

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

Cy 36 of 38 Cys

Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
Attn: Division Historian

By RLB/MJS

NARA, Date 11/27/80

1. (U) Operation Bold Lancer I (Thoan Thang IV)
2. (U) Dates of Operation - 041200 May 70 to 141925 May 1970
3. (C) Location - Base Area 354 (XT 1060, XT 1090, WT 8060, WT 8060)
4. (U) Command and Control Headquarters - 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
5. (U) Reporting Officer - Paul J. Mueller Jr, Col Inf Commanding
6. (C) Task Organization:

2/14 Inf (05 May - 14 May 70)	7/11 Arty (DS) (04 May - 14 May 70)
3/22 Inf (04 May - 14 May 70)	A 2/32(-) (GS) (06 May - 14 May 70)
1/5 Inf (M) (04 May - 14 May 70)	B 3/13 (R) (05 May - 14 May 70)
2/22 Inf (M)(-) (04 May - 08 May 70)	C 3/13 (R) (10 May - 14 May 70)
E 2/22 Inf (M) (04 May - 13 May 70)	D 3/13 (R) (08 May - 12 May 70)
D Troop 3/4 Cav SQDN (04 May - 08 May 70)	
3/17 Air Cav SQDN (06 May - 14 May 70)	

Brigade Control

1F 75th Inf (Rangers) (04 May - 14 May 70)
 A 65th Eng. (DS) (04 May - 14 May 70)
 Prov. Co. (Nui Da Den) (04 May - 14 May 70)
 46th Inf Plt Scout Dog (04 May - 14 May 70)
 1 Plt 25th MP Co. (04 May - 14 May 70)

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

 a. Artillery

- (1) 7/11 Artillery (DS) HQ (041200 - 141925 May 70)
 - A Dtry - (04 May - 14 May 70)
 - B Dtry - (04 May - 14 May 70)
 - C Dtry - (04 May - 14 May 70)

Support by the 7/11 Arty was continuous and extremely timely. The planning and coordination of these fires were also extremely effective.

(2) Divarty

- B 3/13 (155) (Reinf)
- C 3/13 (155) (Reinf)
- D 3/13 (8") (Reinf)

All support by the 3/13 Arty was well coordinated and very effective.

(3) II Field Force Artillery

- A 2/32(-) (GS)

The indirect fire support provided by the 2/32 was highly effective during the Cambodian operation.

- b. US Army Aircraft
- (1) 1st Brigade Aviation Section - This is a section of 5 light observation helicopters. Support provided included both administrative and tactical missions. The close cooperation between brigade and the aviation section was contributed to overcoming many of the control problems inherent with operating in a large area of operations. Troop-lift support was provided by the 187 AHC (6-8, 10, 11, 13, 14 May) and 116 AHC (6, 9, 12, 14 May) with both troop transport and armed helicopter escort.
 - (2) C Troop 3/4 Cav and 3/17 Air Cav also provided helicopter, gunship and aerial recon support in the brigade area of operations. This support enabled the brigade to have an immediate strike capability in contact areas, the assets to visit new areas for enemy troop movements and enemy staging and supply areas.
 - (3) US Air Force - Tactical air support was provided by the US/F Forward Air Controllers and and Fighter aircraft. This support provided the air strikes necessary for destroying enemy bunker storage complexes, and troop concentrations.
- c. Engineer Support - Special use was made of Company E 65th Engineers for installation of a pontoon bridge for the movement of mechanized troops over the Rach Cai Bach River (Rach Deng Co) into Cambodia. Their support was effective however emplacement of the bridge was delayed due to difficulty of establishing a bridge approach on the west bank of the river.
- d. Signal-Communications support for this operation was supplied by the organic commo platoon and elements from the 125th Signal battalion. Brigade commo provided the radio communications. Due to the distance involved during the first part of the operation, the communications was at times difficult. The installation was quick and effective. VHF communications was provided by 125th Signal. This means of communications was delayed in becoming operational due to the difficulty encountered with equipment serviceability. However, once communication was established it was very reliable with prompt action and efficient operation.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE: The general status and disposition of enemy forces in the vicinity of Base Area 354* prior to operation Bold Lancer I was believed to have been as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>SOURCE OF INFO</u>
95C Regiment	Western War Zone C	570	PW/Contacts
HQ/9th VC/NVA DIV	Base Area 354(Cambodia)	845	PW/Rallier
Z31	Vic Xom Giua		
	Base Area 354(Cambodia)	UNK	FW
272 VC/NVA Regt	NW of Thien Ngon	900	PW/Contacts

* Note that Base Area 354 covers an area in W. War Zone C (Viet Nam) and Cambodia W. of Doghead.

a. The principal targets of the operation commencing on 6 May were the suspected base area, training and logistical facilities and headquarters units of the 9th VC/NVA Division located in the northern portion of Base Area 706 and Base Area 354 in Cambodia. A secondary, but important consideration was the presence of the 95C Regiment in Western War Zone C and Base Area 354. This unit had been in an offensive posture since late March and had conducted numerous attacks against the 1st Cav. Division (AM) Fire Support Bases in the area. In addition it was thought that the targeted area in Cambodia contained various support units and replacement organizations. PW's captured in previous operations in War Zone C had indicated the existence of a unit known as Z-31 which supplied replacements to main force units in the area.

CLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12350, Section 2.2, (1)

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- b. When combat operations were initiated in Base Area 354 enemy contact was significantly less than anticipated. Initially groups of as many as 30-40 NVA were engaged with gunships but ground contact was limited to scattered exchanges of fire with small groups. There appeared to be no organized resistance and no significant enemy formations were encountered until 9 May when elements of 1/5 Inf (M) engaged a tenacious enemy force. On 12 May C 1/5 Inf (M) NDP was attacked by an estimated two company force. Although no positive identification was made the attack was believed to have been conducted by the 95C Regiment. With the exception of this contact the enemy encountered in the operation were not in an offensive posture and generally were not organized to conduct coordinated defensive operations. Many of the large base areas discovered had evidently been recently evacuated, with civilians reporting that large numbers of personnel had moved to the West and southwest out of the operational area at the start of the operation.
- c. The following units were identified as having operated in the area prior to the operation:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
94 Engr Bn	PW/Documents
C 20 Sig. Co. 95C Regt.	Documents
Z-31c Military Hospital	Documents
94 Recovery Regt	Documents
C23 Hospital. 82 RSG	Documents
Medical Dispensary, 82 RSG	Documents
Z-31, 94 Recovery Regiment	PW's
9 Bn, 94 Recovery Regiment	Documents
Transportation Bn, 82 RSG	Documents
3rd Bn, 95C Regiment	Documents
K77 Hospital, RS Section COSVN	PW's
Property and Training Sect. COSVN	Documents
27 Bn, Engr, Office, Mil. Staff Dept COSVN	Documents

A total of 50 bunker and hootch complexes, 11 rice storage areas, 6 arms and munitions storage areas, 4 hospital complexes (1 with a capacity of 250 beds) and a complete workshop with arcwelders and machine tools (drill press, lathe) was found in the objective area. The road and trail networks found indicated motor vehicle traffic and numerous motorboats and sampans were captured along the Rach Cai Bach River. Two battalion size training areas were also discovered containing, in addition to living accommodations, bleacher areas and classrooms, large mess halls and wooden mock-ups of tanks, jets and helicopters. Base Area 354 was in all probability a training, rest and staging area for the 9th VC/NVA Division and numerous supporting elements.

d. The Cambodian portion of Base Area 354 lies in an area roughly 17km by 13km and is bounded on the east by the Rach Cai Bach (Rach Deng Go) River and on the south by the Prek Kampong Spean River. Neither of these rivers is fordable. The Rach Cai Bach is approximately 50m wide and the Prek Kampong Spean is slightly larger at 50-75m. Consequently there are no direct routes of approach into the area from SVN. The eastern half of the area is densely forested and provides few landing zones except in the extreme southern portion. Numerous roads and trails run throughout the area and provide good access to the entire base area. Cross country traffic is largely limited to tracked vehicles as roads and trails soon become very difficult for wheels to travel due to deterioration. To the west of Base Area 354 the terrain is sparsely wooded and provided good cross country trafficability.

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It should be noted that the operation was conducted during the latter part of the dry season and only scattered showers fell during the period. As rains increased, trafficability throughout the area was considerably reduced. Weather had little effect on aircraft operations during Bold Lancer I. Good flying weather was predominant and on only one occasion did ground fog delay an airmobile operation until midmorning.

e. During the initial stages of Phase I cover and concealment in Area 354 was of two distinct types. Approximately one third of the area was open and flat providing no cover and very limited concealment. Most open areas were dry rice paddies offering limited concealment behind rice paddy dikes for the infantry and no concealment for wheeled or track vehicles. The open area afforded free movement to mechanized vehicles and wheeled vehicles towing artillery pieces and few problems were encountered in these areas. These open areas offered unrestricted observation and field of fire. All open areas in Area 354 were usable for both mechanized and to a large extent to wheeled vehicles providing avenues of approach in any required direction. The other two thirds of the area of operations was densely vegetated varying from double to triple canopy. Mechanized and wheeled vehicles were limited to dirt roads and wide trails. Ground troops were restricted by thick underbrush although there were numerous trails throughout the area. Limited cover was provided by the dense canopy and considerable concealment was provided by the thick undergrowth in the area. Observation and fields of fire were restricted at times to a few feet and at best a few meters, in all densely vegetated areas. During the initial assault into Cambodia two critical terrain features became evident in the successful accomplishment of the mission. The first was the bridge site across the Rach Cai Bach River at Lo Go (vicinity WT 969752). The site was critical in that it provided access through the forest to the west by trails to the village of Tasuos. This bridgehead also provided access by road south to the Prek Kampong Spear River. The second critical terrain feature was the village of Tasuos directly west of the bridge site. The village controlled the junction of several roads, and airmobiling the 3/22 Inf. to secure the village enabled the rapid deployment of a mechanized infantry unit to the west and then south after reaching the village. The road south from the bridgehead and adjacent to the Rach Cai Bach River was utilized by another mechanized infantry battalion providing a suitable avenue of approach to the south.

f. The population in Base Area 354 was largely located west and south of the bridge site at Lo Go (subsequently FSD Minnie WT 969752). One population center, Tasuos (WT 917747) was the focus of much of the initial tactical operations. Nowhere in the TAOI was the population in excess of 800 persons per village. Just to the south of the TAOI was the city of Kampong Trach (WT 866615) which had a population in excess of 1,000 people.

The attitude of the indigenous was initially one of fear, followed by warmth and cooperation. The 1/5 Inf(M), 2/14 Inf and the 2/22 Inf(M) enjoyed friendly relations with local villagers, though at Tasuos the 3/22 Inf encountered ill will because of an artillery incident.

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9. (C) MISSION: 1st Bde, 25th Infantry Division relieved elements of 1st Cav Div (AM) in northwestern War Zone C on 4 May and attacked into Base Area 354 to locate and destroy enemy supply staging areas, equipment and personnel.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 1st Bde, 25th Infantry Division conduct Operation Bold Laner in three phases.

Phase I - Movement of elements of the brigade into northwestern War Zone C, relief of elements of 1st Cav Div (AM) and preparation for the attack (4 and 5 May).

Phase II - Attack and river crossing. On 6 May 1970 one Infantry Battalion was air assaulted into Cambodia. One company secured the western bank of the Rach Cai Bach River by air assault while 2/22 Inf secured the eastern bank. Company E 65th Engineers constructed a float bridge for the passage of 1/5 Inf (Mech) and 2/22 Inf (Mech) to their objectives in Cambodia.

Phase III - Detailed Search - The insertion of another infantry battalion by air on 8 May 1970 began the detailed searching of the base area. This continued through 14 May 1970 with all elements of the brigade.

11. (C) EXECUTION: (See Overlay) Operation Bold Laner I was an offensive move into Cambodia on a search and destroy mission to limit the enemies capability to resupply into S. Vietnam. The order for the operation was issued on 3 May 1970.

