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AGDA (M) (5 Dec 69) FOR OT UT 693230

18 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31. July 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCHE

1 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (E-1)

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Location: Cu Chi Base Camp (XT647153), Cu Chi, RVN.
Reporting Officer: Major General Ellis W. Williamson
Prepared By: Major Michael D. Keating, 18th Military History Detachment.
Map References: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series: L7014, Sheets: 6131 I, II;
6132 II; 6230 I, II, III, IV; 6231 I, II, III, IV; 6232 II, III, IV;
6330 I, II, IV; 6331 III.

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

A. General: During the previous reporting quarter the 25th Infantry Division had completely preempted the enemy's planned "Winter-Spring" Offensive. In the last week of February 1969, the Division crushed the enemy attack forces which had moved against Patrol Base Diamond, Fire Support Base Mahone II, Dau Tieng Base Camp and Cu Chi Base Camp. During March the Division engaged in a series of intense battles with enemy forces in their staging areas along the Saigon River, and in the Ben Cui and Cau Khoi Rubber Plantations as numerous attempts to ambush Division convoys were turned into major enemy defeats. The Division maintained relentless pressure against the enemy units throughout April, forcing their depleted remnants to seek sanctuary. Toward the end of April the enemy made several futile attempts to salvage some success from his aborted offensive. His multi-battalion attacks against Patrol Base Diamond II, Patrol Base Diamond III and Patrol Base Frontier City, launched from Cambodia, resulted in abject defeat and the loss of 494 men. The Division's counteroffensive had left the enemy forces in a seriously weakened condition.

As the present reporting period began, the Division determined to pursue a three-fold objective aimed at preemption of any new enemy offensive moves. Through widespread reconnaissance missions and battlefield surveillance, the Division troops would detect, engage, and destroy enemy main force units through the rapid reinforcement of and application of massive firepower to every contact. Combined operations with ARVN and RF/PF forces would be increased to the maximum in order to up-grade the efficiency of these units and to apply more combat power throughout the Division TAOR. The pacification program would be vigorously executed in order to further erode the enemy's physical and psychological strength. Special emphasis would be placed on the destruction of the Viet Cong Infrastructure.

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The Division G2 Section rapidly and accurately developed their estimate of the enemy's intentions for the spring and summer of 1969. The enemy campaign plans did not promise or call for total victory as in the past. Instead, they indicated that victory would be achieved in an "indirect" and "complicated" way. Military activity would be conducted to gain political and psychological advantage over the U.S. and GVN, thus weakening our resolve, hastening our departure, and leaving the NLF politically dominant in South Vietnam. (See Overlay 1 - Enemy Unit Locations).

The enemy planned to conduct this campaign with a series of high points of activity timed to coincide with significant Viet Cong and North Vietnamese holidays and important events at the Paris Peace Talks. Prior to each high point of activity, the main force units would avoid contact and prepare themselves in their base areas. During these periods the local forces would be active in extending their area of control through terrorism, and occupy the attention of U.S. and GVN forces by interdicting lines of communication and conducting harassing attacks, attacks by fire and sapper attacks. In addition to keeping U.S. and ARVN forces preoccupied, these tactics would screen the movement of main force supplies and units to forward areas. The high points themselves would involve coordinated attacks by main and local force units to disrupt the pacification efforts and seize objectives of significant political/psychological advantage.

Tay Ninh Province was pinpointed as the major battlefield of the earlier stages of the offensive. In that area, Tay Ninh City, Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551), Fire Support Base Washington (XT147568), Fire Support Base Buell (XT218535), Fire Support Base Crook (XT055595), the Tay Ninh Chieu Hoi Center (XT210500) and ARVN and U.S. installations at Ben Soi (XT093475) were targeted for attacks. Cu Chi (XT6515) and Dau Tieng (XT4947) Base Camps were also considered enemy objectives. In the southernmost portion of the TADR, Duc Hoa City (XS4996) and Bao Trai (XS389998) as well as Fire Support Base Keams (XT604017), which sits astride a traditional enemy line of communication from Cambodia to Saigon, were given special attention by elements reconnoitering the area. The Phu Cuong and Ba Bep Bridges, vital links across the Saigon River, were also slated for destruction.

The considerably weakened enemy attempted to bolster local guerrilla forces with full time cadre for use in terrorist activities and disruption of the pacification program. Throughout May, enemy main force units received replacements and supplies, conducted training in rear base areas, and sent out reconnaissance elements while local forces continued terrorist activities and assassinations. Special instruction in techniques for sapper squads was completed by the 1st of June, pointing to a possible increase in this type of activity.

During this period, the plight of the enemy soldier seemed to be far from improving. Attempts to offset low morale were evidenced by frequent issuance of directives stressing ideological indoctrination. The Committee On South Vietnam no longer promised total victory and set limited military objectives for their forces. The fear of air strikes, continuous failure

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to achieve combat success, a shortage of food and ammunition, malaria and exhaustion all contributed to a deteriorating enemy morale. Evidence indicated an increasing trend of discontent among VC/NVA forces who apparently began to pursue the thought that the war would be solved politically.

During May, the organization of Division forces in the 1st Brigade area around Tay Ninh City included the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, and the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, supported by the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery and, for the first ten days of May, by Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

The 4-9 Inf was given the mission of conducting day and night offensive operations in the Renegade (XT2828-XT2832) and Straight Edge (XT16-34) Woods to interdict VC/NVA lines of communication; to find and destroy enemy base areas, caches and elements of the 291st and 272nd NVA Regiments and D16 VC/NVA Battalion. The 4-23 Mech was given a similar mission in areas generally north of Tay Ninh City along with prevention of enemy control of Highways 22 and 26. The mission of the 3-22 Inf was to locate and destroy elements of the 273rd NVA Regiment northwest of Tay Ninh and to preempt attacks by fire against Tay Ninh City and Tay Ninh Base Camp. Emphasis was also placed upon conducting night operations based upon current intelligence to further frustrate enemy operations.

The 2nd Brigade continued operations in Hau Nghia Province with six battalions conducting extensive reconnaissance/search operations. The 2nd Brigade was composed of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, with the mission of destroying elements of the 269th VC/NVA Battalion, the 2642 VC/NVA Battalion and local VCI in the Bao Trai-My Hanh region (XT5005); the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, charged with destroying base areas, caches and interdicting movement of the 9th VC/NVA Division west of the Vam Co Dong River; the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, with the mission of locating and destroying base areas and caches of the 88th and 268th Regiments and eliminating VC cadre in the Trung Lap-Hobc Woods area (XT5020-6020) as well as preventing attacks by fire against Cu Chi Base Camp; the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, with the mission of destroying local forces of the 109th and 268th VC/NVA Regiments and local VC cadre in the upper Citadel area (XT5025); the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor (-), operating in the Filhol-Phu Hoa Dong areas (XT6720-XT7010) to conduct reconnaissance/search operations to interdict enemy movement and destroy local force elements and Viet Cong cadre; and the 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne Infantry, to preempt enemy activity east of the Angel's Wing.

The 1-508 Inf left Division control on 24 May and the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry shifted to support elements of the 2nd Brigade. The 2nd Brigade was supported by the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery.

The 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, supported by the 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, continued to be the maneuver battalions under 3rd Brigade control in the western portion of Binh Duong Province. The 2-22 Mech had the basic mission of contacting

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elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions in the Ben Cui (XT4646) and Michelin Rubber Plantations (XT5550) where vigorous attempts to disrupt the local communist infrastructure had met with success in the previous reporting period. The 1-27th Inf was to destroy enemy caches and units in the Boi Loi Woods area (XT4838).

The 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry was to operate in the western Citadel region north of Go Dau Ha and destroy elements of the 88th, and 268th VC/NVA Regiments and VC cadre. Elements of the 1-5 Mach and 2-14 Inf, under the operational control of the 2-34 Armor, provided security for the Phu Cuong (XT8114) and Ba Bep (XT7813) Bridges. (See Overlay 2 - 25th Inf Div TAOR 1 May - 30 June 1969)

The month of May was generally characterized by scattered activity throughout the Division area with the major actions developing in the 2nd Brigade area in Hau Nghia Province as a result of preemptive operations conducted by Division forces. During the first week in May, enemy main force units were in a standdown posture, performing reconnaissance, re-supply missions and training. Operation Toan Thang, Phase III was still in effect as Division forces moved to counter these preparatory gestures by the enemy.

Hard fighting broke out in the 2nd Brigade area in a series of friendly initiated contacts with enemy platoon and company sized elements lodged in the Citadel, Ho Bo Woods and Filhol-Pan Hoa Dong areas. On 2 May, Troops A and B, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, performing a reconnaissance mission, located a group of bunker complexes near the Boi Loi Woods (XT475325), and engaged an unknown sized enemy force with organic weapons. NVA soldiers in the bunkers returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons and RPG's. The cavalrymen moved their Sheridan tanks forward and pounded the bunkers with 155mm fire while helicopter gunships pinned the enemy down. The ground troops moved back to allow artillery and air strikes to smash the well-fortified bunkers. Sweeping through the area, Troops A and B recovered 28 enemy bodies and captured two Viet Cong prisoners-of-war.

In the Citadel on 5 May, enemy plans for a convoy ambush were upset by the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, which was sweeping the area along Highway 6A north of Trang Bang (XT500256). Warned in advance by intelligence of the ambush attempt, the convoy security elements engaged the enemy as they moved along the highway ahead of the convoy. Artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes were placed upon the enemy position and 16 NVA were killed. The ambush attempt was the first of several small enemy actions designed to give their replacements combat experience as part of an Emulation Campaign. At 1145 hours that same day in the Ho Bo Woods (XT599228), Company A, 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne Infantry, opened fire on an unknown number of enemy and kept them fixed in place for destruction by air strikes. Sixteen NVA were killed and two U.S. infantrymen wounded in the encounter.

Activity increased sharply in the 2nd and 3rd Brigade areas during the second week of May and the first of several enemy initiated attacks

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announced the beginning of his Summer Offensive. Troops B and C, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, maintained security off of Highway 1 northeast of Trang Bang (XT508198), detected enemy troops one kilometer from the highway and engaged them with organic weapons, 81mm mortars, artillery and helicopter gunships, resulting in 13 enemy killed. In the eastern portion of the 2nd Brigade AO on 8 May at 1300 hours, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, conducted a combat assault along a suspected enemy route to Saigon (XT765160). They located an enemy force and engaged them with organic weapons. An element from the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, joined the contact and placed 90mm tank fire on the enemy. Helicopter gunships and artillery were employed and a sweep of the area revealed 29 enemy killed. One enemy soldier rallied to Company D (2-14 Inf) and identified the enemy force in contact as the 2nd Battalion, Quyet Thang Regiment.

In the 3rd Brigade area on 7 May, Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, exploiting Hoi Chanh information concerning a bunker complex manned by the 3rd Battalion, 101st NVA Regiment, killed 13 NVA with automatic weapons and rockets south of the Michelin Rubber Plantation (XT5847). This incident preceded a major encounter with the enemy when, two days later (9 May), a Hoi Chanh led Company D, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, and Company C, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, into the same area (XT571453) where they gained contact with an enemy force estimated at 200-400 NVA. The base area held a large quantity of supplies and war materiel, including 23.4 tons of rice, and 1,400 pounds of salt. In the two-day battle that followed, U.S. forces poured a barrage of organic weapons, artillery and air strikes into the area with helicopter gunships overhead strafing enemy positions. Night imposed a temporary curfew over the battlefield but, on the morning of 10 May, hostilities continued with the well-disciplined enemy troops who refused to be driven from the area and had to be destroyed in place. After their resistance had been broken, a total of 115 enemy bodies were recovered and three prisoners-of-war were captured. The 101st NVA Regiment had suffered a tremendous loss which prevented them from participating in future operations for the rest of the month. U.S. losses were two killed, nine wounded and two armored personnel carriers damaged.

At 1040 hours on 10 May seven kilometers northeast of Go Dau Ha (XT453282), Troops A, B and C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, on a reconnaissance/search operation, engaged an enemy company with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes, resulting in 25 enemy killed. The cavalymen lost one man killed, three wounded and one "Sheridan" destroyed.

On the night of 10 May, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, and one platoon from Company D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, established a night offensive position in the Citadel (XT559278). When they had dug in and circled their positions with wire obstacles, a test firing of weapons was ordered and, during the test firing, one of the mortar crews sent up an illumination round. This light silhouetted 30 NVA

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moving up to the perimeter. The surprised enemy soldiers began to run from the area in confusion as .50 caliber machine gun fire from the armored personnel carriers tore into them. The enemy elements were so disorganized that they were unable to return effective fire. A search of the area the next morning disclosed 35 enemy killed and 19 weapons abandoned.

Acting on reports received from workers in the Ben Cui Rubber Plantation stating that the 1st Battalion, 18B NVA Regiment was moving into the Ben Cui from the north to ambush the Cu Chi-Dau Tieng supply convoy, the 3rd Brigade sent Companies A and C, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry into the area (XT460470) on 12 May. Company C made contact at 0945 hours and killed six NVA with organic weapons and artillery. At 1145 hours, not far from this contact, Company A encountered an entrenched enemy platoon and engaged them with artillery and TAC air. Enemy small arms and RPG fire killed one American and wounded six others. After fire ceased, Company A located 29 enemy dead, four small arms, 40 RPG rounds and a 60mm mortar with five rounds of ammunition.

As a follow-up to the interception of this force in the Ben Cui, the 1st Brigade's 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, moved into the Crescent area (XT4055) on 13 May to interdict any further movement to the south. Early on the morning of 14 May, Company A received a mortar and ground attack from an estimated enemy battalion against their night offensive position (XT408518). Company A fought back with organic weapons, artillery, gunships and TAC air and killed 54 of the enemy, again identified as part of the 18B NVA Regiment.

On the night of 12 May, the Division received its share of the theatre-wide shellings that struck most major U.S. installations. Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT4947) received 38 107mm rockets, 11 120mm mortar rounds and four 82mm mortar rounds; Cu Chi Base Camp (XT6515) was hit with six 107mm rockets, and Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551) received 33 107mm rockets. There were also attacks by fire on FSB Pershing (XT518256), FSB Patton (XT583217), PB Diamond III (XT327215), FSB Stoneman (XT303710), FSB Rawlings (XT317497), PB Frontier City (XT203293), FSB Crook (XT055595), and Tower #1 at the Phu Hoa Dong Compound (XT7019). The Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, suffered the heaviest losses with one man killed and five wounded as 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire rained down on their position in the Cu Chi Subsector (XT627125). Other than this incident, the Division had three men wounded. Fire Support Base Rawlings effectively returned fire with a Night Hawk helicopter and killed 11 NVA, after receiving 75mm recoilless rifle fire.

The 3rd and 6th ARVN Airborne Battalions turned back three attacks on their positions southwest of Tay Ninh City (XT121411-XT0943-XT1746) on 11 and 12 May, killing a total of 176 NVA and capturing four prisoners from the 271st NVA Regiment.

This brief series of attacks constituted the first phase of the enemy's Summer Offensive. Subsequent enemy plans to launch attacks during May for propaganda value had to be postponed again and again. Enemy leaders held

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meetings to analyze their losses while continuing reconnaissance and attacks by fire in preparation for a series of larger attacks against strategic U.S. installations and targeted civilian centers in celebration of Ho Chi Minh's birthday on 19 May. These attacks did not materialize and the enemy initiative lay dormant until the first week of June. Enemy actions consisted primarily of incidents of taxation, terrorism, mining and propagandizing. In the meantime, the Division concentrated on locating the elusive enemy to engage and destroy him.

Following the attacks in the 1st Brigade area, Company C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, on a reconnaissance mission ten kilometers east of Nui Ba Den mountain (XT396548) on 13 May, located six enemy who had been killed by artillery as a result of detection by SLAR. In the area where they found the bodies, Company C destroyed 66 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, seven rounds of recoilless rifle ammunition, six hand grenades, three RPG rounds and three small arms weapons. At 1420 hours on 14 May, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, conducting a reconnaissance mission three kilometers southwest of Trai Bi (XT093664), encountered an entrenched enemy company and was supported by artillery, and air strikes. A sweep of the area after the enemy broke contact disclosed 25 NVA bodies.

In mid-May, stressing combined operations, the 2nd Brigade launched a cordon and search operation of the Ap Giong Viec hamlet (XT605155) just north of Cu Chi Base Camp. The resulting intelligence initiated a series of significant contacts with local force units.

Ap Giong Viec hamlet is surrounded by open rice paddies, with dense bamboo hedgerows around the houses. The target area was a suspected communication/liason point for the Viet Cong. Company B and one platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry with the 132nd Regional Force Company initiated the operation at 0500 hours on 21 May. The concept of the operation was to cordon around the hamlet, while the 132nd Regional Force Company conducted the search. Since the area was known to be heavily booby trapped, air strikes with napalm were used to soften the periphery of the area and eliminate some of the booby traps. Upon completion of the air strikes, an artillery preparation (155 howitzers and 4.2" mortars) was employed on enemy bunkers and fighting positions uncovered by the air strikes. Following this, the search force moved into the objective area.

They immediately captured a Viet Cong prisoner-of-war, armed with an AK-47 rifle, who indicated that he was a squad leader and that there were 20 other Viet Cong in the complex. A PSYOPS tape was made by the prisoner calling upon his comrades to surrender and a helicopter with loudspeakers was dispatched to the operational area with the Cu Chi District Chief who appealed to the enemy force to surrender. As a result of this PSYOPS effort, one Viet Cong Hoi Chanh rallied to the friendly forces. Upon completion of the PSYOPS broadcast, the enemy was again engaged and the 132nd Regional Force Company and two platoons from Company B (1-5 Mech) made a sweep of the area which disclosed 17 Viet Cong KIA, six Viet Cong prisoners-of-war, 14 AK-47 rifles, four pistols, and several ChiCom grenades, claymore mines, documents and mortar accessories.

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Interrogation of the prisoners determined that they were members of the C-20 Local Force Company. The most important of the prisoners were the Undersecretary for the Party Chapter Committee of Cu Chi, the Political Officer of the Cu Chi Village Guerilla Unit, and a nurse who had previously worked for the 554th Engineer Battalion on Cu Chi Base Camp. The nurse was instrumental in the capture of three females employed at Cu Chi Base Camp who worked for the Viet Cong. These personnel were involved in the mining of the 554th Engineer Battalion mess hall on 3 January 1969. Through interrogation of the Viet Cong Undersecretary for the Party Committee of Cu Chi by the 25th Military Intelligence Detachment, additional intelligence on the hiding place of the C-20 Local Force Company Commander and other party officials was obtained.

Based on intelligence gained from the operation on 21 May, another combined operation was initiated in Ap Giong (XT605155) on 26 May, with U.S. Forces forming the cordon and regional forces conducting the search.

The most significant result of this operation was the killing of the C-20 Local Force Company Commander and the location of a document on his body indicating that a meeting of all Viet Cong hamlet and district chiefs of Cu Chi District was to be held on 29 May in the village of Xom Rang 1 (XT575235). In addition, 15 other VC were killed in the action.

On 29 May, the 2nd Brigade reacted to exploit the intelligence gained from these documents. The operation began at 0800 hours with U.S. forces establishing a cordon and a combined U.S. and regional force conducting a search in the Xom Rang 1 area. The exact location of the meeting was not known, but the general area was known to be in the vicinity of XT570235, an area of dense, heavily booby trapped hedgerows and populated with Viet Cong sympathizers. The 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry was the control headquarters for the operation.

After the cordon was established, a PSYOPs helicopter began broadcasting in the target area directing all civilians to move to a civilian collection point. The concept of the cordon and search was changed to an assault of the target area when the PSYOPS aircraft received heavy ground fire and observed numerous enemy taking evasive action. The friendly forces converged into the area, bombarding enemy positions with organic weapons, artillery, 90mm tank guns and helicopter gunships (LFT). As the enemy fled through the palm groves and bamboo, they were pounded with air strikes. This confrontation cost the enemy one NVA prisoner-of-war, 59 VC/NVA KIA, one 82mm mortar, 30 AK-47 rifles, eight RPG rocket launchers, 25 Chicom grenades, 1200 pounds of rice and 300 yards of cloth.

The destruction of 59 enemy of the 3rd Battalion, 268th NVA Regiment preempted the planned attack on the Trung Lap compound which was indicated by documents captured after the action. This series of operations dealt a critical blow to both the local force insurgents and Viet Cong infrastructure operating within the 2nd Brigade area of responsibility.

In other operations in the 2nd Brigade area, Companies B and D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, and Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th

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Infantry (OPCON 2-12 Inf) waged a two-day battle in an NVA base area on the northern edge of the Ho Bo Woods (XT569311) as 2nd Brigade elements forced the enemy to fight when he preferred to maintain a standdown posture. On 13 May at 0955 hours, the two companies conducted a combat assault and spotted an enemy soldier dressed in camouflaged clothing. He was killed by small arms fire. Intense enemy fire consisting of automatic weapons and RPG's erupted from the brush and Company D withdrew under the cover of artillery and helicopter gunships (LFT). Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, set up a blocking position while air strikes leveled the enemy base area. The action was reinforced by Company B (2-12 Inf), lifted into the area on eagle flights. Company D (2-12 Inf) and Company A (1-5 Inf) advanced through the bunker complex and found 50 enemy bodies and 60 bunkers destroyed. The next morning (14 May), the three companies again assaulted the area and, in several scattered incidents, killed 34 more NVA.

