 7 July for a briefing on current status of personnel and administration in the 25th Inf Div. Brigadier R.H.F. Holloway, O.B.E., NZA, Commander, Field Force Command and Commander, 1st Inf Bde Group, New Zealand visited the 1st Bde at Tay Ninh on 7 July.

Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI was at a low level during the second week of July (8-14 July) as enemy main force units avoided contact. Most activity was reported in the Boi Loi and Ho Bo Woods area. Numerous Duffle Bag and radar activations from Base Area 354 across Tay Ninh Province to the Saigon River Corridor indicated that the enemy was attempting to build up his personnel and logistical bases for future attacks against Allied bases and installations in the Div's TAOI. Also, the number of mining incidents increased significantly from last week to 24.

The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with six battalions and 4-49 ARVN (OPCQY 1st Bde on 12 Jul 70) operating in north central Tay Ninh Province during the second week of July. There were two significant contacts reported in the 1st Bde's AO resulting in five enemy killed. A/4-9 Inf, at an NDP 5 kilometers west of Tay Ninh (XT118525), engaged five enemy with organic weapons, artillery and Hight Hawk at 0240 hours on 12 July resulting in five enemy killed. The enemy returned fire with small arms until 0250 hours but there were no US casualties. A sweep of the contact area the next morning resulted in the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one RPG launcher, one M16 rifle, three RPG rounds with boosters, four ChiCom hand grenades, four rifle grenades, 15 magazines with ammunition for M16 rifle, five M-2 carbine magazines, two pounds of medical supplies and  $\frac{1}{4}$  pound of documents. A convoy from the 48th Trans Gp with a security element from 2nd Bn, 60th Inf received automatic weapons and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 8 kilometers northwest of Trang Bang (XT455259) at 1710 hours on 14 July resulting in one US killed and six wounded. One vehicle was a combat loss, two vehicles suffered heavy damage, four vehicles suffered moderate damage and six vehicles suffered light damage. Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results.

The 2nd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the second week of July with two battalions operating in Long Hanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. There were two contacts with enemy forces during the week resulting in the capture of one PW. C/1-27 Inf received 10X60mm mortar at 1800 hours on 9 July 2 kilometers southeast of Xuan Loc (YS609975) resulting in three US killed. A/1-27 Inf located a small medical cache 1.8 kilometers southeast of Xuan Loc (YS610988) at 0735 hours on 12 July. They evacuated 13 cases of medical supplies which were hidden under a poncho in natural vegetation.

The 3rd Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with four battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces with responsibility for route

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security along Highways 4, 13, 19, 22 and 239. Enemy activity in the 3rd Bde's AO continued at a moderate level during the second week of July with the 101 Regiment the most active unit in the 25th Inf Div's TAOI. Three significant shelling incidents were reported during the week. HHC/2-14 Inf at Dau Tieng Base Camp received two 81mm mortar rounds at 0437 hours on 8 July resulting in heavy damage to three AH1G Cobras and light damage to three AH1G Cobras. Fire was returned by mortar with unknown results. An NDP of B/3-4 Cav 8 kilometers west of Ben Suc received two HE rounds at 2245 hours on 8 July resulting in two US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons with unknown results. Later, at 0330 hours on 9 July, the NDP of B/3-4 Cav again received two HE rounds resulting in three US wounded.

There were 12 contacts with enemy forces in the 3rd Bde's AO resulting in six enemy killed during the second week of July. A convoy from Co A, 65th Engr Bn received small arms, RPG and .51 caliber machine gun fire 3.5 kilometers west of Ben Cui (XT413443) at 1615 hours on 8 July resulting in two US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons, LFT and A/3-4 Cav reacted with unknown results. Recon/3-22 Inf with B/3-22 Inf and one MACV advisor, in a three vehicle convoy, received one RPG round 6 kilometers northwest of Ben Suc (XT543383) at 1710 hours on 10 July resulting in one US killed (MACV advisor), two US wounded and one  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton truck heavily damaged. Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results. A CH47 Chinook from 242nd Avn Bn, while hovering at a spot 12 kilometers southeast of Dau Tieng (XT545365), received one RPG round and went down burning at 1840 hours on 10 July. The enemy force then opened up on the downed craft with small arms and RPG fire. US casualties were three killed, 16 wounded and one missing while the CH47 suffered heavy damage. Fire was returned by organic weapons and a Navy PBR with unknown results.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued operating in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces with two battalions and in Nhon Trach District with one battalion during the second week of July. Enemy activity remained at a low level as main and local force units avoided contact. Three contacts were reported, only one was significant. At 2255 hours on 8 July, an Infant received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 5.6 kilometers west of Thu Thua (XS4872). A supporting 3rd Bde Night Hawk received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire also. Fire was returned with organic weapons, Navy LFT and an AC-119 resulting in four enemy killed. There were no US casualties or damage to the aircraft.

Colonel Howard W. Greer, Assistant J3, MACV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 10 July for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities. Mr. Robert Gibson (GSE-18), Research and Engineering Consultant (Designate) to CINCPAC visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 12 July for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities.

Enemy activity within the 25th Inf Div's TAOI remained at a low level during the third week of July (15-21 July) as main and local force units avoided contact. Most of the activity was reported in the Boi Loi and Ho Bo Woods areas in the 3rd Bde's AO. There was an increase in the number of mining incidents over last week to 29.

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The 1st Bde continued Operation TOAN THANG IV with five battalions operating in north central Tay Ninh Province and northwestern Binh Long Province during the third week of July. Enemy activity remained at a low level with nine contacts reported resulting in 12 enemy killed. Recon/2-60 Inf engaged two enemy 2.5 kilometers northeast of Bau Tram (XT518782) at 1405 hours on 18 July with claymore mines resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one K54 pistol, one pack and a small amount of documents. D/2-60 Inf, in two engagements at 0905 and 0925 hours on 20 July about 3 kilometers south of Bau Tram (XT500833), killed three enemy with claymore mines, organic weapons, LFT and artillery. They also evacuated one AK47 rifle, six RPG rounds and a small amount of documents. An airstrike in support of an A/3-17 Air Cav helicopter gunship strike 1 kilometer north of Phum Romduol (XT179982) resulted in two enemy killed at 1130 hours on 20 July. A/2-60 Inf located a weapons cache 3.5 kilometers northwest of Soc Tram (XT464881) on 16 July at 1230 hours and on 17 July at 1050 hours. Two ChiCom machine guns (poor condition), two SKS rifles (poor condition), two bolts for SKS rifles and three mock-ups for ChiCom hand grenades were evacuated the first day. A total of 104 individual weapons and two crew-served weapons were evacuated from the cache on the second day.

The 2nd Bde continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of July with three battalions (4th Bn (M), 23rd Inf went to OPCON 2nd Bde from OPCON 1st Bde on 16 July) operating in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. Enemy activity in the 2nd Bde's AO during the week was extremely light with only one contact reported. The Deputy CO of the 2 Bn, 274 Regiment rallied at Binh Son (YS212935) on 18 July and gave information concerning his and other units. He stated that the 1 Bn, 274 Regt was split into two sections located southwest of Xuan Loc, YT360050 and east of Bearcat, YS255990. The unit was to consolidate at the second location for an operation in the Binh Son area sometime during the next month. The 2 Bn was located northeast of Binh Son, YS239950 and a guerrilla unit which provided combat support to the regiment was located near the 2 Bn vic YS230951.

The 3rd Bde continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the third week of July with four battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces. Enemy activity remained at a low level during the week with 10 contacts reported resulting in seven enemy killed and one PW captured. HHC/2-14 Inf at Dau Tieng Base Camp received six unknown type rockets at 1817 hours on 19 July resulting in six US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned with artillery with unknown results.

One PW was captured by A/2-14 Inf 5.4 kilometers north of Thi Tinh (XT617578) at 1155 hours on 17 July. They evacuated one AK47 rifle with four magazines, one hammock, one pound of rice and a small amount of medical supplies. The PW was a member of the 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, 1 Company, 1 Battalion, 101 Regiment which normally operates in the area where the capture took place. B/3-4 Cav received heavy small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 10 kilometers west of Ben Suc in the Boi Loi Woods (XT480357) at 1800 hours on 18 July resulting in two US soldiers killed and eight wounded. One M-551 and one APC suffered heavy damage. Fire was returned by

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organic weapons, artillery, LFT, Night Hawk, Shadow, flareship and airstrike with unknown results. Snipers from B/3-4 Cav at an NDP 11.5 kilometers northwest of Ben Suc (XT467380) engaged seven enemy with small arms fire at 0550 hours on 21 July resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of a small amount of documents. A convoy from Btry B, 5th Bn, 2nd Arty received small arms and RPG fire from both sides of Highway 14 at 1015 hours on 21 July 7 kilometers south of Dau Tieng (XT526407) resulting in two US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons and artillery and B/3-22 Inf reacted with unknown results. One Duster suffered light damage.

The 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div continued operating with two battalions in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and one battalion in Nhon Trach District with responsibility for security of the local pacification program. Enemy activity was light with five contacts reported resulting in eight enemy killed. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 2015 hours on 15 July when Tm 21, Co E (Rgr), 75th Inf engaged the point element of a 50 man force moving 5 kilometers west of Ben Luc (XS573766) with organic weapons, Navy LFT, Shadow and artillery resulting in three enemy killed. The enemy force returned fire with small arms and hand grenades until 2230 hours. The Rangers withdrew from the area on Kenner boats without suffering any casualties. C/2-47 Inf (M) engaged three enemy at 1835 hours on 17 July 8 kilometers west of Thuy Dong (XS208808) with organic weapons resulting in two enemy killed.

General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, US Army visited Cu Chi Base Camp and two FSB's on 15 July for an update on 25th Inf Div activities. Brigadier General Donnelly P. Bolton, Director of Operations, ODCSOPS, DA visited Cu Chi Base Camp for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities on 15 July. Brigadier General William F. Doehler, USMC, Deputy J3 (Designate), MACV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 15 July for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities. Colonel Gordon C. Jung, Deputy G3, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 16 July for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities. Brigadier General M.J.L. Greene became Acting Commander of the 25th Inf Div on 17 July. Colonel William L. Graves, CO (Designate), 1st Bde visited Cu Chi Base Camp from 17-22 July for an initial orientation on 25th Inf Div activities. Major General William B. Latta, CG, USA STRATCOM visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 17 July for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities. Air Vice Marshal B.A. Eaton, CB, CBE, DSO, DFC, Air Member For Personnel, Royal Australian Air Force visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 17 July to talk with Royal Australian Air Force FAC's. Colonel Robert R. Baker, MACV J3-04 visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 20 July for a briefing on BASS/Duffel Bag operations in the 25th Inf Div. Lieutenant General Michael S. Davison, CG, II FFV, visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 20 July for an update on 25th Inf Div activities. Major General Edward Bautz, Jr. resumed Command of the 25th Inf Div on 20 July.

Enemy activity in the 25th Inf Div's TAOI remained at a low level during the fourth week of July (22-31 July) as main and local force units avoided contact. The areas of greatest enemy activity were along infiltration routes in north central Tay Ninh Province and SR-1 and MR-1 around Xuan Loc.

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There was also an increase in enemy attacks by fire over the previous week in the 1st and 3rd Bde AO's. There was a slight increase in the number of mining incidents.

The 1st Bde continued Operation TOAN THANG IV during the fourth week of July with five battalions and the 4th Bn, 49th Regt (ARVN) operating in north central Tay Ninh Province and northwest Binh Long Province. Three significant shelling incidents were reported in the 1st Bde AO during the week. Tay Ninh Base Camp received 10-15 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle (four rounds impacted inside) at 0240 hours on 24 July resulting in the wounding of one US soldier and light damage to one structure. HHC/2-22 Inf (M) at FSB Denny (XT336894) received three 122mm rockets at 1903 hours on 27 July resulting in three US wounded. At 1930 hours on 29 July, C/2-22 Inf (M) at FSB Denny received seven 107mm and 122mm rockets resulting in seven US wounded. Fire was returned to XT361936 by artillery with unknown results.

There were 110 contacts with enemy troops in the 1st Bde's AO during the week resulting in 17 enemy killed and two prisoners-of-war captured. The most significant engagement of the week occurred on 22 July. A convoy from Btry B, 1st Bn, 27th Arty with Btry C, 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty received small arms and RPG fire on Highway 22 ten kilometers north of Thien Ngon (XT072877) at 0930 hours resulting in two US wounded and light damage to one truck. Fire was returned by artillery, LFT and airstrikes and A/2-34 Arm and 4-49 ARVN reacted with unknown results. Later, at 1158 hours, 4-49 ARVN engaged an estimated 150 enemy in a bunker complex with organic weapons, artillery, LFT and airstrikes resulting in 10 enemy killed and two PW's captured. The PW's identified the C5 Co, K7 Bn, 95C Regt, 9th NVA Div. Four AK47 rifles, two RPG launchers and one light machine gun were evacuated. Four enemy were killed by A/2-22 Inf (M) in two engagements on 24 July. At 0955 hours, two enemy were engaged with claymore mines 1 kilometer west of Bo Tuc (XT370852) resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 with magazine. Later, at 1758 hours, two enemy were engaged with claymore mines 100 meters west of the 0955 hours contact resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle and a small amount of documents. C/2-12 Inf received six command detonated claymore mines and small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon located in a large bunker complex 3 kilometers southwest of Tau Tung Thngai (XT406801) at 1530 hours on 31 July resulting in two US soldiers killed and four wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, LFT, artillery and airstrikes until 1545 hours when contact was lost.

A number of bunker complexes were located by 1st Bde forces during the week. B/2-22 Inf (M) located three bunker complexes 2.5 kilometers east of Katum (XT354907) at 1616, 1620 and 1630 hours on 24 July. They destroyed 31 bunkers, 50 fighting positions, one mortar position, two 82mm mortar rounds and a small amount of commo wire. A/2-60 Inf located and destroyed two tons of polished rice 4.6 kilometers northwest of Sroc Tam (XT467896) at 0955 hours on 25 July. A small amount of documents was also evacuated.

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Enemy activity in the 2nd Bde's AO increased over last week but was still considered at a low level as main and local force units attempted to alleviate their critical supply shortages. There were seven contacts with enemy forces in MR-7 during the fourth week of July resulting in four enemy soldiers killed. A/1-27 Inf received small arms and mortar fire 15 kilometers southeast of Xuan Loc (YS574985) at 1806 hours on 22 July resulting in five US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery with unknown results. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 2010 hours on 28 July when an NDP of C/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy 1.2 kilometers west of Xuan Loc (YT339068) resulting in four US wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery until 2215 hours resulting in three enemy killed.

The 3rd Bde continued Operation TOANG THANG IV during the fourth week of July with four battalions operating in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces. Enemy activity in SR-1 was at a moderate level during the week with the 101 NVA Regt the most active unit. There was one attack by fire in the 3rd Bde's AO. D/3-22 Inf at FSB Redleg (XT678305) received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar at 1840 hours on 30 July resulting in five US wounded. Fire was returned by mortars with unknown results.

There were seven contacts with enemy forces in the 3rd Bde's AO during the week resulting in 10 enemy killed. B/2-27 Inf engaged three enemy 8 kilometers northeast of Cu Chi (XT696171) at 2200 hours on 24 July with organic weapons and LFT resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles. Enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire killed one US soldier and wounded one. C/3-4 Cav engaged an unknown number of enemy with claymore mines 3 kilometers east of Khiem Hanh (XT469353) at 1100 hours on 27 July resulting in three enemy killed. There was no enemy return fire. An NDP of B/2-27 Inf 8.5 kilometers northeast of Trung Lap (XT644287) engaged 5-7 enemy with mortar fire at 1920 hours on 28 July resulting in three enemy killed. The bodies were located at 1215 hours on 31 July by B/2-27 Inf 14 kilometers southwest of the 28 July NDP.

The 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div operated with two battalions in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and one battalion in Nhon Trach District during the fourth week of July. Enemy activity was extremely light with only three contacts reported resulting in three enemy killed.

Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey, DCG, USARV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 23 July for the presentation of the Meritorious Unit Citation to HHC, 25th Inf Div and for an orientation briefing on 25th Inf Div activities. Chaplain (Col) Franklin T. Gosser, Staff Chaplain, II FFV visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 25 July for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities. Richard S. Harvey, Finance Director, National Laymen's Council of the Church League of America visited Cu Chi Base Camp, FSB Kien and Nui Ba Den on 28 July to visit with troops of the 25th Inf Div. Colonel John Bergner, CO, 34th Gen Spt Gp visited Cu Chi Base Camp on 28 July for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities. Colonel John P. Cooper, CO (Designate) 25th Inf Div Artillery, visited

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Cu Chi Base Camp and other fire support bases from 30 July to 2 August for an orientation on 25th Inf Div activities.

The 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division killed 125 and captured nine of the enemy during the month of July, accounted for 160 individual weapons, 14 crew-served weapons and 5.1 tons of rice captured or destroyed. Division soldiers destroyed 120 mines and booby traps while detonating 48, resulting in 74 US soldiers wounded.

The quarter from 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970 was highlighted by the Cambodian cross-border operations directed by President Nixon on 1 May 1970. The 1st and 2nd Brigades, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and all maneuver battalions of the 25th Infantry Division played an integral part in the attack. Although limited in time and restricted geographically, the Division was highly successful in destroying enemy supply points, training sites and base areas along the Cambodian border. The accomplishment of this mission greatly reduced enemy offensive capabilities in the III Corps area of South Vietnam. Additionally, the enemy suffered significant personnel losses. A total of 1075 enemy soldiers were killed, 54 captured and 22 Hoi Chanh received by 25th Infantry Division forces during the nearly two month long Cambodian operations. Consequently, the enemy was forced to move his personnel and supply bases deeper into Cambodia and considerable time and effort will be required to reconstitute those destroyed bases. Personnel intended by the enemy for offensive action will have to be diverted to supply and support service. The total result, though not yet fully evident, will certainly aid the GVN pacification program and serve to give the ARVN/RF/PF forces additional time and confidence to oppose any further aggression.

During the Cambodian operations, the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued operations in their respective TAOI's, tactically executing small unit operations, ambushes and combat patrols to locate the enemy, disrupt his movements and uncover his supplies. Emphasis continued to be placed on the pacification program and upgrading RF/PF forces throughout the Division's TAOI.

The Division pulled out of Cambodia during the last week of June. The 1st Brigade was assigned to a new AO in north central Tay Ninh and northwest Binh Long Provinces and throughout July concentrated on interdicting enemy infiltration from Cambodia and destroying enemy supply bases along the border. The 2nd Brigade moved to a new AO in Long Hanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces in MR-7 during July and concentrated on the destruction of the enemy and his supplies.