Command and Control

The brigade forward CP was moved to Thien Ngon (XF 085817) on 5 May 1970. This was to augment the command and control originating from Tay Ninh Base Camp. On 10 May, the movement of the brigade headquarters was completed from TNBC and Thien Ngon to FSB Wood (WF 047794).

Operations 6 May

Movement of ground troops into Cambodia began on 6 May 1970 with the combat assault of three companies of the 3/22 Infantry to the vicinity of the village of Tasuos (WF 917747), and one company securing the bridgehead on the western bank of the Rach Cai Bach River (WF 968752). The 2/22 Inf (M) attacked to seize the bridgehead on the eastern bank, and Co E, 65th Engr Bn initiated float bridge construction.

0334 and 0416 - two Commando Vaults were employed at the bridge site in Cambodia for the insertion of elements of the 3/22 Inf. These were 15,000lb bombs.

0715 - C 3/22 Inf spotted 30 individuals moving away from their position at XF 046815 at 150m. They were engaging with S/A, gunships and artillery with negative results.

0955 - C 3/22 received an unknown number of HE rounds, resulting in 2US KIA and 8US WIA. Fire was determined to be friendly artillery.

1025 - A & D Co 3/22 received small arms fire from the vicinity of Tasuos. Engaged with organic weapons and LET's resulting in 2UA KIA and 3 WIA. Negative enemy losses.

Total enemy losses for the day were: 46 NVA KIA or KBA; captured - 13 SKS rifles, 3xCC carbines, 1xUS M-1 carbine; destroyed - 27 bxs, 2x50m trenches, 7xCC HG's, 6 hootches, 1 tunnel uncovered, 1x51 cal position, 1xshack and 2xF/P.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Operations 7 May

0605 - The engineers completed the bridge. At 0715 B 1/5 Inf(M) crossed the bridge. The rest of the 1/5 Inf(M) finished crossing the bridge 0800. At 0830 2/22 Inf(M) started across the bridge. Movement across the bridge was completed at 1000hrs.

0740 - At grids WT 920635 and WT 938620 Vietnamese PBR's received heavy automatic weapons fire, RPG and 51cal fire. Fire was returned with organic weapons, A/S, LFT, FLC and Black Pony. Engagement was at a distance of 40m. Results were; 2US WIA, 1VN KIA, 10VN WIA. Enemy losses unknown.

1045 - B 3/17 Air Cav engaged 14 enemy with organic weapons at WT 951461. Results 14 enemy KBA. On a recon of the area, they located and destroyed 1x57 RR.

1200 - B 7/11 Arty (towed) crossed the river, followed 1/5 Mech and were in firing position by 071730 May 70.

1300 - At WT 905670, A 1/5 Inf(M) engaged an unknown sized enemy force with organic weapons. Enemy force returned fire with S/A and A/W fire. Fire ceased at 1310. Results were; 1US KIA, 1US WIA; enemy losses were 11NVA KIA, 8 PW's and 6 weapons.

1525 - A 2/22 Inf(M) engaged an unknown size enemy force vicinity WT 9672. Engaged with organic weapons and LST with unknown results.

1745 - A 2/22 Inf(M) received S/A and A/W fire from vicinity WT 9465. Returned with organic weapons and LFT, 10 enemy in woodline at 150m. Results 4 enemy were KBA.

2050 - Recon 1/5 Inf(M) AP received 5 RPG's and S/A fire. Contact broke at 2100hrs with one platoon of B Co reacting. Results were; 1US KIA, 1US WIA and 4NVA KIA.

Support for ground troops was primarily through the use of aerial rocket artillery and 105 artillery supporting on the west side of the river. Enemy losses for the day were: 73 NVA KIA; captured 6 unknown type weapons, 2x25lb mines, 5x rifle grenades, 1xSKS; destroyed 65 hootches, 70m trench destroyed, 4 bxs, 1x57mm RR.

Operations 8 May

The 8th of May saw the completion of the move into Cambodia with the insertion of the 2/14 Inf into the south of the brigade area of operations. This completed Phase II of the operation. Significant actions for the day were;

0528 - B 1/5 Inf(M) at WT 900673 NDP observed and engaged 10 enemy at 300m. Engaged with organic weapons with negative results.

0650 - VN PBR at WT 9560 received 6 rds B-40 and heavy A/W and 51 cal fire from an unknown size enemy force. Returned with organic weapons, FLC, A/S and LFT. Fire ceased immediately. Results; No friendly casualties; enemy results unknown.

2/22 Inf(M) minus Co B relieved OPCON 1st Bde; placed OPCON 2nd Bde.

The communication was excellent during the period discussed. Arty support was both DS and general support nature.

The total results of enemy losses were; 28NVA KIA; captured 1xSKS rifle, 55gal Mogas, 55gal oil, 42 bicycles, 2 AK-47's, 26 hootches, 4 tunnel entrances uncovered, 12 motor scooters, US losses, 13 US WIA.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, (U)

NARA, Date 11/27/90

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Operations 9 May

All units were involved in detailed searches of their areas of operation. Enemy activity increased. Significant activities for the day were:

0102hrs - VN PBR at WT 962608 received B-40 and heavy A/W fire from an unknown size enemy force. Fire was returned with organic weapons, FAC, LFT and N/H. Distance of engagement was 50m. Fire ceased at 0112hrs. There were no friendly casualties and negative enemy results.

1010hrs - C 1/5 Inf(M) at WT 890658 engaged 4-5 individuals with organic weapons at 200m. Recon at the contact located an area 400m long by 400m wide, containing a large base camp complex with messhalls, bunkers, fighting positions. They also located 1 RPG launcher, 1 transistor radio, 10xRPG rounds, 5lbs documents, 20x60 satchel charges, 1xNVA protective mask and 100xAK rounds. Negative casualties.

1130hrs - A 1/5 Inf(M) at WT 835684 was in contact with an estimated platoon size NVA element. Enemy were engaged with organic weapons and LFT. The enemy returned with S/A, and A/W fire. Results were: 1US KIA, 14US WIA and 9NVA KIA.

1130hrs - B 1/5 Inf(M) at XT 835705 engaged an unknown size enemy force. Fire was returned with S/A, A/W and RPG sporadically. US forces employed a LFT and A/S. Negative casualties or results.