In the 3rd Brigade area following the attacks of 12 May, the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, began a reconnaissance mission in a densely vegetated area northwest of Dau Tieng in the Crescent. On 13 May, Companies A and C made contact at 1330 hours with an enemy force dug in to well-concealed positions (XT456514). Enemy fire consisted of small arms, automatic weapons, RPG's and 60mm mortar rounds which killed one U.S. soldier and wounded nine others. Artillery and air strikes destroyed the enemy's fortified positions, driving them from the area and killing six. At 1621 hours on 14 May, in the same general area (XT451513), Companies A, B and C and the Reconnaissance Platoon of the same battalion engaged elements of an enemy battalion-sized force and again received heavy RPG and mortar fire. Artillery and air strikes broke the enemy's resistance, leaving seven NVA dead. The combined U.S. forces lost two men killed and five wounded.

During the third week in May, the 1st and 3rd Brigades experienced light contact but fighting in the 2nd Brigade area continued to be intense.

On 16 May, the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, located a large cache in the Ho Bo Woods (XT510316) and in the next two days evacuated or destroyed 17.4 tons of rice, 4.75 tons of salt, 25 pounds of marijuana, several motorbikes and bicycles, 9800 rounds of small arms ammunition, 50 pounds of foodstuffs, one 60mm mortar, 37 rounds of RPG ammunition, and other assorted weapons and munitions. Also on 16 May, Companies A and B, 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne Infantry, conducted combat assaults in the southeastern portion of the Ho Bo Woods (XT657246) and, at 1330 hours, engaged an enemy force with organic weapons. Helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes supported the firefight that developed and when the fighting had subsided, 38 NVA bodies were located at the contact site. Neither of the two U.S. companies sustained casualties.

On 18 May, the 2nd Brigade again turned its attention to the Citadel where two contacts developed only minutes apart within three kilometers of each other. At 1235 hours, Troops B and C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, completing a detailed search of an area which had disclosed four NVA bodies, exchanged fire with an enemy platoon, was reinforced with artillery and helicopter gunships, and killed 14 Viet Cong (XT513282). At 1247 hours, Company D,

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2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, conducting patrols along Highway 6A, engaged 1-2 enemy platoons and killed 14 more NVA (XT508259), supported by 81mm mortars, artillery and helicopter gunships.

There were three contacts in the Ho Bo Woods on 20 May. At 0952 hours, Troops B and C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, lost one man killed, two wounded and sustained damage to one "Sheridan" and an armored personnel carrier (XT542321) as a result of enemy fire after they contacted an enemy force entrenched in a bunker complex. They saturated the area with 152mm tank fire, artillery and air strikes and located six NVA killed. At 1515 hours, searching an area nearby (XT512324), Troop A located a 30-bunker hospital complex which had been in recent use. At 1420 hours, Company C, 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne Infantry, conducting a reconnaissance mission, fired on an enemy force of unknown size, killing 16 of the enemy and capturing nine weapons while suffering no casualties (XT572234). At 1535 hours in the Ho Bo Woods (XT568319), Team #25, Company F, 75th Infantry (Ranger) blasted a Viet Cong squad in a daylight ambush with claymore mines and organic weapons, killing seven of them.

Company D, 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry, located a cache in the Filhol Rubber Plantation (XT639219) at 1340 hours that same day (20 May), uncovering 18 rounds of RPG ammunition, 18 RPG boosters, 80 rounds of M-79 ammunition and quantities of 155mm, 105mm and small arms ammunition.

During the last week of May, activity in the 1st Brigade area was at a relatively low level. On 23 May, the 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion killed 30 NVA in an engagement southwest of Tay Ninh City on the west side of the Vam Co Dong River (XT142435). At 1300 hours on the same day, Company A, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, on a reconnaissance mission in the Cau Khoi Rubber Plantation (XT333409) southeast of Tay Ninh City, located 15 NVA in green uniforms who had been killed by artillery fire. That night, a Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Night Hawk helicopter, flying near the Cambodian Border west of Tay Ninh (WT985583), killed five NVA with automatic weapons and rockets.

At 2150 hours on 24 May, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry at Fire Support Base Crook (XT055595), detected numerous groups of 5-6 enemy around their base with radar and throughout the night engaged them with organic weapons, artillery, Night Hawk helicopters, a C-119 gunships and aerial rocket artillery, killing 20 NVA. On the night of the 25th, Tay Ninh Base Camp received several 107mm rockets but there were no casualties or damage. On 28 May, the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery Aerial Observer located seven NVA KIA in an area that had been engaged with artillery as a result of seismic sensor activations.

In the 2nd Brigade area, the month closed with the same intense activity that had prevailed throughout May. On 22 May, a 25th Aviation Night Hawk helicopter observed a group of enemy around a campfire south of Ben Suc (XT600315) at 0115 hours and killed ten NVA with rockets and automatic weapons. In the eastern portion of the 2nd Brigade AO on 23 May, the 2nd

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Battalion, 34th Armor at Fire Support Base Emory (XT702147) detected movement with radar and called in artillery, resulting in 10 more NVA KIA. On 24 May, contact was gained in the Citadel (XT503257) when Company B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, engaged a squad of NVA soldiers and battered their position with artillery, killing nine of them. The next day, a 2nd Brigade command and control ship engaged an unknown number of enemy one kilometer west of the Saigon River (XT640309) with artillery and air strikes, killing 11 NVA.

On 26 May, Companies C and D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, sweeping an area of previous air strikes (XT551293) near the Hobo Woods, located nine NVA KIA and, at 1435 hours, the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, supporting Company C, strafed enemy soldiers with automatic weapons on the east side of the Ho Bo Woods (XT590304), killing eight of them.

On 31 May, Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, on a reconnaissance mission west of the Saigon River (XT641298), met with an enemy platoon entrenched in a base area and called for artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes. The enemy base was destroyed and 25 NVA killed. Eleven enemy weapons, 24 hand grenades and 14 rounds of RPG ammunition were either captured or destroyed. That same day, Company B, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, located seven tons of rice in the Hobo Woods (XT560280) while on a reconnaissance mission.

Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT14947) received rocket and mortar attacks on 23, 25 and 27 May but again sustained no casualties or damage.

During the month of May, Division planning placed increased emphasis on combined operations with Regional, Provincial and ARVN units to improve their combat efficiency. The number of daily operations more than doubled to a total of 531. These operations were, for the most part, combat assaults, night combat patrols, counter VCI operations, reconnaissance-in-force, cordon and search, base camp defense and MSCAPS. A third of all the operations were conducted during the hours of darkness.

In pacification efforts during the month, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades, DISCOM, and the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, conducted a total of 179 broadcast and 174 leaflet missions and treated 20,000 patients.

As the month closed, the body count of enemy killed stood at 1,586.

During June, the enemy launched a series of attacks which constituted the second phase of his Summer Offensive. The main thrust of these attacks centered in Tay Ninh Province, the 1st Brigade area of operations, as the 9th VC/NVA Division moved against Tay Ninh City. The attacks were preempted by Division and GVN forces. Intelligence sources indicated that the enemy's immediate objective in attempting to enter the city and hold a portion of it for a five day period was to announce the establishment of Tay Ninh City as the capitol of the NLF's Provisional government. The enemy also hoped to show the local populace that the allied forces could not protect them, thereby destroying confidence in the GVN pacification program; to embarrass the U.S.

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internationally, and to receive support from the populace in the form of a popular uprising. Between high points of activity, the enemy launched a vicious terrorist campaign, entering hamlets by night to assassinate civilians, and conducted an intensive campaign to extend and strengthen the infrastructure as a base upon which to launch the political activities of the NLF's shadow government.

The Division's goals during this period continued to be to work towards a balanced mission of pacification, engagement of enemy main force units in heavy contact, and the continued upgrading of South Vietnamese units.

The alignment of maneuver battalions in the TAOR remained basically unchanged for the first three weeks of June but during the month the Division accomplished a major revision of its boundaries and restructured the composition of its three brigades.

Night Hawk helicopters and night combat patrols were continually employed to hamper the enemy's movement during the hours of darkness and to undermine him psychologically by reducing his sense of security at night. The Division planned to locate the enemy with small reconnaissance forces and to quickly concentrate friendly forces when contact was established.

The attack on Tay Ninh City followed a period during which enemy forces reconnoitered U.S. and GVN installations while avoiding contact in the 1st Brigade area. Enemy forces moved toward the city from the northwest, southwest, south and east. At 0550 hours on 5 June, Companies C and D, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, air-lifted into the Renegade Woods 15 kilometers south of Tay Ninh (XT296313), intercepted elements of the 271st NVA Regiment, and engaged them with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and air strikes, resulting in 45 NVA KIA. Four Americans were killed and 14 wounded, and a light observation helicopter was shot down and destroyed.

During the early morning hours of 6 June, the enemy initiated a chain of attacks against fire support bases surrounding Tay Ninh City. Indirect enemy fire struck a night defensive position established by the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, at the base of Nui Ba Den mountain northeast of Tay Ninh City (XT268564); at Fire Support Base Washington northwest of Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT146568); at Fire Support Base Buell north of Tay Ninh City (XT220535); and at Fire Support Base Crook 14 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh Base Camp and six kilometers from the Cambodian Border (XT055595). The 5th and 8th ARVN Battalions killed 86 enemy when the 271st NVA Regiment attempted to overrun their positions southeast of Tay Ninh City (XT17-41-XT1442). Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551) received 24 107mm rockets and 57 82mm mortar rounds but sustained no casualties or damage.

The first indication of an impending attack on Fire Support Base Crook (3-22 Inf) came at 2000 hours on 5 June when the base monitored seismic sensor activations, indicating movement east and northwest of the base. At the same time, the AN/PPS-4 radar mounted on the observation tower began to detect groups of 3-4 enemy personnel moving in the woodlines around the base. All of these targets were engaged with supporting artillery.

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At 2130 hours, the battalion executive officer (in command of the base) requested interdiction artillery fires on the trails and likely assembly areas around the base, and placed the base on 100% alert. At 0100 hours, movement around the base generally ceased, but at 0255 hours, the enemy initiated an attack by fire, consisting of a heavy concentration of rocket, mortar, recoilless rifle, RPG and small arms fire. Most of the rockets passed over the base and impacted outside the wire to the east. One man was killed by a mortar round as an LP withdrew from the west but within the base there were only minor injuries and little damage.

Coordinated with the attack by fire, the enemy launched a battalion sized assault from the south and east. The troops within the base laid down a heavy volume of grazing fire, as the howitzers fired "Killer Junior" to the depth of 150-200 meters all around the base. Supporting 155mm artillery hit enemy positions in the woodline to the south, 8 inch artillery was fired deeper into this area, the base's 81mm and 4.2" mortars fired on the woodline to the east, and 175mm artillery was used to suppress enemy positions to the north. These intense defensive fires slowed the enemy assault but a 16-man element did breach the outer wire to the south with bangalore torpedoes; they were stopped with small arms and claymore mines. Although the attack had halted, the bulk of the enemy force remained in the open, firing small arms and RPG's. At 0400 hours, AC-47 and AC-119 gunships, helicopter fire teams and Air Force fighters moved into the area and saturated the open areas around the base with an intense volume of fire. These gunships were engaged by .51 caliber anti-aircraft fire, with the heaviest concentration to the west. These anti-aircraft positions were suppressed and by 0530 hours the enemy had been forced to withdraw. Company B sent a platoon through the breach in the wire to search the area to the south and, when the platoon moved into an old village area outside the base, they were engaged at close range by a group of 10-15 enemy concealed in spider holes. The platoon quickly returned to the perimeter and requested artillery and TAC air, forcing the remaining NVA to withdraw. A sweep of the battle area revealed 76 NVA KIA and numerous arms and munitions. Infiltration passes found on three of the bodies identified the battalion as an element of the 272nd NVA Regiment.

At 0930 hours, 6 June, seven kilometers east of Tay Ninh in the Cau Khoi rubber (XT340457), Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, a 3rd Brigade element, reacting to intelligence, preempted an ambush attempt on a Division convoy moving along Highway 26. Company A engaged an element of the 95C NVA Regiment with organic weapons, artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes, resulting in 20 NVA KIA.

That same day, Company A, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry contacted an element of the 88th NVA Regiment just outside the northern suburb of Ap Thanh Son (XT245534) where the enemy attempted a penetration of the city. Company A killed 10 NVA soldiers with .50 caliber fire from their tracks at a cost of four men wounded.

That night at 2000 hours, the pattern of activity around Fire Support

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Base Crook resumed in an almost identical fashion. Radar and seismic sensor activations indicated enemy personnel moving towards and all around the base. Each area of activity was engaged with mortar and artillery fire, or direct fire from the howitzers within the base. By 0100 hours on 7 June, the majority of movement had ceased, but all areas continued to be engaged with direct (Killer Junior) and indirect fires. At 0200 hours, a Night Hawk helicopter, flying in support of the action, detected large groups of enemy moving towards the base along the road from the east. Artillery fires were immediately shifted to attack these groups. At 0255 hours, the enemy attack by fire began with greater intensity than on the previous night. For the first few minutes, the rate of fire was 150 rounds of rocket, mortar and RPG fire per minute, and approximately 50 rounds per minute for the next one and one-half hours. Three U.S. soldiers were wounded by the initial volley. Coordinated with the attack by fire, the enemy launched a two battalion ground assault, one battalion moving out of the woodline to the northeast, and the other attacking from the northwest. The base engaged the attacking enemy with "Killer Junior" and automatic weapons. The Night Hawk helicopter strafed the enemy coming out of the jungle to the northeast, while helicopter fire teams hit the battalion on the northwest with machine gun and rocket fire. These gunships were followed by TAC air strikes which dropped napalm and fragmentation bombs on this force. An AC-47 gunship and helicopter gunships engaged the .51 caliber machine guns which had begun firing from the west. 175mm artillery fire was placed on the jungle to the northwest while mortar fire, 155mm and 8 inch howitzer fire was used to suppress the enemy firing positions to the east and south. The area was under continuous illumination by an AC-119 gunship which engaged the area outside the wire with mini-gun fire. The enemy coming from the northeast was stopped before they reached the wire. The force attacking from the northwest breached the first wire barrier but penetrated no further. The continuous defensive fires forced the enemy to attempt to withdraw, but the volume of automatic weapons fire and bursting munitions was so great that the majority were trapped and cut down in the open. Those who did reach the jungle had to move through concentrations of mortar and artillery fire, which shifted out in pursuit of them.

By 0530 hours, those enemy who could had withdrawn. Sweeps of the area began at 0830 hours and uncovered 323 NVA bodies, 10 prisoners-of-war and a large quantity of weapons and munitions (See Combat After Action Interview Report, Tab D)

During the day (7 June), an element of the 272nd NVA Regiment was engaged by GVN forces as it attempted to enter the southern sector of Tay Ninh City (XT2646). The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry set up blocking positions in reinforcing the scattered contacts. Forty-six of the enemy were killed.

At 1440 hours, the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry joined ARVN soldiers in Ap Thanh S'on to drive out elements of the 88th NVA

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Regiment, B87th Local Force Company and K18AA Transportation Company. As civilians fled the area, the combined friendly forces engaged in house-to-house fighting, killing a total of 42 enemy.

At 2000 hours that night (7 June), the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry at Fire Support Base Crook ordered a test firing of weapons in the event that the enemy might initiate another attack. Scattered enemy fire erupted from the woodlines and was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, helicopter gunships, AC-119, TAC air and a Night Hawk helicopter. Three NVA KIA were found the next morning. Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, under the operational control of the 3-22 Inf, conducted a sweep around FSB Crook on 8 June and located 60 60mm and 40 82mm mortar rounds. At 2340 hours on 7 June, Tay Ninh Base Camp received six rounds of 82mm mortar fire. These attacks continued through the next day (8 June) when Tay Ninh Base Camp received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at 0045 hours and rockets, four in a series, at 0622 and 0800 hours, resulting in one U.S. KIA and six 107mm rockets at 2145 hours.

On 9 June, the 5th and 6th ARVN Airborne Battalions southwest of the city killed 86 NVA and captured three prisoners-of-war who identified the enemy forces as elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 272nd NVA Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 271st NVA Regiment, supported by each regiment's anti-aircraft company.

Another engagement around Tay Ninh City took place when Companies A and C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, reacting to intelligence reports, fought a three-hour battle with elements of the 95C Regiment 10 kilometers east of the city in the Crescent (XT387504). Company C had found a bunker in a woodline and evacuated 22 rounds of RPG ammunition. Enemy soldiers concealed in the woodline hit Company C with 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, followed by an intense barrage of small arms, automatic weapons, RPG and recoilless rifle fire. Company C advanced through this fire while Company A moved forward on their left flank. Close combat and bunker-to-bunker fighting ensued and the recoilless rifle position was eliminated with a hand grenade. Artillery and air strikes were brought to bear on the bunker complex and a sweep of the area uncovered 51 NVA KIA. Three Americans were killed and seven wounded. As darkness approached, Companies A and C established a night defensive position (XT383504) and, at 0400 hours, the perimeter security forces detected movement to their front and requested illumination. The perimeter guards opened fire on enemy soldiers moving toward their positions and killed five NVA with automatic weapons.

Following this action, the high rate of activity subsided in the first Brigade area. At this point, the enemy had not yet fully committed his forces and was to stage a second attempt to gain a foothold in Tay Ninh City later in the month.

In the 2nd Brigade area during the first week in June, there were several small scale operations by main force and local force enemy units in Sub-Region 1, designed to harass and wear down friendly forces. On

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1 June, Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, received small arms and automatic weapons fire on an LZ in the Ho Bo Woods seven kilometers south east of Ben Suc (XT614270). The helicopter fire teams returned fire with organic weapons, and during the firefight, a helicopter reinforcing the action was shot down, resulting in two U.S. killed and ten wounded. Two UH1 helicopters received minor damage and one UH1 was destroyed. Sixteen enemy were killed and 13 weapons left behind.

There were several contacts with elements of the 268th VC/NVA Regiment in the Citadel and Ho Bo Woods. The major action with this enemy unit was initiated by the 2nd Brigade during a five-day reconnaissance/search mission involving a task force consisting of Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry; Companies A and C, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, elements of the 3-49 ARVN Regiment and Company A, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor. Sharp fighting began on 5 June, the first day of the operation, at 1248 hours, when the friendly forces engaged a large concentration of entrenched enemy soldiers with organic weapons (XT568255). Artillery and helicopter gunships were shifted to support the contact. In the exchange of fire, five Americans were killed, 14 wounded and three armored personnel carriers destroyed. A helicopter gunship from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company was shot down, resulting in four U.S. killed. The superior firepower of the allied forces broke the enemy resistance and sweeps of the contact site revealed 72 enemy killed, 35 AK-47 rifles, nine other assorted small arms and six RPG rocket launchers with 15 rounds of RPG ammunition.

Activity in the 3rd Brigade area near Dau Tieng remained at a low level of activity during the first week in June. On 2 June, a Hoi Chanh led Company D, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, to a cache in the Michelin Rubber Plantation (XT557541) where Company D evacuated six small arms, 800 rounds of small arms ammunition and several mortar and M-79 rounds. At 0233 hours on 6 June, Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT4947) received 20 82mm mortar rounds and 20 107mm rockets resulting in minor damage to five trucks, two structures, one UH1 and one OV-10 aircraft. At 0250 hours, Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, received an attack from an enemy company on their night offensive position nine kilometers west of Dau Tieng (XT391441). The initial thrust of the attack killed three Americans and wounded three others. Company B returned fire with organic weapons, artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes. At dawn, eight enemy bodies were found outside the perimeter.

On 7 June, the 3rd Brigade began preparations to pass responsibility for the Michelin Rubber Plantation, the Trapezoid and Iron Triangle to the 1st Infantry Division. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry relocated its battalion command post from Fire Support Base Mahone II and completed movement of all its elements to Dau Tieng Base Camp.

Following the activity around Tay Ninh during the 5-9 June time frame, action in the 1st Brigade area dropped to a lower level with the enemy continuing attacks by fire and terrorist activities. Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551) received rocket and mortar attacks on 10, 11, 13 and 14 June.

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On 11 June, 12 U.S. soldiers were wounded by one of these attacks and on 14 June a P.O.L. storage area was destroyed by a 107mm rocket that ignited 30 55-gallon drums of P.O.L. Three U.S. soldiers were wounded.

On 10 June in the 1st Brigade area, the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery aerial observer located 12 NVA who had been killed by artillery on the western base of Nui Ba Den mountain (XT248594) and eight more bodies west of Trai Bi (XT048683).

The 2nd Brigade experienced a moderate level in the number of contacts initiated while conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations. On 8 June, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry and Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, conducted a bomb damage assessment north of Trung Lap in the Citadel (XT573247) where they located seven NVA KIA and seven AK-47 rifles. At 1705 hours in this same area, the two companies initiated a firefight with elements of the 268th VC/NVA Regiment, engaging them with organic weapons, artillery, air strikes and helicopter gunships. Seventeen NVA were killed and eight small arms captured or destroyed.

On 9 June, Troops B and C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, with a regional force company, on a reconnaissance-in-force in a rubber plantation north-east of Go Dau Ha (XT482251), located an enemy force and engaged them with organic weapons, artillery and helicopter gunships, resulting in 29 NVA KIA. That same day, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, providing security for Company E, 65th Engineer Battalion, killed eight NVA with helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes in the Citadel north of Trang Bang (XT515245).