The 3rd Brigade during July continued to prevent the enemy from infiltration into Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces and disrupted local force activities through the use of small unit tactics. The 3rd Brigade was also tasked with the responsibility for the defense of Cu Chi Base Camp and designated one battalion as Division Ready Reactionary Force.

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Operations by 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division forces accounted for 254 enemy KIA (to include Cambodian operations) during the quarter, forced Sub-Region 3 units to operate in dispersed groups to avoid Allied detection, disrupted Sub-Region 6 local and main force plans for attacks on Saigon and greatly expanded the pacification program in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces. With United States Naval forces, 3-9 Inf Div forces seriously disrupted the enemy's ability to operate along canals and rivers within Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces, prevented enemy reinforcements of men and supplies to local guerrilla forces and reduced the effectiveness of the Viet Cong infrastructure by continuous monitoring of the enemy's routes of movement.

b. (C) Personnel:

(1) During the months of May through July 1970, the aggregate Division personnel strength averaged 17,760 of 17,709 authorized or 100.3%. Enlisted personnel strength averaged for this period 16,477 of 16,410 authorized or 100.3%, while officer personnel strength for the period averaged 1,279 of 1,299 authorized or 98.3%. Personnel shortages continued to exist in Infantry, Signal Corps and Artillery captains, aviators overall, and non-commissioned officers in the grades E6 through E8 in the 11B, 11C, 12B, 13E, 17K, 31G, 63C and 76P MCS series.

(2) During the period 1 May through 31 July 1970, the Division had 114 KIA's (2 officers and 112 EM), and 1,259 WIA's (90 officers and 1,169 EM), excluding OPCON units. There were 7 nonbattle deaths, 104 nonbattle injuries and 4 missing in action (2 officers and 2 EM). Officer gains for the period numbered 339, while administrative losses were 487. EM gains were 5,353, while administrative EM losses totaled 6,137.

(3) Principal Command and Staff: The identification of the principal Command and Staff personnel within the 25th Infantry Division for the reporting period is as follows:

Commanding General	Major General Edward Bautz, Jr. (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Assistant Division Commander - A	Brigadier General Michael J. L. Greene (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Assistant Division Commander - B	Brigadier General John R. Thurman III (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Chief of Staff	Colonel Thomas J. Hanifen (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
ACofS, G1	LTC Thomas E. Hiley (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
ACofS, G2	LTC Toshio Aoyagi (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)

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ACofS, G3

LTC James E. Coggins  
(1 May 70 - 4 Jul 70)

LTC Ted G. Westerman  
(5 Jul 70 - 31 Jul 70)

ACofS, G4

LTC Burton J. Walrath  
(1 May 70 - 21 Jun 70)

LTC John H. Claybrook  
(22 Jun 70 - 31 Jul 70)

ACofS, G5

LTC Davant T. Williams  
(1 May 70 - 15 Jun 70)

LTC Anthony J. Perrotto  
(16 Jun 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade

Colonel Paul J. Mueller, Jr.  
(1 May 70 - 21 Jul 70)

Colonel William F. Graves  
(22 Jul 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Commanding Officer, 2nd Brigade

Colonel Ennis C. Whitehead, Jr.  
(11 May 70 - 14 May 70)

Colonel Sam C. Holliday  
(15 May 70 - 6 Jun 70)

Colonel Walworth F. Williams  
(7 Jun 70 - 20 Jun 70)

Colonel Joseph R. Ulatoski  
(21 Jun 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Commanding Officer, 3rd Brigade

Colonel Olin B. Smith  
(1 May 70 - 28 May 70)

Colonel James M. Connell  
(29 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Commanding Officer, DIVARTY

Colonel Harry A. Buzzett  
(1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Commanding Officer, DISCOM

Colonel Robert B. Hammerquist  
(1 May 70 - 14 May 70)

Colonel Linwood B. Mather  
(15 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)

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Commanding Officer, 725th Maint Bn	LTC Wallace H. Dawson (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 25th S&T Bn	LTC Delmas V. Lippard (1 May 70 - 30 Jul 70)
	LTC Joseph L. Van Camp (31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 25th Med Bn	LTC Bruce R. LaFollette (1 May 70 - 14 Jul 70)
	LTC David Arbiter (15 Jul 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 125th Sig Bn	LTC William R. Rogers (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 65th Engr Bn	Colonel James L. Trayers, Jr. (1 May 70 - 31 May 70)
	LTC Forrest T. Gay III (1 Jun 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 25th Avn Bn	LTC Robert R. Gosney (1 May 70 - 28 Jun 70)
	LTC Harry W. Drotor (29 Jun 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 4th Bn, 9th Inf	LTC Robert W. Welsh (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf	LTC Charles W. Norton (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 4th Bn (M), 23rd Inf	LTC Edward M. Bradford (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 27th Inf	LTC Martin L. Rosenstein (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf	LTC Albert P. Hodges (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf	LTC Ted G. Westerman (1 May 70 - 4 Jul 70)
	LTC Oliver B. Combs (5 Jul 70 - 31 Jul 70)

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Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 12th Inf	LTC Sheppard H. Phillips (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf	LTC John R. Parker (1 May 70 - 20 May 70)
	LTC Nathan C. Vail (21 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf	LTC John E. Hazelwood (1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor	LTC William Greenberg (1 May 70 - 11 May 70)
	MAJ L. G. Nowak (12 May 70 - 13 May 70)
	LTC Birtrun S. Kidwell (14 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav	LTC Corwin A. Mitchell (1 May 70 - 5 May 70)
	LTC Noel D. Knotts (6 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 8th Arty	LTC Richard A. Manion (1 May 70 - 29 Jun 70)
	LTC David R. Hampton (30 Jun 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 7th Bn, 11th Arty	LTC Robert E. Robinson (1 May 70 - 8 May 70)
	LTC Paul M. Payson (9 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty	LTC William D. Taylor (1 May 70 - 30 Jul 70)
	LTC Thomas Soberick (31 Jul 70)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty	LTC Charles S. Stodter, Jr. (1 May 70 - 30 Jul 70)
	LTC Thomas L. Kelly (31 Jul 70)

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Adjutant General

LTC William J. Winter, Jr.  
(1 May 70 - 20 Jun 70)

LTC Peter H. Walker  
(21 Jun 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Division Chaplain

LTC Gene M. Little  
(1 May 70 - 7 Jun 70)

LTC Roy V. Peters  
(8 Jun 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Finance Officer

LTC James A. Enloe  
(1 May 70 - 9 Jun 70)

LTC Frederick J. Wadsworth  
(10 Jun 70 - 30 Jul 70)

CPT Garry D. Foster  
(31 Jul 70)

Information Officer

MAJ Warren J. Field  
(1 May 70 - 14 Jul 70)

MAJ Robert E. Kelso  
(15 Jul 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Inspector General

LTC John M. Walton  
(1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Staff Judge Advocate

MAJ Burnett H. Radosh  
(1 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Provost Marshal

LTC William Gregerson  
(1 May 70 - 4 Jun 70)

LTC Clyde L. Murphy  
(5 Jun 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Division Surgeon

LTC Bruce LaFollette  
(1 May 70 - 14 Jul 70)

LTC David Arbiter  
(15 Jul 70 - 31 Jul 70)

Division Chemical Officer

MAJ James D. Knipp  
(1 May 70 - 8 May 70)

LTC Robert R. Knox, Jr.  
(9 May 70 - 31 Jul 70)

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Headquarters Commandant

MAJ Harry A. Ficken  
(1 May 70 - 17 Jun 70)

MAJ Bruce L. Brown  
(18 Jun 70 - 16 Jul 70)

CPT A. Marc Christianson  
(17 Jul 70 - 31 Jul 70)

c. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Summary of Enemy Activity.

(a) Enemy activity in the AO during May was concentrated against Allied offensives in Cambodia. The 9th VC/NVA Division reacted to Allied thrusts by repositioning two of its regiments deeper into Cambodia, leaving the 95C Regiment in and around BA 354. The 272 Regiment displaced westward from Bo Ba Tay to the vicinity of Prey Veng, Cambodia. The 7th VC Division withdrew into Cambodia to oppose Allied operations in the COSVN Base. Contacts during the operation were limited to small pockets of resistance guarding cache sites and other areas of importance. There were also contacts with numerous COSVN security agencies and units with the mission of protecting headquarters complexes. The enemy situation within the RVN borders did not change significantly during the month. Three regimental sized units posed a threat to friendly forces and installations in RVN. They were the 95C Regiment in western War Zone "C" and the 209 and 165 Regiments in northern War Zone "C". The only increase of activity within RVN was the reappearance of the 101 Regiment, SR-1, in new areas of operation in the Saigon River Corridor. The regiment had displaced from the Upper Saigon River Corridor to the Michelin/Upper Citadel Area.

(b) Enemy activity in the 25th Infantry Division AO was at a moderate level during the month of June. As US units completed the final phase of withdrawal from Cambodia, little change in the disposition of enemy units was noted. The 95C Regiment, 9th VC/NVA Division remained in and around Base Area 354, while the other two regiments of the 9th Division (271 and 272) continued to move deeper into Cambodia. The 165th and 209th Regiments of the 7th NVA Division remained in their locations north and northeast of Base Area 353, and the 141st Regiment did not move from its location to the northwest of the Flat Iron. There was also contact with security and signal elements of COSVN. Elements of the 208th Artillery Regiment were identified to the north of Katum where that unit appeared to have the mission of supporting elements of the 7th NVA Division. Overall, the center of activity was along the Saigon River between Dau Tieng and the Mushroom, where the 101st Regiment was identified several times during the month of June. Activity in SR-2 and SR-3 was at a low level throughout the month.

(c) Harassing attacks by fire were experienced throughout the AO during July, particularly in the area of northern War Zone "C" and in the Saigon River Corridor. Sub-region 1 was the most active area. The 16th Armor/Sapper

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Office, COSVN was identified conducting harassing attacks on FSB Denny during the month. The Postal, Transportation and Communication Office, COSVN was also identified during the month. COSVN divisional elements appeared to be remaining in Cambodia. However, the only identification of a divisional unit was that of the 209th Regiment, 7th NVA Division near FSB Lanyard, possibly indicating that the unit was returning to north-central War Zone "C". The 101 Regiment, Sub-region 1 was the most active unit in the AO. It was identified several times during the month in the Michelin-Trapezoid-Boi Loi Area. Enemy units seemed to be concentrating their efforts toward the disruption of the GVN Pacification Program, restoring supply and communication channels and regaining popular support. Heavy sensor activity was recorded across Tay Ninh Province, north of Nui Ba Den, during July indicating that enemy elements may be moving back into Tay Ninh from Cambodia for possible offensive activity in War Zone "C" and along the Saigon River Corridor.

(2) During the quarter, the G2 Air Section produced a substantial number of area studies for the brigades and battalions of the division. An increase too, was recorded in the number of photo missions which were flown during the period. Increases resulted from the Cambodian operations and changes in the division's areas of operation.

### II Section Production 11 May 70 - 31 July 70

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Readouts (Interpretations)	64	51	84	199
Mosaics	12	10	6	28
Area Studies	28	6	13	47
Trafficability Studies	12	5	16	33
Handheld Annotations	125	160	300	585
Army Photo Missions	41	15	40	96
AF Photo Missions	30	40	51	121

(3) The Interrogation Prisoner of War Section, 25th Military Intelligence Company, processed 159 detainees during the quarter. This number included 78 VCG/VC/NVA/PW's, 64 detainees, 7 VCS-CD's, 7 Civil Defendants and 13 innocent civilians.

(a) For the quarter, the IPW Section developed 12 targets for field units. Eight exploitations were successful and resulted in 14 enemy killed, 33 bunkers located and destroyed and the capture of five tons of rice, six tons of salt, approximately ten tons of small arms ammunition, one 1.5 KW generator, an estimated twenty pounds of documents, one SKS enemy rifle, 240 pounds of TNT in good condition, twenty gallons of gasoline in five gallon cans, one bag of miscellaneous supplies, one .50 caliber ammo can of medical supplies, one M16 ammunition can of candy, two quarts of whiskey, one K54 pistol, two quart bottles of medicine, surgical utensils, one gas stove, one package of pictures of NVA nurses, two K54 magazines with ammunition, ten pounds of clothing, two gallons of gasoline, two bottles of Dextrose, six candles and three bandages.

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(b) The increase in the number of PW's and returnee's during the past quarter was caused by the operations in Cambodia. 127 of the total 159 detainees during this period were processed during the month of May, 1970, reflecting a significant increase in exploitable targets. Since the return of American Forces to SVN, however, the number of detainees has decreased, a result of the decline in enemy activity.

(4) Sensor devices continue to be successfully employed in the 25th Infantry Division AO in both a target acquisition and intelligence role. Sensors are located to monitor base areas, routes of infiltration, areas of mining and booby trap incidents, enemy supply routes and waterways.

(a) Unattended ground sensors were emplaced in selected areas in Cambodia with the primary purpose of intelligence gathering after troop withdrawals. With the withdrawal of all US troops on 30 June, the unattended ground sensors became the primary source of intelligence in Cambodia, and played a secondary role in target acquisition. Consolidated monitoring at Division level by Base Area Surveillance System enabled the Duffel Bag section to correlate the data from all sensor fields and furnish the Division with useful information. The main areas of interest were as follows:

1 Activity in Base Area 354 indicated a general trend of movement from the Trans-shipment point, west to east. This information substantiated other intelligence reports indicating a border crossing site in the area. The primary activity in Base Area 354 was the movement between the Trans-shipment Point (WT9163) and a border crossing area (WT9765).

2 Activations west of the Dog's Face indicated enemy activity in a west to east direction. Activations were caused by vehicular movement toward the Vietnam border.

3 Activity in the Fishhook and northwest of the Fishhook showed a trend of movement in a north to southeast direction indicating movement toward the SVN border. Certain areas also showed heavy concentrations of activity (XT5194) on a daily basis, an indication of a possible base camp or bunker area.

(b) In a different application of UGS, sensors were emplaced in FSB Jamie and monitored after evacuation by US personnel. The sensors were emplaced on 31 May 70 and US personnel were withdrawn by 2 Jun 70. Activations after evacuation indicated enemy activity in the FSB. When US forces re-occupied this location, enemy elements were found in the area.

d. (C) Operations.

(1) Army Aviation:

(a) During the quarter the 25th Aviation Battalion supported the Division in the conduct of Operation TOAN THANG 42, TOAN THANG 43 and TOAN THANG 44 as

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well as the redeployment and resumption of TOAN THANG IV. Support hours fell within the established flying hour program for each type model and series aircraft except the OH6A.

(b) There has been no change in daily aircraft requirements during this reporting period. The battalion continues to support the 25th Infantry Division in a general support role.

(c) Statistical Summary of Combat Performance Data: (1 May to 31 July 1970)

	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Total</u>
Flight Hours	4101	3257	3486	10844
Sorties	7635	6227	7334	21196
Passengers Carried	12600	11635	12347	36582
Cargo Carried (Tons)	357	213	270	840
Enemy Eliminated (BC)	15	10	16	41
Enemy Eliminated (Poss)	0	0	0	0
Enemy Structures (Dest)	5	0	4	9
Enemy Structures (Dam)	3	0	0	3
Enemy Sampans (Dest)	0	0	0	0
Enemy Sampans (Dam)	0	0	0	0
Detainees	0	0	0	0
POW's	0	0	0	0

(d) There was no significant change in the operational concept of the Division's air assets during the reporting quarter.

(e) Statistical Summary for Troop D, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav: (1 May to 31 July 1970)

	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Total</u>
Flight Hours	2113	2073	1714	5900
Sorties	3960	3464	3380	10804
Passengers Carried	3778	2770	1457	8005
Cargo Carried (Tons)	9	8	5	22
Enemy Eliminated (BC)	93	14	16	123
Enemy Eliminated (Poss)	0	0	0	0
Enemy Structures (Dest)	7	39	51	97
Enemy Structures (Dam)	0	10	7	17
Enemy Sampans (Dest)	0	10	0	10
Enemy Sampans (Dam)	0	0	0	0
Detainees	0	0	0	0
POW's	2	0	0	2

(f) During the reporting quarter the battalion experienced six major accidents. The causes were as follows: Three UH1H's due to an engine failure, a tail rotor failure and due to loss of RPM while in an overgross condition; two AH1G's due to an engine failure and target fixation while in a

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gun run; and one OH6A due to engine failure. Troop D, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav (OPCON) experienced two major accidents as follows: one AH1G due to engine failure and one OH6A due to engine failure.

### (2) Engineer Operations:

(a) During the period 1 May 70 to 31 Jul 70, the majority of engineer effort was in the form of direct support of the 25th Infantry Division in combat operations in both the Republic of Vietnam and Cambodia. Company A continued in direct support of the 1st Brigade, Company C in direct support of the 2nd Brigade until 30 June, and Company D in direct support of the 3rd Brigade. Company B assumed direct support responsibility for 2nd Brigade on 1 July. The remainder of the battalion continued in general support of the 25th Infantry Division. A large portion of the missions conducted this quarter were in support of ground operations in Cambodia. On 30 June, Company B, having assumed a direct support role for the 2nd Brigade, departed Cu Chi for the new Brigade area of operations south of Xuan Loc. Company C then assumed a general support role for the 25th Infantry Division.

### (b) Significant Activities:

1 The single most significant activity during the quarter was the conduct of ground operations in Cambodia. The 65th Engineer Battalion provided engineer support to the 25th Infantry Division throughout the entire Cambodian campaign.

2 Support from the battalion was initiated on 5 May with the move of elements of A, B and E Companies to Thien Ngon and FSB Wood North in War Zone C. This was followed on 6 May by the move of a forward command post including elements of S-2, S-3, S-4 and Battalion Maintenance sections to Tay Ninh and Thien Ngon. Also on 6 May, Company E began construction of a 15 float M4T6 bridge on LTL to span the Rach Ca River and allow the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf and 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf to cross into Cambodia. This bridge remained in operation until 14 May when it was extracted by Company E.

3 Company C had been operating in direct support of the 2nd Brigade in AO Chop approximately 40 kilometers southeast of Saigon. On 6 May the company initiated action to accompany the 2nd Brigade in its move north to take part in the Cambodian campaign. Company C completed its move to Thien Ngon, through Cu Chi and Tay Ninh, on 8 May.

4 From 6 May to 13 May, elements of A, B and C Companies continued to work in the western section of War Zone C and in Cambodia. This work included the development and upgrade of the critical road network into Cambodia, and the development of Thien Ngon Base area and neighboring fire support bases as well as fire support bases in Cambodia.

5 The turning point for the battalion occurred on 14 May as elements of Company A moved from Thien Ngon to Katum in the eastern portion of War Zone C. In addition, elements of the battalion forward command post moved from Thien Ngon to Tay Ninh.