1610hrs - C 1/5 Inf(M) at WT 840674 received A/W and RPG fire, returned with organic weapons. Support was requested from Artillery, LFT and A/S. Results were; 1US KIA, 14US WIA, unknown enemy results. Artillery support was provided by 7/11 Arty (DS). The artillery fire was accurate and timely.

1923hrs - FSB Minnie at WT 971750 received 25-30 rounds of 82mm Mortar fire from suspected locations of WT 971747. Fire was returned by 7/11 Arty, Blue Max and FAC. Results were; 1US KIA, and 18US WIA, enemy losses were unknown.

2030hrs - Recon 1/5 Inf(M) at WT 903665, enroute to AP received S/A fire from an unknown sized enemy force. Fire was returned with organic weapons. Fire ceased at 2035. Results; 2US WIA; enemy losses - 4 NVA KIA, 101lbs of documents, 10x60mm mortar rounds, 1xset NVA web gear, 3x60 HG's, 15lbs clothing, 5lbs medical supplies, 3 canteens, 6 ponchos and 1 helmet.

0630 to 1800hrs - Co B 2/22 Inf(M) found two large caches, one at WT 959621 and the other at WT 953688. The results at these finds will be reflected in the totals.

The communications for all actions in the Bde AO the 9th of May were good. Some of the minor problems encountered had been solved and commo was operating in an effective manner. The artillery put down effective indirect fire both on contact areas and intell targets. Total enemy losses for the day were; 29NVA KIA; captured 1xAK-47, 1xSKS, 30 tons of rice, 3xlarge boats, 1xlarge sampan with inboard motor; destroyed 3xhooches, 16xsampans, 160bxs, 1x200m trench line, 9xhuts, cooking utensils, 3 hammocks, 1xhomemade gun, 15 structures, 6 structure damages, 75m of trench uncovered.

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Operations 10 May

The operations on 10 May were directed toward cache sites. The contacts during the day were limited to hit and run tactics with one to two individuals. The result of the days actions were: 8NVA KIA; captured - 18xSKS, 50xAK-47's, 1xRPD LMG, 80xAK-54 pistols, 6x51cal MG, 100 CC claymores, 1xCC LMG, 1xCC HMG, 1xM-2 carbine, 6xM-16's, 17xAK-50's, 1x7.62 AA/EG, 12x100lb bags of rice, 250x5lb blocks of explosives, 1 entrenching tool, 1x25-30lb mine, 1 1/2 tons rice, 88 CC HG, 65x5lb blocks explosive, destroyed - 192bx's, 6xF/P's, 124 hootches, 3 classrooms, 2NVA flags, 1x51cal position, 254 CC HG's, 6x60mm mortar rounds, 9x81mm mortar rounds, 133 sleeping positions, 1 mess hall with 3CC stoves, 1500 NVA CW uniforms, 200 blue shirts and trousers, 200 brown shirts, 500-1000lbs miscellaneous items, 6 pigs, 4 chickens, 4 sewing machines, 150gal MoGas, 50gal Kerosine, 2x122mm rockets, 7 rolls of 35mm film, 4x60mm rounds, 5RG's, 2 boxes blasting caps, 15x25lb mines, 6cases CC HG's, 25lb of C-4. 90lbs of documents were captured.

Operations 11 May

The operations were a continuation of Phase III of Bold Lanamr I. Action was light. Significant actions during the day were.

1005hrs - C 3/17 Air Cav observed enemy at WT 768837 with packs, cooking utensils and ponchos. Engaged three individuals evading the area.

Results; 3NVA KBA.

1010hrs - D 3/22 Inf at WT 933744 located an old enemy base camp containing medical supplies, bicycles, C-4, several messhalls, VIP messhall and 90-100lbs of documents. The hootches were made of tin. One large classroom was located which was 50' x 200' with 22 large desks and a podium in front.

1040hrs - A 2/14 Inf at WT 968740 located and destroyed 2 sampans, 1 with motor and 5 hootches.

1250hrs - C 2/14 Inf at WT 948648 located a small workshop with 1 arc welder assorted tools, 1000lbs miscellaneous parts, 10-15 small generator motors, 1xSKS, 2 RPG launchers and 1 drill press.

Totals for the day were: 7NVA KIA; captured - medical supplies, bicycles, 90-100lbs documents, 1 arc welder, 10-15 small generator motors, 1xSKS, 2RPG launchers, 1 drill press; destroyed - 2 sampans, several messhalls, 1 classroom, 25 tons of rice, US losses were 4US WIA.

The day was completed with the receipt of the warning order for the 1st Brigade to depart the present AO NLT 141800 May to assume AO in Base Area 353.

Operations 12 May

Operations on the 12 May were marked by the heaviest contact of the operation with C 1/5 Inf(M). The rest of the action during the day was limited to small contacts with 3-4 individuals. Caches were generally smaller.

0530hrs - C 1/5 Inf(M) at WT 928682 received S/A, RPG, mortar fire and sniper fire from an unknown sized enemy force. Returned fire with organic weapons, LFT, NH, C&C ship, FAC A/S. A & B Co 1/5 Inf(M) reacted with A Co receiving fire at WT 413687. Contact was broken at 0950. Results: 5US KIA, 44US WIA, 1 Kit Carson KIA, 6 APC's Combat Loss. Enemy losses: 13 NVA KIA.

1020hrs - D 2/14 Inf located and destroyed, at WT 931663, 10 hootches 10' x 20' in size.

1130hrs - C 3/17 Air Cav at WT 865998 engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons. Results 15 NVA KBA. A/S put in by Issue FAC with an additional 6 KBA. Individuals were carrying SKS's.

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1800hrs - A 3/22 Inf at XT 044840 located and destroyed 4 old F/P's, 30' comco wire, 1xVA protective mask, 1 first aid kit, 23x82mm mortar rounds, also located NVN KB arty 2-3 weeks old.

Results of the day were: US losses - 5US KIA, 47 US WIA, 1 Kit Carson KIA, 6 APC's Cmbt loss; Enemy losses - 51 NVN KIA, 10 hootches, 4 F/P's, 30' comco wire, 1 protective mask, first aid kit, 23x82mm mortar rounds.