At 1710 hours on 11 June, Team #23, Company F, 75th Infantry (Ranger) engaged an unknown number of enemy in the Boi Loi Woods (XT505327) with small arms and automatic weapons, resulting in eight NVA KIA.

At 1105 hours on 13 June, Company C, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, conducted a reconnaissance mission north of Trang Bang in the Citadel (XT511244) towards a blocking position established by a regional force company. An armored personnel carrier received an RPG round, resulting in major damage and two U.S. wounded. Company C suppressed the enemy fire and destroyed seven Viet Cong in place with artillery and air strikes. West of this contact (XT524232), Company D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, on a reconnaissance mission, engaged an enemy force in a bunker complex and placed artillery and air strikes on the position with helicopter gunships overhead to strafe enemy soldiers who attempted to escape. Twenty-nine enemy were killed and 12 small arms captured.

On the night of 13 June, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, established night ambush positions northwest of Cu Chi Base Camp. At 2120 hours, Company A engaged approximately 15 enemy with organic weapons, claymore mines and helicopter gunships, resulting in six enemy killed and one U.S. wounded (XT587168). At 2310 hours, the second night combat patrol initiated an attack by artillery directed at enemy

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movement (XT571164). A firefight ensued when the enemy returned fire with RPG's, damaging an armored personnel carrier and wounding four American soldiers. Helicopter gunships joined the firefight, and one of them was shot down, wounding its four crew members. A sweep of the area at dawn disclosed 16 NVA KIA.

At 1150 hours on 14 June, Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry, with the support of the 116th Assault Helicopter Company conducted a combat assault in the Filhol Rubber Plantation (XT624216) and engaged an element of the C18AA Company of the 268th VC/NVA Regiment. Initial contact was made by an infantryman who killed an enemy soldier with small arms fire. The gunships accounted for 15 enemy KIA. One prisoner-of-war was captured and nine small arms destroyed. A reconnaissance after the firefight produced another NVA prisoner-of-war and a small quantity of arms and ammunition.

Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT4947) in the 3rd Brigade area received rocket and mortar attacks on 9, 10 and 12 June without sustaining casualties or damage. On 11 June, Company B, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, operating five kilometers northwest of Dau Tieng (XT425485), engaged a large, well-entrenched enemy force after receiving 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. In a day-long battle, Company B placed organic weapons fire on the enemy and received artillery, helicopter gunship and air strike support. Sixty-two enemy, identified from the three prisoners-of-war captured during the contact as elements of the K1 and K2 Battalions, 95C Regiment, were killed and a quantity of arms and ammunition destroyed. Two U.S. soldiers were killed and 11 wounded.

On 16 June at 0110 hours, a sapper unit probed the signal facility on top of Nui Ba Den mountain (XT281582). Hurling satchel charges, the sappers killed four Americans, destroyed two bunkers, one building, one generator and one sensor van and captured an M-16 rifle. One of the sappers was killed.

After losing over 500 personnel in a move to overtake Tay Ninh City during the first week in June, the 9th VC/NVA Division again moved against the city on 19 and 20 June. The first indication of a new 9th VC/NVA Division offensive against the city appeared on 16 June when two ralliers from the 271st NVA Regiment disclosed preparations and plans for the attack.

Enemy forces were positioned northwest, west, southwest, southeast and east of Tay Ninh City. At 0145 hours on 19 June, Fire Support Base Washington (XT116568), nine kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh City, manned by the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, detected numerous, small groups of enemy soldiers moving toward the perimeter. Minutes later, the base illuminated the flat marshland around the base and sighted sapper squads crawling toward the perimeter. A heavy mortar barrage, lasting over a half an hour, was initiated against the base, causing minor wounds to the defenders. Helicopter gunships, including a Night Hawk helicopter, AC-47

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gunships, and five batteries of artillery, were employed to engage the enemy before he came within striking distance of the perimeter. Anti-aircraft fire from .51 caliber machine gun positions was suppressed south of the base. Despite the use of supporting fires, the enemy continued to advance toward the northwest portion of the perimeter and penetrated the first two rows of wire obstacles. The sappers were halted with small arms fire and the enemy withdrew under the cover of sporadic sniper fire. Thirty-five enemy, identified as elements of the 3rd Battalion, 88th NVA Regiment, were killed and six NVA prisoners-of-war captured. This attack was believed to have been a diversionary tactic, so that elements of the 1st Battalion, 88th NVA Regiment could attempt to infiltrate into the city to capture the Cao Dai Temple and proclaim it as the seat of their provisional government.

Rocket and mortar attacks were also received in the early morning hours by Fire Support Base Crook (XT055595). Fire Support Base Buell (XT217535), Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551), and the night offensive position of Company C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, north of the city (XT238575). The 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion engaged the 1st Battalion, 88th NVA Regiment just before sunrise on Highway 13, a major route into the eastern sector of the city (XT237497). Company C (4-23 Mech) moved from its night offensive position and dispatched several armored personnel carriers to block the primary avenues of approach to the Cao Dai Temple. The enemy elements were assaulted by the combined friendly forces and made to withdraw outside the city into an area where they were engaged with Cobra gunships, resulting in 44 NVA KIA.

Throughout the day, an element of the 6th ARVN Marines fought a large enemy force of the 271st NVA Regiment west of Tay Ninh as they attempted to move toward the city. In heavy contact, the ARVN marines killed over 100 of the enemy.

Two battles took place southeast and southwest of the city on the afternoon of 19 June. At 1610 hours six kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh (XT267405), elements of the D1 and D14 VC/NVA Battalions and the 271st NVA Regiment attacked a small convoy bringing supplies to Troops B and C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, after it had turned off of Highway 22. The cavalrymen and elements of the 276th Regional Force Company moved out of their offensive positions and attacked the U-shaped ambush configuration. Troop C sent two platoons to assist the convoy and received automatic weapons and RPG fire which killed the troop commander. The ambush was closed behind Troop C, and the cavalrymen had to force their way out of the encirclement, in some cases, by backing their tracks and tanks over enemy positions. Helicopter gunships, artillery and TAC air supported the contact which terminated late in the day. Sweeps of the area on 19 and 20 June disclosed 98 NVA KIA. U.S. losses were four killed, nine wounded, one "Sheridan" destroyed, and damage to another "Sheridan", six armored personnel carriers and an M548.

At 1620 hours to the south-southwest of Tay Ninh in the Straight Edge Woods (XT204386), Companies B and C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry,

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reinforced the 6th ARVN Marines who were following up an initial contact made by the U.S. Navy with the 271st NVA Regiment. Setting down on a hot LZ, Companies B and C pulled away from the well-fortified enemy positions, which were concealed by thick overhead vegetation, and requested and received artillery to soften the area. Company B deployed to set up a blocking position and Company C and the ARVN marines conducted an assault through the enemy positions, firing their organic weapons and engaging the bunkers with hand grenades. They forced the enemy to withdraw into an open field and brought heavy organic weapons fire to bear on the retreating enemy. Company B flanked the area and added to the small arms fire. Seventy-two enemy were killed in the engagement.

At 2215 hours six kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh (XT1740), gunships from Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, received anti-aircraft fire and engaged the enemy position with automatic weapons, killing 15 NVA. The following day (20 June), the 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion killed 30 NVA in two contacts in the same general area (XT169412).

Activity in the 2nd Brigade area also increased sharply during the 3rd week in June with the majority of enemy attacks consisting of attacks by fire against the Division's fire support and patrol bases.

At 0935 hours, 15 June, Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, on a reconnaissance-in-force four kilometers north of Trang Bang in the Citadel (XT482243), made contact with a large enemy force and was reinforced by elements of a regional force company, Company B, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, and the Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry. Artillery, helicopter gunships and air strikes were employed to suppress enemy RPG fire and to dislodge the enemy from his fortified positions. Fifty-three enemy were killed in the battle while one American lost his life and 12 were wounded. That night, at 2037 hours, Cu Chi Base Camp (XT6515) received four 122mm rockets, resulting in one U.S. KIA and three U.S. wounded.

At 0020 hours on 17 June, a mine boom protecting the Phu Quong Bridge (XT803139) was heavily damaged by a mine planted by Viet Cong saboteurs.

In the Ho Bo Woods that same day, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a reconnaissance mission and made contact at 1332 hours, killing three Viet Cong (XT593277). Moving northwest, Company C killed an NVA soldier at 1505 hours (XT566276) and at 1630 hours initiated a firefight with an enemy force of unknown size, incapacitating them with riot control agent (CS) and then destroying them in place with artillery and gunships. Thirty-two Viet Cong were killed and eight weapons destroyed.

On 18 June, rockets and/or mortar rounds struck PB Dees (XT554272), four times during the day, FSB Patton (XT502195) at 0123 hours, FSB

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Stuart (XT499192) at 0520 hours, FSB Pershing (XT518256) at 0535 hours and Cu Chi Base Camp (XT6515). Coordinated ground attacks did not follow the shellings and no damage or casualties were sustained. The same pattern of coordinated attacks by fire occurred on 20 June when, at 1845 hours, FSB Pershing, PB Dees and FSB Stuart simultaneously received five rounds of 82mm mortar fire. On 21 June, the Phu Hoa Dong Tower (XT706195) and PB Devin (XT551177) received mortar attacks. Throughout the week, the 25th ARVN Division HQS at Duc Hoa, the Hau Nghia Province Capitol at Bao Trai and the Duc Hoa subsector were targets for enemy gunners. In these attacks, the number of rounds were few and caused little damage.

In the 3rd Brigade area, Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT4947) was shelled more intensely than those targets in the 2nd Brigade AO, receiving rocket and mortar fire on 15, 19 and 20 June. Two 2½ ton trucks were combat losses as a result of the 20 June shelling.

The fourth week in June witnessed a sharp increase in enemy anti-aircraft fire in the TAOR, a rise in terrorist activities against civilians and GVN administrators and the completion of a major realignment of the Division TAOR. The enemy maintained an avoidance posture in preparation for future attacks unless threatened in his base areas by Division offensive maneuvers.

In the 1st Brigade area, Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551) was shelled on 22, 23, 27 and 28 June, resulting in one U.S. killed, one U.S. wounded, two 5-ton trucks, two bunkers, and one UH1H destroyed, heavy damage to a UH1H, moderate damage to five UH1H's, and minor damage to one building. On 27 June, Fire Support Base Sedgwick (XT248302) killed five enemy outside the perimeter with mortar and artillery fire.

On 26 June, a light observation helicopter flown by Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, in support of the 1st Brigade, received small arms fire from the eastern base of Nui Ba Den mountain (XT295565) and returned fire with artillery and helicopter gunships, killing 23 NVA.

The 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, conducted an extensive operation around Nui Ba Den mountain, a physical anomaly honeycombed with numerous natural caves and a traditional haven of local Viet Cong forces. On 27 June at 0505 hours, Company C, in a night offensive position one kilometer east of the mountain (XT315576), received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and RPG's from the west and northwest. Company C returned the fire with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes while Company B, alerted to the attack, moved from the west to reinforce the activity. At daybreak, Company A moved from the northeast and linked up with Company C and the two companies assaulted the area forcing the enemy into Company B. A portion of the enemy elements withdrew into a banana grove at the foot of the mountain. Trapped between the three companies on both flanks and to their front and by the mountain to their rear, the enemy soldiers were hit with direct 8 inch

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howitzer fire and air strikes. The fighting continued throughout the day and, when contact was broken, a sweep of the area disclosed 94 NVA KIA, three NVA prisoners-of-war, 30 AK-47 rifles, four RPG rocket launchers, two 82mm mortar rounds and 20 rounds of RPG ammunition. Interrogation of the PW's identified the 1st Battalion, 88th NVA Regiment. U.S. losses were one killed, six wounded, heavy damage to an armored personnel carrier, light damage to a light observation helicopter, and one armored personnel carrier destroyed. The next day (28 June) at 0945 hours in this same area (XT305575), Company B (4-23 Mech) in operations to exploit the contact, engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and artillery, resulting in eight NVA KIA. At 1355 hours, moving closer to the mountain, Company B received a barrage of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. A platoon from Company A, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor placed 90mm tank fire on the enemy position and artillery was fired in support of the contact. Eleven NVA were killed and a 60mm mortar was destroyed.

Working their way along the east side of the mountain on 29 June, Company A (4-23 Mech) engaged enemy forces in several scattered contacts, firing 90mm recoilless rifles into caves and bunkers, resulting in five NVA KIA and five bicycles captured (XT2958-XT2860).

On 1 July, Companies B and C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, again moved along the east side of the mountain (XT295576) and, in day-long operations, engaged a series of caves and bunkers with riot control agent (CS), TAC air, helicopter gunships and organic weapons, resulting in 53 NVA KIA, 11 AK-47 rifles and one 60mm mortar. There were no U.S. casualties. The enemy unit was identified as the 58 Artillery Battalion, 69th Artillery Command.

In the 2nd Brigade area at 2200 hours on the night of 22 June, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, positioned three platoon-sized night combat patrols in an area south of Trung Lap (XT577178-XT573180-XT569183) where scattered enemy activity had been experienced the night before. As soon as the 3rd Platoon established its position, they were informed by an observation post that Viet Cong were mining Highway 7A nearby. A reconnaissance element was ordered to investigate the report and engaged the Viet Cong with M-79 fire. The enemy returned fire with M-79 grenades and RPG's and the reconnaissance element withdrew. Helicopter gunships were requested to place fire on the suspected enemy positions and the enemy pulled back near a village where they began engaging the 3rd Platoon with 60mm mortar fire, killing one U.S. and wounding six. The 3rd Platoon was reinforced by the other two combat patrols and Company B (2-14 Inf), while Company B, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, established a blocking position. The enemy was engaged with artillery, M-72 light anti-tank weapons, helicopter and AC-47 gunships and, at 0200 hours, a sweep of the contact site uncovered 30 enemy KIA, 17 small arms and a 60mm mortar.

On 23 June, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, on a reconnaissance mission of an area (XT550280) engaged by artillery as a result of seismic sensor activations near the Ho Bo Woods, located 25 NVA

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KIA. At 1030 hours on 24 June, a light observation helicopter received small arms fire and force landed two kilometers west of the Saigon River seven kilometers southeast of Ben Suc (XT647288). Company B (2-12 Inf) conducting a reconnaissance mission nearby, moved into this area, secured the helicopter, and returned fire with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and TAC air. Fourteen enemy were killed and nine weapons destroyed.

On 25 June, a light observation helicopter flown by Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, in the same general area of the previous day's contact (XT647288), took several hits from small arms and engaged the area with gunships, artillery and air strikes. Company A, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, swept the area and located ten NVA KIA and three AK-47 rifles.

On 27 June, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry conducted a combat assault into an area near the Saigon River five kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong (XT758170) and, at 1055 hours, made contact with an enemy force of unknown size, probably an element of the Quyet Thang Regiment. The enemy returned a heavy volume of RPG and small arms fire, killing three Americans and wounding four. Enemy anti-aircraft fire hit a gunship, a command and control helicopter (2-14 Inf) and a MEDEVAC helicopter. Company B, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, reacting to the contact, reinforced Company C (2-14 Inf) from the west. Helicopter gunships, air strikes and artillery supported the sharp fighting and when the enemy broke contact, the infantrymen located 44 NVA KIA, 15 AK-47 rifles, two RPG rocket launchers and 100 rounds of RPG ammunition.

On 28 June, an artillery aerial observer, flying in support of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry on a reconnaissance mission operation, observed enemy soldiers in the Citadel north of Trung Lap (XT560265) and engaged them with artillery, resulting in 11 NVA KIA, and four AK-47 rifles and one RPG rocket launcher destroyed. On 30 June, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, on a combat assault just north of the Ho Bo Woods (XT542305) killed seven NVA and destroyed four AK-47 rifles.

On 24 June, the 3rd Brigade began preparations to turn over control of Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT4947) to elements of the 1st Infantry Division. Companies A and B, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry moved from Dau Tieng Base Camp to Fire Support Base Keene (XT604017) to replace the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry who assumed responsibility for Fire Support Base Emory (XT702147) and secured the Phu Cuong (XT8114) and Ba Bep (XT7813) Bridges. The 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor (-) left FSB Emory and came under the operational control of the 1st Brigade. The 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry also came under the operational control of the 1st Brigade at this time while placing its Company A OPCON to the 3rd Brigade.

On 30 June, the 3rd Brigade moved its command headquarters to Cu Chi Base Camp (XT6515).

The 1st Brigade continued to operate in Tay Ninh Province and assumed

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responsibility for the Crescent area (XT4050) and Cau Khoi (XT3445) and Ben Cui (XT4646) Rubber Plantations. After 30 June, the 1st Brigade was composed of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, based at FSB Washington (XT146-568) and FSB Crook (XT055595) with the mission of contacting elements of the 88th NVA Regiment and 9th VC/NVA Division artillery units northwest of Tay Ninh City, preempting attacks against Tay Ninh Base Camp and interdiction of enemy lines of communication; the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, operating north and northwest of Tay Ninh City against elements of the 88th NVA Regiment and 82nd Regional Support Group, conducting pacification operations in the vicinity of Mo Cong (XT1361) and preemption of MSR interdiction; the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, continuing operations in the Renegade (XT2828-XT2832) and Straight Edge (XT1634) Woods to interdict movement of the Tay Ninh Provincial Battalion; the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, operating in the upper Boi Loi (XT4838), Cau Khoi (XT3445) and eastern Crescent (XT4550) areas to destroy elements of the 95C and 101st NVA Regiments, conducting resource control checkpoints with district forces and securing Highway 26; and the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor (-), conducting offensive operations in support of and securing the land clearing operations of the 60th Land Clearing Company in the eastern Crescent. Furtherance of the military pacification effort continued in Tay Ninh's provincial districts (Phu Khuong, Phuoc Ninh, Hieu Thien and Khiem Hanh).

The 2nd Brigade continued operations north of Highway 1 from Trang Bang to Phy Cuong, with primary emphasis in the Citadel (XT5025). The maneuver battalions in the 2nd Brigade were the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, with the mission of conducting intensive Eagle flight, combat assault and reconnaissance mission operations in the Citadel to destroy the 268th Regiment with emphasis on night operations and utilizing the mobile patrol base concept; the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, operating in the Citadel with the 2-12 Inf to destroy the 268th VC/NVA Regiment and local forces, and MSR security along Highway 1 and 8A; and the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, based at FSB Emory (XT702147), with the mission of conducting air mobile and reconnaissance/search operations in the Ho Bo Woods (XT6027) and Phu Hoa Dong areas against elements of the Quyet Thang Regiment and other main forces attempting to infiltrate through this traditional infiltration corridor, and combined operations with Regional, Provincial and 5th ARVN Division elements. The Brigade was also to support pacification efforts in Trang Bang, Cu Chi and Phu Hoa Dong Districts.

Having moved to Cu Chi, the 3rd Brigade operated in the Duc Hue (XT3307) and Duc Hoa (XS5997) Districts with a forward command post at Bao Trai (XT5405), emphasizing combined operations with 25th ARVN Division and Hau Nghia Provincial Forces. The 3rd Brigade was comprised of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry at FSB Keene (XT604017), tasked with locating elements of the D12 Sapper Battalion and caches, and combat assaults in the vicinity of the Van Co Dong River to destroy Sub-Region 2 battalion and Duc Hoa local force companies, and the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, with the mission of operating in Duc Hue District out of FSB Jackson (XT425-168), conducting periodic airmobile operations west of the Van Co Dong

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River with the majority of effort directed toward interdiction of eastward movement of Sub-Region 2 units.

During the month of June, the Division accelerated its upgrading of ARVN, Regional and Popular forces. The number of combined daily operations rose to a monthly total of 843. In pacification efforts, the Division treated 24,544 patients and conducted 228 leaflet and 234 broadcast missions. The Division killed 1,939 of the enemy during June, captured 45 prisoners-of-war, received six ralliers, and captured or destroyed 444 individual weapons, 114 crew served weapons and 14 tons of rice.

As the month of July approached, the Division continued to focus its attention on Tay Ninh Province. The 9th VC/NVA Division had been soundly defeated in its two moves toward Tay Ninh City during June. Its 271st and 272nd Regiments had suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment as had the D1 and D14 Provincial Battalions. The highly successful preemptive campaign of the 4-23 Mech against elements of the 88th NVA Regiment, who had fled to Nui Ba Den mountain following its feeble attempts to penetrate the northern sector of the city, left that unit seriously weakened. Despite these overwhelming defeats, intelligence indicated that these same elements of the 9th VC/NVA Division planned to attempt a "more violent" effort at securing the Cao Dai Temple and proclaiming it as the seat of the NLF's illegal, shadow government.