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6 A pattern for the remainder of the campaign emerged with these moves. Both Company A based in Katum and Company C based in Thien Ngon, with the aid of the remainder of the battalion, continued to provide direct engineer support to their respective brigades. This support was rendered in the following areas: continual development of fortifications, road systems, and drainage in the respective base areas; construction, maintenance and removal of fire support bases in the respective brigade areas on both sides of the border; and continual sweep team and demolition team support to combat units in the field.

7 Several other important missions were accomplished by elements of the battalion during the Cambodian campaign. On 21 May, Co C used demolitions to remove a damaged bridge on Route 7 approximately 7 kilometers east of Phum Krek and replaced it with an AVLB. Co C then moved to a location approximately 11 kilometers east of Phum Krek on Route 7 and constructed a 38 foot M4T6 dry span bridge over a damaged concrete span. On 22 May, Co C placed an AVLB as a bypass on Route 78 approximately 1 kilometer inside Cambodia, then later constructed an 80 foot double-single Bailey bridge at that location. On 31 May, Co A placed a 45 foot M4T6 dry span bridge in the village of Memot in Cambodia. On 9 June, Co B extracted the AVLB on Route 7 and constructed a 60 foot double-single Bailey bridge at that location. On 13 June, Co B constructed another 60 foot double-single Bailey bridge at Memot after Co A extracted the 45 foot M4T6 dry span at that location. Both Bailey bridges were constructed to replace bridges that had been damaged during combat operations in an effort to leave behind stronger and more durable structures than had previously existed.

8 Main effort during the final stages of the campaign was directed at insuring that extraction routes for American units in Cambodia remained open. The most critical extraction encountered was that of two "Rome Plow" land clearing companies of the 62nd Engr Bn. The route for extraction of the approximately sixty plows and allied equipment was maintained by Co A with the aid of elements of the 588th Engr Bn. One company "walked" its plows approximately 10 kilometers to FSB X-Ray where it rendezvoused with its lowboy convoy. The convoy then traveled the remaining 10 kilometers of the route to Katum. Considerable difficulty was encountered in traveling the narrow, mud-slick roads and the entire process took two days. Because of the problems encountered with the first extraction, the decision was made to walk the remaining company the entire length of the extraction route to Katum. Little difficulty was encountered and the extraction was completed in less than one day. All elements of the land clearing team departed Katum on 25 June.

9 While operations were being conducted in Cambodia in May and June, Co D continued to provide direct engineer support to the 3rd Brigade with its missions entirely within the RVN. These missions included the construction of a new fire support base, upgrading of two existing fire support bases, upgrading of four important roads and work in Cu Chi and Dau Tieng Base Camps.

10 Co D also initiated a new program in the Battalion involving the use of lime for soil stabilization. Fire Support Base Snyder was constructed by Co D using lime soil stabilization with excellent results. In addition, lime

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stabilization was used in upgrading FSB Kien and in the construction of the new 2nd Brigade base camp. Currently, the method is being used in the upgrading of LTL 14 in the 3rd Brigade area.

11 Several significant projects were undertaken during the quarter in and around Cu Chi Base Camp. On 10 May, Co B undertook the mission of recovering a downed OV-10 aircraft in a swamp approximately 10 kilometers west-southwest of Cu Chi. Recovery was made extremely difficult by the lack of firm footing, extent of damage to the aircraft and the depth to which it was buried in the mud. On 24 May positive identification of the crew was made and all secure equipment was finally recovered.

12 Inside Cu Chi Base Camp, work continued on the design and upgrade of the bunkerline drainage. Work continued in upgrading the berm with Co's B, C and D participating. Construction of the new perimeter bunkers also continued with supervisory help from Co's B and C.

13 On 17 June, Co B was assigned the mission of repairing the collapsed swimming pool at the Division stand-down area in Cu Chi Base Camp. Work included preparation of the site, removal of unserviceable portions of the pool and driving 96 sheet piles as a new framework for the pool. On 29 June the general support and direct support roles of Co's B and C, respectively, were interchanged. Consequently, Co C assumed the responsibility for completion of the pool project. Their work included capping the piles, placing the new rubber lining, constructing new concrete walkways and general cleanup of the pool area. The project was completed on 13 July.

14 Three other major company relocations occurred during the quarter. On 19 June one platoon of Co C moved from Thien Ngon to Tay Ninh where it continued to support the Cambodia operation. From 26 to 28 June Co C conducted a phased move, through Tay Ninh, to Cu Chi. On 29 June the Company completed its move from Thien Ngon to Cu Chi and prepared to assume its new role as general support company for the Division.

15 On 30 June, Co B, newly assigned as the direct engineer support company for the 2nd Brigade moved from Cu Chi to the site of the new brigade base camp 26 kilometers south of Xuan Loc. Work has continued to date on the 400 by 600 meter Operation Base Lynch. This has included site clearing, construction of all interior roads, culvert construction and ditching for interior drainage, as well as berm and bunker construction for the defense of the base.

16 In ceremonies held in Cu Chi Base Camp on 3 July, Co B, as an attached unit, received the Valorous Unit Award with the 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav. The 3-4 Cav with its assigned and attached units was cited for "extraordinary heroism while engaged in military operations" in the Boi Loi Woods for the period 1 Jan 69 through 22 Feb 69. A small detachment of Co B was present to receive the award while the remainder of the company continued its work in the new brigade base camp.

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17 Co A initiated action in order to accompany the 1st Brigade in its move from Tay Ninh to Dau Tieng on 20 June. The 3rd Plt of Co A moved to Dau Tieng on that date and undertook the mission of preparing an area to accept the remainder of the company. In addition, the platoon assumed the job previously conducted by Co D of improving the drainage, bermline and fields of fire in the base camp. Also, a self-help bunker construction program was initiated with timber precut and supervision provided by Co A. The last elements of Co A departed Tay Ninh for Dau Tieng on 23 July.

18 During July, Co E returned to riverine operations. During the week of 19 July the following support was provided: a total of four assault boats and six 25 HP outboard motors with crews were placed under operational control of 6th Bn, 31st Inf in Ben Luc; two assault boats and three 25 HP outboard motors with crews were placed under operational control of the 8th Engr Bn in Phuoc Vinh; two assault boats and three 25 HP motors with crews were placed under the control of Co A in Dau Tieng. On 28 July an additional three assault boats and three outboard motors were sent to the 6th Bn, 31st Inf while three of the previously assigned boats were retrograded to Cu Chi. During this period, Co E received six Boston Whalers with 40 HP motors from the Thai Army, repaired them and prepared them for transfer to the ARVN in Ben Hoa District.

19 On 17 July, a 30 day land clearing operation was conducted by the 984th Land Clearing Co of the 62nd Engr Bn. The area being cleared was located in the 3rd Bde's AO immediately north of Dau Tieng. The 65th Engr Bn, through its Co D, was responsible for coordination of support required by the land clearing team, for advice on trafficability of the area being cleared and for insuring that all necessary bridging required for the team's movement was required.

### (c) Civic Action:

1 Co C conducted a three day civic action project in July. In the village of Thai My, a laterite foundation for a two room school was excavated and compacted. An access road was built from the village to a nearby church. In Ap Binh, an area for a high school was cleared and graded and an access road was constructed.

2 Civic action projects in the form of secondary road repair were also conducted. During this period 111 kilometers of secondary road were upgraded.

3 MEDCAPS for this quarter were conducted three times per week until 24 Jun 70. At that time, the program was expanded to four MEDCAPS per week to serve Son Loc and Mui Lon hamlets. A total of 3,070 patients were seen during the period and 63,700 \$ VN worth of medical supplies were distributed.

### (d) Water Production for the quarter was as follows:

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>GALLONS PRODUCED</u>		
	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
Cu Chi	840,800	740,200	565,000
Katum		150,400	21,070
Thien Ngon		491,600	139,736
FSB Rawlings	170,000	50,340	15,000
FSB Washington	115,500	23,100	15,000
FSB Kien	36,000	42,500	20,000
FSB Wood III	119,200		
FSB Jackson	16,200		
FSB Chamberlain	40,100		
FSB Colorado	240,500		
FSB N. Dakota	118,600		
FSB Dorn	_____	_____	15,600
Monthly Totals	1,496,900	1,498,140	791,406

TOTAL PRODUCTION FOR THE QUARTER: 3,786,446 GALLONS

(3) Artillery Operations:

(a) During the reporting period the 25th Infantry Division Artillery provided direct and general artillery support to maneuver elements of the 25th Inf Div. Operations included those in Cambodia, the economy of force stay-behind operation in Vietnam, reconsolidation after 30 June and the re-configuration to the wet weather season posture toward the end of the reporting period. Although there were attachments and detachments, normally support was provided as follows:

1st Brigade	7th Battalion, 11th Artillery
2nd Brigade	1st Battalion, 8th Artillery
3rd Brigade	2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery

The 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery provided general support for the Division.

(b) 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery:

1 During the period 5 May - 29 June 1970 the battalion supported 1st Brigade operations in Cambodia. Battalion headquarters was located at

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Thien Ngon from 5 - 7 May, FSB Wood 8 - 15 May and Katum from 16 May - 29 June. The operation was characterized by frequent displacements in the Fishhook area of Cambodia and in Vietnam in the vicinity of the Fishhook. Batteries occupied a total of 21 different firing positions during the period.

2 From 30 June through 31 July the battalion supported operations in northern and northeastern area of Tay Ninh Province. Preparations were made for the move to Dau Tieng and support of the 1st Bde in western Tay Ninh, eastern Binh Duong and southwestern Binh Long Provinces.

3 During the reporting period the battalion fired a total of 55,314 rounds.

### (c) 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery

1 The 1st Bn, 8th Arty departed Bearcat on 7 May to support 2nd Bde operations in Cambodia. From 9 May until 10 June the battalion headquarters controlled operations from within Cambodia. Batteries displaced 21 times and were subjected to road blocks or ambushes on three of these moves. 2nd Bde elements in contact with the enemy were supported by 1st Bn, 8th Arty firing batteries on 44 occasions. The battalion fired 23,784 rounds during the operations. 1st Bn, 8th Arty was credited with the discovery of two major caches while in Cambodia.

2 The battalion headquarters withdrew from Cambodia on 10 June and the battalion supported the 2nd Bde in the move back to Vietnam. The battalion functioned out of Tay Ninh Base Camp until 1 July 1970 when it displaced to Xuan Loc and on 19 July to Operational Base Lynch for wet season operations.

### (d) 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery

1 On 7 May, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty was given the mission of providing artillery support to the 3rd Bde over an area of operations encompassing the area which was formerly the TAOI of the entire Division. This required a complete shift in the battalion's center of gravity from Hau Nghia Province to Tay Ninh Province. All firing batteries were split into two, three gun elements and rendered support to the 3rd Bde in its economy of force operation. The battalion's direct contribution to the operation in Cambodia was the displacement of Btry B, 2/77 Arty to Cambodia on 1 May with a mission of reinforcing 7th Bn, 11th Arty. Btry C, 7th Bn, 11th Arty was sent to 2nd Bn, 77th Arty in a direct exchange of batteries. Batteries reverted to their parent organizations on 18 June. While in Cambodia, Btry B, 2/77 Arty expended 12,043 rounds. During the period of the operation in Cambodia, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty provided support to all maneuver elements of the Division with the exception of 1st Bn, 27th Inf and 4th Bn, 9th Inf.

2 Toward the end of the operation in Cambodia the area supported by 2nd Bn, 77th Arty contracted and shifted to the east. On 31 July, the

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3rd Bde TACR straddled the Saigon River and was bounded on the north at Minh Thanh and on the south by Gia Dinh Province. The construction of FSB Redleg as an artillery manned and defended base and the reconfiguration of FSB Tennessee in a similar manner were part of the preparations for assuming a wet season posture.

3 Total expenditures by 2nd Bn, 77th Arty during the period were 42,686 rounds.

### (e) 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery

1 All four firing batteries of the battalion supported operations in Cambodia at various times during the period 4 May - 30 June 1970. Missions included general support reinforcing and reinforcing the direct support battalions operating in or in the vicinity of Cambodia.

2 As the operation in Cambodia phased down, the center of gravity of Division operations drifted back toward the east. Beginning in late June and extending through all of July the most critical area was the Saigon River Corridor along an axis from Dau Tieng and Phu Cuong. Batteries C and D were positioned at Dau Tieng and Btry B at FSB Snyder to support operations in the area.

3 Batteries of the battalion provided their own fire support base defense at FSB's Hampton, Devin and Snyder throughout most of the reporting period.

### e. (C) Logistics:

(1) To support two Division brigades, 25th Infantry Division Support Command elements moved to the Thien Ngon area from 4 - 6 May in support of the Cambodian operation. Forward supply, maintenance and medical elements were established at Thien Ngon. Class I, III, IIIA, V, VI (to include sundry packs), VIII and IX supplies and limited Class II and IV were available to the supported units at Thien Ngon. Class I, III and V were drawn from Saigon Support Command activities at Tay Ninh and transported forward by motor transport. Saigon Support Command augmented Divisional motor transport assets which significantly increased the availability of this primary mode of transportation. In the middle of May, one of the brigades was moved to Katum as a forward base to conduct further operations in Cambodia. The same DISCOM support elements were established at Katum as at Thien Ngon. JP-4 refuel points were established at Thien Ngon and Katum with fuel provided on a daily basis by Air Force C-123 and C-130 "Bladder Bird" aircraft. A "dustoff" control was established at both locations to facilitate medical evacuation. 25th Supply and Transport Bn FSE's, 725th Maintenance Bn's Contact Teams and 25th Medical Battalion Dispensaries at both locations maintained close coordination with both their parent organizations and supported units to ensure prompt and efficient support. Full support activities were maintained at Thien Ngon and Katum until the end of the Cambodian operation on 30 June 1970.

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(2) In late June, in response to impending changes in the disposition of troop units in the AO as a result of the cessation of the Cambodian operation, supply, maintenance and medical support activities were increased at Dau Tieng to support a brigade sized force being deployed to that location from Katum and Tay Ninh. All classes of supply were provided by Divisional assets, with the exception of Class V which was thruput from Long Binh. The 40th Dental Detachment provided dental service and area support. Dustoff was provided from Tay Ninh and Cu Chi. A JP-4 refuel point was operated and supported by 25th Supply and Transport Bn.

(3) During the first half of July, elements of a brigade size force moved in increments to a new AO south of Xuan Loc. Co C, 725th Maint Bn established a maintenance support facility at Xuan Loc augmented by contact team at FSB Lynch, the brigade CP. Also at Xuan Loc, a dispensary was operated by the 25th Med Bn and a dental clinic by the 137th Dental Detachment (KJ). Class I and III were thruput to 25th S&T Bn FSE at Nui Dat by Saigon Support Command. In addition, 25th S&T FSE maintained limited Class II and IV and accepted requisitions for Class VII. Class V was thruput from Long Binh depot to FSB Lynch whenever full S&P loads were requested by a unit; otherwise, units picked up Class V at Long Binh depot, Class VIII and IX were available at Xuan Loc. Brigade air assets utilized common user rearm/refuel points at Blackhorse and Nui Dat.

(4) During late July, the Division was tasked to provide aircraft and medical evacuation support to ARVN Airborne Brigade Forces located in western War Zone C. A six point JP-4 refuel station was established and medical evacuation was provided by Tay Ninh "Dustoff Control".

(5) Following are significant projects accomplished by the Office of the Installation Coordinator, Cu Chi Base Camp:

- (a) Reconstruction of Waikiki East swimming pool.
- (b) Water distribution system for Cu Chi.
- (c) Electrical upgrade throughout the base camp.
- (d) Construction of headwalls and culverts to improve drainage.

(6) Transportation requirements and assets rose significantly during the reporting period. Motor transport provided the majority of the bulk cargo shipments to Division forward areas. GS assets of the 48th Transportation Group augmented Division capability. The CH47 helicopter was successfully employed in daily resupply and unit moves from forward areas to field locations. During the quarter, over 98% utilization of CH47 aircraft assets allocated to the Division was achieved. CH54 assets were used extensively for the insertion and extraction of heavy lift items of equipment. Air Force assets were utilized for expedited unit moves and aerial resupply of JP-4 to Thien Ngon and Katum. The Division's operation of personal property shipment facilities was terminated at Tay Ninh and Cu Chi with Saigon Support Command assuming the mission.

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### (7) 25th Medical Battalion:

(a) The 25th Medical Battalion supported both Division and non-Divisional units with Medical service and supplies.

#### 1 Medical Totals:

##### Patients Seen:

- a Disease - 2,916
- b Non-battle injuries - 2,061
- c IRHA - 571 (NOTE: Seriously wounded patients are dusted off directly to the 12th Evacuation or 45th Surgical Hospital.)

#### 2 Supply and Services:

- a Line items issued - 2,020
- b MEDCAP line items issued: 414
- c Bulk pharmacy items issued: 2

(b) The 40th Medical Detachment (KJ), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion, provided dental treatment for the Division.

1 Total treatments - 20,268

2 Civic actions - 3,996

(c) The 1159th Medical Detachment (HA), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion, provided evacuation to Divisional and non-Divisional units.

1 Total Patients - 3,406

2 Total Missions - 11,554

3 Flying Time - 1,754 hours

4 Aircraft Availability - 75%

5 Aircraft Flyable - 6 (100%)

### (8) 25th Supply and Transport Battalion:

(a) During the period 4 May thru 29 June 1970, S&T FSE's at Thien Ngon and Katum issued a total of 443,485 rations, 2,931 sundry packs, and 3,830,000 pounds of ice. The FSE's issued 1,691,000 gallons of fuel as well as 445 major end items to Division units which participated in the Cambodian operation.

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### f. (C) Communications:

(1) During the reporting period, the 125th Signal Battalion continued to provide the 25th Infantry Division with VHF multichannel radio communications, FM secure and clear radio, radio teletype, communication center and message service, photographic support and tactical telephone communications.

#### (2) Significant events:

(a) This reporting quarter was unique in that the battalion had to make a transformation from an extended static operation to support what was a highly mobile Division.

(b) During the quarter the 2nd Bde moved from Bearcat to Thien Ngon to Tay Ninh to Xuan Loc to FSB Lynch and the 1st Bde moved from Tay Ninh to Thien Ngon to Katum to Tay Ninh to Dau Tieng. Forward area signal centers were installed at each location.

(c) On 9 May 1970, Co A moved a forward area Signal Center to Thien Ngon in support of the 1st and 2nd Bde's consisting of five AN/MRC-69, one AN/MTC-3, communication center, FM relay, one SB-611, one AN/GRC-142 and two wire teams.

(d) On 16 May 1970, Co B moved a forward area Signal Center to Katum, consisting of three AN/MRC-69, one AN/MRC-73, one AN/MTC-7, one AN/MGC-17, one SB-611 and two wire teams. They also established two VHF systems, 70-75 from Tay Ninh to Katum and 50-76 from Cu Chi to Katum.