Operations 13 May

Action on the 13th of May picked up again to include numerous contacts with the enemy. Most of the contacts were with people evading the area. Significant action during the day were:

0710hrs - B 3/22 Inf at WT 938735 observed and engaged 2 individuals with no return fire. Results were 1NVN KIA, 1AK-47 and 1CC HG.

0830hrs - B 3/22 Inf at WT 940734 located a cache containing 17 cases of empty vials, 7 gunny sacks of empty plasma, bottles, 1 cas of 9mm rounds. Samples of all items was evacuated to FSB Woo.

0945hrs - C 3/17 Air Cav at WT 795228 observed and engaged 3 individuals.

Results 3NVN KBs.

1015hrs - A 2/14 Inf at WT 964724 received S/A fire from USEF. Returned with organic weapons. Results 1xA -47, 1NVN uniform and 1NVN KIA. Engaged at 100m

1045hrs - D 2/14 Inf at WT 977640 located a bunker complex of bn size.

Possibly a training area which would hold approximately 200 individuals.

1130hrs - D 2/14 Inf at WT 975631 engaged 10 individuals at 350m with weapons and resupply. There was no return fire with 1 NVN KIA.

1200hrs - A 2/14 Inf at WT 964725 located a hospital compound of 200-250 bed capacity. Engaged with an A/S resulting in 3 hootches and 36 bunkers destroyed.

1245hrs - A 2/14 Inf at WT 964724 received S/A fire from an USEF 150-200m south of their location. Fire was returned with organic weapons. Results: 1US KIA, enemy losses unknown.

1310hrs - D 2/14 Inf at WT 973654 located 2 tons of rice, 1 complete 57mm RR and 1 rocket launcher tripod.

1530hrs - B 2/14 Inf at WT 956685 located 12 tons of rice, unknown number of rolls of cloth, 3lbs medical supplies, ammo reloading equipment for US ammo, several sewing machines.

1630hrs - C 3/22 Inf at WT 905766 observed and engaged 5 individuals 150m from their location. Results were; 1US KIA, 1US WIA, enemy losses unknown.

Throughout the day the communications system was maintained at a high level of operability. Aerial support by the 3/4 Cav and 3/17 Air Cav proved invaluable in providing maximum air cover for contacts and also providing a means by which areas inaccessible to ground troops were covered.

Operations 14 May

The 14th of May saw the withdrawel of the 1st Bde from Base Area 354. The last unit pulled out of the AO at 1925 on 14 May 1970. The move was to relieve the 1st Cav (AM) in place for operations in the Fishhook area of Cambodia.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

12. (C) RESULTS: In the 9 day period covered by Operation Bold Laner I, operational results were:

Enemy Losses - 283 MVA KIA, 12 POW's, 7 Hoi Chanhs, 297 individual weapons, 34 crew served weapons, 1561 rounds + several tons HE ammo (destroyed) 9 cases 4847 S/A rounds, 222 tons rice, 355lbs documents, 705 buildings, 1202 bunkers, 701lbs, 56 non-motorized sampans, 12 boats with inboard motors, 8 tons corn, 1 nineograph machine, 2 boxes of ink, 3 sets of binoculars, 17 wirecutters, 15 picks, 500 pick and shovel heads, 60 garden hose heads, 17 cases glass vials 17 gunny sacks of empty plasma bottles, 5 cases glass tubing, 1536 lbs explosive, 55 A/T mine, 2-10KW generators, 250 bed hospital complex, 30 rolls barbed wire, 100 saw blades, 10 small motors, 5 sewing machines, 2 boxes blasting caps, 100 pistol holsters, 1 drill press, 1 lathe, 2-55 gal drums fuel oil, 3 arc welders, 30 satchel charges, 1070lbs clothing, 10 shape charges, 17 sets web gear, 4 rucksacks, 10 detonators, 1 radio, 60 AK magazines, 100 MG barrels, 150 MG drums, 20 canteens, 1800 unknown forms.

3. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

A. Supply

Class I, limited Class II & IV, Class V, Class VIII and Class IX were available in sufficient quantities at Tay Ninh Base Camp with back up support at Cu Chi Base Camp. The establishment of a Forward Support Element at Thien Ngon commenced on 4 May 1970. Class III products were furnished to the battalions promptly and in adequate amounts from the Forward Support Base. Class I other than C rations was not available except in Tay Ninh. The battalions sent resupply convoys back to Tay Ninh daily to obtain Class "A" rations, ice, and some Class V as well as some repair parts.

The Forward Support Base of Thien Ngon was slow in establishing a Class I distribution point and obtaining ice for the units, Units requested ammunition through the D/O who arranged for the ammunition to be drawn from the ASP at Tay Ninh and hauled to Thien Ngon. This was normally delivered 1 to 2 days after the item was requested. Because of a high usage of ammunition during the initial phase of the operation, the battalion supplemented this by going directly to the ASP and picking up ammunition and delivering it the same day.

B. Maintenance

A Contact team from D Co 725 Maint Bn was established at the Forward Support Base. The first two or three days were oriented on getting the maintenance facilities established and repair parts were in short supply, however, this was quickly remedied and repair parts began to arrive in sufficient quantity.

C. TREATMENT OF CASUALTIE , EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

A medical clearing station was established in the FSB for treatment of minor wounds and caring for illnesses not requiring hospitalization. Additionally a Dust off station was established in the clearing station for calling for and controlling Medevac helicopter. Evacuation was prompt.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

D. TRANSPORTATION

The initial requirements for supplies and equipment at the Forward Support Base exceeded the wheel transportation assets. The distance of the only land line of communication and the security required prohibited more than one convoy to and from the Forward Support Base a day. Additional support was provided by the US Air Force aircraft to the Forward Support Base where an air strip capable of handling C123's was located. Transportation for resupply to the battalions who assaulted into Cambodia was generally accomplished by CH 47 and UH1 helicopter. This was accomplished in a superb manner. The responsiveness of the aviation to the battalions needs, enabled the units to continue combat operation with no delays. CH 54 aircraft were used for the evacuation of the disabled combat vehicles.