All indicators pointed to the 15-25 July time-frame as the period during which the attack on the city was most likely to occur. Concurrent with this series of actions, the enemy planned to secure Highway 22 from Tay Ninh to Trang Bang and then overthrow the Go Dau Ha District. By 2 July, main force units were to relinquish the battlefield to local force and guerrilla units who would maintain pressure while main force units prepared for the highpoint in their staging areas. On 15 July, the main forces would return to initiate the highpoint. Some reports indicated that if the planned highpoint failed to achieve its goals, the cycle would be repeated until Tay Ninh City was seized. One source stated that on 1 July, attacks by fire would be launched in the area to coincide with such attacks throughout Vietnam but this action did not take place. The targets for the offensive continued to be Division installations near the Cambodian Border (FSB Crook, FSB Washington) in the initial stages with the attack concluding in approaches to the city from the north, northwest and southwest. As the month of July began, the 271st and 272nd Regiments were believed to be located west-southwest of Tay Ninh near and in Cambodia; the 88th Regiment remained on and around Nui Ba Den mountain, and the D1 and D14 Battalions were located west of the Straight Edge Woods in Bo Ba Tay, Cambodia. However, one agent indicated that the D14 may have been operating in the upper Cau Khoi Rubber Plantation (XT3248).

During the first two weeks of July, activity was at a moderate level with no large contacts developing in the path of the Division's preemptive campaign. While a lull in main force battles was characteristic of this

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period, an undercurrent of enemy activity in preparation for the July high-point was evident in all areas of the TAOR. Reconnaissance, communication/liaison, resupply and propagandizing missions were dominant. In addition, the enemy escalated his brutal terrorist campaign which involved assassinations accompanied, in some cases, by mutilating his victims, kidnappings, forced labor and theft of identification cards. This campaign was directed primarily against GVN officials and sympathizers, their families, uncooperative civilian populations and retired ARVN personnel. The incidence of mines and booby traps increased as the enemy attempted to make his presence known while incurring a minimum of casualties. During the first two weeks of July, Division soldiers destroyed 103 booby traps and 35 mines and detonated 29 booby traps and 21 mines, resulting in eight Division soldiers killed and 34 wounded. Punji pits and similar devices also made frequent appearances and several incidents of civilian death and injury from these mines and booby traps were noted.

Having massed five maneuver battalions, an additional artillery battery and the direct support of Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry in the Tay Ninh area, the 1st Brigade also gained operational control of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, to further bolster its combat power for the defense of Tay Ninh City. In addition, the Division was prepared to summon the highly mobile firepower of the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry to Tay Ninh should the enemy attempt to carry out his plans to interdict Highway 22.

The nightly shellings of Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551) decreased during the first two weeks of July but the base did receive attacks by fire on 6, 8 and 13 July. The attack on 13 July resulted in two Division soldiers killed and four wounded.

Generally, contact in the area was light as the enemy avoided the 1st Brigade's extensive reconnaissance, combat assault and night combat patrol operations. However, two significant contacts did develop northwest and north of Tay Ninh.

At 1350 hours on 7 July, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, on a reconnaissance mission northwest of Tay Ninh (XT174682), engaged four enemy with small arms, automatic weapons, helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes. Two enemy bodies were located after the engagement. The approach of darkness prevented a further search of the contact site. Returning to the area the next day, Company C found several new graves and uncovered 19 more enemy bodies. Further search of the area resulted in finding two AK-47 rifles, four RPG rounds, four 82mm mortar fuses, 50 rounds of small arms ammunition, 400 pounds of rice and 15 pounds of documents. The documents identified the 58th Mortar Battalion and disclosed that this unit, formerly directly subordinate to the 69th Artillery Command of COSVN, appeared to have been incorporated into a newly formed regiment operating under the name of the F66 Artillery Regiment. The documents also revealed the location of 34 planned firing sites dispersed in a triangular configuration

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around targets in the Tay Ninh area.

The second engagement resulted from Division efforts to eliminate the enemy elements on Nui Ba Den mountain. The north side of the mountain was engaged with a series of B-52 strikes and Company A, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry, was given the mission of conducting bomb damage assessment of the strikes on 12 July. Sharp, difficult fighting developed when Company A gained contact at 1305 hours. The enemy responded with heavy small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire, taking advantage of the cover offered by the huge boulders and caves. The organic weapons fire of the infantrymen (2-2 Inf) was augmented with helicopter gunships, artillery, and napalm and fragmentation bombs. Thirty-one of the enemy were killed. The next day, the same area was saturated with riot control agent (CS) and again bombarded with air strikes. Company C (2-2 Inf) swept into the area and again met resistance from enemy soldiers firing small arms. Ten of the enemy were killed. Total friendly casualties for the two days of fighting on the mountain's rugged terrain were nine killed and 22 wounded.

Following its successful offensive operations around the mountain in June, the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, remained east of that area, conducting reconnaissance operations and accounting for 25 enemy killed during the first two weeks of July in several scattered contacts. The 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry accounted for 17 enemy killed during the same period as a result of reconnaissance operations. On 7 July, Company B, southwest of Tay Ninh City (XT208385), located nine NVA killed, seven hand grenades, two RPG rounds, eight RPG boosters, two bangalore torpedoes, 20 60mm mortar rounds and 100 pounds of rice.

In other actions in the 1st Brigade area, a Night Hawk helicopter killed 15 NVA on 6 July with automatic weapons and rockets just outside of the southwestern sector of Tay Ninh City (XT194464). On 8 July, a Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Night Hawk helicopter located two targets, one six kilometers southwest of Tay Ninh (XT195419) and one in the Straight Edge Woods (XT130350), resulting in six NVA KIA. A helicopter with an Airborne Personnel Detector kit, operating 20 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh near the Cambodian Border (WT992576), engaged an unknown number of enemy with gunships and air strikes, resulting in nine enemy killed and four heavy machine guns destroyed.

In the 2nd Brigade area, the enemy was expected to avoid actions which would result in heavy losses in personnel and rely heavily on attacks by fire to fulfill his role in the July highpoint. One report stated that the K1 Battalion, 268th Regiment and the 1st Battalion, Quyet Thang Regiment had rehearsed plans for a coordinated attack on the Phu Hoa Subsector (XT7415). Captured documents revealed that Sub-Region 1 forces were conducting a reconnaissance of the Cu Chi District for movement of a multi-battalion force into the area.

Activity was at a moderate level in the 2nd Brigade area during the

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first two weeks of July with a higher incidence of small, ineffective attacks by fire. Attacks by fire were made against Patrol Base Dees (XT554227) on 2, 6, 7 and 9 July; Fire Support Base Pershing (XT518256) on 6, 7 and 9 July; Fire Support Base Stuart (XT499198) on 6 and 9 July; Fire Support Base Patton (XT582155) on 9 July; Patrol Base Dragon (XT638284) on 6 July and Cu Chi Base Camp (XT6515) on 10 July. On 5 July at 2055 hours, Fire Support Base Pershing detected enemy movement on its PPS-5 radar and engaged the area with 4.2" mortars, resulting in five enemy killed. At 0100 hours on the morning of the 6th, after receiving ten rounds of 82mm mortar fire, FSB Pershing returned fire with artillery, resulting in five more enemy killed. That night at 1905 hours, the base received three rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire, and engaged the suspected position with mortars, artillery, and helicopter gunships, resulting in eight enemy killed.

The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, operating in the eastern portion of the TAOR, killed 30 enemy soldiers, captured 13 prisoners-of-war and 24 weapons, and received one rallier in contacts initiated while on reconnaissance/search missions. On 9 July, Company A supported by an Air Force forward air controller engaged elements of the 3rd Battalion, 268th Regiment and the Trang Bang District Force in the Ho Bo Woods (XT592279). While the infantrymen exchanged small arms and automatic weapons fire with the enemy, helicopter gunships and air strikes were employed in support. The joint effort resulted in 17 enemy killed.

The operations of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, resulted in a total of 75 enemy killed during the two week period. On 5 July, while on a reconnaissance mission in the Citadel north of Trang Bang (XT518248), Company A uncovered a cache consisting of 36 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 14 RPG rounds, three bangalore torpedoes, 84 60mm mortar rounds, 15 60mm mortar fuzes, two complete 60mm mortars and an SKS rifle. At 1630 hours that day, Company B, sweeping an area east of the find (XT554223), located seven NVA soldiers who had been killed by artillery and air strikes. At 2035 hours that night, a combat patrol from Company B, in the same general area (XT567-219), engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, an AC-47 gunship, helicopter gunships and artillery. Sweeping the area the next morning, the patrol killed an enemy soldier and located seven enemy bodies. Further search of the area disclosed that the enemy element, identified as a part of the 83rd Rear Service Group, had been in the process of laying mines, and the infantrymen destroyed two mines and a booby trap.

On 8 July, the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, supporting the 2-12 Inf on a combat assault six kilometers northwest of Cu Chi (XT588173), engaged an unknown number of enemy, resulting in 17 enemy killed. On 10 July, Company D, on a reconnaissance mission in the Citadel (XT508245), engaged elements of the 3rd Battalion, 268th Regiment with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and air strikes, resulting in ten enemy killed and five weapons destroyed.

On 14 July, the Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Patrol (2-12 Inf),

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exploiting information gained from a prisoner-of-war, located a cache containing 15 SKS rifles, six Chicom carbines with telescopic sights, three M-1 rifles, four M-1 carbines, two Browning Automatic Rifles, four AK-47 rifles, one M-16 rifle, two 60mm mortar tubes, two RPG rocket launchers, two light machine guns, 20 82mm mortar rounds, 3600 rounds of small arms ammunition, five 60mm mortar rounds, nine anti-tank mines, 20 RPG rounds, 14 hand grenades, 10 rifle grenades and 600 feet of communications wire.

The 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, killed 11 enemy soldiers and eliminated eight weapons in performing route security, reconnaissance missions and security operations for Rome plow efforts. The 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, in a variety of assignments in the Citadel and Ho Bo Woods killed 34 of the enemy and accounted for two prisoners-of-war, seven tons of rice, four weapons, five sampans, 2000 blasting caps, 500 feet of detonator wire, 500 feet of communications wire, 42 RPG boosters, 11 mortar charges and 79 mixed mortar and recoilless rifle rounds.

In other 2nd Brigade operations, the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, operating four kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong (XT765164) with three Regional Force companies on 8 July, engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons and gunships, resulting in 18 enemy killed, three credited to Regional Force soldiers. During the firefight, an RPC round hit a command and control ship, causing it to crash, resulting in one U.S. killed and one wounded. Another light observation helicopter was hit with small arms fire but received only minor damage. Also on 8 July, ARVN forces captured an enemy weapons cache five kilometers east of Cu Chi (XT675135). The cache contained 20 122mm rockets which were probably intended for use by the 9th Artillery Battalion of Sub-Region 1, possibly in attacks on Cu Chi Base Camp.

On 11 July, elements of the 1st ARVN Cavalry Regiment, under the operational control of the 2nd Brigade, on a reconnaissance mission in the Ho Bo Woods, engaged an unknown number of enemy at 0800 hours, resulting in nine NVA killed and three prisoners-of-war captured (XT020234). At 1530 hours, they killed two more enemy with grenades (XT622235) and, at 1700 hours, engaged six enemy with organic weapons, artillery and air strikes, resulting in another two NVA killed.

The lull in enemy activity was most apparent in the 3rd Brigade area with the majority of effort resulting in only light, scattered contacts and the location of small caches.

On 7 July, near the Parrot's Beak (XT275058), an Air Force forward air controller, flying in support of the 3rd Brigade, engaged an unknown number of enemy with air strikes, resulting in 17 enemy killed and nine .51 caliber heavy machine guns destroyed. On 12 July, the 132nd Regional Force Company, in military pacification efforts, captured nine prisoners-of-war four kilometers southwest of Cu Chi (XT685100). At 1855 hours on 13 July, Team 26C, Company F, 75th Infantry (Ranger), exploiting intelligence

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information engaged 15 enemy who were in the process of establishing an ambush site aimed at Navy patrol boats operating along the Vam Co Dong River (XT417101). Team 26C opened fire with organic weapons and employed helicopter gunships, a Night Hawk helicopter, an AC-47 gunship and artillery, resulting in seven NVA killed.

The third and final highpoint of the enemy's current Summer Campaign failed to materialize as expected during the third week of July. However, a series of contacts southwest of Tay Ninh City along the Vam Co Dong River and repeated actions with what appeared to be main force elements, possibly the 88th NVA Regiment, in the Nui Ba Den area, indicated that enemy elements were operating along traditional approach routes to the city. An increase of enemy activity during the evening and early morning hours of 19-20 July was similar to that experienced during D-Day of the June highpoints, indicating that D-Day for the July action may have occurred. Tay Ninh City was still predicted to be the primary target for coordinated action by enemy forces with elements of the 9th VC/NVA Division spearheading the attacks. Action in the Tay Ninh area would be supported by attacks in the sub-regions which would consist primarily of attacks by fire and limited sapper action. Go Dau Ha was mentioned again as a probable target of the Tay Ninh Provincial Battalions, especially the D14, but was expected to receive only an attack by fire.

As the lull continued into its third week, the enemy increased his propaganda efforts in the villages and hamlets as the main force units hurriedly attempted to solve replacement and supply problems. With the 88th NVA Regiment located on the northern slopes of Nui Ba Den, the 272nd Regiment was located by an agent along the Cambodian Border near the Straight Edge Woods (XT130335) where the 1000 man unit was staging to attack Thanh Dien (XT1945) and then Tay Ninh Base Camp. An agent also located the D14 Battalion in Phuoc Tan Village (XT393292) north of Go Dau Ha with intentions of harassing neighboring GVN outposts and mining Highway 22. The threat of the 88th Regiment from the northeast had been blunted, if not completely preempted by allied action. Enemy forces were expected to resort heavily on attacks by fire as their capability for sustained ground action was estimated to be considerably less than that which he possessed during the June attacks.

On 16 July, Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, engaged an unknown number of enemy four kilometers west of Nui Ba Den with automatic weapons, rockets, air strikes and artillery, resulting in three enemy killed. At 1625 hours that day, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, providing security for Rome plow operations on the north side of Nui Ba Den (XT288610), engaged an unknown number of enemy with automatic weapons, helicopter gunships and artillery, resulting in three NVA KIA.

On 18 July, Company C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, conducting operations at the base of Nui Ba Den mountain (XT300580), engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and

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artillery, resulting in 27 NVA killed. The following day at 0933 hours, Company C, on a mounted reconnaissance with a Regional Force company near Highway 13 east of Tay Ninh City (XT300553), engaged an unknown number of enemy with helicopter gunships and artillery, killing 12 and destroying an 82mm mortar. At 2040 hours, in the northern portion of the Cau Khoi Rubber Plantation where they had established a night offensive position (XT310482), Company C engaged 10-15 enemy with organic weapons and artillery, killing four NVA. Also on 20 July, a bombing mission near the Cambodian Border (WT993635) resulted in six enemy killed and three secondary explosions.

While the 1st Brigade worked to preempt any moves against Tay Ninh City, the 2nd Brigade experienced numerous small contacts. In the meantime, the capture of a senior captain of Sub-Region 1 correlated with documents captured by the 1st Infantry Division in June gave the Division an indication of the effects of its preemptive efforts in Sub-Region 1. The document, a report signed by a cadre of the Rear Service Staff, Sub-Region 1, COSVN, stated that allied activities had greatly hampered operations in northern Cu Chi District. The report indicated that the activities of civilian labor teams, assault youth groups, and transportation units had been greatly reduced due to the large increase of allied operations and that the extensive use of armored vehicles, helicopters, air strikes and artillery by US/GVN forces had destroyed many rice storage, animal and poultry and transportation and hospital areas. Pressure was also applied to these areas by a large number of successful ambushes.

Trang Bang District was referred to several times as an extremely weak area. One paragraph revealed that the guerrilla movement had been slowly deteriorating due to a lack of cooperation by the local populace. The people refused to conceal troops, care for wounded soldiers, store rice or join civilian labor teams. As a direct result, the collection and purchasing of goods were seriously impaired. In addition, the document stated that the GVN "Chieu Hoi" program had been intensified and that the exploitation and employment of Hoi Chanhs to strike enemy forces had endangered many concealed positions.

This evaluation of the enemy's current situation in Trang Bang was expanded to include all of Sub-Region 1 by Tran Minh Dao who was captured when he tried to conceal himself in a spider hole. Dao was a senior captain who at the time of his capture was on his way to train company grade and higher officers of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 268th Regiment. He had been with the Viet Minh as early as 1949, and had been trained in North Vietnam. Dao indicated that, due to heavy losses and land clearing operations, the 268th Regiment and Quyet Thang Regiment were going to revert back to the Phase I guerrilla and sapper tactics of pre-Tet 1968. This change in tactics is indicative of the erosion of Sub-Region 1's capabilities due to heavy losses inflicted by US/GVN forces in 1968/1969.

The change in tactics would also include increased mining and attacks against small units. Large scale attacks by night would be replaced by

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sapper attacks. Dao said the Viet Cong and Sub-Region 1 believe that they will still win the war, but by political rather than military means. He further stated that U.S. forces in Cu Chi, Trang Bang and Tay Ninh had been highly successful in inflicting heavy casualties on Viet Cong main force, local force and guerrilla forces. The 268th Regiment and Quyét Thang Regiment had been unable to keep their units together. The Rome plow land clearing efforts eliminated the ability of the Viet Cong forces to concentrate. Dao said that the enemy in Sub-Region 1 would not be able to mount its attacks until September until which time it would concentrate on destroying the increasing capabilities of ARVN forces and made good use of propaganda material against the ARVN/U.S. forces. He recommended that the Division conduct daylight operations by first locating a specific target, preparing the area with napalm and artillery fires to destroy mines and booby traps, and moving in infantry troops by air to block routes of escape. On 19 July, the Division carried out a highly successful airmobile raid in this manner. (See Tab E for IPW Report on CPT Dao)

On 15 July, three caches were discovered by 2nd Brigade elements. At 0935 hours six kilometers northwest of Cu Chi in the Filhol Rubber Plantation (XT675170), Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, OPCON 2-14 Inf, engaged 5-6 enemy with organic weapons, resulting in one wounded NVA prisoner-of-war. The prisoner directed Company A to a cache consisting of two AK-47 rifles, one RPG rocket launcher with two rounds of ammunition, one M16 rifle, 50 pounds of rice and six hand grenades. At 1000 hours six kilometers northeast of Trang Bang (XT528246), the Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Platoon, 2-12 Inf, exploiting information gained from a prisoner-of-war, evacuated 48 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, 82 hand grenades, 10 rifle grenades, four RPG rounds, seven anti-tank mines, 20 small arms magazines, one bangalore torpedo, two RPG boosters, 2.5 pounds of explosives, two field telephones and 15 blasting caps. At 1045 hours, Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, in the Boi Loi Woods (XT516333) on a mounted reconnaissance, located a small base area, destroyed two booby traps and evacuated three AK-47 rifles, 250 bottles of penicillin, 25 bandages, three pounds of documents, one medical bag, assorted hypodermic needles and five pounds of canned food.

At 1450 hours, a helicopter from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, engaged four enemy four kilometers northeast of Phu Loi (XT749209), resulting in four enemy killed and five AK-47 rifles destroyed. At 1910 hours that night, the enemy attempted to launch small attacks by fire against FSB Stuart (XT499195), FSB Pershing (XT518256) and PB Dees (XT554227) and, at 2053 hours, against FSB Patton (XT582155) but none of the rounds landed inside the perimeters.

On 16 July, two kilometers northwest of Trung Lap (XT568231), a Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, helicopter gunship with an artillery aerial observer engaged an unknown number of enemy at 1820 hours with artillery, killing five of them.

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On 19 July, the 2nd Brigade executed a classic airmobile raid which climaxed three weeks of piecing together and evaluating intelligence information. The target resulted from a routine read-out of low level aerial photographs taken over Tu Duon Hamlet (XT589269) by the Tactical Imagery Interpretation Section of the 25th Military Intelligence Detachment. The last two frames revealed a newly constructed hut which was larger than the other huts in the area, and was distinguishable by its wooden roof, in contrast to the thatched roofs of the other huts in the vicinity. A series of photographs taken by the Aerial Surveillance Section, G-2 Air, and an Air Force reconnaissance mission revealed trenches, trails, mounds that resembled graves, a possible well and row-crops. During the period of surveillance, these excavations went through a series of changes, indicating that activity around the hut was continuing and recent. On 10 July, a prisoner captured by Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry in the vicinity of Sa Nho in the Ho Bo Woods (XT575275), stated that he knew the location of a house where 20-25 members of his unit stayed each night. These personnel, who were responsible for supplying food for NVA units operating in the Tu Duon/Sa Nho area, arrived each night at approximately 1800 hours and remained until dawn the following morning. He indicated that this house had been used every night for the past seven months.

On 16 July, a Visual Reconnaissance Mission was flown by the IPW section and hand-held photographs were taken of the Sa Nho area. The photographs were shown to this prisoner who immediately identified the same hut which had been under surveillance by the Imagery Interpretation Section.

This information was passed to the S2 of the 2nd Brigade who in turn recommended the target to the Brigade S3 for response. The Brigade decision was to conduct an early evening airmobile raid and the mission was given to the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry. After a careful reconnaissance and evaluation of the objective, the Battalion Commander decided to employ heavy preparatory gunship and artillery fires, a close troop insertion, continuous close fire support, and a rapid troop extraction. Two platoons from Company B, 2-14 Inf (OPCON 1-5 Mech) would be employed.