(e) On 2 July 1970, the Battalion installed a FM secure retrans station at Long Binh, in support of 2nd Brigade located at Xuan Loc.

(f) On 13 July 1970, a complete Signal Center Platoon was deployed by Co C to FSB Lynch in support of the 2nd Bde.

(g) On 15 July 1970, the Battalion moved one each AN/MTC-17 and one each AN/GRC-142 from Xuan Loc to FSB Lynch in support of the 2nd Bde.

(h) The Battalion also installed an FM secure relay station on Hill 873, in support of the 2nd Bde.

(i) The Division Photo Lab processed 282 work orders, producing 7,451 prints.

(j) The Division MARS Station processed the following traffic between 1 May and 31 July 1970:

- 1 Total number of requests - 10,325
- 2 Total number of requests passed - 6,007
- 3 Total number of calls completed - 4,190

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(k) The multichannel systems were changed as follows:

- 1 On 3 May, Co B moved one AN/MRC-69 to Katum to install a multichannel system to Tay Ninh in support of 2-34 Arm and 2-47 Inf (M).
- 2 On 5 May, Co A moved one AN/MRC-69 to Thien Ngon and installed system to Tay Ninh in support of 1st Bde forward CP.
- 3 On 7 May, FSB Hull was discontinued and equipment and personnel returned to Co B at Tay Ninh.
- 4 On 8 May, FSB Devin was discontinued and equipment and personnel returned to Co C at Cu Chi.
- 5 On 10 May, A.O. Chop was discontinued and personnel and equipment returned to Co C at Cu Chi.
- 6 On 11 May, construction of a tower (AB-216) was completed at Thien Ngon.
- 7 On 12 May, Co B moved one AN/MRC-69 to 1st Bde forward CP (FSB Wood II), this system was installed to 2nd Bde (Thien Ngon).
- 8 On 14 May, the VHF system between FSB Wood II and Thien Ngon was discontinued.
- 9 On 19 May, Co B moved on AN/GRC-163 to FSB Jamie to establish a system between Dau Tieng and FSB Jamie in support of 5-60 Inf.
- 10 On 2 June, Co B installed an AN/GRC-163 4 channel system from Dau Tieng to FSB Kien.
- 11 On 12 June, the AN/GRC-163 system from FSB Kien to Dau Tieng was discontinued and Co C installed a 12 channel AN/MRC-69 system from FSB Kien to Cu Chi.
- 12 FSB Jackson was closed on 12 June and personnel and equipment returned to Co C at Cu Chi.
- 13 On 13 June, Co B moved one AN/MRC-69 and one SE-611 to Dau Tieng in support of 1st Bde.
- 14 On 15 June, FSB Rawlins was discontinued and equipment and personnel returned to Co B at Tay Ninh.
- 15 The field cable installation platoon from Co C was tasked with installing new cable at Dau Tieng on 15 June.
- 16 On 18 June, FSB Chamberlain was closed and personnel and equipment returned to Co C at Cu Chi.
- 17 On 19 June, FSB Hampton was closed and personnel and equipment returned to Co C at Cu Chi.
- 18 On 19 June, two common user circuits and one user TOC to TOC circuit and RATT was installed to Quan Loi in support of the 11th ACR, using the army area system.
- 19 On 22 June, the Signal Center at Thien Ngon was discontinued and personnel and equipment returned to Co A at Cu Chi. Co B installed a system using AN/MRC-69 from Dau Tieng to Tay Ninh.
- 20 On 24 June, Co B installed a multichannel from Dau Tieng to Cu Chi in support of the 1st Bde.
- 21 On 29 June, the Signal Center at Katum was closed leaving one AN/MRC-69 to install system between Katum and Tay Ninh.
- 22 On 9 July, the system from Thien Ngon to Tay Ninh was discontinued and personnel and equipment returned to Co B at Tay Ninh.

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23 On 13 July, Co C moved a Signal Center Platoon to FSB Lynch with systems extending from FSB Lynch to Cu Chi relayed through Long Binh and a system to Long Binh 53rd Signal Battalion to be extended to Cu Chi and Xuan Loc, 2nd Bde.

24 On 15 July, Co C Signal Center Platoon located at FSB Lynch installed a 4 channel system using AN/GRC-163 from FSB Lynch to Nui Dat in support of 2nd Bde.

25 On 28 July, Co B moved one AN/MRC-69 to Thien Ngon to install a system from Thien Ngon to Cu Chi relayed through Nui Ba Den.

### g. (C) Materiel:

(1) The 725th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts and supply to the 25th Infantry Division. Aircraft availability during this period averaged 85.9%. The following are the number of pieces on which maintenance was performed during the quarter:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>
WHEEL	219	250	240
TANKS & TRACK	210	159	140
SMALL ARMS	677	1159	1156
ARTILLERY	83	78	80
CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT	23	15	32
GENERATORS	109	115	82
COMMEL	2190	2926	3041
OFFICE MACHINE	122	141	141
AIRCRAFT	164	146	148
AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS	199	179	195
REFRIGERATION EQUIPMENT	17	13	8
OTHER	95	89	110
TOTAL	4108	5270	5373

(2) Significant relocation of Divisional units within the TAOI necessitated the use of heavy contact teams in widely scattered locations. The 725th Maint Bn supported Divisional maneuver battalions (1 Armor, 2 Mech Inf) and supporting units from as many as six separate locations.

### h. (C) Revolutionary Development/Pacifications:

(1) The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES-70), 30 June 1970.

(a) Phase I (Jan-Jun) for HES 70 ended with the June report. All provinces/districts displayed an upward movement of hamlets into the secure categories (ABC). A total of 61 districts and one village were upgraded in June. A more significant parameter of pacification is the population living in ABC hamlets. In the Division TAOI, 95.9% of populace lives in secure areas which is an increase of 3.1 percentage points over May.

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(b) Tay Ninh Province: Of the population, 99.3% reside in secure areas; 0.7% short of the Phase I goal of 100% in ABC.

(c) Hau Nghia Province: 20 districts were upgraded in June. Hau Nghia fell far short of its Phase I goal of 97%. Presently, 88.6% of the population live in ABC hamlets.

(d) Long An Province: Continued progress in upgrading hamlets. 34 districts and the last village in the TAOI moved into the secure category. Long An has surpassed its Phase I goal of 90% with 97.6% of its populace in secure areas.

(e) Tri Tam, Nhon Trach, Xuan Loc, Xuyen Moc, Duc Thanh Districts: These districts showed improvement by upgrading some "D" hamlets.

(f) 30 June 1970 Actual HES Pacification Ratings:

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Tay Ninh	8	105	6	0	0	0	119
Hau Nghia	2	58	59	17	0	0	136
Long An	0	251	113	19	2	0	385
Tri Tam	0	5	2	3	0	0	10
Nhon Trach	0	22	14	7	0	0	43
Xuan Loc	0	37	17	2	0	0	56
Xuyen Moc	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Duc Thanh	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>10</u>
AO	10	490	214	48	2	0	764

i. (C) Civic Action:

(1) MEDCAPS, ICAPS, NITECAPS and DENTCAPS have continued during the reporting quarter with 112,393 patients being treated in 2,446 operations.

j. (C) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS):

(1) A total of 11,550,000 leaflets were disseminated in the Division during the reporting period.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel. None.

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Unattended Ground Sensor Operations.

(a) Observation: The employment of unattended ground sensors in remote

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areas is limited by the system monitoring capability at Brigade level.

(b) Evaluation: Remote sensor fields in Cambodia were monitored at Division level by BASS using a relay established at Nui Ba Den. This monitoring did not interfere with the Brigade's requirements to maintain surveillance of their own sensor fields.

(c) Recommendation: The BASS system enables remote sensor fields and tactical Brigade level sensor fields to be monitored simultaneously.

c. (C) Operations:

(1) Problem Encountered in Transportation of Cache Supplies.

(a) Observation: During the Cambodian Operation, units of 4th Bn (M), 23rd Inf found between 300-500 bags of rice in cache sites. This created a logistical problem in transportation. The M-548 carriers proved to be a highly effective asset in this role.

(b) Evaluation: The combat role of the APC's was not impaired for reasons of overloading. The M-548 carriers were highly suitable for this mission, thereby permitting the APC's to maintain their flexibility and maneuver capability.

(c) Recommendation: On an operation in which units are assigned a primary mission of area search and clear and intelligence indicates that cache sites will be found, an M-548 carrier should be made available to transport cache finds.

(2) Problems Encountered Due to Moisture Accumulation in Radios.

(a) Observation: The accumulation of moisture in radios during stand-down caused radios to become inoperable. This was not obvious to battalions when they were moving to their new AO's because technical inspections were optional.

(b) Evaluation: The reason for this problem was later found to be moisture accumulation.

(c) Recommendation: Radios should be operated daily and allowed to warm up. When larger radios are employed in field operations, when possible, every effort should be made to have air conditioning units. This has proved highly effective with the RT-524 and KY-8.

(3) Employment of Limited Assets for Interdiction and Search Operations.

(a) Observation: Periodically, ground commanders find themselves in situations where they have to conduct interdiction and search operations utilizing limited troop and air assets.

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(b) Evaluation: The use of multiple single-ship insertions on point targets of opportunity provides the commander with the capability of efficiently covering a large area in a short period of time with limited assets.

### 1 Air assets required:

- a One C & C aircraft (either LOH or UH1H)
- b One LOH
- c Two troop carrying slicks
- d Two gunships

### 2 Personnel and equipment:

a 12 troops divided into two six-man airmobile teams with one NCO with each sortie team.

b Individual equipment includes the following as a minimum - basic load of ammunition and weapon, identification smoke (2), non-persistent CS grenades (2), persistent CS packets for seeding bunkers (2), hand grenades (2), one gallon of water, RCA mask and one C-ration; also, two M-72 LAW's per team.

### 3 Conduct of the Operation:

a Initially, the scout LOH with gunship cover moves into the designated area of operations and surveys the entire area of operation noting any suspicious points for insertion.

b The LOH marks targets of opportunity with smoke for gunship preparatory fires. As the gunship prep finishes, one UH1H inserts its six troops as close to the target as possible.

c Once the troops are on the ground, the C & C ship directs their ground activities. Upon completion of the search mission, the C & C ship calls the troop UH1H on station to extract the troops.

d Meanwhile, the scout LOH continues to search for another suspect target against which to insert the second team.

e This leapfrogging technique continues until all suspect areas are completely searched.

f The time interval will vary according to the situation. However, thirty minutes is usually adequate for a routine insertion and search mission. If a contact develops, additional troops and support assets are made available as necessary.

(c) Recommendation: This type operation requires air support which is generally not available within an infantry brigade. If air assets are made available, the ground commander can successfully use this configuration to cover a large area with a small number of troops. Obviously, the suitability of this operation is dependent upon the size of enemy elements in the area and the capability of the parent unit to reinforce.

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(4) Ambushes.

(a) Observation: Combinations of mounted, dismounted and mechanical ambushes have deterred VC/NVA use of mines and infiltration routes across Highway 19.

(b) Evaluation: During July 1970, Highway 19 was utilized as part of the convoy route between Cu Chi and Dau Tieng. The combinations as mentioned above were used at critical points such as culvert sites and previously mined areas. Mounted ambushes along this route could be heard and often seen by the enemy, and therefore, were blocking positions. In an attempt to avoid these blocking positions, the VC/NVA were channelized and would move into the mechanical or dismounted ambush. Mechanical ambushes extended the area controlled.

(c) Recommendation: Use this tactic to extend combat units and to deter enemy interdiction and infiltration.

(5) Night Leager in Relation to Area of Search.

(a) Observation: In operations against small bands of VC/NVA, night positions for a troop were displaced at distances away from the following day area of search.

(b) Evaluation: Whether the VC/NVA have been deceived as to areas of search by the troops, has not been determined as of yet.

(c) Recommendation: Use this tactic as a deterrent against likely ambush areas.

(6) Security in Laterite Pit Operations.

(a) Observations:

1 Security provided for extended laterite pit operations has, in some cases, proved to be inadequate. Usual procedure has been to provide a stationary observation post for the entire day.

2 During the quarter, there were two ambushes in the vicinity of laterite pits resulting in one death and 10 personnel wounded. In addition, three booby trapped hand grenades and one 15 pound AT mine were detected in laterite pits on three separate occasions.

(b) Recommendation: Security of laterite pit operations in unsecured areas should take on a more active aspect. Frequent moves of observation posts as well as mobile reconnaissance of the surrounding area should be made.

(7) Combat Engineer Vehicle with Mine Clearing Roller

(a) Observations:

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1 The size of the mines encountered by the CEV-mineroller has increased with each detonation.

2 Detonation of any mine has automatically deadlined the minesweep operation.

3 Only a small section of road can be covered by one pass of the CEV-mineroller.

4 The CEV boom is too short to be used to mount or change roller assemblies.

(b) Evaluation: The steadily increasing size of mines encountered demonstrated that the enemy is attempting to determine the size mine required for maximum damage to the mine roller. Further, the possible use of time delay fuses, offset pressure devices, or command detonated mines in order to inflict damage to the CEV itself cannot be discounted. The mounting of the mineroller assembly to the specialized CEV effectively prevents the use of the CEV for its designed work. Its ability to travel cross-country is destroyed. The use of its bulldozer blade is completely prevented. The use of its demolition gun and lifting boom, while not completely stopped, is severely restricted.

### (c) Recommendations:

1 The mineroller should be removed from the CEV and mounted, as designed, on an M-48 tank.

2 If use of the CEV-mineroller is to continue, use it only on random missions or to fill one-time minesweep requirements.

3 The addition of a wrecker and truck, carrying spare assemblies, to the team would allow rapid repair of blown rollers and continuation of the mine sweep.

4 Use multiple rollers working abreast to provide more effective coverage of the road being swept.

### (8) Lime Soil Stabilization

(a) Observation: The use of lime for soil stabilization has proven to be successful.

(b) Recommendation: Lime for soil stabilization should be used in the following manner:

1 Lime is introduced during the hauling process at a ratio of five bags per truckload of soil.

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2 Mixing is done by windrowing or by use of a disc harrow.

3 Normal compaction methods follow final grading.

(9) Width of MSR's.

(a) Observation: Considerable difficulty has been encountered when MSR's are not constructed to standard width specifications.

(b) Evaluation: Difficulty encountered in sub-standard width roads include the loss of time required by the cautious passing of oncoming traffic. Furthermore, vehicles forced off the road can easily become mired in newly worked earth on the sides of the roads.

(c) Recommendation: All roads constructed to carry heavy traffic should conform to standard military road specifications including a 7 meter minimum traveled way with 1.5 meter shoulders.

(10) Land Clearing Extraction.

(a) Observation: A definite trafficability problem was encountered in the extraction of the land clearing teams during the final days of the Cambodian campaign. The approximately 20 kilometer route consisted of narrow roads through dense rubber plantation growth. The road itself was deteriorating under sporadic rainfall.

(b) Evaluation: The first extraction attempt involved the meeting of the Rome Plows and the tractor trailer units at a half-way point along the route, FSB X-Ray. Considerable difficulty was encountered by the wheeled vehicle convoy in traversing the 10 kilometer route to and from FSB X-Ray. The entire process from Katum to the rendezvous point and return to Katum took two days. Because of the difficulty encountered by the wheeled vehicles earlier and the impending deadline for the Cambodian withdrawal, the decision was made to walk the remaining plows the entire route to Katum. It was felt that any plow becoming stuck during the walk could be retrieved by one or more of the remaining plows. Furthermore, if bypass of any portion of the road became necessary, the land clearing team would have little difficulty clearing a path through the dense growth. The extraction of the second company using this method was accomplished in less than one day.

(c) Recommendation: In any operation with similar conditions, the alternative of walking the Rome Plows out of an area of poor trafficability should be considered. The major lesson learned in the operation was that a land clearing company can walk out of an area of poor trafficability in much less time and with less difficulty than had been anticipated.

(11) Utilization of Nighthawk in Conjunction with Infant.

(a) Observation: The innovation of employing a Nighthawk in conjunction

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with the Infant System has proven to be extremely successful during recent operations.

(b) Evaluation: A specified strike zone is provided the Nighthawk/Infant by the supported Brigade. The Infant ship patrols the area at a lower altitude than the Nighthawk aircraft. With a single light on top of the aircraft, the Infant can avoid detection from the ground while providing the cover Nighthawk with a visible means of identification. The enemy has demonstrated no fear of an aircraft which he is unable to see, thus allowing the Infant to effectively engage him. Once the enemy is engaged, the primary roles of the two aircraft change. The Infant ship then becomes the cover ship with the Nighthawk employing its Xeon searchlight to detect additional movement in the target area. Any movement and/or suspected enemy locations are then engaged with the Nighthawk 7.62mm mini-guns. The employment of this combined team has provided an effective means of curtailing night movement of enemy supplies and personnel. It has been noted that after extended use of the Infant/Nighthawk team, enemy movement at night was reduced substantially, targets have become fewer and the enemy has been forced to move over more difficult terrain and in fewer numbers.

(c) Recommendation: That commands concerned consider employment of the Infant/Nighthawk team.

d. (U) Organization. None.

e. (C) Training:

(1) Instrument Training Program.

(a) Observation: The need has been evidenced for a more detailed instrument training program to upgrade proficiency of assigned aviators.

(b) Evaluation: This organization presently requires all assigned aviators to perform, as a minimum, two GCA's and two ADF approaches each month. Hoods have been made available at each subordinate unit operations, and aviators have been instructed to practice hooded flight at every available opportunity. Additionally, ground school classes covering instrument flight have been integrated into this unit's training program. This well rounded instrument training program raises the proficiency of all assigned aviators and does much towards the professional development of the recently rated aviators.

(c) Recommendations: That aviation units establish definite requirements for their instrument training programs, to include the integration of ground school classes into unit training schedules.

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(2) Forklift, 6,000 lb, Rough Terrain.

(a) Observation: An excessive failure rate has been experienced for engines on subject vehicle during the reporting period. Seven of these engines have required replacement and three will not be rebuilt due to holes made in the block by broken connecting rods.

(b) Evaluation: Although there is evidence of poor operator and organization maintenance, a more general problem may be the transmission which allows the operator to shift to reverse while moving forward and vice versa. At present, there is no lockout mechanism in the transmission. Operators have been observed using the transmission/engine as a brake. The probability of bent and eventually broken connecting rods is great.

(c) Recommendation: That increased emphasis be placed on educating drivers on the economical as well as safe operation of heavy equipment.

f. (G) Logistics

(1) Supported units not reporting new locations

(a) Observation: During the Cambodian Operation, supported units did not notify support activities on a timely basis when the unit would move from one AO to another. This caused an extensive time loss on the receipt of supplies by units as the S&T battalion supply activities continued to ship supplies to the unit's previous location.