E. COMMUNICATION

Communications were taxed by movement and the distances moved. During the first portion of the operation, difficulty was experienced in commo with Tay Ninh. As soon as a retrans unit was installed on Nui Ba Den, the rest of the communications improved to the degree that no major breaks occurred.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT:

Company E 65th Engrs constructed a float bridge to span the Rach Cai Bach River for the rapid movement of the mechanized battalions into Cambodia. Two Commo Vault Air Strikes were employed in preparation of landing zones for the air assault of 3/22 Inf Bn into the bridgehead area in Cambodia. These were employed on 6 May 1970 at 0334hrs and 0416hrs.

15. (C) PSYOPS ACTIVITIES:

a. Initially the emphasis for PSYOP/Civic Action planning during the operation Bold Lancer I, was on tactical PSYOP aerial broadcasts. Tapes targeted at the populace, however, were developed to inform non-combatant of Allied intentions, to allay fears and to urge them to remain in their homes and stay clear of the battle area. The objectives were three-fold:

- (1) To minimize civilian casualties
- (2) To reduce the number of refugees.
- (3) To create a favorable psychological climate in which to operate.

b. A lack of civic action planning was realized midway in Operation Bold Lancer I, when it became obvious that there were many more opportunities for Medcaps to be held than were anticipated. The emphasis on rapid movement of troops during the initial stages of the operation, caused the area of Medcaps to be de-emphasized in civic action planning.

c. Initial planning with respect to non-combatants was to prevent or minimize the refugee problem by advising the populace through aerial loudspeaker broadcasts to remain in their homes. The success of this plan was demonstrated by the fact that during Operation Bold Lancer I, only eight ethnic Cambodian refugees and seven ethnic Vietnamese refugees were evacuated.

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d. Medcaps, after it became apparent that they were feasible, were used to further good relations between US troops and the civilian populace. A total of seven Medcaps treating 355 patients, were held during Operation Bold Lancer I. It is significant to note that the civilian populace in base area 254 was generally very healthy and therefore the number of patients treated was somewhat less than might be expected. Information gathered at Medcaps indicate that NVA medics had performed occasional Medcaps in the area prior to the beginning of the operation.

e. The attitudes of the indigenous personnel toward the U.S. presence varied greatly. In the vicinity of Tasuos, the attitude was distinctly pro-Viet Cong and NVA, while in the southern portion of the TAOI, the civilians invited U.S. troops to supper after Medcap teams had visited their village, in rapid response to property damage caused by the unit. Only after three Medcaps did the attitude in Tasuos show signs of changing.

f. The Cambodians first loyalty was to his family and village. Information was obtained by direct conversation with villagers, either during tactical operations or Medcaps. In almost every case, the Cambodians informed U.S. troops that the NVA and the Viet Cong had departed days or even hours before the Americans had arrived.

g. It became apparent as the operation progressed, that Civic Action, i.e. Medcaps and Icaps, should be emphasized and that the shortage of interpreters decreased the effectiveness of tactical operations. In future operations, Civic Action should immediately compliment tactical operations and interpreters should ideally be assigned one to each maneuver company.

5.(c) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to the fact that operations were conducted in Cambodia, Operation Bold Lancer I was significantly different from other brigade operations in the past. For the first time, in a substantial period, the brigade operated as an entity employing its maneuver battalions in a closely integrated, mobile role with control and support elements operating in the field.

Mission accomplishments required the attack of a river line in a densely jungled area to permit bridging to be installed for the passage of mechanized forces. The time required to construct the bridge was sufficiently long to permit a concerted enemy counterattack, and hence the operation was of relatively high risk. As no counteraction materialized, the passage of mechanized forces into the objective area to link up with heliborne forces was accomplished without serious incidents.

The base area was dispersed over a large jungle area, which made detailed searching difficult and time consuming. Although a substantial quantity of supplies was captured and a large number of facilities were destroyed, the time and forces available permitted the neutralization of only a portion of the base area. More time to operate in the area would certainly have achieved additional results.

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Initial operations included some problems because of difficulty in communication. Maintenance of the brigade main CP at Tay Ninh, necessary in order to maintain communications with the Division CP, was not the best solution, as communication with some battalions on the move was periodically lost, and the contact between the main and forward CP's was not always reliable. The problem was resolved when an area communication facility (VHF) was established at Thien Ngon, permitting the movement forward of the main CP.

Recommendations:

- (1) Brigade command post exercises should be conducted periodically to assure optimum performance of staff sections under full field conditions
- (2) Communication planning for operations over extended distances should include early establishment of communication facilities at points where the brigade CP's must be located in order properly to control their maneuver elements.