The execution of these plans at 1730 hours was perfectly timed and highly effective. Helicopter gunship and artillery preparations were shifted just as the nine-ship lift set down on its LZ. Encountering only sporadic and ineffective return fire, the two platoons overran their objective. A sweep of the area uncovered 47 enemy killed and a large amount of abandoned equipment. After these elements were extracted, two F-100 fighters hit the area with fragmentation bombs and napalm. This strike was followed by another with two A-37 fighters bombarding the area. A PSYOPS helicopter was diverted to the scene to broadcast "Surrender or Die" appeals. This was followed by an artillery attack of 145 rounds, and by another PSYOPS mission consisting of surrender appeals and 30,000 safe conduct passes and "Chieu Hoi" leaflets being dropped.

A sweep was conducted the next day by one mechanized (1-5 Mech) and

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two rifle companies (2-14 Inf), during which several additional enemy bodies and weapons were found. Total enemy losses for the operation were 54 KIA, ten detainees, and 28 AK-47 rifles, ten RPG rocket launchers, one RPD light machine gun, two K54 pistols, two RPG rounds, one M1 carbine, one Chicom radio, 30 pounds of medical supplies, 3000 pounds of rice, and six pounds of documents captured. Of the detainees apprehended, one was classified as an NVA prisoner-of-war, one as a Viet Cong guerrilla, one as a Viet Cong prisoner-of-war, and three as civil defendants. There were no Division casualties.

The installation destroyed in this raid had housed the A-17 Local Force Dispensary, served as a supply point for the 83rd Rear Service Group, and as a way station for VC/NVA elements moving through the area. (See Combat After Action Interview Report, Tab F)

In the 3rd Brigade area, enemy forces were expected to continue their pattern of harassment activity. Participation in the July highpoint would be limited to shelling attacks against key GVN/U.S. installations in Duc Hoa District. Sub-Region 2 units continued to move supplies and conduct reconnaissance, working closely with local forces during the week but sources indicated that the units were still operating in their Cambodian base areas. There were only minor contacts during the week with no significant activity other than several shelling incidents directed against the Duc Hue Special Forces Compound.

The enemy, plagued with heavy losses in May and June by repeated U.S./GVN preemptive activity, was unable to implement his planned highpoint during the last week of July; however, reports continued to confirm that such an action was still planned by the enemy.

In western Tay Ninh Province, the 9th VC/NVA Division repositioned its regiments but avoided contact. The 271st Regiment was located by an agent on 24 July in the Straight Edge Woods. The 88th Regiment appeared to be moving to positions southwest of Tay Ninh City. There was some evidence to indicate the return of the 88th Regiment to Sub-Region 1 but such a move was not considered likely at this time. Seven agent reports placed a battalion of the 272nd Regiment in the Angel's Wing (XT266200) where it was reported to be coordinating with the 269th Battalion to attack Phuoc Luu (XT3220-XT3424).

Since the enemy was not thought to have the capabilities to launch its July highpoint in Tay Ninh Province, the enemy would attempt to maintain his presence through attacks by fire, especially against the Ben Keo Training Center (XT2343), Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551), Fire Support Base Washington (XT146568) and Fire Support Base Crook (XT055595). The heavy concentration of enemy forces southwest of Tay Ninh City increased the possibility of ground attacks near the Cambodian Border.

Due to the low level of activity in this area, the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry was released OPCON from the 25th Infantry Division on 21 July and

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returned to the 1st Infantry Division.

On 22 July, Company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, at Fire Support Base Sedgwick II (XT244311) engaged three enemy with a Night Hawk helicopter, resulting in two enemy killed. At 2215 hours on 23 July, FSB Sedgwick II again engaged movement, killing two NVA, confirming from documents taken from their bodies that enemy elements were reconnoitering the base.

Also on 22 July, Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, killed three NVA with organic weapons and artillery 11 kilometers northwest of Go Dau Ha (XT185278), while receiving minor damage to a light observation helicopter from enemy small arms fire.

Company A, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor and Company C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, in day-long operations around Nui Ba Den (XT2856), killed nine of the enemy in three contacts. At 1315 hours, Company C (4-23 Mech) received five rounds of 82mm mortar fire and engaged the suspected position with gunships and artillery, destroying the 82mm mortar.

On 28 July, 1st Brigade elements captured or destroyed a large supply of enemy equipment by locating three caches. At 1030 hours, the Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Platoon, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, engaged five enemy who were defending a position east of the Cau Khoi Rubber Plantation (XT395455). The enemy soldiers fled but were forced to leave 200 pounds of rice, 50 pounds of medical supplies, 25 pounds of clothing and a pound of documents. At the same time, 18 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh (XT053610), Company D, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, located 25 fighting positions, 10 75mm recoilless rifle cannisters, 10 107mm fuze cans and 20 120mm mortar fuze cans. A Hoi Chanh, who had been captured by the Viet Cong as a civilian and escaped, led Company C, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, to a cache (XT455507) containing 200 boxes of small arms ammunition, 160 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition, 86 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, seven rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition, 220 RPG rounds, 69 bangalore torpedoes, 112 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 64 hand grenades, 123 rifle grenades, two AK-47 rifles and one light machine gun.

During the week, Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551) received 107mm rockets on 25 and 28 July, resulting in minor damage to two UH1H helicopters and one structure.

Activity in the 2nd Brigade area was light early in the week but increased as a result of operations directed at further disruption of the Sub-Region 1 infrastructure.

At 0055 hours on 22 July, a night combat patrol from Company A, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, engaged the 24-man 2 Company, 2nd Battalion,

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Quyêt Thang Regiment as its personnel were returning from an unsuccessful rice procuring mission to Tan Thanh Dong (XT740110). The combat patrol intercepted the enemy unit six kilometers north of Phu Cuong (XT742155) and engaged them with organic weapons, claymore mines, helicopter gunships and an AC-47 gunship, resulting in seven enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war. The elimination of eight men from the understrength unit probably destroyed its capability to function effectively. Five other combat patrols engaged enemy movement that night near Highway 1 northwest of Cu Chi with unknown results (XT5815).

At 1030 hours on 25 July, the Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, with elements of the 1-5 Mech three kilometers northwest of Trung Lap in the Citadel (XT562230), engaged a small, well-entrenched enemy force, later identified from documents as elements of the Cu Chi District Force, with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and air strikes, resulting in four enemy killed and one hand grenade, one AK-47 rifle, one K54 pistol and one .45 caliber pistol destroyed.

On 23 July, a Viet Cong platoon leader had entered Luc Du Hamlet (XT594-206) to harass and propagandize the people. Reacting to this report and gaining information on the possible location of this man's unit, Companies C and D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, conducted a combat assault into an area six kilometers northwest of Trung Lap (XT530230) on 27 July. A command and control helicopter spotted a base area composed of six bunkers, and 10 spider holes with three interlocking tunnels, and directed helicopter gunships over the area following air strikes. The two infantry companies swept the complex, encountering only light resistance, and located 24 enemy killed, 14 AK-47 rifles, one 60mm mortar with seven rounds of ammunition, 500 rounds of small arms ammunition and three pounds of medical supplies.

On 27 July, elements of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, under the operational control of the 1-5 Mech, conducted extensive searches of an area five kilometers north of Trung Lap (XT5826) with Company C establishing a blocking position (XT590264-XT588268). At 1950 hours, the Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Platoon (2-14 Inf) apprehended six detainees (XT580268), resulting in three Viet Cong prisoners-of-war and one civil defendant being identified. At 1120 hours, Company A evacuated 500 rounds of small arms ammunition and 550 sets of NVA uniforms (XT576271). At 1232 hours, a command and control helicopter (1-5 Mech) killed an NVA soldier with automatic weapons as he attempted to evade observation (XT568-258) and at 1347 hours, the Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Platoon (2-14 Inf) killed four NVA with automatic weapons.

On 28 July, the 2nd Brigade dealt elements of the 268th Regiment and local Viet Cong elements another devastating blow in a one-day operation code-named "Operation Nutcracker." The operation arose out of information gained from a Hoi Chanh and targets spotted by the Tactical Imagery Interpretation Section of the 25th Infantry Division Military Intelligence Detachment. It involved elements from six infantry and one mechanized company with one Regional Force company supported by four batteries of artillery,

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helicopter gunships and TAC air. The mission of these elements was to search five objective areas in the Citadel north of Trang Bang with the intention of capturing high-ranking Viet Cong cadre and officials. The first objective was located in the vicinity of XT579238 and was the primary target of the operation, aimed at the capture of a prominent Viet Cong official. Companies A and D, and the Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, with the Regional Force Company searched this area but experienced only minor contact.

Objective 3 (XT571245) was north of the primary target and searches by Companies B and C (2-14 Inf) also resulted in minor contact. Companies C and D (2-14 Inf) then moved to Objective 4 (XT571252) while Company B, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry searched Objective 5 (XT575230).

Companies A and C, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, met with an unexpected, large enemy force as they neared Objective 2 (XT565233) at 0958 hours where intelligence reports placed a small number of local Viet Cong cadre. The enemy force was well-entrenched and the two companies pulled back while air strikes were employed to soften the enemy positions. Companies A and C attempted an assault but the enemy returned a heavy volume of small arms and RPG fire. Additional air strikes were required to break the enemy's resistance but a third assault by the two companies succeeded in overrunning the bunker complex.

By the end of the day, the Division forces counted 53 enemy killed and had captured six prisoners-of-war. The enemy had also lost 27 AK-47 rifles, four RPG rocket launchers, one .51 caliber heavy machine gun, one K54 pistol, and 20 107mm rockets. Three Division soldiers were killed in the action and 13 wounded. One light observation helicopter was shot down and classified as a combat loss.

On 29 July, at 0355 hours, elements of Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, in a night offensive position in the Boi Loi Woods (XT492352), received 13 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and small arms fire, resulting in four cavalymen wounded. Troop A returned fire with organic weapons, artillery, an AC-119 gunship, and a Night Hawk helicopter, resulting in three NVA killed and the loss of one K54 pistol and eight RPG rounds. Documents found on the enemy bodies identified the 101st NVA Regiment.

At 1620 hours (29 July), the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, operating five kilometers south of Trang Bang (XT517144), engaged eight enemy with organic weapons, resulting in six enemy killed and two prisoners-of-war. In the firefight, a booby trapped hand grenade was detonated, wounding a Division infantryman. At 2045 hours that evening, the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, at Fire Support Base Pershing (XT518256), having detected movement with radar, engaged ten enemy with artillery, killing all of them.

On 30 July, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, OPCON 1-5 Mech,

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conducting a reconnaissance along a road on the edge of the Filhol Rubber Plantation (XT637172) located a cache consisting of 13 anti-tank mines, 10 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, six rounds of M-79 ammunition, one shaped charge, 600 rounds of small arms ammunition, 14 pounds of explosives and one French rifle. At 2205 hours that night, Patrol Base Dees (XT554-227), manned by the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in one Division soldier killed and three wounded.

On 31 July at 0250 hours, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry at Patrol Base Hunsley engaged an estimated 20 enemy with artillery, resulting in two enemy killed. At 0930 hours, the Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, engaged six enemy five kilometers north of Trang Bang (XT485249) with small arms and automatic weapons, resulting in three NVA killed and three prisoners-of-war. They also located one .38 caliber pistol, two M16 rifles, one RPG round and 500 rounds of small arms ammunition. At 1225 hours just off of Highway 8A less than one kilometer from Cu Chi (XT624218), the 116th Assault Helicopter Company killed two enemy with rockets and automatic weapons. At the same time, Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, on a mounted reconnaissance mission in the Boi Loi Woods five kilometers west of Ben Sue (XT516347), engaged 6-8 enemy with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, air strikes and artillery, resulting in six NVA killed. An enemy RPG round struck a "Sheridan" tank wounding two cavalymen and inflicting moderate damage to the reconnaissance vehicle. At 1830 hours, the 116th Assault Helicopter Company with elements of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry and Regional Force elements conducting a reconnaissance mission four kilometers southwest of Trung Lap (XT541197), killed seven NVA with organic weapons.

Activity in the 3rd Brigade area was generally light during the final week of July with one sharp encounter erupting near the Parrot's Beak. As the month closed, the enemy was expected to continue efforts to rebuild the infrastructure, to counter the GVN pacification drive and to harass friendly positions through attacks by fire. Small reconnaissance elements from Sub-Region 2 Headquarters and Sub-Region 2 main force units would continue to operate in Duc Hoa District. Of the Sub-Region 2 units, the 267 Battalion, the 2642 Battalion, the 269 Battalion, the D16 Battalion (all VC/NVA) and the 6 Local Force Battalion and 308 VC Battalion were believed to have their major elements in Cambodia with the 2642 and 269 Battalions having elements dispersed in the Sugar Mill area (XT455060), the D16 having elements in upper Hau Nghia (XT4722-5826) and the 267 and 6 LF Battalions having elements dispersed in the Pineapple (XS604882) region.

On 23 July, Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry and an Air Force forward air controller operating six kilometers southwest of Duc Hoa (XS566934) engaged 10 enemy in two sampans with gunship fire and air strikes, destroying the two sampans and killing at least eight NVA. That night, a Night Hawk helicopter located two targets northeast of Hep Hoa (XT473105-XT4610), resulting in seven NVA killed.

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On 26 July at 2130 hours, a night combat patrol from Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, five kilometers north of Hep Hoa (XT423115), killed four enemy with organic weapons and recovered a K54 pistol, a flac jacket and a hand grenade. Documents removed from the bodies identified the Forward Medical Element of Sub-Region 2. The identification was another in a series of indicators that suggested the existence of a Sub-Region 2 Forward Headquarters in upper Duc Hoa District.

At 1900 hours on 29 July, Companies C and D, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, were airlifted into an area near the Cambodian Border known as the Parrot's Beak not far from the Plain of Reeds (XS3790). The two companies were responding to a heavy contact made by a Special Forces-CIDG force. The two 54-man companies moved to the southwest while two air strikes were placed on the enemy's positions (XS361877). The enemy returned a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from well-fortified and concealed positions. They were engaged by four Cobra gunships from Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion and seven Cobra gunships from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry. By evening, the enemy had withdrawn, leaving 65 dead behind. Division losses were eight men killed and nine wounded. Documents taken from the bodies identified the 263 Battalion, its rear service elements and several infiltration groups.

At 1820 hours on 31 July, a Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry gunship, flying along the Cambodian Border near the Angel's Wing (XT3213), killed three enemy with automatic weapons.

On 26 July, the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, operating in Long An Province and responsible for the security of Highways 4, 18 and 23 and for local pacification programs, came under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division. This brigade is composed of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry; the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry; the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, and the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, supported by the 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery.

Of Sub-Region 3 forces, the 506 VC Battalion was located by a contact on 28 May (XS997738) in eastern Can Giuoc; the 508 VC Battalion on 16 June (XS795708) in northwest Can Giuoc District; the Dong Phu NVA Battalion along the Gia Dinh and Long An Border northwest of Can Giuoc (XS811723); the 265 Battalion on 29 June (XS848653) south and east of Can Giuoc City, and the 520 Battalion on 30 June (XS697844) in the south central portion of Sub-Region 3. Activity in the AO of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was expected to remain at a light to moderate level as enemy forces continued resupply and reinforcement programs. Attacks by fire were expected with emphasis on isolated Regional and Popular Force outposts, especially in those areas where the pacification effort was being emphasized. Several company sized ground actions were possible by Sub-Region 3 main force units against selected targets.

On 28 July at 1335 hours, Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry,

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operating eight kilometers northeast of Tan An (XS600720), killed five NVA and at 1500 hours, Company D, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, with Troop B in support on a combat assault, killed three enemy with organic weapons and artillery. They also located 10 RPG rounds, an AK-47 rifle and an RPG rocket launcher. At 1550 hours, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, located 13 NVA who had been killed by artillery in the same general area. On 29 July, the Reconnaissance Platoon (2-60 Inf) on the banks of the Vam Co Tay River eight kilometers northeast of Binh Phuoc (XS693577), killed two enemy with the support of the 240th Assault Helicopter Company.

At 0545 hours on 30 July, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry, after establishing a day ambush site off a waterway four kilometers south of Can Duoc (XS735570), engaged three enemy in a sampan resulting in one enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war. At 1130 hours, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, on a combat assault, contacted an enemy force six kilometers southwest of Can Giuoc (XS765710) with the 240th Assault Helicopter Company in support, resulting in six enemy killed.

On 31 July at 1745 hours, Company C, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, conducting an eagle flight operation one kilometer south of Vinh Kim (XS376425), engaged five enemy in a tunnel with a shaped charge, killing all five of them and destroying the tunnel. Other elements of Company C, operating just outside of Long Thanh Tay Hamlet (XS639660), uncovered two caches consisting of 40 hand grenades, three rounds of M-79 ammunition, 10 RPG rounds, 13 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, four ammunition drums for a light machine gun, 10 NVA gas masks, four pounds of medical supplies and cleaning equipment for a 60mm mortar. In other scattered contacts throughout Long An Province, the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, infantrymen killed eight of the enemy on 31 July.

During July, Division soldiers killed 991 of the enemy, captured 42 prisoners-of-war, captured or destroyed 242 individual weapons and 59 crew served weapons, and 18 tons of rice. Combined daily operations with ARVN, Regional and Popular Force units totaled 801. In pacification efforts, including totals for the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, from the 26th of July, the Division conducted 431 leaflet and 381 broadcast missions and treated 27,960 patients.

During the quarter, 667 Hoi Chanhs rallied in the 25th Infantry Division TAOR.

During the reporting period from 1 May 1969 to 30 July 1969, the Division had completely prevented enemy forces in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia Provinces from gaining the objectives they had outlined in their plans for the "Summer Offensive." In Tay Ninh Province, two moves by the 9th VC/NVA Division to gain a foothold in Tay Ninh City to establish it as the capitol of the NLA's illegal, shadow government had been halted along the approach routes to the city and its regiments dispersed and decisively defeated. So great were the enemy's losses in personnel and equipment that he was unable

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to initiate the third highpoint of his Summer Campaign during July as he had planned. Thus, the propaganda weapon which he hoped would develop from victories there was denied him and he failed to succeed in instigating a popular uprising or gain support from the people for his cause.

In Hau Nghia Province, the Division had sought out the enemy and defeated him in main force battles and inflicted serious damage to the Viet Cong Communist Infrastructure there. Through an accurate gathering and appraisal of intelligence information, the Division had conducted a series of timely operations which penetrated the infrastructure in Sub-Region 1, eliminating or capturing significant cadre and high ranking officials, interdicting the supply routes of rear service elements and destroying large amounts of materiel in his base areas. The success of this preemptive campaign compelled the enemy main force units to terminate large scale operations and begin reversion back to the Phase I guerrilla tactics of pre-Tet 1968. Land clearing operations and persistent engagement of enemy elements had hampered his ability to concentrate his forces, depleted his available manpower, demoralized his soldiers and impaired his capability to initiate the highpoints of activity he had planned. His stature in the eyes of the people had been reduced and the people were reluctant to provide him with logistical support. Strategic placement of night combat patrols, full exploitation of radar and other surveillance devices and the employment of Night Hawk helicopters had disrupted his movement during the hours of darkness.

As the quarter closed, the Division continued to defeat the enemy at his every move, further pacification of the Vietnamese people in its area of operations, and strengthen the capabilities of ARVN/PF/RF forces.

B. (C) New Programs and Techniques: Beginning in early April and continuing throughout this reporting period, the Division has developed a program to computerize the large volume of operational and intelligence data which results from operations within the Division area. This program is aimed at reducing the amount of time and effort required to analyze and interpret this information and to exploit its full potential to improve the combat efficiency of the Division. The system employs the UNIVAC 1005 computer. The raw data for each program is obtained from a careful screening of the Daily Intelligence Summary, the Operational Situation Report, and the G2 and G3 Daily Journals, by the G3 Doctrine and Training Division. The raw data is extracted from these source documents and recorded manually on work cards on a daily basis. These work cards are then delivered to the AG Machine Records Branch where they are converted to punch cards and processed through the computer which produces the desired programmed data in a tabular form. The data is then analyzed by the G3 Doctrine and Training Division and applied to charts, and map overlays for ease of interpretation by G2 and G3 personnel. The application of this system to specific programs is discussed in the report at Tab G.

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The development of Night Hawk operations continued during this period with increasingly effective results. The configuration of the Night Hawk aircraft and the operational procedures have been standardized within the Division. Each Night Hawk aircraft is equipped with a Xenon searchlight, a Night Observation Device, and a 7.62 minigun on the left side; and an M-60 Machine Gun and M14 Rifle w/starlight scope on the right side. Each crew is thoroughly briefed by a representative from the battalion or brigade to which the Night Hawk has been allocated, and this representative becomes a part of the mission crew, to perform the necessary liaison and to give fire clearances. During this reporting quarter, Night Hawk operations have accounted for 130 enemy KIA. The report at Tab H contains a detailed description of Night Hawk operations within the Division.

Extensive land clearing operations continued in the Division area to deny concealed areas and routes to the enemy. In the Boi Loi Woods (XT5234) and in areas around the Crescent (XT4352-XT3760), the operations were conducted by land clearing companies using the standard Rome Plows. In the Citadel area (XT5025), the 65th Engineer Battalion applied a new technique to clearing the dense hedgerows which had served as obstacles to friendly operations and provided the enemy with concealment for his fortifications. The battalion procured a 75 meter length of naval anchor chain, weighing approximately three tons. This chain is connected to the rear of two D7E bulldozers. The bulldozers move down each side of the hedgerow, dragging the chain in an elongated "V" behind them. The weight of the chain and the power of the bulldozers rips the vegetation out by the roots, and the numerous booby traps are detonated at a safe distance behind the bulldozers. This system is fast, efficient and much safer for the equipment operators. See Tab I.