(b) Evaluation: Support activities cannot properly provide support to a unit unless notified by the unit of their new location where supplies will be picked up.

(c) Recommendation: That a field operation procedure be set up by brigades where a unit moving to a new location is required to notify both support activities in the old location and the new location of their move.

(2) Field Parts Request

(a) Observation: Difficulty has been encountered in understanding parts required from verbal descriptions given in radio messages from units in the field.

(b) Recommendation: All equipment sent to the field should be accompanied by the appropriate technical manual. Any part required can then be ordered by its federal stock number thereby avoiding confusion and delay.

(3) Chain Saw

(a) Observations:

1. Chain saws on loan to non-engineer units are susceptible to breakage in the hands of inexperienced operators.

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2. The sensitive recoil starters on chain saws have been subject to abuse by operators not using proper starting techniques. Breakdowns have occurred when the full length of starter cord is used.

(b) Recommendations:

1. An experienced engineer operator should be assigned to any mission where chain saws are required by non-engineer units.

2. Effort should be made to insure all operators are aware of proper starting techniques. Emphasis should be placed on the use of only an 18 inch pull on the starter cord to prevent starter breakdown.

(4) Repair Parts for Low-Density Items

(a) Observation: The operational status of low density items has been severely affected by an excessive delay in the receipt of repair parts.

(b) Evaluations: Excessive deadline time has resulted from the lack of repair parts for the AVLV, CEV and RT crane. An AVLB was deadlined over 100 days for a torsion bar anchor (FSN 2530-657-5827). A CEV has been deadlined for over 80 days while awaiting seals for the suspension system (FSN 5330-657-5827 and FSN 5330-727-3949). Rough terrain (RT) cranes have been deadlined or on a limited operational status due to the non-availability of steering cylinders and outrigger cylinders (FSN 2530-682-7641 and FSN 2530-226-8369). The low density of the mentioned items precludes storage of many fringe type items in USARV.

(c) Recommendations: An evaluation should be made at depot and direct support maintenance levels, of the effectiveness of the current repair parts system for these low density, mission essential items. This evaluation should include a study of the amount of time that an item of equipment is deadlined due to a NCRS condition.

(5) Support for deployed elements:

(a) Observation: The unit has experienced continued difficulties obtaining adequate POL support for its deployed elements.

(b) Evaluation: During recent deployment of elements in support of operations, units supported did not furnish adequate POL support. In the cases POL had to be obtained through Signal Battalion resources on a continuing bases. The resultant diversion of effort affects smooth operation.

(c) Recommendation: That support units be forcefully reminded of their responsibility to furnish POL support.

g. (U) Communications. None.

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h. (U) Materiel. None

1. (C) Other:

(1) Utilization of HB Teams.

(a) Observation: During the Cambodian operations, several HB teams were assigned to the battalions to assist in S-5 type work. In some instances, their logistical needs were not properly met and they were improperly utilized.

(b) Evaluation: Coordination between battalion and higher headquarters prior to arrival of HB teams would greatly assist in delineating responsibility and support

(c) Recommendation: HB teams, when attached to battalions, should be maintained under battalion control and used on mission type basis. Teams should be thoroughly briefed on tactical situation and also provided with all necessary logistical support.

(2) Wheel Studs.

(a) Observation: An unusual amount of breakdowns of the M172A1 trailer have been due to stripped or broken studs.

(b) Evaluation: Operators are neglecting periodic checks, to include tightening of lugs, which can prevent excessive wear of studs and preclude vehicle breakdown.

(c) Recommendation: Every effort should be made by unit leaders to insure that all operators carry out periodic checks of their equipment.

(3) SOI Changes.

(a) Observation: Problems were encountered by small units supporting elements in the field when SOI changes occurred.

(b) Recommendation: Small units supporting isolated infantry elements should check daily with these elements to keep abreast of any SOI changes or modifications.

(4) Aviation Safety, Pre-Accident Plan.

(a) Observation: Key personnel designated in the pre-accident plan outlined in 25th Division Reg 95-1 are aware of only their specific duties and are not fully cognizant of the entire aspect of the plan.

(b) Evaluation: It is not only demanded that each individual be capable of performing his required duties in the event of an accident but it is also

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highly desirable that the individual be aware of what action should have already been initiated and what is expected of others in the sequence of events. This would allow each individual to quickly analyze the situation to determine if additional action is required.

(c) Recommendation: Periodic tests of the pre-accident plan be initiated by the airfield commander to ensure that all personnel are aware of their assigned duties. This would serve as a communications network check.

(5) Flight Hazards and Foreign Object Damage at Forward Area Helipads.

(a) Observation: The continuing problem of hazardous resupply pads and foreign object damage dictates the necessity for a continued education program for those personnel selecting and maintaining helipad locations.

(b) Evaluation: Several helipads throughout the TAOI are located such that there is only one approach and departure path due to terrain or man made objects such as antennas and wires. Additionally, loose objects in the vicinity of helipads increases the possibility of foreign object damage to aircraft. Operational Hazard Reports submitted through Aviation Safety channels have resulted in some improvements in landing areas. Continuing positive actions taken by supported units will do much to conserve aviation assets.

(c) Recommendations: Due to frequent changes in field locations a concerted continuing effort be made by all units concerned in the proper location of helipads and in the elimination of hazards to flight and foreign object damage.

(6) Aviator Fatigue.

(a) Observation: Aviator fatigue was found to be a contributing factor in a recent aircraft accident. The fatigue was attributed to long hours spent in the scramble shack.

(b) Evaluation: With guidance from the US Army Board for Aviation Accidents Research, it was determined that attack helicopter crews are living in an environment which taxes their physiological capabilities and induces fatigue at a rapid rate. A closer look at mission requirements resulted in a change in crew scheduling. Instead of having four aircraft crews on a 24 hour ready basis in the scramble shack, two crews standby in the scramble shack and the other two crews remain on standby in the company area until such time as they are needed. This has aided in keeping duty man hours to a minimum. Improvements to the scramble shack are under way and air conditioning improvements have been work ordered.

(c) Recommendation: That all units assigned attack helicopters be made cognizant of environmental causatives of aviator fatigue and the need for necessary preventive measures.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:



T. J. HANIFEN  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

Inclosures

1. Troop List
2. Task Organization
3. Enemy Main Force Unit Identifications
4. Commander's Combat Notes  
(Utilization of Airborne Personnel Detector)
5. Commander's Combat Notes  
(EEI on Cache Sites)
6. Commander's Combat Notes  
(LOI - Procedures for Requesting and Coordinating of Areas of Operations within the 25th Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest)
7. Commander's Combat Notes  
(LOI - Combat Operations Ranger Company)
8. Addendum - Lessons Learned

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AVFEC-RE (Undated) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 25th  
Infantry Division Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65  
(R2)(U)

DA, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 11 SEP 1970

FRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational  
Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970  
from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Width of MSR's", page 87, paragraph  
2c(9). Road construction should conform to the standards defined in  
MACV Dir 415-6 where the road is or will become part of the Vietnamese  
road system. Additionally, many tactical routes can be constructed as  
a one lane road with turnouts at appropriate locations. This requires  
less construction effort and provides a satisfactory road for many  
situations.

b. Reference item concerning "Land Clearing Extraction", page 87  
paragraph 2c(10). Tractors that are "walked" 10 kilometers or more  
inevitably suffer break downs primarily because of extreme overheating  
problems. This factor must be considered when planning moves and suffic-  
ient time allocated to preclude damage to the tractors being "walked"  
out of areas of poor trafficability.

c. Reference item concerning "Reports Control", inclosure 8, page 2,  
paragraph 2b(4). Tactical units subordinate to this headquarters were  
given detailed instruction in cache reporting procedures subsequent to  
Cambodian operations. All units within MR 3 are now reporting contents  
of caches in spot reports, followed by cumulative totals in their daily  
INTSUMs.

d. Reference item concerning "Bridge Classification", inclosure 8,  
page 2, paragraph 2b(5). Proper procedures for classifying and maintaining  
bridges are contained in FM 5-36.

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
AVFEC-RE (Undated) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 25th  
Infantry Division Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65  
(R2)(U)

e. Reference item concerning "Lack of Authorized Lift Capability", inclosure 8, page 3, paragraph 2f(2). ACofS, G4 will coordinate with GS maintenance units to ascertain the feasibility of augmenting DS units when extensive use of maintenance contact teams is required.

f. Reference item concerning "Disassembly of Communication Assets", inclosure 8, page 5, paragraph 2g(4). Limited demounting of components of signal end-items may result in more efficient operation without great loss of mobility if the concept of temporary bunkering is borne in mind. The "fixed" installation into which components are ground-mounted may be engineered so as to permit short-notice reassembly of end-items. This reassembly can be exercised periodically much as a jump team is put through alert drill when the situation has become static, but the capability to move suddenly must be retained.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
W. C. BARTEL, JR.  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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AVHDO-DO (Undated) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 19 NOV 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Combat Engineer Vehicle with Mine Clearing Roller," page 85, paragraph 2c(7). The unit commander may, at his discretion, place the mine roller on the CEV or the M48 tank. This has been common practice in Vietnam. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Instrument Training Program," page 88, paragraph 2e(1). USARV Supplement 1 to AR 95-1 dated 24 March 1970 requires unit commanders to conduct an instrument training program for aviators under their command. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "Repair Parts for Low-Density Items," page 90, paragraph 2f(4): nonconcur. DA Cir 700-18 specifically states that non-demand supported items will not be stocked forward of the theater depot. This is also the policy within USARV. Actions to reduce NORS status for low density equipment should be taken at the unit and DSU level. Units and DSUs must insure that PLLs and ASLs are accurate and that demand data is captured at both levels. Requisitioning objectives at the DSU should be adjusted accordingly. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.  
Captain AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
IIFORCEV  
25th Inf Div


GPOP-DT (undtd) 33 Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Infantry Division for Period Ending  
31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 6 JAN 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGO  
Asst AG

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## TROOP LIST 25th INFANTRY DIVISION

AS OF 31 JULY 1970

### I. ORGANIC

- a. Command & Control Elements
  - HHC, 25th Inf Div
  - HHC, 1st Brigade
  - HHC, 2nd Brigade
  - HHC, 3rd Brigade
- b. Combat Elements
  - 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry
- c. Combat Support Elements
  - HHC, 25th Inf Div Arty
  - 1st Bn, 8th Arty
  - 7th Bn, 11th Arty
  - 3rd Bn, 13th Arty
  - 2nd Bn, 77th Arty
  - 25th MP Company
  - 25th Aviation Battalion
  - 65th Engineer Battalion
  - 125th Signal Battalion
- d. Combat Service Support Elements
  - HHC & Band, 25th Div Spt Cmd
  - 25th Admin Company
  - 25th Med Battalion
  - 25th S&T Battalion
  - 725th Maintenance Battalion

### II. ASSIGNED

- a. Command & Control Elements - None
- b. Combat Elements
  - 1st Bn (Mech), 5th Inf
  - 4th Bn, 9th Inf
  - 2nd Bn, 12th Inf
  - 2nd Bn, 14th Inf
  - 2nd Bn (Mech), 22nd Inf
  - 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf
  - 4th Bn (Mech), 23rd Inf
  - 1st Bn, 27th Inf
  - 2nd Bn, 27th Inf
  - 2nd Bn, 34th Armor (-)
  - Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf

*Incl 1*

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## II. ASSIGNED (Cont)

- c. Combat Support Elements
  - 9th Chemical Det
  - 38th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
  - 44th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
  - 46th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
  - 66th Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)
  - 265th FA Arty Det (Radar)
- d. Combat Service Support Elements
  - 15th Public Information Det
  - 18th Military History Det
  - 20th Public Information Det
  - 25th Military Intelligence Company

## III. ATTACHED

- a. Command & Control Elements - None
- b. Combat Elements - None
- c. Combat Support Elements
  - Btry B, 5th Bn, 2nd Arty
  - Btry I, 29th Arty (1 Plt)
  - 44th EOD Det
  - 159th Medical Det, Helicopter Ambulance
  - 258th FA Det (Radar-CM)
  - 341st Avn Det
  - 362nd Avn Det
- d. Combat Service Support Elements
  - 5th Weather Sqdn Det (USAF)
  - 3 AA Plt, 2nd Civil Affairs Company
  - 20th Preventive Med Det
  - 40th Med Det
  - 390th Quartermaster Det (Petroleum)
  - USA Special Security Det
  - 372nd Radio Research Company

## IV. OPERATIONAL CONTROL

3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

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V. DIRECT SUPPORT

LOCATION

4th Med Det	Cu Chi, RVN
Co B, 36th Signal Battalion	Cu Chi, RVN
53rd Signal Det	Cu Chi, RVN
61st Trans Det	Cu Chi, RVN
86th Hq Co Sig Bn Support	Cu Chi, RVN
94th Co Maint Support	Cu Chi, RVN
116th Assault Helicopter Co	Cu Chi, RVN
242nd Assault Helicopter Co	Cu Chi, RVN
277th Bn Resupply Service	Cu Chi, RVN
283rd Sig Det	Cu Chi, RVN
325th Weather Det	Cu Chi, RVN
501st Land Clearing Co	Cu Chi, RVN
578th Sig Support Co	Tay Ninh, RVN
587th Sig Support Co	Tay Ninh, RVN

VI. GENERAL SUPPORT

LOCATION

8th Aerial Port Sqdn	Cu Chi, RVN
12th Med Hospital Evac	Cu Chi, RVN
Hq & A Btry, 6th Bn, 15th Arty	Tay Ninh, RVN
20th TC Co Aircraft	Cu Chi, RVN
45th Surg MA (MUST)	Tay Ninh, RVN
269th Avn Bn Assault Helicopter	Cu Chi, RVN
362nd Engr Co	Tay Ninh, RVN
515th Engr Plt Asphalt Construction	Cu Chi, RVN
554th Engr Bn Construction	Cu Chi, RVN
Co C, 588th Engr Bn Combat	Tay Ninh, RVN

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## Changes in Task Organization

Effective 1 May 70

<u>1st Bde</u> 3-22 Inf (-) 1-5 Inf (M) 4-23 Inf (M) A/3-22 Inf 2-12 Inf 7-11 Arty (105)(DS) A/65th Engr (DS) 1/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS) D/3-4 Cav (DS)	<u>2nd Bde(OPCON II FFV)</u> 1-27 Inf 4-9 Inf T F Warrior A/3-4 Cav D(-)/3-17 Air Cav 1-8 Arty (105)(DS) C/65th Engr (DS) 2/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)	<u>3rd Bde</u> 2-27 Inf (-) 2-14 Inf C/2-22 Inf (M) D/2-27 Inf 2-22 Inf (M)(-) 2-77 Arty (105)(M) D/65th Engr (DS) 3/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)
<u>Div Troops</u> F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS) 25th Avn Bn 125th Sig Bn (GS) 65th Engr Bn (-)(GS) 3-4 Cav (-)(OPCON 1 ACD) 2-34 Arm (-)(OPCON 1 ACD) 2-47 Inf (M)(OPCON 1 ACD)	<u>Div Arty</u> 3-13 Arty (155/8") B/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GS) <u>IIFV Arty (GSR)</u> A/C/1-27 Arty (155) B(-)/C/5-42 Arty (155) A(-)/C/2-32 Arty (8"/175)(DS) B(-)/7-8 Arty (8")	<u>3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div</u> 6-31 Inf 2-60 Inf 5-60 Inf E/75th Inf (RGR)(DS) C/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(DS) B/3-17 Air Cav 2-4 Arty (105)(DS) 571 Engr (DS)

2 May 6-31 Inf to 3rd Bde  
A/5-60 Inf (OPCON 1 ACD)

3 May 5-60 Inf (OPCON 1 ACD)

4 May 2-22 Inf (M) to 1st Bde  
4-23 Inf (M) to 3rd Bde  
2-12 Inf to 3rd Bde  
5-60 Inf to 3rd Bde  
1-7 Cav to 3rd Bde  
6-31 Inf to 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div  
2-14 Inf to 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div

5 May 2-14 Inf to 1st Bde

7 May 2nd Bde return to control of 25th Inf Div  
3-4 Cav to 1st Bde

8 May 3-4 Cav to 2nd Bde

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10 May 2-27 Inf to 2nd Bde  
2-22 Inf (M) to 2nd Bde  
2-47 Inf (M) to 2nd Bde  
2-34 Armor (-) to 3rd Bde

13 May 1-7 Cav returns to 1st Air Cav Div

14 May 2-27 Inf to 3rd Bde

Effective 15 May 70

1st Bde

1-11 ACR  
2-14 Inf  
3-22 Inf  
1-5 Inf (M)  
7-11 Arty (105)(DS)  
A/65th Engr (DS)  
1/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)

Div Troops

F/75th Inf (-)(RGR)(GS)  
25th Avn Bn  
125th Sig Bn (GS)  
65th Engr Bn (-)(GS)

2nd Bde

1-27 Inf (-)  
B/2-22 Inf (M)  
4-9 Inf (-)  
C/3-4 Cav  
2-22 Inf (M)(-)  
C/1-27 Inf  
2-47 Inf (M)  
3-4 Cav (-)  
D/4-9 Inf  
1-8 Arty (105)(DS)  
C/65th Engr (DS)  
2/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)

Div Arty

3-13 Arty (155/8")(GS)  
B/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GS)

IIFFV Arty (GSR)

B/1-27 Arty (155)(GSR)  
C/5-42 Arty (155)(GS)  
A(-)/B(-)/C(-)/2-32 Arty (175/8")(GS)

3rd Bde

2-27 Inf (-)  
2-12 Inf  
4-23 Inf (M)  
5-60 Inf  
B/D/2-27 Inf  
2-34 Arm (-)  
2-77 Arty (105)(DS)  
D/65th Engr (DS)

3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div

2-60 Inf  
6-31 Inf  
E/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)  
C/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(DS)  
2-4 Arty (-)(105)(DS)  
571 Engr (DS)

19 May 2-12 Inf to 1st Bde  
2-14 Inf to 3rd Bde

21 May 1-11 ACR leaves 1st Bde  
4-23 Inf (M) to 1st Bde  
1-5 Inf (M) to 3rd Bde

22 May 2-60 Inf to 1st Bde

23 May 3-17 Air Cav (-) to Div Troops

30 May 3-4 Cav (-) to 1st Bde

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Effective 1 June 70

1st Bde  
2-60 Inf  
4-23 Inf (M)  
2-12 Inf  
3-22 Inf  
3-4 Cav  
7-11 Arty (105)(DS)  
C/3-13 Arty (155)(GSR)  
A/65th Engr (DS)  
1/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)

Div Troops  
F/75th Inf (-)(RGR)(GS)  
25th Avn Bn  
125th Sig Bn (GS)  
65th Engr Bn (-)(GS)  
3-17 Air Cav (-)  
5-60 Inf (OPCON 1 ACD)