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OPERATIONAL RESULTS

WT927739 Centaur 46 eng 30xNVA-9xKIA.
WT915747 Eng 1xNVA on bike-1xKIA, 1xSKS CIA.
WT917748 D-3/22 Contact-5xNVA KIA.
WT927742 Centaur 46 and B-3/22 eng 3xNVA-1xNVA KIA, 1xhooch dest.
WT900730 Centaur 46 Eng 7xNVA-1xNVA KIA.
WT891741 Centaur 47 Eng 3xNVA-2xNVA KIA, 2xSKS CIA.
WT886754 Centaur 46 Eng 5xNVA-2xNVA KIA.
WT927710 B-3/22 found 6xNVA killed by gunships.
WT937732 A-2/22 Eng 2xNVA-1xKIA, 1xSKS CIA.
WT910746 Falcon Eng 10xNVA-1xNVA KIA.
XT027781 D-3/22 dest 4xbunkers.
XT032797 B-3/22 dest 4xUS claymores hooked up to PRC-25 btry.
WT967746 Centaur 47 Eng and dest 12xbunkers w/AS.
WT915747 A-3/22 found 10.6 tons of rice(to be evac) Dest 1xhonda, 10xbikes.
WT915746 A-3/22 dest 14xbikes, 15# doc and 2xtons of rice to be evac.
WT954760 Centaur 46 Eng base camp of 80xbunkers and 30xhooches.
WT923748 Centaur 46 loc 160x100# bags of rice. (8 tons to be evac)
WT945755 Centaur 41 Eng 5xbunkers and 3xhooches.
WT918749 D-3/22 found 25 tons of rice and 20# of docs-evac.
WT927742 B-3/22 dest 4xbunkers, 2xhooches, found 9xtons of bagged rice(evac).
WT937732 A-3/22 dest 2xbunkers.
WT927710 B-3/22 found 2# of docs and small amt of medical supplies.
WT930736 A-3/22 dest 30xbunkers and 30xhooches made of wood and straw.
WT967741 B-3/22 dest 11xsampans w/inbd mtrs, 2xsamp, 5xmtrs and 6xtons corn.
WT967753 A-3/22 dest 10xbunkers.
XT047812 C-3/22 dest 8xbunkers.
XT034733 A-3/22 loc hospital complex(suspected).
XT047807 C-3/22 dest 19xbunkers and connecting tunnels.
WT936766 A-3/22 dest 20# AT mine.
WT965746 B-3/22 dest 60 well constructed hooches-12-15 man size.
WT963745 D-3/22 found and dest 1xhvy 30 cal MG, 1xlt 30 cal MG, 1xM-2 Carb, 3xSKS, 1xB-40, 13x20# AT mines, 85xCC HG, 4xPRG rds, 10xpick axes, 17xlarge wire cutters, 3xbinoculars, 6xRG, 65x5# exp blocks.
WT983767 D-3/22 loc Inf Tng base. Dest 40xbunkers, 40xhooches, large mess hall, VIP mess hall and 10xtons rice evac.
WT907667 1/5 dest 60xrds AK ammo, 15xlbs clothing. Evac 10# docs and dist 6xtons of rice and food stuff to civil pop.
WT896662 1/5 dest base camp complex-10xCC HG, 15xlbs of clothing and evac 60# of documents.
WT883647 1/5 dest base camp complex-2xCC HG and 1xgas mark.
WT897677 1/5 dest 50xrds AK and evac 2lbs doc.
WT900675 1/5 dest 15xsets of web gear and 40 loaded AK mags. Evac 12xburb guns, 3xSKS, 5xAK, 1xK54, and 3xlbs doc. 1xUS Jeep.
WT904674 1/5 dest 10xRG, 4xRPG rds, 10xCC Shape charges, evac 1xRPG-7, 1xtransceiver radio and 10xlbs doc.
WT891646 1/5 dest 10xrds 60mm mtr, 8xloaded AK mags, 1xRPG rd, 5# C-4 and 15xlbs clothing and equip, 3xAK's, 1xSKS, and 5# doc evac.

Enclosure 3 to Combat Operations After Action Report

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WT850570 1/5 dest 4xCC HG and 1x51 cal psn.
WT855651 1/5 dest bunker complex-dest 15# clothing and evac 2# docs.
WT867652 1/5 evac 7xCC claymores, 6xcases of HG(150) and 12 cases of C4(230#).
WT855747 1/5 dest 2xroad blocks.
WT933733 1/7 loc base camp.
WT933748 1/5 dest 10xbunkers.
WT951748 1/5 contact 1xNVA KIA.
WT933668 1/5 8xPW evac(replacements no sig intel).
WT897666 1/5 4xdetainees (IC).
WT903674 1/5 Contact 11xNVA KIA
WT895665 1/5 Contact 4xNVA KIA.
WT899668 1/5 Contact 2xNVA KIA.
WT899677 1/5 Contact 2xNVA KIA.
WT890658 1/5 Partially dest 200xbunkers.
WT876627 1/5 Hoi Chanh-ARVN's to exploit.
WT835675 1/5 Contact 17xNVA KIA.
WT903664 1/5 Contact 4xNVA KIA.
WT966762 2/22 loc ammo storage areas made of brush.
WT968734 A-2-22 eng 2xNVA. Res: 1xNVA KIA.
WT930745 Scts 2/22 loc base camp and dest 2xtons rice.
WT946656 A-2/22 Contact 4xEni KIA.
WT885660 C-2/22 APC hit mine-2xUS WIA-mod dam to APC.
WT883655 2/22 APC hit mine. 2xUS WIA.
WT923687 C-2/22 contact s-a w/USEF. Res: 2xUS WIA.
WT953677 A-2/22 recd 2xrds 82mm mtr and RPG. 1xUS WIA.
WT900688 Scts 2/22 loc 2xNVA KIA.
WT923661 A-2/22 APC det 70-80lb mine. 3xUS WIA. APC CBL.
WT961685 A-2/22 dest 2x25' sampans w/motors and 9x15' sampans, 25xbxs, 3 small huts, messhalls and 3 day old cooked food.
WT953692 C-2/22 dest 2xbx, sleeping equip and cooking utensils.
WT976655 Scts 2/22 dest 4xbamboo thatched hootches, RPG 7 rds, pots pans and 3xfgt psns.
WT959622 B 2/22 dest 35xbx (6x6' and 20x20') 6xfgt psns, 64xhootches, 3 classrooms (20x50'), 2xRPG launchers, 6x60mm rds, 9x81mm rds, 8xslpg psns, messhall (20x20') w/3xstoves, 6xtons of bagged rice, 250 #lb blocks of exp and 2xSKS's in ex shape.
WT952691 C-2/22 contact 4-5 eni, 2xNVA KIA.
WT953688 C-2/22 dest 125 slpg psns, 1500 NVA uniforms, 400 shirts 200 trousers and 1000 lbs of misc clothes and utensils.
WT923637 2/14 1x55 gal drum of oil, 1x55 gal drum of fuel, 3xsampans (1 w/eng) 1xton of rice, 2xbikes and 1xox cart-dest.
WT912638 2/14 dest 2xB40 rds, 2xCC claymores and 2xAK-47's.
WT038787 2/14 dest 1xRPG rd w/booster and 2xCC HG.
WT906646 2/14 dest 1xAK-47.
WT917648 2/14 dest 80 crates of food, 2x10KW Gen and 100lb shape Charge, 225x Frag grenades, 29xAK mags, 12xassult rifles, 9xSKS's, 66xAK-47s, 21 cases of exp(60xblocks/case), 80xK-54s, 1x122mm rkt, 100xholsters, 50 uniforms, 3x75mm RR, 3xcases of K-54 ammo, 1xcase CC HG, 2xcases 9mm ammo, 4xcases 7x62 ammo, 100xsaw blades, 500xshovel heads, 40xAt mines, 1xLMG, 6x51 cals, 1x120mm mtr, 100xCC claymores, 5xRPG's, 6xM16s 16xAK-50s and 3xtons of bagged rice evac.