The efficiency of the Division's ground surveillance radar systems was significantly increased during the month of May through a reevaluation of emplacement and employment techniques, and visits by a USAECOM inspection team and a mobile training team which gave on site instruction to operators on the maintenance and operation of the sets. To sustain the increased efficiency, the Division established a radar operations school at Cu Chi. Once graduates of this school began returning to their units the Division experienced a sharp increase in the number of radar sightings throughout the TAOR. See Tab J.

Another surveillance system which shows continued improvement is that involving the "Duffelbag" seismic sensors (See Tab K). These devices have greatly hampered the enemy's freedom of movement as evidenced by the 371 enemy killed by artillery and Night Hawk aircraft in response to activations. They have also proven invaluable in providing early warning of impending enemy attacks. The defenders of Fire Support Base Crook had indications of enemy movement around the base five hours before the actual attacks began. In these five hours, fire support was massed and preemptive attacks by fire were initiated against the enemy.

The total range of sensory, detection and intelligence collecting

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capability available to the Division (i.e. Night Hawks, radar, Duffelbag, night vision devices, SLAR, Red Haze, LRRP's, night combat patrols, agent reports, IPW, document readouts, VE, airborne personnel detectors etc.) is evolving into a system of battlefield surveillance and control. One example was the successful employment of the computer system to clearly define the problem of mining activity within the Division, and the employment of seismic sensors, night combat patrols, artillery and Night Hawks, to counter this activity (See Tab L). Another example of this organization of effort is the establishment of the Target Information Center under the supervision of the Division G2 (Tab M). The agency is staffed by members of the G2 Section and the Fire Support Elements. They record, correlate, and analyze all source information and convert it into target recommendations. The target recommendations are made to the Division G3 who selects the appropriate combat response.

C. (c) Personnel.

(1) During the months of May, June and July, 1969, the aggregate Division personnel strength averaged 17,939 of 17,626 authorized, or 101.8%. Enlisted personnel strength averaged for this period 16,603 of 16,329 authorized, or 101.6%, while officer personnel strength for the period averaged 1,336 of 1,297 authorized, or 103.0%. Personnel shortages continued to exist in Infantry Captains and Lieutenants and Field Artillery Lieutenants and non-commissioned officers in the grades of E6 through E9 in 11B, 11C, 11F, 12B, 17B, 17K, 31G, 63A, 63C, 76A, 76P, 76Y, 76Z, and 94B MOS.

(2) During the period 1 May through 31 July 1969, the Division had 179 MIA's (15 officers and 164 EM), and 2,070 WIA's (138 officers and 1,932 EM), excluding OPCON units. There were 21 non-battle deaths, 36 non-battle injuries and no missing in action. Officer gains for the period numbered 427, while administrative officer losses were 413. EM gains were 4,326, while administrative EM losses totaled 2,646.

(3) Principal Command and Staff. The identification of the principal command and staff personnel within the 25th Infantry Division for the reporting period is as follows:

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D. (C) Operations.

(1) The G3 section developed plans and executed operations to pre-empt VC/NVA operations and to destroy VC/NVA forces. DTOC Forward continued to function at Tay Ninh. This integrated staff served two purposes:

- (a) It provided a staff and command post for the ADC-M.
- (b) It provided coordination and liaison between Division Headquarters and FWNF in the Tay Ninh area.

(2) The G3 Plans section coordinated all friendly operations conducted in the 25th Division TAOR. This section coordinated areas of operations with the 5th ARVN Division, 25th ARVN Division, and B-32, SIGG. It also coordinated

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combined operations and provided planning guidance to maneuver units of the Division and the OPCON 3rd Bde, 9th Infantry Division.

(3) The G3 Air Section coordinated the Division Tactical Air Support and B-52 strikes. The USAF TACP assigned to support the Division was responsible for controlling tactical air strikes, visual reconnaissance, assisting in the development of B-52 targets and B-52 target bomb damage assessment. There were 2746 tactical air sorties flown in support of the Division. The air strikes were in support of troops in contact, landing zone prep, pre-strikes and harassing and interdiction strikes. Bomb damage assessment was:

Killed By Air (Body Count)	802
Killed By Air (Possible)	91
Bunkers Destroyed	4824
Structures Destroyed	450
Secondary Fires	81
Secondary Explosions	399

During this period there were 61 B-52 strikes consisting of six sorties each flown in support of the Division operations. Most of the targets were located in and around War Zone C. Over 27,000 tons were dropped on troop concentrations, base camps, storage areas, communications centers and infiltration routes. A bomb damage assessment was made on each target. Reports from agents, ralliers and prisoners-of-war indicate that the B-52 strikes have contributed greatly to the combat power of the Division and are in a large part responsible for the enemy being defeated in each move that he made. These same reports estimate the number of enemy dead and wounded by the strikes well into the thousands and uncountable quantities of supplies and equipment lost.

(4) The Division Chemical Section, and the 9th Chemical Detachment continued to support Division operations by employment of non-persistent and persistent CS, personnel detector and defoliation missions. During the reporting period a total of 507 E158 CS cannisters and 6,977 CS grenades were helicopter dropped in support of troops in contact. A total of 186,520 lbs of micropulverized CS powder was dropped from CH-47 aircraft to restrict known or suspected enemy infiltration routes, base camps and rocket and mortar sites. Additionally, 1,328 lbs of powdered CS were employed in contamination of enemy bunkers and tunnels. A total of 15,900 gallons of defoliant and 36,730 gallons of diesel fuel was sprayed upon approved defoliation projects in the Division TAOI. Assistance was also provided to the 25th ARVN Division. A total of 208 hours of flying was devoted to airborne personnel detection missions. The Chemical Section has conducted classes on the protective mask for the Lightning Replacement Training Center and provided personnel for courtesy pre-IG and CMMI inspections. During the reporting period 40 55-gallon fougasses have been

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made and delivered to Fire Support Bases for employment in perimeter defense. Chemical Section personnel have also participated in the evaluation of the Personnel Marking and Identification System and Retroreflector program brought into country by Edgewood Arsenal.

(5) The Fire Support Element worked under the general staff supervision of the ACoS, G3. The FSE coordinated the fire support for the maneuver elements of the Division and supervised the Artillery Warning Control Centers.

Each maneuver brigade was provided direct support by a light artillery battalion. Although there were some attachments and detachments, normally support was provided as follows:

<u>BRIGADES</u>	<u>DS BATTALIONS</u>
1st Brigade	7th Bn, 11th Artillery Btry A, 2d Bn, 77th Arty Attached
2nd Brigade	1st Bn, 8th Artillery
3rd Brigade	2nd Bn (-), 77th Artillery

The 3rd Bn, 13th Artillery (155mm/8") provided general support for the Division.

During the reporting period, the plan for the movement of batteries to support wet season operations and to support the relocation of the 3d Bde was completed.

Expenditures of artillery ammunition by the Division Artillery were:

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
105mm total rds	59,110	69,982	84,046
rd/tube/day	35	43	50
155mm total rds	12,391	15,684	16,104
rd/tube/day	22	29	32
8" total rds	1,732	1,670	1,717
rd/tube/day	14	14	14

(6) Army Aviation

(a) During the period 1 May 69 to 31 July 69, Army combat with a support

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was provided to the 25th Inf Div by organic and nonorganic aviation units. Organic aviation units providing support included the 25th Aviation Battalion; D Troop, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav; 1st, 2nd and 3rd Bde Aviation Sections; Division Artillery Aviation Section; and E Co, 725th Maintenance Battalion. Nonorganic air support was furnished to the Division by units of the 12th Aviation Combat Group. Assault Helicopter Companies and CH-47 aircraft were provided by the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion whose units include the 116th Assault Helicopter Co, 187th Helicopter Co, and the 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Co.

(b) Due to the dramatic increase in mission support hours flown by the 25th Aviation Battalion throughout the reporting quarter, the total flight hours for the Division for July 1969 was only a few hours less than a phenomenal total of 10,000 hours. An increase in quarterly flying hours of nearly 20 per cent was attributed to the Battalion. This accounted for a significant expansion in the support rendered to the maneuver elements of the Division.

(c) Normal daily aircraft requirements included eight (8) UH-1H for command and control, one (1) for administrative courier, and three (3) for general support. Three (3) OH-6A LOH aircraft were provided daily for command and control and general support missions. Two (2) light fire teams consisting of AH-1G "Cobra" and/or UH-1C aircraft were on continuous 24 hour alert in support of contact missions, while additional gunships were provided daily for escort and cover type missions. Two (2) U6-A aircraft are utilized for administrative courier, general support missions and maintenance parts runs. Beyond normal daily support, numerous airmobile operations were conducted including movement of ready reaction forces, and the insertion and extraction of Division maneuver elements. Many pre-planned and hasty airmobile operations were conducted which normally required six (6) UH-1H lift ships, one (1) command and control ship, and one (1) light fire team and one (1) UH-1H smoke screening ship. Significant increases in the capability to conduct and support night operations were also effected. Night missions included flare drops in support of ground units and recurring night light fire team scrambles, counter-mortar missions, command and control, and general support missions. A dramatic expansion of the "Night Hawk" program was effected. Since early in this reporting period, four (4) "Night Hawk" aircraft have been stalking the Division area of operation for seven (7) hours per "Night Hawk" aircraft every night. Two (2) UH-1H LRRP standby alert aircraft were provided every night. Special missions for the battalion consisted of chemical drops, psychological operations, personnel detector, defoliation, search and rescue, emergency resupply, emergency aeromedical evacuation, and smoke screening.

(d) STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF COMBAT PERFORMANCE DATA: (1 May - 31 July 69)

	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Total</u>
Flight Hours	4,139	4,687	4,765	13,591
Sorties	6,230	7,597	8,636	22,468
Passengers Carried	8,565	8,796	12,489	29,850
Cargo Carried (Tons)	175	290	320	785
Enemy Killed (BC)	81	95	95	271

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	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Total</u>
Enemy Killed (Poss)	65	54	45	164
Enemy Structures (Dest)	33	22	37	92
Enemy Structures (Dam)	29	0	4	33
Enemy Sampans (Dest)	5	11	4	20
Enemy Sampans (Dam)	0	1	0	1
Aircraft Hits	8	14	4	26

(e) The Battalion experienced three (3) major accidents during the reporting quarter. The accidents were caused by: hovering downwind in a strong gusting tail wind; vertigo and disorientation at night in marginal weather; a mid-air collision with an aircraft from another unit. During the same period the Battalion experienced no aircraft incidents. Two (2) aircraft were lost to enemy ground fire.

(f) Effective 260001 July the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division. Non-organic air support was furnished to this unit from the 240th AHC, 222 CAB and the 190th AHC, 145th CAB. Organic aircraft of the Brigade consisted of four (4) OH-6A and four (4) UH-1 Helicopters. During the stated period the 112th Aviation Combat Group flew the following support for the 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division: Sorties flown - 47,019; Passengers airlifted - 91,745.

(g) Additional non-organic air support was provided by Co A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cav Div in Tay Ninh Province. This unit flew 12,629 sorties and airlifted 27,653 passengers.

(h) Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance missions were flown through the TAOI by B and C Troop, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Cavalry of the 12th Combat Aviation Group, the 73rd Surveillance Company (Mohawk) and the 74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company (Bird Dog). Primary aero-medical evacuation was provided the Division by the 159th Medical Company.

(7) Engineer Operations.

(a) During 1 May to 31 July the 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, provided combat engineer support to the Division. In addition to the normal combat engineer support, the 65th Engineer Battalion cleared 1,040 acres in the Citadel area. The current operations incorporate an anchor chain which not only clears hedgerows, but greatly reduces the number of mine casualties and damage to the clearing equipment.

(b) During this reporting period, Company A provided direct combat support to the 1st Brigade in Tay Ninh. Daily minesweeps of the MSR's in the 1st Brigade's area of operations coupled with combat engineer demolition teams in support of the 1st Brigade's battalions have been an extremely important part of the combat engineer support provided by Company A.

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1. The fire support bases in the 1st Brigade AO required continuous maintenance. This included upgrading the access roads to Fire Support Bases Washington, Rawlins and Crook as well as land clearing around Stoneman and Crook.

2. During the latter half of July, Company A was engaged in the burning of felled rubber trees along the northern portion of the road through the Cau Khoi Rubber Plantation. The purpose of this burning was to remove the maximum amount of concealment for possible enemy ambush forces.

3. Company A completed clearing around Fire Support Base St. Barbara (French Fort) vic XT2868 during the first portion of this reporting period. The clearing started 30 April 1969 and terminated on 6 May 1969. The clearing provided fields of fire and eliminated a concealed approach area for the enemy. Approximately 450 acres were cleared.

4. Company A continued to clear fields of fire on the summit of Nui Ba Den throughout the reporting period. A water catchment basin on the summit of Nui Ba Den was also completed during this period. The catchment basin was approximately 25 ft deep and 300 ft in circumference. The entire basin was coated with concrete to provide an impervious lining. The concrete was placed by hand. The total area covered by concrete was 18,200 sq ft.

5. Company A relocated FSB Sedgewick to its present location vic XT238-308. The most unusual aspect of this operation involved rafting a D7E dozer down the Oriental River to the Renegade Woods and walking the dozer overland to Sedgewick. Once at Sedgewick the dozer knocked down the berms at old Sedgewick and prepared new positions and berms at the new FSB location.

(c) During this reporting period, Company B continued upgrading various aspects of the Cu Chi Base Camp perimeter. A total of eight (8) forty foot observation towers were completed. These towers are located at critical points on the base camp perimeter. An eleven (11) km cyclone fence to reduce possible infiltration into the interior of the base camp was also completed.

1. Company B also initiated extensive road repair and drainage work at FSB Hampton. As Hampton is quite level, improvement of the drainage was relatively difficult. The most beneficial action in this effort was the construction of a large slit trench with a dozer. This trench was dug to the water table and established an adequate slope to allow the water to drain from the interior of the FSB. As the hydrostatic head increased the differential pressure forced the runoff into the water table. Since the onset of the monsoon season the access road to FSB Hampton has deteriorated extensively. Adequate repair could not be made with traffic continuing to use the road. The most feasible course of action was the construction of a new access road. This required breaching an ARVN minefield. The breaching was accomplished by using standard bangalore torpedoes.

2. Company B is presently upgrading the northern portion of the road through the Cau Khoi Rubber Plantation. When completed, this road will possess the

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capability to accommodate heavy convoy traffic. The road previously served as a main artery for the operation of the rubber plantation. During the early part of 1969 the 20th Engineer Brigade land clearing teams removed two hundred (200) meters of rubber trees on each side of the road. As mentioned previously, Company A is presently removing the felled rubber trees. Company B's effort on this project will provide another alternative for convoy traffic to Dau Tieng. This will assist in reducing the probability of convoy ambush as well as improving the overall road network in the Division A0.

3. Although Company B is a general support company, extensive engineer assistance was provided the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, in a direct combat support role. Company B provides minesweep and demolition teams to the cavalry troops on a continuing basis.

4. Company B provided earthmoving equipment and technical assistance to the ARVN 25th Infantry Division's engineer battalion in the building of a road from vic XT569042 to the intersection of route 9A northeast of Duc Hoa.

5. Company B also provided extensive direct combat engineer support to the II Field Force land clearing team operating in the 25th Infantry Division A0 from 29 June 1969 to date.

(d) During the entire reporting period Company C continued to provide direct combat support to the 2nd Brigade. This combat support consisted of minesweep teams on the MSR's and roads leading to the 2nd Brigade fire support bases as well as combat demolition support to the 2nd Brigade's maneuver battalions.

1. Company C provided the engineer support to extensively upgrade routes TL 7A, TL 6A, 8A and 249. This LOC maintenance has been continuous throughout the reporting period. Without this engineer support these roads would have become impassable early in the monsoon season.

2. Company C also performed extensive and continuous maintenance on Fire Support Bases Emory, Devin, Patton, Pershing and Keene. This maintenance consisted of road, berm, bunker and drainage improvements.

3. Company C's ability to immediately respond to patrol base construction requirements with airmobile equipment insured adequate defensive earth works before nightfall on the first day. The patrol Bases constructed with airmobile D-5 dozers were Dragon and Hunsley. An integral part of the defense of a patrol base and fire support base is a wooden, portable observation tower. Company C constructed and airlifted observation towers for five (5) field installations.

(e) This reporting period saw Company D's area of responsibility change entirely. During June 1969, the 3rd Brigade moved its headquarters from Dau Tieng to Cu Chi. The move found Company D operating primarily along and to either side of the axis formed by route TA 10. The major points of interest

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on this axis are Duc Hoa at the southern extremity, Bao Trai in the center and Fire Support Base Jackson on the northern terminus of the axis. Road sweep responsibilities in this area include 8A, TL 10, 249 and 7A south from the Brigade boundary to its intersection with Route TL 10.

1. Prior to their move from Dau Tieng, a large portion of Company D's activities were concerned with land clearing, particularly the clearing of rubber trees in the Ben Cui and the Michelin plantations. During the last quarter, approximately 300,000 square meters of land were cleared. By far the most efficient method of clearing was found to be through use of a naval anchor chain hooked between two bulldozers. This method allows for greater efficiency in felling trees and, subsequently stacking the trees in windrows. After windrowing, the trees were allowed to dry and then burned. It was found that dousing liberally with penepime and ignition with trip flares or thermite grenades serves to thoroughly reduce the windrows to ashes.

2. The next large project undertaken during the period covered by this report was the rehabilitation of LTL 19 between FSB Wood III and Dau Tieng. This road was at one time built with some deliberation but had been worn down and rutted by convoys. Piecemeal attempts had been made by this unit to repair the road but it was not until the necessary equipment was applied for that comprehensive repair was undertaken and the road materially improved. The key factor was locating a source of good laterite, a deposit with a high percentage of large, fairly uniformly sized nodules to employ on the road. Once this was accomplished, the road surface was rebuilt, graded, and drainage restored to yield a stable, all-weather dirt road which stood up well to traffic and has required little further maintenance.

3. The next large project was the construction of FSB Wood III. Although the site chosen was less than ideal from the standpoint of drainage, careful planning and the installation of numerous culverts allowed the FSB to be kept almost entirely free of standing water. In addition, the use of laterite obtained from the source used on LTL 19 provided good interior roads which stood up to the abrasion of constant usage by APC's.

4. After moving into its new area of operation, Company D initiated construction of Fire Support Base Chamberlain. This base is located in the vicinity of Tho Mo just off route TL 10 two-thirds of the way from Bao Trai to Duc Hoa. This location was previously an ARVN hardspot complete with the normal high density anti-personnel minefield. As the hardspot was not of sufficient size to accommodate the 3rd Brigade unit, it became necessary to enlarge the ARVN hardspot. This necessitated removal of one-half of the minefield. This was accomplished by dragging a naval anchor chain between two (2) M-48 tanks. This removed a large percentage of the anti-personnel mines. The remainder of the mines were detonated by saturating small segments of the minefield with JP-4 and igniting the fuel. This produced an intense heat which cooked off the remainder of the mines in the field.

(f) During this reporting period, Company E's major projects included

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completion of construction of "Waikiki East," the new 25th Infantry Division swimming pool. The pool was opened and dedicated by the CINCUSARPAC, General Haines. Continued support of the bridge defense systems at Phu Cuong and Dau Tieng was provided with 27' bridge erection boats and Boston Whalers. Several rafting missions were successfully completed on the Oriental River utilizing 4-float and 5-float reinforced M4T6 rafts. The unit bridge holding area was extensively remodeled and improved for ease of inventory and accessibility. Construction of a pre-fab maintenance building was completed and will provide a weather-proof working area. Three 48" culverts were emplaced on Route 6A near FSB Pershing to replace an M4T6 dry span. The dry span had been erected to replace a timber trestle bridge which was completely burned by the enemy. A large well was constructed with a 20-ton rough terrain crane at FSB Hampton. In the month of May, 5-ton bridge trucks were used extensively to haul 5" rock to FSB Keene.

1. Company E also built 1 ea 36' x 36' M8A1 helipad at FSB Hunter. On the 21st of July, Company E started the replacement of the Ann Margaret Bridge (XT6617). The existing I-beam bridge and spillway washed out due to high water during the first part of July 1969. The bridge is currently being replaced with five (5) 72" culverts. As the present current is approximately ten (10) feet per second, extensive hand work is necessary to insure adequate tamping and seating of the culverts to prevent erosion of the fill. Soil-cement is being used extensively.

(g) Additional support was provided by non-Divisional units from the 20th Engineer Brigade.

1. The 588th Engineer Battalion (Combat) with the 362 Engineer Company (Light Equipment) and the 544th Engineer Company (Construction Support) attached, operated from Tay Ninh and provided engineer support in the northern part of the Division TAOI. Significant operations included completion of paving operations on QL 22, between Cu Chi and Tay Ninh, construction of aircraft parking facilities at Tay Ninh, operation of the Nui Ba Den Quarry, and numerous MCA projects.

2. The 554th Engineer Battalion (Construction) with the 104th Dump Truck Company and the 515th Asphalt Platoon attached, operated from Cu Chi and provided support in the southern portion of the Division TAOI. Significant operations included completion of paving operations on QL 1 and QL 22, construction of aircraft parking facilities at Cu Chi, completion of the Cu Chi airfield upgrading, operations of an asphalt plant at Cu Chi, and numerous other MCA projects.