2nd Bde  
1-27 Inf  
4-9 Inf  
2-22 Inf (M)  
2-47 Inf (M)  
1-8 Arty (105)(DS)  
D/3-13 Arty (8")(Reinf)  
C/65th Engr (DS)  
2/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)

Div Arty  
A/3-13 Arty (155)(GS)  
B/5-2 Arty (AW)(GS)

IIFV Arty (GSR)  
E/C/1-27 Arty (155)(GSR)  
B/C/5-42 Arty (155)(GSR)  
2-32 Arty (175/8")(GS)  
C/7-8 Arty (175)(GS)

3rd Bde  
1-5 Inf (M)(-)  
C(-)/2-27 Inf  
2-14 Inf  
2-27 Inf (-)  
C(-)/1-5 Inf (M)  
2-34 Arm (-)  
2-77 Arty (105)(DS)  
B/3-13 Arty (155)(GSR)  
D/65th Engr (DS)  
3/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)

3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div  
6-31 Inf  
E/75th Inf (RGR)  
C/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(DS)  
2-4 Arty (-)(105)(DS)  
571 Engr (-)

3 June 3-22 Inf to 3rd Bde

12 June 2-34 Armor (-) to 2nd Bde

14 June 2-47 Inf (M) to 2nd Bde

Effective 15 June 70

1st Bde  
2-60 Inf  
2-12 Inf  
4-23 Inf (M)  
D/3-4 Cav  
7-11 Arty (-)(105)(DS)  
B/2-77 Arty (105)(Reinf)  
A/3-13 Arty (155)(Reinf)  
A/65th Engr (DS)  
1/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)

Div Troops  
F/75th Inf (-)(RGR)(GS)  
3-4 Cav (-)(DS ARVN Abn)  
25th Avn Bn  
125th Sig Bn (GS)  
65th Engr Bn (-)(GS)  
3-17 Air Cav (-)

2nd Bde  
1-27 Inf  
4-9 Inf  
2-22 Inf (M)(-)  
2-34 Arm (-)  
B(-)/2-22 Inf (M)  
1-8 Arty (105)(DS)  
C/D/3-13 Arty (8")(Reinf)  
C/65th Engr (DS)  
2/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)

Div Arty  
B/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GS)

IIFV Arty (GSR)  
B/1-27 Arty (155)(GSR)  
B/C/5-42 Arty (155)(GSR)  
2-32 Arty (175/8")(GSR)

3rd Bde  
2-14 Inf  
3-22 Inf  
1-5 Inf (M)  
2-27 Inf  
2-77 Arty (-)(105)(DS)  
B/3-13 Arty (155)(GSR)  
D/65th Engr (DS)  
3/F/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)

3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div  
2-47 Inf (M)  
6-31 Inf  
E/75th Inf (RGR)  
C/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GS)  
2-4 Arty (-)(105)(DS)  
571 Engr (-)  
5-60 Inf (OPCON 1 ACD)  
A/2-4 Arty (105)(DS)

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17 June 3-4 Cav (-) OPCON ARVN Abn Div

19 June 1-11 ACR and 3-11 ACR OPCON 25th Inf Div

25 June 3-4 Cav (-) to 11 ACR

27 June 11 ACR Air Cav Trp to 3-17 Air Cav (-)  
5-60 Inf to 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div

28 June 3-4 Cav (-) to Div Troops

29 June 4-9 Inf to 1st Bde  
2-22 Inf (M) to 1st Bde  
2-34 Arm (-) to 1st Bde  
3-4 Cav (-) to 3rd Bde  
D/3-4 Cav to Div Troops

30 June 3-17 Air Cav (-) to 1st Bde  
11 ACR Air Cav Trp  
D/3-4 Cav to 3rd Bde

Effective 1 July 70

1st Bde  
2-60 Inf  
2-12 Inf  
4-23 Inf (M)  
4-9 Inf  
2-22 Inf (M)  
2-34 Arm (-)  
3-17 Air Cav (-)(DS)  
A/C/3-13 Arty (155)(Reinf)  
7-11 Arty (105)(DS)  
A/65th Engr  
C/1-8 Arty (105)(DS)

2nd Bde  
1-27 Inf  
1-8 Arty (-)(105)(GS)  
B/65th Engr (DS)

Div Arty  
B/5-2 Arty (155)(GSR)  
B/C/5-42 Arty (155)(GSR)  
2-32 Arty (8"/175)(GS)

Div Troops  
F/75th Inf (RGR)(GS)  
25th Avn Bn  
125th Sig Bn (GS)  
65th Engr Bn (-)(GS)

3rd Bde  
2-14 Inf  
B/1-5 Inf (M)  
3-22 Inf  
1-5 Inf (M)(-)  
2-27 Inf  
2-77 Arty (105)(DS)  
B/3-13 Arty (155)(GSR)  
D/65th Engr (DS)  
3-4 Cav

3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div  
2-47 Inf (M)(DS NT Dist)  
6-31 Inf  
5-60 Inf  
E/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)  
C/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GS)  
2-4 Arty (-)(105)(DS)  
571 Engr

6 July 1-5 Inf (M) to 2nd Bde

9 July 4-49 ARVN (DS) to 1st Bde

12 July 4-49 ARVN (OPCON 25th Inf Div) to 1st Bde

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Effective 15 July 70

1st Bde

4-9 Inf  
2-12 Inf  
2-60 Inf  
2-22 Inf (M)  
4-23 Inf (M)  
2-34 Arm (-)  
3-17 Air Cav (-)(DS)  
7-11 Arty (105)(DS)  
A/C/3-13 Arty (155)(Reinf)  
A/65th Engr (DS)  
4-49 ARVN (OPCON)

Div Troops

F/75th Inf (RGR)(GS)  
25th Avn Bn  
125th Sig Bn (GS)  
65th Engr (-)(GS)

2nd Bde

1-27 Inf  
1-5 Inf (M)  
1-8 Arty (105)(DS)  
E/65th Engr (DS)  
  
Div Arty  
D/3-13 Arty (8")(GS)

IIFV Arty (DS)

B(-)/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GS)  
C/7-8 Arty (175/8")(GS)(POF)  
A/1-27 Arty (155)(GSR)  
B/2-32 Arty (175/8")(SP)(GSR)  
A/B/5-42 Arty (155)(GSR)

3rd Bde

2-14 Inf  
B/3-22 Inf (-)  
3-22 Inf (-)  
2-27 Inf  
3-4 Cav  
B/3-13 Arty (155)(GSR)  
2-77 Arty (105)(DS)  
D/65th Engr (DS)

3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div

6-31 Inf  
5-60 Inf  
2-47 Inf (M)  
D/3-17 Air Cav  
E/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)  
C(-)/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GS)  
2-4 Arty (105)(DS)  
571 Engr

16 July 4-23 Inf (M) to 2nd Bde

23 July D/3-4 Cav (DS) to 1st Bde

25 July C/3-17 Air Cav to 1st Bde

Effective 31 July 70

1st Bde

4-9 Inf (-)  
2-12 Inf  
2-60 Inf  
2-22 Inf (M)(-)  
2-34 Arm (-)  
C/4-9 Inf  
7-11 Arty (155)(Reinf)  
A/3-13 Arty (155)(Reinf)(SP)  
A/65th Engr (DS)

Div Troops

F/75th Inf (RGR)(GS)  
25th Avn Bn  
125th Sig Bn (GS)  
65th Engr (-)(GS)

2nd Bde

1-27 Inf  
1-5 Inf (M)  
4-23 Inf (M)  
1-8 Arty (105)(DS)  
B/65th Engr (DS)  
D/588th Engr (DS)  
D/3-4 Cav (OPCON)  
  
Div Arty  
D/3-13 Arty (8")(GS)(SP)

IIFV Arty

B(-)/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GSR)  
C/7-8 Arty (175/8")(GS)(POF)  
A/1-27 Arty (155)(GSR)(SP)  
E/2-32 Arty (175/8")(SP)(GSR)  
B/5-42 Arty (155)(GSR)

3rd Bde

2-14 Inf  
A/3-4 Cav  
3-22 Inf  
2-27 Inf  
3-4 Cav (-)  
B/2-22 Inf (M)  
E/C/3-13 Arty (155)(SP)(GSR)  
2-77 Arty (105)(DS)  
D/65th Engr (DS)

3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div

6-31 Inf  
5-60 Inf  
2-47 Inf (M)  
D/3-17 Air Cav  
E/75th Inf (RGR)(DS)  
C(-)/5-2 Arty (AW)(SP)(GS)  
2-4 Arty (105)(DS)(SP)  
571 Engr

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Enemy Main Force Unit Identifications  
31 July 1970

COSVN NON DIVISIONAL UNITS

16 Armor Office	No Location
69 Artillery Command	XU542023

COSVN DIVISIONAL UNITS

9 Division	
271 Regiment	WT475666
272 Regiment	XT0242
95C Regiment	WU862046
7 Division	
209 Regiment	XT073879
165 Regiment	XU221137
141 Regiment	XU495084

TAY NINH PROVINCE

D1 Battalion	XT2050
D14 Battalion	XT3924

SUB-REGION 1

268 Regiment	XT478359
K1 Battalion	XT460375
K2 Battalion	XT502242
K3 Battalion	XT675090
101 Regiment	XT501449
K1 Battalion	XT538329
K2 Battalion	XT520393
K3 Battalion	XT538329
Quyêt Thang Regiment	XT699181
K1 Battalion	XT543128
K2 Battalion	XT783079
K3 Battalion	XT761161
Bach Dang Battalion	XT577307
8 Artillery Battalion	XT640345
9 Artillery Battalion	XT634361
10 Artillery Battalion	XT592485

SUB-REGION 2

128 Artillery Battalion	XT170250
267 Battalion	XT277154
269 Battalion	XT533624

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SUB-REGION 2

2642 Battalion	XT649023
D12 Battalion	XS694873
D16 Battalion	XS540996
308 Battalion	XT163255
6 LF Battalion	XS645936

SUB-REGION 3

1 NVA Regiment	XS679729
K4 Battalion	XS623690
K5 Battalion	XS6071
K6 Battalion	XS633595
K7 Battalion	XS638590
K8 Battalion	XS625904
506 Battalion	XS937737
508 Battalion	XS810738
520 Battalion	XS793707
265 Battalion	XS835660
Dong Phu Battalion	XT078050
3 Artillery Battalion	XT359179
211 Sapper Battalion	XS623690

SUB-REGION 6

N10 Battalion	XT200500
N13 Battalion	XS962943

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCGM

4 June 1970

SUBJECT: Utilization of Airborne Personnel Detector (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (U) The Airborne Personnel Detector (People Sniffer) has proved to be an effective intelligence source, providing information capable of rapid exploitation. This letter has been prepared to point out the capabilities and limitations of the Airborne Personnel Detector and to suggest methods of tactical employment.
2. (U) The Airborne Personnel Detector is a device which is used to detect the presence or absence of personnel and provides a realtime readout of information. The device is normally mounted in a UH-1H aircraft. Air passing through the APD is sampled using a physical process for the presence of particles emitted by man and other sources. Only one type of personnel detector is now used within the Division, the Detector, Concealed Personnel, Aircraft Mounted, XM3 (commonly known as the APD). This detector consists of two independent detecting components, and therefore provides two independent readouts for corroboration of the readings. The dials are graduated from zero to 100, with 100 being a maximum reading. An Airborne Personnel Detector readout of 80 or greater generally indicates the current or recent presence of personnel in an area, and is reported as an Alfa reading; a reading of 60-80 is significant but indicates a weaker or deteriorated source and is reported as a Bravo reading. Both Alfa and Bravo readings must be examined with respect to the environment before they can be considered intelligence of military importance.
3. (C) The utilization and effectiveness of the Airborne Personnel Detector is influenced by many variables, among which are: flight pattern of aircraft, altitude of aircraft, meteorology, smoke, air strikes and artillery, population, numbers of personnel, personnel cover, and others. Each of these major factors will be discussed separately.
  - a. Flight Patterns of Aircraft. The exhaust of the aircraft will affect the personnel detector. Therefore, it is important that the flight pattern be such that the aircraft is always moving upwind (see Inclosure 1). In this manner the influence of the exhaust is minimized.
  - b. Altitude of Aircraft. It is essential that the aircraft be flown as low as possible above tree-top level to get the most meaningful APD

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4 June 1970

SUBJECT: Utilization of Airborne Personnel Detector (U)

readings. The altitudes of the aircraft should be kept relatively constant, as experiments have shown that a variation of 40-50 feet materially affects indicator readings. A flight altitude of 5-15 feet above the tree-top level appears to be optimum.

c. Meteorology. The plume of particles given off by personnel on the ground responds to meteorological conditions in a manner very similar to that of smoke from a burning grenade. Since this plume is detected by the Airborne Personnel Detector, an understanding of the meteorological effects is essential to successful APD employment. The most significant meteorological conditions are atmospheric stability, wind, and rainfall.

(1) The air is most stable when the plume of particles remains in a layer near the ground. Since the plume is not dispersed vertically, it remains concentrated and thus easier to detect by an Airborne Personnel Detector flying through it. This period of greatest atmospheric stability usually lasts until about 1000 hours each day, when a period of vertical air turbulence begins. Consequently, relatively open areas are best "sniffed" prior to 1000 hours. In heavily wooded areas, sniffing is most productively done later so that vertical turbulence has lifted the plume of particles up above the canopy.

(2) The wind speed and direction play an important part in the detection of personnel. The flight pattern of the aircraft must be oriented on the wind direction as previously described in paragraph 3a, above. Wind speeds also affect detection. Wind speeds of 5-10 knots (measured just above the top of the vegetation) provide the best conditions. Experiments conducted under these wind speeds have shown that small (5-man) groups give detectable readings 100 meters downwind. The APD, of course, has no capability of determining how many people are being detected, but only of determining the presence or absence of personnel.

(3) The Airborne Personnel Detector has no capability of operating in the rain. However, rainfall will cleanse the air, eliminating the majority of all scents so that readings taken one to two hours following a rain are actual readings reflecting the probable presence of personnel. On the other hand, readings taken prior to precipitation may pick up residual scent left by personnel who have vacated the area.

d. Smoke, Airstrikes, and Artillery. Smoke materially affects "People Sniffer" readings. Consequently, during the dry season when smoke from fires in fields blankets an area, the APD is relatively ineffective. Personnel should be careful to search upwind in areas of recent (within the last 24 hours) activity, and should be careful to determine whether or not there has been recent fire support activity in the area.

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SUBJECT: Utilization of Airborne Personnel Detector (U)

e. Numbers of Personnel. Control tests of the Airborne Personnel Detector indicate that it will readily pick up and give a maximum reading for groups of five or more personnel. The particle buildup normally occurs within 30 minutes. For groups of five, ten and 12 persons, significant readings occurred for as long as five hours after the personnel had departed the area and maximum readings occurred in all cases for up to three hours.

f. Personnel Cover. Tests run on five and ten-man teams in open and also in foxholes ten meters apart indicate that, although there is degradation of reading when the enemy is in foxholes, it is not sufficient to be discernible to the normal operator once the personnel have been in the area for an hour or so.

g. Population. The "People Sniffer" will pick up concentrations of personnel in hamlets. Therefore, any searching done near a known populated area will give maximum readings. Although the enemy may be in the populated area, it is impossible to separate friend from foe, and such readings have no military significance.

h. Other Influences. From time to time, personnel have claimed that the "People Sniffer" is influenced by water buffalo. Repeated tests have shown the water buffalo does not exude a scent which is detectable on the APD. The only exception would be water buffalo stirring up a dust cloud. The past enemy practice of hanging buckets of urine in trees for deception has not been encountered recently. Since the ammonia-detecting mode is no longer used, this practice is of no concern to APD missions.

4. (C) From the foregoing, it can be seen that the "People Sniffer", like any other intelligence source, requires careful employment and proper interpretation to obtain maximum benefits. The following hints are provided to assist units to improving the results obtained from the utilization of the "People Sniffer".

a. Employment of Aircraft. It is recommended that a "People Sniffer" team can be composed of a "slick", a LOH, and a Cobra. The "slick" will carry the APD. The LOH can make immediate reconnaissance in areas where significant readings have been obtained, protected by the Cobra as it seeks out the enemy. If the aircraft are not all from the same unit, an extra measure of coordination must be made to insure that the aircraft function as a team.

b. Employment of Personnel. It is considered essential that each Brigade designate an officer to plan and effect coordination of APD missions in the brigade area. This officer must be thoroughly trained in the employment, capabilities and limitations of the APD to insure the

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4 June 1970

SUBJECT: Utilization of Airborne Personnel Detector (U)

selection of appropriate areas for search. It is this officer who must integrate APD missions into the overall reconnaissance plan to the brigade. Experience indicates that neither the APD operator nor the pilot of the APD aircraft can monitor the flight pattern. This task must be performed by the pilot of the following Cobra. The APD operator monitors detector readouts and transmits the occurrences of Alfa and Bravo readings to the pilot. The APD operator also (in addition to the door gunners) monitors events on the ground. The pilots of the APD ship have no additional duties besides transmitting to the Cobra the fact that an Alfa or Bravo event has occurred. The Cobra pilot must determine the grid coordinates of the readings and transmit this information to the brigade.

c. Pattern of Search. Search patterns should always be upwind. Consequently, the determination of wind direction is a vital ingredient to a successful search. This factor also plays an important part in analyzing the downwind distribution of readings from a force of enemy personnel. The aircraft should also fly at a constant altitude of approximately 5-15 feet above tree-top level to eliminate variations in readout resulting from changing altitudes. The Cobra pilots must be continuously on the lookout to insure that the team does not sniff too close to hamlets or in areas where artillery and air strikes have recently been conducted. Such searches will give readings of no military significance and degrade the use of the APD in the minds of Commanders. APD operators are instructed to disregard any readings from a known source other than enemy.

d. Time of Search. It takes less than one hour for a detectable plume to form from five or more enemy personnel in an area. On the other hand, it takes a minimum of three hours for the scent of five or more personnel to decay appreciably. Since it is known that the enemy moves during the night and early daylight hours and attempts to stay hidden during the day, it makes sense to initiate "People Sniffer" missions during the wet season between 0900 and 1000 hours. This procedure will minimize the effects of scent decay, and you have full opportunity to obtain scents of personnel still in the area. If one is willing to cope with the problems of scent decay, it makes no difference when searches are initiated during the wet season. However, during the dry season, best results are obtained in the early morning hours in relatively open areas and after 1000 hours in heavily wooded areas. When feasible, consideration will be given to sniffing within one to two hours after a rain since tests have determined that the rain cleanses the atmosphere of residual and background readings so that any readings which are obtained after a rain are an excellent indication that personnel are in the area.