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WT911847 2/14 dest 2x122mm rkts.
WT902855 2/14 capt 1xK-54, dest 4xHg, 12xCC Hg, 1xRPG 7 and 2xboxes of blasting caps.
WT917080 2/14 dest 50 lbs NVA clothing and 750 lbs of rice.
WT833658 2/14 recd Hoi Khanh (9th Div).
WT910653 2/14 dest 1xAK-50, 3xCC Hg, 3xAK maga and 2xNVA KIA.
WT897714 A 2/22 contact 1xAPC dam. Neg res.
WT899685 3/17 loc Bx complex and poss ammo storage area.
WT937769 C 2/22 loc cache w/100x7.62 MG barrels, 500xshovels and 100-150 MG drums.
WT900650 B 2/14 contact eng 2xNVA Res: 2xNVA KIA, 1xAK-50, 30xCC Hg's, 3xAK maga OIL.
WT924754 A 3/22 recd 2xHC, 2xSKS's and 2xCC Hg's.
WT965715 187 AHC recd g/f w/4 hits and neg cas.
WT976645 2/22 loc Bx complex. WT948727 2/22 loc hospital complex. 3/22 recd
WT969618 2/22 loc trenches.
XT099762 Rcn 2/14 dest 40 lb bbt mine
WT800717 LOH recd s-a g/f w/neg hits.
WT967831 3/17 obs eni assy area and 3xNVA.
WT960687 B 1/5 det unk size mine bbt. 4xUS WIA
WT963687 B 1/5 det unk size mine bbt. 2xUS WIA.
WT948647 C 2/14 loc work shop 1xarc-light welder, asst tools, 1000 lbs of misc parts, 10-15 small gen motors, 1xdrill press, 2xRPG launchers and 1xSKS.
WT888890 C 3/17 contact 2xNVA KBA.
WT933696 C 1/5 loc base area, hootches and 25xTons of rice.
WT934743 D 3/22 loc BC, messhalls, lg classroom, med supplies and 90-100 lbs of doc.
WT960747 A 2/14 loc 2xsampans and 5xhootches.
WT932743 S2 3/22 loc 4xTons of rice. Evac to TNBC.
XT043803 A 3/22 recd 3xrds 82mm mtr. No cas.
WT917665 B 2/14 contact-1xNVA KIA and 5lbs med supplies CIA.
WT906663 B 2/14 contact 1xNVA KIA and 1xAK-47 CIA.
WT966694 B 1/5 APC det 30 lb mine. Res: 3xUS WIA. APC CBL.
WT963693 B 1/5 APC det 30 lb mine. Res: 3xUS WIA. APC mod dam.
WT908697 B 1/5 dest 6xhootches.
WT931690 C 1/5 det 50 lb mine. Res: 3xUS WIA. APC CBL.
WT966692 B 1/5 dest 4xsampans.
WT951690 B 1/5 dest 34xhootches, 22xBxs and 1xRPG.
WT925730 Scts 1/5 loc 1xTon of rice, 24-lbs of clothing, 4xlbs doc (evac) Dest 9-hootches, 1xBx, 1xkitchen. Contact-2xNVA KIA.
WT933690 C 1/5 APC det 30 lb mine. Res: 1xUS WIA. APC CBL.
WT928683 A,B,C, 1/5 contact 5xUS KIA, 44xUS WIA, 1xAPC CBL. 1xKit Carson Set KIA. 13xNVA KIA.
WT905855 C 3/17 Eng 1xNVA-1xNVA KIA.
WT932663 D 2/14 dest 10-hootches.
WT865998 C 3/17 Eng 15xNVA Res: 21xNVA KIA.
WT895728 A 3/22 Contact-1xUS WIA. Neg enemy res.
WT918643 2/14 dest 7x120mm mortar rds and 72xcases CC explosives.

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WT947765 D 3/22 det BBT-Res: 2xUS WIA.
WT968735 B 3/22 contact. Neg Res.
WT915145 B 2/14 Contact 2xNVA KIA.
WT976631 D 2/14 dest 100 lbs corn, 300 lbs rice, 4xbikes and 1/2 lb doc.
XT044838 A 3/22 dest 4xfgt psns, 30' commo wire, 1xNVA gas mask, 1xfirst aid kit, 23x82mm mtr rds, 7xNVA bodies killed by arty.
WT967637 C 2/14 capt 1xPOW(reclass. HC).
WT939744 B 3/22 cont 1xNVA KIA, 1xAK-47 and 1xCC HG CIA.
WT965724 A 2/14 cont cng 2xNVA-1xKIA and 1xAK CIA.
WT940734 B 3/22 fnd 19xcases of empty vials, 7xgunny sacks of plasma, 50xboxes of pills and 5xcases of glass tubing, 1xmicograph machine, 2xboxes of ink.
WT908707 B 2/22 dest 30#mine-BBT-Act w/in 12 hrs.
WT975613 D 2/14 cont- 1xNVA KIA.
WT965724 A 2/14 fnd hosp comp 200-250 beds.
WT974659 D 2/14 fnd 2xtons corn, and 57mm RR.
WT925708 B 2/22 dest 30#CC mine-BBT.
WT956643 B 2/14 fnd 1xNVA killed by s-a.
WT957686 B 2/14 fnd 1.2 tons rice, many bolts of cloth, 3 lbs med equip, ammo reloading equip, several sewing machines.
WT906764 C 3/22 Contact-1xUS KIA and 1xUS WIA.
WT966630 B 2/14 contact 1xNVA KIA.
WT977647 C 3/17 rec'd s-a fire w/neg hits.
WT965725 A 2/14 contact-1xUS WIA.
WT977640 D 2/14 loc and partially dest bkr complex appeared to be Bn size Trng area.

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