3. When the 3rd Brigade, 9th Inf Div, came under the operational control of the 25th Inf Div on 26 July 1969, the following Engineer units were in support of the 3-9; Co C, 15th Engr Bn located at Tan An; Co C, 8th Engr Bn located at Ben Luc; Co D, 93rd Engr Bn located at Tan An; two platoons, Co A, 15th Engr Bn located at Can Giuoc; one platoon, Co B, 15th Engr Bn located at Tan An, and two platoons, Co D, 15th Engr Bn located at Tan An and Can Giuoc.

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(8) Signal Operations.

(a) The Division Signal Office continued to coordinate and exercise staff supervision over all tactical communications within the Division.

(b) Significant activities were the continued VHF support of nineteen fire support bases and three major base camps. The number of base camps was reduced to two when the Dau Tieng Base Camp and the area east of the Saigon River were placed under control of the 1st Infantry Division.

(c) The 125th Signal Battalion facilities at Dau Tieng were reduced from an Area Signal Center to a radio relay site. This site provides a radio relay link from Division Main, Cu Chi to 1st Brigade at Tay Ninh. This relay removed the requirement to route two relay systems over Nui Ba Den. This provided better alternate routing and obviated the potential of two radio relay systems going off the air simultaneously. Problems encountered in the past with systems routed over Nui Ba Den were complete power losses, resupply problems, especially during the rainy season, and difficulty in transporting spare parts to and from the mountain top. Eventual plans call for the erection of a 160 foot tower at Go Dau Ha and removal of the second system over the mountain. The only facilities visualized to remain on the mountain are the Division FM ~~transmission~~ transmission stations.

(d) In conjunction with the move of the 3rd Brigade from Dau Tieng to Cu Chi the following COMTEL support was provided. The Division Wire Officer personally coordinated the installation of each telephone for Brigade Headquarters, two OPCON Infantry Battalions, the DS Artillery Battalion, and Engineer Company. In addition to supervising the installation of the administrative telephones, the Wire Officer coordinated the installation of a tactical cable system to 3rd Brigade. The Field Cable Platoon, 125th Signal Bn, extended a 50 pair cable from the Lightning Main wirehead to provide tactical communication facilities for the 3rd Brigade. This allowed immediate installation of brigade telephones, sole user circuits, and teletype circuits to higher, lower, and lateral headquarters prior to the brigade moving its headquarters from Dau Tieng. Communications were never lost during the move. Similar support was rendered in the establishment of the Brigade Forward CP at Bao Trai.

Under the direction of the Division Signal Officer, a Division wide program was instituted to clean up all wire and cable construction on the Division Base Camps. Under this plan, all unused wire and cable was to be removed and salvaged. Existing construction was policed and appropriately tagged by the using unit. Anticipated results will be better telephone communications and cable installation, ease of trouble shooting, and a uniform orderly method of cable construction.

(e) Due to the wide support given to Divisional units at many fire support bases, COMTEL maintenance and supervision were found to be lacking.

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To overcome this fault, a readiness assistance team was organized. This team, under the supervision and control of the Signal Battalion S-3, visits the VHF sites on a periodic basis. This does not preclude immediate assistance visits to those sites experiencing difficulties in maintaining communications.

(f) In early June 1969, a new switchboard, AN/MTC-1, was installed at Lightning Main. The new installation was effected without loss of service to any one subscriber. Immediately, service and efficiency were vastly increased.

(g) In an effort to provide better service to the Division's field troops, a Mobile MARS Station was assembled. This station then went to the troops, enabling the infantrymen to make a call home from the fire support base. Since it was first deployed to fire support sites in June 1969, the mobile station has processed over 455 completed calls to CONUS. The mobile station was assembled under the supervision of the Division Radio Officer who is also the Division MARS Director. Personnel from Cu Chi MARS Station operate the mobile station in the field. Initial response has been enthusiastic by the troops serviced with equal indorsement by the maneuver unit commanders thus far supported. Equipment used in the mobile station is Collins Single Side Band Radio Equipment. This was installed in an AN/MSC-31 Communications Operations Van; a three element beam antenna was constructed using an AP-557 Antenna Mast to support it. Other than poor atmospheric conditions, contact with CONUS has been established every time the station has been committed.

(h) The last quarter also saw the issuance of the latest generation of Single Side Band RTT equipment, the AN/GRC-142. This equipment resulted in better RTT by the personnel from the Radio Platoon, COMREL Operations Company, 125th Signal Bn. This resulted in positive and efficient initiation of the radio nets using this equipment.

(i) Current Signal Systems:

1. In order to fulfill its mission of providing direct signal support to Division Headquarters and division subordinate units, the battalion operates both static and mobile communications facilities. Telephone, radio, RATT and Communications Centers are located at each of the two major base camps. Twelve channel VHF systems are provided to interconnect base camps of higher, lateral and subordinate units. Additionally, VHF systems, when the availability of equipment permits, are extended to fire support bases.

2. Systems Control (SYSCON): In addition to the normal command, control and coordinating facilities found in all battalions, the 125th Signal Battalion employs a SYSCON which has systems operated by the battalion S3 and is responsible for coordination, direction and supervision of installation and operation of all communication systems operated by the battalion.

3. Communications facilities provided by the 125th Signal Battalion:

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a. FM Radio: The battalion provides the personnel and equipment for Division stations in the following FM nets: Division Command Clear (NCS); Division Command Secure (NCS); Division Intelligence Net (NCS), and II Field Force Command Net.

b. Automatic retransmission facilities are provided at Nui Ba Den for the Division Clear and Secure nets on a full time basis. An additional retransmission facility is provided at Dau Tieng. This unit is used primarily with the Division Intelligence Net but is available for the Command Net.

c. An FMI facility is provided at Cu Chi Base Camp.

d. Battalion Command Net: This net is used to coordinate and control the activities of the battalion. This net is especially useful as a SYSCON engineering net when relocating and establishing new signal centers.

e. IIFF AM Voice Command Net: The battalion maintains a SSB Voice capability for the Division to enter this net on call.

f. AM Radio RATT: The Division Opns/Intell RATT Net is remoted into the Division Tactical Operations Center. Voice frequency teletype circuits are provided to major subordinate units and terminated in the DTOC as back-up to RATT. The Division Admin Log RATT Net provides a net control station for DISCOM Main and stations for DISCOM subordinate units at forward signal centers. The battalion operates the 25th Infantry Division, III Corps Opns/Intell RATT Net, on a full time basis.

g. Communications Center: The 25th Infantry Division communications center facilities are provided by the 125th Signal Battalion. During the reporting period, an average of 2008 messages were handled per month. Of the traffic handled, 18.8% was originating traffic, 65.5% terminating traffic, 14.8% relay traffic, and 17.9% were hand carried messages. High precedence traffic continued at a high volume. An average of 76.1% of all traffic handled had precedence of immediate or higher. Additionally, communications center facilities were provided at Tay Ninh Base Camp and Dau Tieng Base Camp.

h. Telephone Switching Centers: An AN/MTC-1 with five (5) dial trunks is used for the Division Main Switchboard. This switchboard is being used in lieu of the authorized AN/MTC-3 because of the number of non-divisional units and subordinate divisional unit's rear areas requiring drops or access to Lightning Main Switch. This alone increases the normal traffic of the Division Main Switch over 300%.

E. (C) Training. All school courses operated during the previous reporting period remained in the training program, and the 9th Infantry Division Sniper School was transferred intact to the 25th Infantry Division, beginning its first course on 30 July. G3 (DOT) continued to coordinate evaluation of Research and Development projects with an average of fifteen evaluations being conducted at a given time. The G3 (DOT) staff was augmented in April with six men who began utilizing the AG Univac 1005 computer to provide data

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and statistical information for operational elements of the Division staff. Initially, the computer was employed to provide organized tables of data obtained from the Division INTSUM, SITREP and TOC Journals. Once a data base was available from 1 January 1969 to the current date, statistics were developed to identify actions. Notable success was achieved in reducing mine damage and booby trap casualties once statistics led to the identification of problem areas. In July, a relatively complex computer program was designed to give an evaluation of duffel bag employment. Work is continuing to further develop useful computerized information for commanders and their staffs.

F. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Enemy activity during the month of May consisted of preparation for the Summer Campaign and initiation of the first highpoint (11-12 May) of the Summer action period. The basic goals of the enemy's Summer plans were to inflict heavy losses on U.S. forces; destroy GVN control at the village and hamlet level; establish a strong and active infrastructure throughout SVN in anticipation of a possible negotiated settlement at the Paris Peace Talks, and "free" the rural areas and exert limited control over the towns and cities. The rate of enemy activity remained at moderate levels throughout the country. Preplanned attacks which were scheduled to take place on 18-19 May in celebration of Ho Chi Minh's Birthday never materialized and were reported to have been postponed due to allied discovery of enemy intentions. Throughout the month, sources indicated that the enemy stressed efforts to upgrade his infrastructure. Cadre personnel from main force and district local force units were assigned to hamlet and guerrilla units in an attempt to bolster the fighting potential of these forces. Sources also indicated that during the latter part of the month, VC district units and the Tay Ninh Provincial Battalions were closely coordinating their activities with village and hamlet guerrilla units to conduct terrorist missions in their respective areas of responsibility. COSVN main force units were active during the month. The 1 NVA Division finished refitting and deployed units into forward tactical positions in Central War Zone C and the Crescent. The 9 VC/NVA Division revamped its regimental locations and missions in order to meet the goals of the Summer Campaign. One regiment, the 273, was discovered to have moved to IV CTZ and was replaced by the 88 Regiment. In SR-1, enemy action was at a moderate level throughout the month with the 268 Regiment being the most active. SR-2 forces continued in their efforts to reestablish their infrastructure and engaged in extensive reconnaissance of targets throughout the Duc Hoa and Duc Hue Districts. Though enemy forces attempted to avoid major contact during the month, they were relentlessly pursued by the 25th Infantry Division and lost over 1586 KIA. Major engagements of the month were (1) on 1 May vic XT4413, the 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion engaged the 3rd Battalion, 271 Regiment resulting in 46 KIA (BC) and two PW's captured; (2) during the attack on LZ Carolyn vic XT275786, on 6 May the 95C Regiment lost 101 NVA KIA and 28 PW's captured; (3) the 101 Regiment was contacted by the 1-27th Inf and 2-22 Inf (M) vic XT571453 on 9 May, resulting in 115 enemy KIA and one PW captured; (4) the 101D Regiment lost 73 men in an attack on LZ Jamie vic XT4872 on 11 May;

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(5) on 11 and 12 May vic XT121411, XT0943, and XT1746, the 3rd and 6th ARVN Airborne Battalions engaged the 271 Regiment resulting in 171 KIA and four PW's captured; (6) on 14 May vic XT408518, the 18B Regiment was contacted by 4-23 Inf (M) resulting in 51 KIA and four PW's captured; (7) the 1-5th Inf (M) and 2-12th Inf contacted elements of the 268 Regiment on 14 May resulting in 54 KIA; and (8) on 29 May, the 268 Regiment was again contacted by the 2-12th Inf and 1-5th Inf (M) vic XT581237 and lost 59 KIA.

(2) During June, enemy action included two highpoints of the Summer Campaign: 5 - 9 June and 19 - 20 June. Sources indicated that the 5 - 9 June highpoint was regarded as the second most significant offensive period of the Summer Campaign, as it was planned to coincide with the Midway Conference between Presidents Thieu and Nixon on 8 June. The principle areas of enemy activity during the month were: Tay Ninh City and its suburbs, FSB's Crook (XT055592) and Washington (XT146568), areas southwest of Tay Ninh City, southeast of Nui Ba Den, in the crescent and upper Cau Khoi, in the Citadel and in areas between Trang Bang and the Lower Boi Loi Woods. During the last week of June, enemy forces generally avoided heavy contact and withdrew to base areas for refitting and preparation for the July action period. During June, the 1 NVA Division, while continuing its operations in War Zone C, was plagued with personnel shortages that limited its operational capability. The 9 VC/NVA Division, the most active of COSVN's divisional units during June, attacked Tay Ninh City twice in an effort to secure temporary control of the city and establish a Provisional Government. Both attempts were anticipated by intelligence sources enabling the 25th Division and Allied maneuver elements to resoundingly defeat both enemy attempts against the city. Enemy activity in SR-1 was at a high level during the first three weeks of the month, but decreased sharply in the last week with the 268 Regiment again being the most active unit in the sub-region. Though SR-1's main forces continued to be active, the general pattern of enemy strategy reflected an increased reliance on local and guerrilla force actions to sustain the momentum of activity against friendly forces. Principle elements of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 268 Regiment and probably a limited number of cadre personnel from the Quyet Thang Regiment were sent to Cambodia for training in guerrilla warfare and sapper techniques. SR-2 units spent most of the month in their Cambodian base areas. However, by the end of the month, small elements of SR-2's main force units had returned to their normal areas along the Vam Co Dong River. During June, the 25th Infantry Division killed a total of 1939 enemy. The major engagements of the month were: (1) on 5 June, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 268 Regiment were contacted by the 2-12th Inf, 1-5th Inf (M) and 2-34th Armor vic XT568255, resulting in 52 NVA KIA and one PW; (2) the 272 Regiment lost 60 men vic XT1442 on 6 June in a contact with the 5th ARVN Airborne Battalion; (3) during an attack by the 272 Regiment on FSB Crook (XT055595) on 6 June, the unit lost 76 men; (4) on 6 June GVN forces and the 4-23 Inf (M) killed 79 enemy and captured four NVA from the 88 Regiment during a contact vic XT2451; (5) the 88 Regiment lost a total of 333 personnel (323 KIA and 10 PW's) during an attack on FSB Crook; (6) the 5th and 6th ARVN Airborne Battalions contacted both the 271 and 272 Regiments vic XT125430 and XT139421 on 9 June resulting in 86 KIA and three PW's;

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(7) on 9 June vic XT382503, 2-22 Inf (M) killed 51 enemy from the 95C Regiment; (8) two battalions of the 95C Regiment were contacted by 1-27th Inf and 2-22 Inf (M) on 11 and 12 June vic XT425485 resulting in 62 NVA KIA and three PW's; (9) the 18B Regiment lost 74 men during an attack on LZ Ike vic XT338719; (10) the D1 and D14 Battalions were believed to have been contacted vic XT267405 by the 3-4 Cav on 19-20 June resulting in 98 KIA, and (11) on 27 June, the 4-23 Inf (M) engaged elements of the 88th Regiment vic XT292570 resulting in 94 NVA KIA and three PW's.

(3) During the first two weeks of July enemy forces prepared for the initiation of the final highpoint of the Summer Campaign which was to occur during the period 16 - 21 July. The 9 VC/NVA Division was to spearhead the attacks while supported by the Tay Ninh Provincial Battalions (D1 and D14). Actions in Tay Ninh were to be complemented by coordinated attacks by fire and small ground engagements in Sub-Regions 1 and 2. Though a number of small actions did take place throughout the TAOI, the expected highpoint did not materialize. Intelligence sources indicated that the enemy, still smarting from heavy losses sustained during June, and repeatedly preempted by the 25th Division and allied interdiction efforts on main avenues of approach to Tay Ninh City, was unable to implement his final action phase of the Summer Campaign. The majority of the enemy main force units spent the month in secure areas undergoing training and refitting. In their absence, local force and guerrilla units attempted to maintain a front of strength by engaging by attacks by fire, acts of terrorism and small but limited ground actions. Also during the month, enemy units increased their propaganda efforts at the village and hamlet level. COSVN main force units were inactive throughout most of July. The 1 NVA Division remained in east-central War Zone C, with the exception of one regiment (101D) which operated in Binh Long (P). The 9 VC/NVA Division was in secure areas in Cambodia and north of Tay Ninh City during early July. Later in the month, elements of the division were believed to have been engaged southwest of Tay Ninh City along the Vam Co Dong River and in the area of Nui Ba Den, along traditional routes into the city. In SR-1, main force units withdrew into secure areas to undergo training. Principal elements of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 268 Regiment and cadre personnel from the Quyet Thang Regiment remained in Cambodia receiving guerrilla and sapper training during the month. These units were to begin infiltrating back into Sub-Region 1 during the last week of the month. During July, the 25th Infantry Division killed a total of 991 enemy. The major engagements were: (1) on 1 July the 88 Regiment was believed to have been contacted by the 4-23 Inf (M) vic XT295576, resulting in 44 NVA KIA; (2) the 3-22 Inf contacted the 58 Artillery Bn on 8 July vic XT167677 where 19 were killed; (3) on 9 July, the 165 Regiment was involved in a battle with the 1st Air Cav Division vic XT740930 resulting in 22 NVA KIA and one PW; (4) elements of the 268 Regiment were engaged by 2-14 Inf vic XT592279 on 9 July, in an action in which 17 NVA were killed; (5) the 2-14th Inf contacted elements of the 83 Rear Service Group vic XT578273 on 19 July resulting in 51 NVA KIA; (6) a 28 July coordinated action by the 2-12th Inf, 1-5th Inf (M), 2-14th Inf and 3-4 Cav in pursuit of an intelligence target, yielded 53 enemy KIA, six PW's and four detainees; the enemy unit was identified as the 268 Regiment, and (7) on 29 July vic IS363890, 2-27th Inf in conjunction with

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CIDG elements contacted a company sized force from VC Military Region II resulting in 96 enemy KIA.

(4) On 21 May, a combined operation of ARVN and 1-5 Inf (M) captured seven VC, together with several pounds of documents. Preliminary document readouts gave the names of two females who received awards for causing the explosion at a 554 Engineer Battalion Mess Hall on 3 January 1969 in which 15 American soldiers were killed. Two of the PW's were tentatively identified as the females identified in the documents and subsequently admitted their involvement in the explosion. They blamed the actual explosion on a third VC female who is still at large. At the time of the explosion, all three females were employed as hootch maids at the 554th. Since 7 July 1969, nine Vietnamese females have been apprehended as VC who worked on Cu Chi Base Camp. Two were apprehended by ARVN MSS in their homes. The other seven were apprehended inside CCBC. Of these nine, seven worked as hootch maids. Interrogation revealed the following EEI from most of the captured VC: numbers of GI's sleeping in designated hootches; numbers of GI's in mess halls at any given time; places where large numbers of GI's congregate; types and amounts of mechanized equipment, to include aircraft and identities of Vietnamese girls having GI boyfriends. Three VC had been given the mission of smuggling explosives onto CCBC, but allegedly refused. The above captured VC plus those apprehended last Spring working on CCBC indicates that a surprisingly high percentage of hootch maids are VC. The establishment of a Civilian Personnel Office has helped to tighten controls on many permanent employees, and increased vigilance and checks conducted on indigenous employees at the Main Gate by MP's. CID and MID personnel has helped tighten control on all local nationals.

(5) The Source Control/Liaison Team during May, June and July, initiated or participated in 21 combat operations through targets developed utilizing Hoi Chanhs and Kit Carson Scouts. As a result of these operations, 185 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers were killed in action, of whom at least nine (9) were District Level Infrastructure Cadremen. Forty-six prisoners were captured, including the Political Officer of Bas Chi (North Cu Chi) District, and fifty-four detainees. One hundred and five individual and five crew-served weapons were captured or destroyed and 4400 pounds of rice were confiscated. Also noteworthy is the fact that 2388 cans of macheral and 62 pounds of medical supplies were taken out of the enemy supply system. Throughout this period, notable operations conducted were:

The Giong Viec Operations	21 and 26 May
Cu Chi District Meeting at Xom Rang	29 May
Operation Buck-shot	23 June
Ba Song Hospital and Pharmacy	1 and 2 July
Hineline's House	19 July
Operation Nutcracker	28 July

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During the reporting period, the Source Control/Liaison Team changed its concept of operations in that practically all coded sources were either discharged or transferred to other users. Stronger emphasis was placed on liaison links established with the Chieu Hoi Centers in Binh Duong and Hau Nghia Provinces, and closer working relationships were established with DIOCC's and FIOCC's throughout the TAOL. The VCI Exploitation Team, formerly under the command of one officer, became an integral part of the Source Control Team and began working in one or two man teams with an American Source Handler collecting intelligence or exploiting tunnel complexes in the field. The addition of the Trace Metal Detection kit as an investigative aid during cordon and search operations proved highly successful in apprehending nine VC suspects at Cay Trom on 11 July. This additional capability is a definite asset in detecting "legal" Viet Cong. The most significant operation during the reporting period was Operation Nutcracker, during which elements of the 2/12th Inf, 2/14th Inf, and 1-5th Inf (H) ran an operation based on intelligence and contacted the 2nd bn, 268th VC/NVA Regiment. It is estimated that up to forty percent of the battalion was annihilated in the six hour contact.

(6) From 1 May 1969 to 31 July, the IPW Section, 25th MID processed 416 detainees. This included 95 VC/NVA PW's, five VCI, 98 VCS, 16 Returnees, 101 innocent civilians, and 101 Civil Defendants.

(a) Readout of documents, interrogation of a VCI PW, and correlation of information with Cu Chi Subsector led to an operation on 29 May 1969 against SR-1/Cu Chi District cadre and unit leaders meeting in Xom Rang (H), which resulted in 59 NVA KIA and one NVA PW.