5. (U) The new Airborne Personnel Detector is much better than those previously used. We have reason to believe that the absence of a "People Sniffer" reading is a fair indication of no personnel in the area. On the other hand, a significant reading may not indicate the presence of personnel because of

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4 June 1970

SUBJECT: Utilization of Airborne Personnel Detector (U)

the effects of scent decay.

6. (C) Current intelligence indicates that the enemy will often break down into three to six-man units. These sized units can be detected by the Airborne Personnel Detector. With proper use and interpretation of the Airborne Personnel Detector, Commanders should be able to obtain reliable real-time intelligence targets on which to react, thereby increasing the combat effectiveness of their units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


1 Incl  
Search Pattern

s/T. J. Hanifen  
t/T. J. HANIFEN  
COLONEL, GS  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

A  
Plus 25th Div Cml (20)  
3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div (20)


A TRUE COPY

  
CARTER MOREY  
MAJ, INF  
Division Historian

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FLIGHT DIRECTION

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCIN

19 June 1970

SUBJECT: EEI on Cache Sites (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (C) At 1525 hours, 22 May 1970, following a combat assault into LZ XU195497, B Company, 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, conducted a ground recon and contacted an estimated enemy company. Contact lasted until 1615 hours. On a sweep to XU210517, Specialist Shakey located a 2 foot by 3 foot foxhole with dirt covering and light foliage camouflage. Upon examining the foxhole, he uncovered a tin sheet. The various coverings of the foxhole, when removed, revealed a shaft which led down into a bunker. The bunkers are about 20 feet long, 10 feet high and vary in width from 6 to 10 feet. All of the bunkers contained bamboo dunnage to allow for drainage. Some 40 sequentially numbered bunkers have since been located in the area.
2. (C) The bunkers are located in double canopy jungle on hills with dense foliage on their ridges. The entrance foxholes are not heavily camouflaged, although they are difficult to locate.
3. (C) There is only one trail 2 to 3 meters wide running throughout the area. The only means of access in the area are a few scattered footpaths; however, none of the footpaths or the main trail leads directly to any of the bunkers.
4. (C) At enclosures 1, 2 and 3 are photographs of drawings depicting the locations of the bunkers as well as bunker construction.
5. (C) The point we are trying to make in the distribution of this narrative and photographs is that there is a definite pattern involved in the placement of caches by the enemy. This effort is not a haphazard venture as it sometimes appears. The photographs attached to this narrative show that these cache sites are well planned and suggest that there is a system involved in the planning of these caches. This system is a pattern and it is paramount in importance that we discover what the pattern is. To do this, it will be necessary not only to clean out and destroy these cache sites, but to sketch them out and compare them with other cache sites in the area.

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SUBJECT: EEI on Cache Sites

19 June 1970

Through this and a study of the terrain where these sites were located, it should give you a better idea of where and how to locate more caches. There is a pattern and it is up to us to find it as soon as possible.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incls  
as

s/Cary A. Stewart  
t/GARY A. STEWART  
1 LT, AGC  
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:  
B


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CARTER MOREY  
MAJ, INF  
Division Historian

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SHAKER'S HILL CACHE  
SOURCE: NATIONAL S-O

NOTE: POINT OF ENTRY CACHE  
LOCATION ON SURF OF  
SLOPE

HEADQUARTERS 8 <sup>th</sup> DIVISION 1 <sup>st</sup> CAVALRY DIVISION
SHAKER'S HILL CACHE SITE 70, 80, 90
1-2-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100


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


SECTION VIEW

~~Incl 2 to INCL 5~~

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ISOMETRIC VIEW

~~Incl 3 to Incl 5~~

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# CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCOP

22 June 1970

SUBJECT: LOI - Procedures for Requesting and Coordinating of Areas of Operations within the 25th Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest (U)

## SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (U) PURPOSE: To clarify terminology and standardize procedures for the requesting and allocation of areas of operation (AO) within the 25th Infantry Division tactical area of interest (TAOI).
2. (U) SCOPE: The LOI is applicable to all Divisional and OPCON units.
3. (C) DEFINITIONS:

a. Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR): A prescribed area which has been assigned specifically to a Commander who is responsible for, and has the authority to act on, the development and maintenance of installations, the control of movement, and the conduct of tactical operations by troops under his control. All fire and maneuver conducted within the TAOR, or the effect of which impinges upon the TAOR, must be coordinated with the Commander of the force assigned the TAOR.

NOTE: TAOR is a common term between US/FWMAF and RVNAF. All current US/FWMAF TAOR's have been coordinated with and assigned by the Vietnamese Division Tactical Area (DTA) Commander concerned and approved by the III CTZ Commander.

b. Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI): An area including, but not necessarily limited to, the area in which the designated US/FWMAF Commander is knowledgeable of the location, activities, and operations of all RVNAF forces and installations, Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps, Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF), and Rural Development (RD) teams in order to achieve, through mutual cooperation and coordination, the maximum effect of the combined friendly forces and fire power. The TAOI differs from TAOR in that US/FWMAF Commanders are neither charged with primary tactical responsibility of, nor expected to conduct tactical operations on a continuing basis in, the TAOI. The Division TAOI is subdivided into brigade TAOI's.

This LOI supersedes Annex A to 25th Inf Div Reg 525-7, dtd 17 Feb 70

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AVDCOP

22 June 1970

SUBJECT: LOI - Procedures for Requesting and Coordinating of Areas of Operations within the 25th Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest (U)

NOTE: TAOI is strictly a US/FWMAF term. The extent of a Division TAOI implies exclusive interest or control of territory.

c. Area of Operations (AO): An area in which US/FWMAF conduct operations during a specific period of time. These operations will be coordinated with, and advance agreement obtained from, the Division Tactical Area (DTA)/Capital Military District (CMD) and/or US/FWMAF TACR Commander. An AO is assigned normally for a specific operation of a specific period of time and must be obtained each time operations are planned outside an approved TACR. AO's are temporary in nature and must be renewed at the end of each calendar month. All fire and maneuver within the AO is controlled by the Commander assigned the AO.

#### 4. (C) General:

a. Divisional units will not grant an AO directly to a nondivisional unit.

b. Divisional units will not request an AO directly from a nondivisional unit unless specifically authorized by CG, 25th Infantry Division, to do so.

c. Time extension will be requested using the procedures in paragraph 5. Approval will be disseminated telephonically.

d. A new AO will always supersede any portion of an old AO upon which it infringes.

e. Artillery "block clearance" is not considered an AO request. Clearances of this type will be coordinated through normal artillery clearance channels.

f. In the event of contact, direct coordination is authorized between Divisional units to expedite approval. The requesting unit will immediately notify G3 Plans of the approval request, forwarding the AO boundary and the name of the person approving the request.

g. In the event of contact in a nondivisional AO or near a TACR boundary when additional area is required for operations or exploitation, the AO request will be forwarded through normal G3 channels (paragraph 5 below). Direct coordination may be made by the unit concerned with the nondivisional unit responsible for the area requested, for purpose of expediting clearance, obtaining friendly troop locations and coordinates. However, such coordination will not constitute clearance to use the area requested. Clearance must be obtained through G3 channels.

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SUBJECT: LOI - Procedures for Requesting and Coordinating of Areas of Operations within the 25th Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest (U)

h. Units not using an approved AO will cancel same by contacting G3 plans.

i. 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division is authorized to coordinate directly with the 7th ARVN Division, 44th Special Zone and RSSZ for areas of operation. Upon approval of any AO outside of Long An Province, G3 Plans, 25th Infantry Division, will be immediately notified and furnished coordinates, AO name, time frame and any subsequent time extensions.

5. (C) REQUEST PROCEDURES:

a. Brigades and units under divisional control are authorized to allocate TAOI to their subordinate units within their assigned TAOI. Brigades will request all AO's through G3, 25th Infantry Division, unless specifically authorized by CG, 25th Infantry Division, to request/co-ordinate AO's directly with other units.

b. All requests for AO's outside assigned TAOI will be coordinated through 25th Infantry Division G3 Plans (CGI 5441/LTG 81) and will contain the following information:

- (1) Requesting unit.
- (2) AO name/number
- (3) Effective date and time frame.
- (4) Boundary trace of the area requested.
- (5) Reason for request (ground recon, troops in contact, exploit contact, etc.).
- (6) Name of person making request.

NOTE: In the event of contact in an AO, Commanders should decide at earliest moment if a time extension is required or desired.

c. Requests on overlays will be accepted only if properly authenticated and all the information in paragraph 5b above is included.

6. (C) SELECTION OF AO BOUNDARIES: The following factors should be considered when selecting AO boundaries:

a. Use terrain features which will be recognizable on the ground and from the air.

b. Do not split a road or stream. Indicate if the terrain feature is inclusive to the AO if a question could exist.

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SUBJECT: LOI - Procedures for Requesting and Coordinating of Areas of Operations within the 25th Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest (U)

c. Attempt to have AO's coincide with existing TAOI, TAOR, or AO boundaries. Do not create small "dead space" areas in which tactical responsibility is questionable and coordination for clearance of fires is difficult.

7. (C) COORDINATION PROCEDURES:

a. Request for inter-brigade or inter-division boundary areas of operation will be received, coordinated and recorded by the G3 Plans section.

b. When approval for an area of operation is received, G3 Plans will notify the requesting unit and prepare an overlay of the approved area for circulation within the DTOC.

c. The G3 Plans file copy of the overlay and request will be kept on file for one year.

8. (C) AO NUMBERING SYSTEM:

a. All AO's will be assigned a number by G3 Plans indicating month and numerical sequence.

b. Numerical sequence numbers will be granted to requesters as follows:

000 - 099 - 25th Division Troops  
100 - 199 - 1st Brigade  
200 - 299 - 2nd Brigade  
300 - 399 - 3rd Brigade  
400 - 499 - 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division  
500 - 599 - ARVN  
600 - 699 - CMD  
700 - 799 - Others

c. Example: 03-107 - an AO granted to 1st Brigade in March.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:  
B; plus G3 (3 Cys)

A TRUE COPY

*Carter Money*  
CARTER MONEY  
MAJ, INF  
Division Historian

s/T. J. Hanifen  
t/T. J. HANIFEN  
COLONEL, GS  
Chief of Staff

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCOP-P

28 June 1970

SUBJECT: LOI - Combat Operations Ranger Company (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. (U) PURPOSE:

- a. To define command and staff responsibilities regarding support for, and employment of, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry.
- b. To establish procedures for employing Ranger teams.
- c. To outline reporting requirements.
- d. To prescribe operational and garrison uniforms.

2. (C) MISSION: To provide long and short-range ground reconnaissance surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities to the Division; and, to provide small unit combat patrols for the performance of selected missions.

3. (C) GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Ranger Company training, organization equipment and operational techniques are designed primarily to acquire information of the enemy through ground reconnaissance and surveillance. This information, provided to the Division on a timely basis, will permit the application of superior fire power and mobility against VC/NVA forces.

a. Depending upon enemy force size (platoon or smaller), the Ranger Company will secondarily maintain the capability to react in support of its own intelligence with Direct Action Mission Teams.

b. The all-important Ranger Company search for the enemy and all manifestations of his system may take several forms. Specific information will be sought within an area designated for Ranger operations; Ranger operations will be conducted to augment the overall intelligence effort employed during the conduct of Brigade or Division-level operations; Rangers will surveil the enemy until larger friendly forces can be effectively deployed and employed; and, Rangers will conduct economy of force and harassment missions in areas of suspected enemy infiltration or presence.

This LOI supersedes 25th Inf Div Reg 525-15, dtd 15 Oct 69

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28 June 1970

SUBJECT: IOI - Combat Operations Ranger Company (U)

c. Capabilities:

- (1) Execute 3-7 day ground reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition patrols.
- (2) Employ a maximum of six teams concurrently.
- (3) Conduct insertions by helicopter; by river patrol boat; or, by integration into the maneuver scheme of Infantry, Mech Infantry, Armor, Armored Cavalry or Artillery units.
- (4) Perform terrain analysis.
- (5) Locate enemy targets for attacks by fire or ground attacks.
- (6) Determine location and size of enemy elements.
- (7) Reconnoiter LZ's to determine presence of enemy and necessity for artillery or air prep prior to the main force landing.
- (8) Ascertain enemy movement patterns.
- (9) Confirm or deny intelligence reported through other sources.
- (10) Capture enemy personnel (PW's) for exploitation
- (11) Confirm the location of, and retrieve, friendly forces personnel who have been captured by the enemy.
- (12) Investigate beyond the physical range of other intelligence collection capabilities organic to the Division.
- (13) Operate in conjunction with Air Cavalry or ground reconnaissance agencies (includes reaction to confirm radar sightings and the findings of other sensing devices).
- (14) Surveil suspected infiltration routes, river crossing sites, other critical terrain features, and suspected enemy base areas.
- (15) Launch Ranger Raids against located enemy units or appropriate size and confirmed VCI targets.
- (16) Use various "stay-behind" techniques (e.g., ambushing in base camps, in recent enemy KIA locations, and in compromised cache sites).
- (17) Conduct select missions using school-trained snipers.

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28 June 1970

SUBJECT: LOI - Combat Operations Ranger Company (U)

4. (C) COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS: The ACofS, G2 will exercise General Staff supervision over employment of the Ranger Company. ADC-A, will discharge functional responsibilities, as prescribed by the Commanding General, with respect to the Ranger Company.

5. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The Commanding Officer of the unit to which Ranger Company elements are attached will provide necessary administrative and logistical support to these Ranger Company elements.

b. Air Support:

(1) D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry normally will provide aircraft when insertion or extraction of Rangers is planned.

(2) Emergency extraction assets will be allocated by Division Army Aviation Element.

c. ACofS, G2: General Staff supervision of the Ranger program; recommends missions and discharges responsibilities to include:

(1) Pre-mission briefing of key Ranger personnel concerning pertinent intelligence data.

(2) Intelligence debriefing of Ranger teams.

d. ACofS, G3 will:

(1) Provide recommendations to the Command Group concerning selected employment of Ranger teams (Direct Action Missions).

(2) Coordinate operations with adjacent units.

(3) When employed under Division control, provide recommendations to the Command Group regarding reinforcement or extraction of a team prior to the scheduled time.

(4) Direct employment of secondary reaction force(s).

(5) Coordinate fire support.

e. ACofS, G5 will coordinate procurement, training and administration of indigenous personnel selected for employment with the Ranger Company.

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SUBJECT: LOI - Combat Operations Ranger Company (U)

28 June 1970

f. Brigade Commanders will:

- (1) Provide space in TOC for Mission Support Station (MSS) while teams are operating in Brigade AO.
- (2) Be prepared to react to intelligence gathered by teams operating in Brigade AO or to reinforce Ranger teams in contact.
- (3) Submit requests for Ranger support missions to this Hqs, ATTN: ACoS, G2.

g. Commanding Officer, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry will:

- (1) Conduct missions as directed by ACoS, G2.
- (2) Provide a platoon-size immediate reaction force.
- (3) Deploy a MSS to forward bases when necessary to coordinate sustained operations. The MSS will consist of personnel and radios sufficient to provide adequate coordination between Ranger teams and the Division.

6. (C) EMPLOYMENT: Factors to be considered in the employment of Ranger teams follow:

a. The normal Ranger team is composed of six personnel. Teams will be combined to form heavy teams if additional power is required; heavy teams can be employed as components of the Immediate Ranger Reaction Force.

b. Ranger teams have an advantage over standard reconnaissance and combat patrols in that they are equipped and trained to operate at considerable distances from friendly forces and in locations not adjoining current operations areas.

c. Ranger teams normally should be provided a large area in which to maneuver. Therefore, friendly operations nearby limit, rather than enhance, Ranger operations.

d. Supporting TAC Air and Artillery, if possible, should be used to provide on-call fire (in the event of enemy contact), to destroy enemy troop concentrations and other targets, as well as to assist in the withdrawal of the Ranger team.

e. Mobility is normally restricted to foot movement in the area of operations.

f. All supplies and equipment for which a need can be anticipated are normally carried by the patrol, since resupply from outside sources may reveal the Ranger team's location.

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SUBJECT: LOI - Combat Operations Ranger Company (U)

g. Due to the limited self-defense time capability of the Ranger team and the Immediate Ranger Reaction Force (4 hours), the immediate provision of supporting aircraft for the purposes of fire support, reaction force mobility, and emergency extraction or reinsertion of the team is essential.

## 7. (C) REPORTS:

a. Spot Reports: This report is initiated by the Ranger team and will be relayed through the MSS to the Ranger Company TOC. Information will then be immediately passed from the Company TOC to G2 Operations.

b. Ranger After Action Report: This report is submitted by the Ranger Company and will include a chronological description of enemy activities noted during employment. The report will be submitted within 24 hours following extraction. One copy will be forwarded to this Hqs, ATTN: ACofS, G2.

c. Monthly Operations Report: (Ref: USAFV Conf msg, AVHCG-O 33205, DTG 211841Z Jan 68, Subj: Long Range Patrol (LRP) Report (RCS-AVHCB-P-5) (U)). The monthly Operations Report will be submitted, in triplicate, monthly by the Commanding Officer, Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry as of 2400 hours the last day of the calendar month to reach this Hqs, ATTN: ACofS, G2 NLT the second day of the month following the reporting period.

## 8 (U) UNIFORM:

a. Operations. Ranger Company personnel will wear the uniform prescribed by the Company Commander during operations.

b. Operational Standby. While in the Ranger Company compound, Rangers are authorized to wear combat uniforms as prescribed by the Company Commander. As a minimum, however, the US Army tape, name tape and pin-on metal collar insignia will be worn in the proper manner. This authorization is granted to facilitate rapid deployment.

c. Garrison. Ranger Company personnel not in a standby posture will wear camouflaged fatigues (FSN 8415-945-7650) tailored in accordance with 25th Infantry Division standards and bearing the subdued mode of all authorized badges, patches, tapes and insignia including the Airborne Ranger Tab. Footgear will be standard jungle boots. Headgear will be the Black Beret with Merrill's Marauder patch. A Ranger Tab may be worn above the patch by those individuals who are Ranger-qualified. The beret will not be worn on combat operations or as a part of the operational standby uniform. The beret will not be worn outside RVN.

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28 June 1970

SUBJECT: IOI - Combat Operations Ranger Company (U)

d. Training. The uniform for training will be camouflaged fatigues, jungle boots, and bush hat. Individual variations of this uniform are not authorized.

9. (U) REFERENCES:

a. II FFORCEV Reg 525-7, dtd 31 Oct 68, Subj: Combat Operations Reconnaissance Patrols (U).

b. FM 31-18, dtd Aug 60, Subj: Infantry Long Range Patrol Company (U).

c. USARV Pan 525-1, dtd 30 Nov 67.

d. USARV Conf msg, AVHCG-0 33205, DTG 211841Z Jan 68, Subj: Long Range Patrol (LRP) Report (U).


FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/T. J. Hanifen  
t/T. J. HANIFEN  
COLONEL, G1  
Chief of Staff

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Co F (Rgr), 75th Inf (5 cys)  
G2 (4 cys)  
G3 (4 cys)

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MAJ, INF  
Division Historian

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## ADDENDUM

to

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1 May to 31 July 1970 (U)

1. (U) The following Lessons Learned have been compiled from a continuing reassessment of the Cambodian operations and their immediate aftermath. Though not available by the submission date of the ORLL, these Lessons Learned are relevant to the operations covered in this report.

2. (C) Lessons Learned.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Accurate Tagging of Captured Documents.

(a) Observation: Captured documents were received at Division without capture data, i.e., date and time of capture, place of capture, circumstances of capture and capturing unit.

(b) Evaluation: Unit identification and other information obtained from captured documents often provides insight into enemy organization, situation, and further intentions. Much of the intelligence value of this information is lost when the location and circumstances of capture are not available.

(c) Recommendations: Additional training on the importance of tagging captured documents should be conducted, possibly in the Division replacement training program. Also, intelligence officers at each level should make every attempt to obtain capture data for those documents that are received without it.

(2) Spot Reporting.

(a) Observation: Unit identification and a summary of knowledge from prisoners was, in the majority of the cases, not spot reported and therefore not available until the prisoners arrived at the Division PW Collection Point.

(b) Evaluation: PWs can provide up to date first hand knowledge of their unit's activities, strengths, and organization. The timely reporting of this information is essential to accurate intelligence estimates.

(c) Recommendations: Initial screening of prisoners should be accomplished as far forward as possible and the information obtained from the initial screening should be spot reported immediately.

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(3) Utilization of IPW Teams.

(a) Observation: The majority of prisoners-of-war were initially interrogated at Brigade Headquarters.

(b) Evaluation: Prisoners-of-war and ralliers should be quickly interrogated so that information obtained can be immediately exploited. At the start of the Cambodian operations initial interrogations were being conducted at Brigade and Division level. This was changed by placing IPW personnel at Battalion and in some instances, Company level. This improved response to intelligence information.

(c) Recommendation: IPW Teams should be placed at the lowest practicable level, tactical situation permitting.

(4) Reports Control.

(a) Observation: Due to the large amount of enemy materiel captured, a more accurate and responsive method of reporting and accounting is needed.

(b) Evaluation: Initial spot reports were not updated as accurate counts were obtained by the operational units. As updating procedures were instituted, there was often wide variance between the initial spot report and final update. A varied breakdown by categories was not initially established Division-wide; thus, ammunition and small arms were not reported by type and, when this information was later desired, it was difficult to obtain. As a refined breakdown of categories was developed, the problem was alleviated.

(c) Recommendation: Field Commanders should initially report estimates when large caches are uncovered unless accurate counting is possible. After initial estimates, accurate updates should be made as soon as possible after the cache is discovered. Ideally, estimates should be updated only once. A complete and wide variety of categories should be established and made known to all units before operations begin.

(5) Bridge Classification.

(a) Observation: Some bridges were not posted with classification signs. In one instance, a guard was posted on a bridge to keep "heavy trucks" from going across and he had no knowledge of the bridge classification or what a "heavy truck" was.

(b) Evaluation: Bridges not classified and marked properly can be dangerous to unknowing personnel and costly in terms of equipment.

(c) Recommendation: All bridges should be classified and marked with the proper signs. If guards are posted, they should have knowledge of the classification system.

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c. Operations:

(1) Employment of Light Scout Teams.

(a) Observation: The NVA engaged the high Cobra gunship as their primary target.

(b) Evaluation: This technique was a deviation from normal enemy tactics. Normally the enemy engaged the low scout aircraft (LOH), then fired on the Cobra once the gunship was engaged. The problem was solved by employing a chase slick with five aero rifles escorting each LST. During VR operations, this aircraft orbited higher and to the side of the Cobra. The crew of the slick aircraft assisted in locating enemy positions and detecting enemy fire when the Cobra was engaged. The aero rifles were sufficient for initial security but did not so overload the chase aircraft that space for a downed crew was not available.

(c) Recommendation: Air cavalry troops should use the chase slick when operating light scout teams in an environment where the enemy has an extensive anti-helicopter capability.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training. None.

f. Logistics:

(1) Forward Ammunition Pick-up Points.

(a) Observation: Forward Ammunition Pick-up Points were established at Katum and Thien Ngon during the Cambodian Operation.

(b) Evaluation: The initial concept of the ammunition pick-up point was for a unit to order ammunition and it would be shipped within a 24 hour period. As time went by, units failed to make pick-ups and a stockage developed on the ground. It was left up to a DAO Representative to attempt to control the operation which became too big to handle efficiently by one person.

(c) Recommendation: Battalion S-4's should place their orders daily so that the Brigade S-4's can consolidate them and ship the requested ammunition the following day. At the Forward Ammunition Pick-up Point, the Brigade S-4 should make sure that the ammunition is distributed to the unit that ordered it.

(2) Lack of Authorized Lift Capability.

(a) Observation: The extensive use of maintenance contact teams, forcing forward support companies to operate in several locations simultaneously, caused problems due to lack of authorized lift capability.

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(b) Evaluation: With the authorized 5-ton wrecker and rough terrain crane, each forward support company has the capability to operate in two locations. Within the 725th Maintenance Battalion, only one forward support company possessed this capability initially, but all were required to operate from more than one base. This problem was eventually resolved through temporary equipment loan from USARV and OPCON assignment of wreckers from Headquarters Company.

(c) Recommendation: Contingency plans should exist for immediately augmenting forward support companies' lift capability from either Battalion or non-Divisional backup maintenance support units, should the tactical situation demand extensive use of maintenance contact teams.

### g. Communications:

#### (1) Communications Difficulties.

(a) Observation: As maintenance units became dispersed, commo systems were extended and became less effective in providing timely information.

(b) Evaluation: The Division Materiel Officer's Staff was unable to stay abreast of changing situations because of poor communication with maintenance forward support elements. Allocations of resources suffered, and maintenance and supply operations were slowed considerably. Forward element Commanders, accustomed to telephonic reports, failed to push through requirements by other means when telephone service failed or became over-loaded. This problem was resolved by mutual effort by all parties to relay operational information continually by all means, including TWX, courier and radio relay.

(c) Recommendation: Commo planning is of paramount importance. Forward element Commanders must be continuously aware of all the forms of commo available to them. All means should be considered in initial planning and used when required.

#### (2) Use of the Airborne Retransmission Unit (FM secure).

(a) Observation: On occasion, enemy action or darkness would find a unit in an area where FM secure radio communications were virtually impossible.

(b) Evaluation: Use of the airborne retrans unit on station over, or near the site, allowed continued FM communications until the unit could move to more advantageous terrain or could erect more efficient antennas. This must be done expeditiously, however, since under ideal conditions, the best aircraft available to the Division has a loiter time of slightly over three hours.

(c) Recommendation: An airborne retrans capability should be retained organic to Infantry Divisions.

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### (3) Use of FM Secure Communications.

(a) Observation: Throughout the Cambodian Operation, the primary and often sole means of communications between Brigade and Battalion was FM secure radio.

(b) Evaluation: The FM secure radio sets proved to be far more effective and versatile than expected. Brigade and Battalion personnel learned that the range of these sets, over nearly all types of terrain and foliage, was greater than anticipated. FM relays and retrans units which were expected to be committed to Cambodian operations were, in most instances, not needed.

(c) Recommendation: That FM secure modes of communications be utilized as extensively as possible in Division operations.

### (4) Disassembly of Communication Assets.

(a) Observation: Because of the relatively stable situation of the Division prior to the Cambodian Operation, it was the custom of some units to disperse components of signal end-items into various fixed facilities.

(b) Evaluation: Because of the rapidity with which execution of the Cambodian Operation was ordered, units were unable to reconstitute signal end-items and some signal assets were deployed in a deadlined status initially.

(c) Recommendation: Units should not permit disassembly of major signal end-items.

### (5) Communications Means Status.

(a) Observation: Often Brigade and Battalion message center TOC personnel did not know what communications were available to them because of the rapid changes in status caused by relocation, equipment availability and conditions.

(b) Evaluation: Many communications delays could be overcome by real-time notification of message center and TOC personnel of communications means status and conspicuous posting of this status. Once the Brigade TOC's and message centers updated means charts and monitored them, these delays were overcome.

(c) Recommendation: That every message center and TOC keep a real-time communications means status posted.

### (6) OPSEC/COMSEC Activities.

(a) Observation: Particular emphasis was placed on COMSEC during the Cambodian Operation.

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(b) Evaluation: The introduction of unscheduled frequency and call sign changes on FM radio nets and the initiation of the KAC-810 (Circle Wheel) Numerical/Authentication Code appeared to be successful in combating enemy COMINT efforts.

(c) Recommendation: These actions should be made a standard part of the OPSEC Annex to Division OPCODE's.

h. Materiel:

(1) Aircraft 114 Radios Installed in OH-6A Helicopters.

(a) Observation: Approximately three to four aircraft in the Division are without FM capability daily.

(b) Evaluation: A study of the problems with the ARC 114 reveals that circuit corrosion and damage to other electronic parts was the result of water leaking into the radio. Failures were attributed to capacitors short-circuiting because of internal defects caused primarily to exposure to humidity.

(c) Recommendation: Preventive measures, at the unit level and at Company E, 725th Maintenance Battalion, such as covering the radios at night and the use of front doors in the LOH, has decreased the rate of failure with the radios.

i. Other:

(1) Estimation and Reporting of Captured Rice.

(a) Observation: Gross over-estimating by field Commanders in regard to captured rice tonnage had a confusing effect when compared with figures of actual tonnage received at the Main Rice Collection Point at Tay Ninh.

(b) Evaluation: There was a large difference between rice reported captured and rice actually evacuated or otherwise disposed.

(c) Recommendation: Brigade and Battalion Commanders should place more emphasis on accurate reporting, handling and protection of captured and destroyed foodstuffs. A handy reference for estimates is the standard rice bag which holds 100 kilos of rice. Ten of these bags comprise one metric ton.

(2) Division Transportation Office (DTO) Personnel Shortage.

(a) Observation: During the peak transportation load, the DTO was required to operate 22 hours daily with an assigned staff of five personnel. This situation proved extremely taxing for this operation.

(b) Evaluation: With the line of logistical resupply extended 71 miles from Division rear to Brigade trains, and marginal convo to the remote area,

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requirements for transportation did not reach the DTO until late in the evening for programming. The office was augmented with a Transportation Air Liaison Officer (TALO) to handle fixed wing missions, which were received by him from the DTO and passed to II Field Force. An average of seven hours was required just to schedule the Chinook support missions. This coupled with fluctuating requirements from the units, changes and undependability of commitments, increased the work load. This required a 24 hour manning capability, in addition to the Assistant DTO's presence at Tay Ninh to receive and coordinate motor transport requirements (primarily ammunition).

(c) Recommendation: The DTO should have a trained transportation liaison officer, NCO, and  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck with an AN/VRC-46 radio to coordinate transportation matters directly with the Brigades. An Infantry Division conducting long range airmobile operations makes augmentation to the TOE necessary.

### (3) Rapid Displacement of Maintenance Elements.

(a) Observation: After several years of fixed base operations, maintenance Battalion elements had lost their ability to rapidly displace.

(b) Evaluation: Dependence on fixed station power sources and permanent mounting of test equipment in buildings resulted in confusion. Equipment vital to the mobile operations, such as the  $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton Contact and Emergency Set, was not available until after deployment was initiated. Little attention was paid by unit Commanders to personal skill requirements and light equipment (primarily hand tools) shortages. When tasked to operate in two and three different locations simultaneously, the shortages and skill deficiencies came to light.

(c) Recommendation: Many problems can be, and were, eliminated immediately by redistribution of personnel and material resources. However, it is only through a continuing effort to maintain a light, highly mobile self-sufficient operation that support units can effectively deploy and efficiently continue their support maintenance mission.

### (4) Employment of Battalion Correspondents.

(a) Observation: Battalion Commanders did not make maximum use of their unit correspondents.

(b) Evaluation: Battalion Correspondents did an outstanding job of providing operational film to the Division Information Office but turned in almost no feature-type copy for release or use by Tropic Lightning News (TLN). Commanders therefore were unhappy about the inadequate publicity given their unit. At the same time, the TLN had to fill with pre-Cambodian copy due to the lack of copy written about the operations.

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(c) Recommendation: That Commanders consider information aspects of an operation in their planning and require that the appointed Battalion Information Officer (usually the S-1) make maximum use of assigned unit correspondents.

### (5) Relations with News Media Representatives.

(a) Observation: News reporting by commercial media in the operational area was generally favorable.

(b) Evaluation: The generally favorable attitude of the press during this operation supported the theory that maximum candor produces the best results. Although newsmen in the field were frequently aware of the future operations, there was no security violations and no release of embargoed information.

(c) Recommendation: Commanders should continue the policy of providing maximum information to the press, through both briefings and discussions, and, when appropriate, a background basis and indication for attribution.

### (6) Use of Motion Picture (MOPIC) Teams.

(a) Observation: MOPIC Teams were not available in the area when needed.

(b) Evaluation: Four MOPIC Teams in the area were from MACOI Audio Visual, Southeast Asia Pictorial Center (SEAPIC) and USARPAC Department of the Army Special Photo Office (DASPO). All were based in Saigon. Of the four teams, only two checked in with the Division Information Office on arrival. All teams operated independently and did not coordinate movement or conduct liaison with the DIO or any Brigade section. As a result, when significant caches were found, it was extremely difficult to determine if a MOPIC Team had been on the scene or to find a MOPIC Team to get to the cache. This became critical when the cache was ammunition and the unit had to take pictures of the cache before destruction and moving to a new area.

(c) Recommendation: (Submitted to MACOI and SEAPIC) MOPIC Team Chiefs should maintain continuous liaison with the Information Office in the area. When this is not practical, teams should establish liaison with Brigade S-1's or S-2's to insure that a Brigade Staff Officer is aware of each team's location.

### (7) Civil Affairs/Refugee Collection.

(a) Observations: It was apparent that Government of South Vietnam (GVN) Officials were adequately prepared to handle most refugee problems from Cambodian operations. The GVN had contingency plans covering refugee collection and resettlement and put these plans efficiently into operation.

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(b) Evaluation: Civil Affairs help was needed when GVN sources were not able to supply needed commodities. Otherwise, the GVN quickly and efficiently processed, cared for and relocated refugees.

(c) Recommendations: US forces should render assistance only when the GVN does not have the capability to handle refugees. Useful commodities such as captured rice should be channeled into GVN refugee centers and civic action projects.

### (8) Radar Sets AN/PPS-4 and AN/PPS-5.

(a) Observations: There have been several incidents in which radar sets have become non-operable in the field and an undue amount of time has been required to move them from their site locations to repair facilities.

(b) Evaluation: When a radar becomes non-operable in the field, the Battalion S-2 should coordinate with the Brigade S-2 to arrange air transportation of the set to the appropriate maintenance facility. If the Brigade is unable to provide air transportation for the Battalion, the Brigade S-2 should coordinate with the Brigade S-3 Air and S-4 and request assistance from G-3 Operations, for the Division Ready Ship. This will require the Brigade Commander's verification that the radar is combat essential. G-3 Operations should coordinate with Army Aviation elements to provide the Division Ready Ship. It has been noted in the past that the transportation available to the Brigades and Battalions for maintenance evacuation has not always been utilized to the fullest and it is at these levels that the transportation should be provided if at all possible.

### (9) Inadequate Information on Mission Sheets.

(a) Observation: Mission sheets which arrived at unit levels had inadequate information which aviators needed to perform necessary pre-flight planning.

(b) Evaluation: On missions assigned to the 25th Aviation Battalion, erroneous and/or incomplete information concerning unit locations and frequency were received. This became a recurring problem on many LOH missions when mission sheets with only the words "Will Brief" were given to the crews. Also, experience has shown that many of the passengers on such missions were not knowledgeable of contact frequencies and were unaware of the information needed by the crews for the preparation of the flight. The requirement for supported units to submit enough information to facilitate pre-flight planning would alleviate this problem area.

(c) Recommendation: Supported units should be required, to the extent possible, to submit adequate information so that aviators can adequately prepare for the flight.

### (10) Army Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program (ASOAP).

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(a) Observation: A recent survey of the oil analysis program conducted by the Battalion Maintenance Office reflected that oil samples were taking too long to arrive at the ASOAP Laboratory through normal mail channels.

(b) Evaluation: This delay presented a serious problem resulting in a three to eight day interval before the ASOAP Laboratory was able to provide this unit with the necessary laboratory results. In an effort to acquire this information within a 24 hour period, the 25th Aviation Battalion began flying oil samples to the ASOAP Laboratory on the scheduled courier flight. Several metal boxes with partitions were improvised for the samples in order to prevent breakage and spillage. Since the implementation of this system, previously experienced delays have decreased appreciably.

(c) Recommendation: All aviation units should improvise some type of container to prevent breakage and spillage of oil samples, and when feasible, fly oil samples to the ASOAP Laboratory.

(11) Establishment of an Aviation Central Issue Facility.

(a) Observation: Many aviation units of the Division are prohibited from establishing a necessary workage level of flight clothing and equipment due to the small number of crew members assigned.

(b) Evaluation: An Aviation Central Issue Facility for flight clothing was established as an integral part of the 25th Aviation Battalion S-4 Section. This facility services all Division flight crew members except Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry. The Central Issue Facility facilitates larger stockage of flight clothing and equipment for Divisional flight crew members for both initial issue and direct exchange. In addition, this facility establishes tighter control of flight clothing and equipment to insure the equipment is available for crew members.

(c) Recommendation: All major units, having numerous small aviation units, should establish an Aviation Central Issue Facility.

(12) Airfield Safety Council.

(a) Observation: There was a definite lack of knowledge and understanding of responsibilities and operational problems between tenant units on Cu Chi Base Camp.

(b) Evaluation: On numerous occasions, problems arose between two individual units and were not brought to the attention of the Airfield Commander and/or the Division Aviation Officer to determine if similar problems were occurring within other units. Sometimes action was required by more than one unit which required extensive coordination. An Aviation Safety Council was formed with members from each tenant unit so that all units would become aware of the existing problems. The units could coordinate collectively on an immediate basis for the establishment of guidelines for corrective actions by the responsible unit or units.

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(c) Recommendation: Action should be taken as necessary by individual units concerned for immediate corrective actions when necessary. However, the Aviation Safety Council should be made aware of the situation immediately if deemed appropriate by the Airfield Commander or recommended by the Division Aviation Officer. If not, the subject should be thoroughly discussed at the next scheduled meeting to determine if further action is required and also to inform the other members of the council of the problem and actions taken.

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