(b) Debriefing of a Hoi Chanh and coordination with Imagery Interpretation Section of the 25th MID revealed the location of H-7 Communications Section of SR-1. The target was in 1st Division TAOR. On 17 July 1969, elements of the 1st Division conducted an operation against this target resulting in one NVA PW and 12 main bunkers of H-7 Section destroyed.

(c) Questioning of a Hoi Chanh and coordination with Imagery Interpretation Section resulted in an operation on 28 July 1969 against Cu Chi District Cadre and Rear Service elements in Xom Rang (H) and Bau Soi (H) area. The operations resulted in 53 NVA KIA, and six NVA PW's.

(7) During the period, the G2 Air Section continued to plan and coordinate Army and Air Force aerial reconnaissance missions. Operating under a change to the 25th Infantry Division SOP, the G2 Air now informs Brigade S2's of missions in their area of responsibility. The brigades then coordinate with artillery to effect necessary check-fires. Direct support Mohawk aircraft accomplished 62 photo and 22 visual missions in May, 38 photo and 16 visual missions in June, and 60 photo and 15 visual missions in July.

(8) During the reporting period, the Imagery Interpretation/Targeting Section made the following contributions to intelligence collections:

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	MAY	JUNE	JULY
Mosaics	19	24	17
Area Studies	21	15	22
Imagery Interpretation Reports	184	151	207
Visual Reconnaissance (hours)	186	180	172

(9) On 5 June, a routine photo recout discovered a recently constructed house vic XT589269, Tu Duon Hamlet. The house was monitored for a period of a month using Mohawk and hand-held photography, and visual reconnaissance. The house, though apparently deserted, showed continued improvement. A PW report confirmed the use of the house by enemy units. On 19 July, a highly successful operation was accomplished, resulting in 54 enemy killed, 10 detainees, 26 AK-47's captured or destroyed, medical supplies and documents, one ton of rice and one radio captured.

(10) Aided by visual reconnaissance, hand-held photography, mosaics and imagery interpretation, a VCI operation in Trang Bang District resulted in 16 enemy killed, six detainees, 10 AK-47's captured or destroyed, medical supplies and documents, explosives and 20 booby traps and mines.

(11) During the reporting period, CPT Gerard A. Clyde and CPT Robert E. Gunter Jr., of the Fire Support Element, were placed under the operational control of G2 Air to maintain functions of the Target Information Center. The Target Information Center was continuously involved in the development of timely and exploitable targets in support of the 25th Infantry Division. By using all-source intelligence indicators and correlating with known fortification enemy areas, the TIC provided meaningful targets to the Brigades, Division Artillery and Air Force. On 12 May, an agent report received from 525 MI Group indicated the presence of an enemy battalion in the vicinity of WT9863. Red Haze emissions and Airborne Personnel Detector readings in the same area also indicated personnel in the area. An air strike was recommended which resulted in six enemy KIA (BC) and the destruction of twelve bunkers. On 21 May, an airstrike placed on a concentrated area of Airborne Personnel Detector readings, near a known bunker complex at XT6030, resulted in 14 enemy KIA (BC) and the destruction of eight bunkers. In response to an Airborne Personnel Detector reading vicinity XT6220 over a known bunker complex, an aerial observer was dispatched to XT6220 to conduct a destruction mission. The AO observed 10-12 personnel in the area and adjusted artillery resulting in five enemy KIA (BC), one secondary explosion, and four bunkers destroyed. An Airborne Personnel Detector mission was flown on 12 June vic WT9760 in response to an agent report of 600 enemy personnel in the area. Several maximum readings were obtained, and, as the aircraft was leaving the area, it received heavy ground fire. Artillery and air strikes were called into the area resulting in 16 enemy KIA (BC) and five .51 caliber

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machine gun destroyed. On 9 July, in response to heavy Duffel Bag activations and Airborne Personnel Detector readings near a known bunker complex, Recon by Fire was recommended to Division Artillery. Missions were conducted vicinity XT6423, XT6424, and XT6524 resulting in four bunkers, 26 fighting positions, and four tunnels destroyed and there were four secondary explosions. In addition, four bunkers, 14 fighting positions, and three tunnels were damaged. A B52 strike was targeted against an enemy base area on 31 July resulting in 51 secondary explosions. The TIC is credited with assisting:

	MAY	JUNE	JULY
KIA	22	29	28
Fortifications Destroyed	43	78	76
Secondary Explosions	12	16	58

(12) Camouflaged seismic, acoustic, infrared and magnetic sensor devices continue to be successfully employed in the 25th Infantry Division TAOR, to detect activity along enemy routes of infiltration and lines of communication. Sensors were employed offensively to monitor known enemy routes of communications, defensively to detect enemy movement near friendly installations, as guardians against enemy mining activities, along critical sections of the Division's main supply routes, and for intelligence by determining the nature, direction and size of the enemy force moving past the sensors. On 21 July, the Duffel Bag Program was decentralized to Brigade level. Brigades assumed responsibility for planning, employing and monitoring sensors in their respective areas. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, assisted by the G2 Special Projects Officer, maintains general staff supervision of the Duffel Bag Program and has the responsibility for requisition and allocation of sensor equipment and provides technical assistance. During the reporting period, 3259 targets were acquired through Duffel Bag operations and were engaged with 34,514 rounds of artillery. Operations have been credited with 371 KIA (BC), 55 individual weapons and 23 crew-served weapons captured or destroyed, 5100 pounds of rice captured and 40 bunkers destroyed. Significant Duffel Bag activities for the period are as follows:

(a) On 10 May, as a result of heavy sensor activations vic XT051756, an air strike was targeted against an enemy complex resulting in 11 NVA KIA (BC) and seven bunkers destroyed.

(b) On 16 May, as a result of heavy Duffel Bag activations in the Cu Chi Rocket Belt vic XT657246 on the night of 15 - 16 May, Companies A and B, 1-508th Inf, 82nd Abn Div, engaged an enemy force resulting in 38 NVA KIA (BC), 14 AK-47 rifles and six RPG's destroyed.

(c) On 17 May, 7-11 Artillery Aerial Observer, assessing the results of strikes against Duffel Bag targets vic XT070548 and XT054563, located 11 NVA KIA (BC) killed by artillery.

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(d) On 19 May, G2 Air Observer located 13 NVA KIA (BC) in sensor field vic XT5027.

(e) On 23 May, Co A, 4-23d Inf (M) vic XT333409 located 15 NVA KIA (BC), killed by artillery in vicinity of sensor field.

(f) On 31 May, B and C, 2-12th Inf vic XT641298 engaged an enemy company resulting in 25 NVA KIA (BC). Heavy activations of sensors in the area the preceding night were a prime contributing factor in the insertion of ground troops.

(g) On 6 and 7 June, sensor fields north and south of Fire Support Base Crook gave the first early indication that the enemy were assembled around the base. Two nights of intensive engagement with the 88th NVA Regiment resulted in 407 NVA KIA (BC).

(h) On 23 June, B/2-12th Inf vic XT550280 located 25 NVA KIA (BC) killed by artillery in a sensor field.

(i) On 18 July, C/4-23d Inf (M) vic XT300580 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 27 NVA KIA (BC). Heavy sensor activity in Duffel Bag field vic XT2959 the previous two nights was the principal intelligence indicator leading to ground operations in the area.

G. (C) Logistics.

(1) (U) Project Clean, implemented in March 1969 as one phase of the USARV DSU improvement program, was completed on 4 May 1969. The following is a recap of Project Clean within the supply and maintenance DSU's of the 25th Infantry Division

Number of stock cards reviewed	23,811
Number of errors corrected	8,436
Number of requisitions cancelled	2,918
Value of cancelled requisitions	\$366,251.52
Number of new requisitions submitted	8,828
Value of new requisitions submitted	\$2,659,863.15

(2) (U) Retrograde of Excess Material: 2709 line items, dollar value \$168,265.46, were retrograded during the reporting period.

(3) (C) A monthly average of sixteen (16) different conventional Class V items were subject to ASR control during this reporting period. An average of eight (8) of these munitions required a minimum of one supplemental allocation each month in order to sustain tactical operations. High dollar/high tonnage items (i.e., 81mm HE, 4.2" HE and artillery rounds) continued to be the principle munitions under management control, in addition to 2.75" rockets and 40mm HE. Several munitions essential to bridge protection were withdrawn

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from ASR control effective 24 July 69; namely, blasting caps, det cord and TNT.

(4) (U) On 1 May, the 25th Infantry Division transferred the Cu Chi ASP to the 1st Logistical Command.

(5) (U) The Division received four (4) Marginal Terrain Assault Bridge Launchers during the period. The 33 foot bridge is mounted on a modified M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier. The four (4) carriers were assigned to the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (2 ea) and the 4th Bn (M), 23rd Infantry (2 ea) for evaluation.

(6) (U) Five (5) experimental 10KW, 60HZ diesel engine driven generators were issued to the Division in late July for evaluation. The generators were issued with a six month supply of repair parts. The 125th Signal Battalion is conducting the evaluation. Mr. Reynold Hemmis, a general equipment specialist with the Mobility Equipment Command, is the project officer.

(7) (U) The issue of fourteen (14) M577A1 Command Post Carriers in late July completed the gasoline engine exchange program for all combat vehicles. The elimination of the gasoline engine reduces the maintenance work load and decreases the danger of fires in vehicles when hit by enemy weapons.

(8) (U) The Division successfully implemented DA Circular 750-29, effective 1 July 1969. This circular eliminated TAERS Line Numbers and replaced them with a two character Equipment Category Code (ECC) and SB 700-20 Line Item Numbers (LIN). The change simplifies identification of equipment shortages.

(9) (U) The AN/GRC 142 Radio was issued as a replacement for the AN/GRC 46. The AN/GRC 142 is a new, more dependable radio set and has improved the radio-teletype capabilities of the Division.

(10) (U) The first Maintenance Information News Letter was published by the G-4 Section in July 1969. This is one of many programs instituted in order to improve maintenance and maintenance equipment throughout the Division.

(11) (U) Throughout the reporting period, the 25th Infantry Division Support Command and attached units participated in Phase III of Operation Toan Thang, supporting from facilities at Cu Chi, Dau Tieng, Tay Ninh and Duc Hoa. Additionally, support was provided to Navy river patrol units located at Phu Cong and Go Dau Ha. The logistical support provided to Dau Tieng was terminated on 30 June due to the redeployment of the 3rd Brigade to Cu Chi Base Camp.

(a) Continued command emphasis was placed on the return of salvaged material to property disposal channels, the retrograde of unserviceable equipment and excess equipment, improvement of living conditions in all areas of the Support Command and supported units and in the management of resources to insure proper support in the areas of supply maintenance, transportation, and medical service. Increased command and staff visits to supported units and continuous coordination with higher headquarters contributed to the

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continuing improvement in logistical support.

(b) The Support Command during the past quarter was responsible for coordinating the transportation aspects of the 3d Brigade redeployment to Cu Chi Base Camp. This encompassed the preparation and execution of a plan to redeploy DISCOM forward support element, the transfer of logistical facilities to the incoming unit, and the acquisition of transportation assets to execute the movement time table for all redeploying units.

(c) An extensive program to rehabilitate buildings was started to improve the area to be occupied by the Third Brigade. Due to the shortages of building materials, the upgrading program required close supervision to insure proper utilization of the limited assets on hand.

(d) The Support Command continued conducting monthly logistical conferences. These are opened with remarks by the Support Command Commander and include presentations by each Battalion Commander, Division Transportation Officer, Division Ammunition Officer, Aircraft Maintenance Officer of the units in the Support Command, who report what their units are doing to better support the Division. They introduce new developments in the logistical support area and discuss ideas on how all units can help themselves. The meeting is followed by a question and answer period which has proved to be very constructive. Also a newsletter is distributed at the monthly logistical meetings. The newsletter consists of input from each Support Command unit and provides the divisional units the newest and latest procedures and policies.

(12) (U) The Division Transportation Section continued to coordinate and schedule the operations of all resupply convoys within the Division Area of Operations. Command emphasis was placed upon centralized control of throughput assets, and in minimizing trailer turn around times. A large degree of success was achieved as the number of divisional trucks moving between Cu Chi and forward supply elements at Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh maximized their utilization during the period. The phasing of unit moves in connection with the relocation of the 3d Brigade was accomplished to maximize use of returning daily convoy vehicles. This was so efficiently handled that only 5 additional vehicles above unit and returning convoy vehicles were required to accomplish the move.

(a) During the past quarter, 736 convoys have been operated in support of the base camps located at Cu Chi, Tay Ninh, and Dau Tieng with a total volume of 18,038 vehicles. The operation of resupply convoys includes establishing schedules, receiving vehicle requirements, and coordination of security forces and traffic control. All convoys operating on the Division MSR, either tactical unit move or unit resupply are granted movement clearance by the Transportation Officer. Highway continues to be the primary mode of transportation for the resupply of the Division base camps. Following is a breakdown of regular resupply convoys operated in the Division area:

1. Cu Chi to Tay Ninh:

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<u>MONTH:</u>	<u>NO. OF CONVOYS:</u>	<u>NO. OF VEHICLES:</u>
May	62	621
June	60	502
July	62	736
TOTAL:	184	1,859
2. <u>Cu Chi/Lai Khe/Di An to Dau Tieng:**</u>		
May	62	806
June	60	981
July	62	553
TOTAL:	184	2,340
3. <u>Long Binh to Tay Ninh:</u>		
May	62	3,237
June	60	3,196
July	62	4,162
TOTAL:	184	10,595
4. <u>Long Binh to Dau Tieng:</u>		
May	62	1,028
June	60	1,011
July	62	1,206
TOTAL:	184	3,245

** The 25th Division ran convoys to Dau Tieng during May and June. Beginning 1 July, the First Division began running convoys to Dau Tieng. The 25th Division has the responsibility for coordinating and securing the Dau Tieng Convoy while moving through the Division AO.

(b) The Division Transportation Section has coordinated the requirements for U.S. Air Force airlift for unit movement and resupply in support of operations. In addition, this section was able to attain a notable record for usage of the one C-7A dedicated aircraft. Special airlift data concerning USAF support is as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CARGO (tons)</u>	<u>TROOPS</u>
May	220	12,031
June	439	18,886
July	526	26,550
TOTAL:	1,185	57,467

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(c) The Division Transportation Section continues to operate hold baggage sections at Cu Chi, and Tay Ninh for the convenience of personnel located within the Division TAOI. These baggage sections are capable of receiving baggage of rotating personnel, processing and delivering baggage to Headquarters Area Command Baggage Section, Tan Son Nhut. The baggage sections also process baggage of newly arrived personnel. Data concerning the Division baggage sections is as follows:

<u>MONTH:</u>	<u>PERSONNEL PROVIDED SERVICE:</u>	<u>PIECES:</u>	<u>WEIGHT:</u>
May	790	1,085	89,205
June	785	1,050	79,308
July	663	920	80,410
TOTAL:	2,238	3,055	248,923

(13) (U) Division Ammunition Office:

(a) On 1 May 1969, control of the Cu Chi Ammunition Supply Point was transferred from the 25th Infantry Division to the 1st Logistical Command.

(b) During the month of June, the 3d Brigade of the Division moved from its base camp at Dau Tieng, and all ammunition was transferred in place to the 1st Infantry Division.

(c) The transfer of responsibility for Cu Chi ASP provided more time for inspection and upgrading of ammunition storage, safety, and serviceability throughout the Division. Considerable improvement has been accomplished in this area.

(14) (U) The 25th Infantry Division Band performed the following commitments during this period.

Categories and Totals.

Award Ceremonies	12
Change of Command Ceremonies	14
Misc. Ceremonies (Incl other Div, Areas)	9
Serenades (Arr and Dep of Troops)	52
Service Club Concerts	10
Civic Action Concerts	10
Formal Retreats (full band)	24
Bugler Commitments	103
Miscellaneous Concerts	11
Fire Support Base Concerts	10
Solo Concerts	10
Hospital Concerts	5
Ensemble Concerts (small groups)	10
Mess Hall Concerts (combo)	10
Traveling Concerts (A and B band)	7
TOTAL COMMITMENTS:	297

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(a) The main emphasis during this period has been placed upon the expansion of the number of troops which the Division Band entertains. This has been accomplished by adding concerts at mess halls, swimming pools, and by taking the band into areas where the troops are working. The theory being that men on the job need a morale boost, as well as personnel resting in stand-down areas. Troop concerts have been maximized by establishing two band teams that can travel by 2½ ton trucks into areas where troops are concentrated, either at work or on stand-down. This concept was also recently employed in the Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng Base Camp Areas. The approach is very well received by the troops and is worthy of further effort. The mass entertainment capabilities of the band have been expanded by utilizing the Woodwind Ensemble and the Accordion Trio in appearances in Saigon at the 25th Infantry Division Combat Art Show and at the Vietnamese-American Association in May, and at the Saigon Conservatory of Music in July. The possibility of TV performances by the Division Band is being explored. Due to the small size of the AFVN studio in Saigon, small units of the band will probably be utilized. Tape recordings are being put out featuring all different types and styles of music to be presented on radio and also for the use of requesting units for entertainment of their personnel in the field.

(15) (U) 25th Infantry Division CMMI Team: During the quarter the CMMI Team inspected 375 vehicles of all sizes. They also inspected 109 generators in the 25th Infantry Division. These inspections were part of the following types of inspections:

- 14 CMMI/AGI Inspections
- 30 Courtesy Inspections
- 19 Roadside Inspections
- 15 Generator Spotcheck Inspections
- 3 Command Interest Reports Completed

(16) (U) 341st Aviation Detachment (Divisional)

(a) The 341st Aviation Detachment (Divisional) has the operational control of Cu Chi Army Airfield.

1. Air Traffic activity for VFR Tower is summarized below:

ROTARY WING	135,585
FIXED WING	5,837
TOTAL FLIGHTS	141,422

2. Air Traffic activity for GCA is summarized below:

PAR APPROACH	281
ASR APPROACH	35
NO GYRO APPROACH	18
VECTOR	85
TOTAL	419

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(b) 25th Division Aircraft Rearming Facility, 341st Avn Det (Div). Ammunition expended for Aircraft is summarized below:

2.75inch Rockets	42,703 rounds
7.62mm Mlnigun	3,657,000 rounds
40mm	34,229 rounds
Flares	1,286 rounds

(c) 25th Division Refueling Facility, 341st Avn Det (Div). Fuel dispensed at the Aircraft Refueling Facility is summarized below:

JP-4	2,317,830 gallons
AVGAS	56,230 gallons

(17) (U) 25th Medical Battalion.

(a) Throughout the reporting period the 25th Medical Battalion continued to provide divisional level medical service to the 25th Infantry Division. IQ and Companies A and C continued to staff and operate the 60 bed Arthur E. Lewis Dispensary at Cu Chi Base Camp. Company B supported Dau Tieng Base Camp with a 40 bed dispensary until redeploying to Cu Chi Base Camp on 24 June 1969. Company D continues to support Tay Ninh Base Camp with a 50 bed dispensary.

(b) Statistics for the quarter's operations are as follows:

1. Medical totals:

Patients treated	15,360
Diseases	13,170
Non-battle injuries	884
IRHA	1,306
Lab Tests	8,846
Immunizations	5,978
Prescription filled	15,925
X-rays	5,497

2. Supply and Service:

Line items issued	6,880
MEDCAP line item issued	1,038
Maintenance work orders	101
Work orders completed	96
Work orders awaiting parts	5
Eyeglasses ordered (pairs)	3,585
Bulk pharmacy items issued	6

(c) The 40th Medical Detachment (KJ), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion, provided dental treatment for the Division.

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1. Dental Support

Total treatments	18,194
Civic action	589

2. Preventive Dentistry:

Instruction in oral hygiene	6,047
Prophylaxis of dental hygiene	2,160
Cavity prevention treatments	2,160
Group lectures	124
Persons attending lectures	6,037
Self-applied prophylaxis treatment	3,887

(d) The 159th Medical Detachment (HA), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion provided evacuation to divisional and non-divisional units.

1. Total patients	3,773
2. Total missions	1,823
3. Nationality of patients:	
U.S.	1,763
ARVN	1,091
VN Civilians	871
VC and NVA	48
4. Medical resupply for blood	2 hours
5. Flying time	1251 hours
6. Average aviator time	203 hours
7. Aircraft availability	72%
8. Flyable	72%
9. In maintenance	30%

(18) (U) 25th Supply and Transport Battalion.

(a) The 25th Supply and Transport Battalion continued its logistical support missions for all units operating within the divisional area of operations.

(b) Class I Supply

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1. Status:	A-Rations	C-Rations
Stockage Objectives	3	10
On Hand	3	10

2. Fresh fruits and vegetables received from Saigon (Rations)

May	423,510
June	439,421
July	<u>375,205</u>
TOTAL	1,238,136

3. Ice Creams:

Cycle of Issue:	Five times per week
Average gallons imported per week:	2,400
Average gallons produced per week (Dau Tieng)	160

4. Ice Issue: Average pounds of ice issued daily - 130,000

NOTE: All ice is potable.

(c) Class II & IV AND VII

1. Deletions to ASL during quarter: 1,069
2. Total lines on ASL: 2,684

3. ASL Status:	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
ASL lines stocked	2,675	2,684	2,684
ASL lines at zero balance	1,322	1,239	1,017
Zero balance with due-out	721	768	974
Total requests received	14,779	18,820	14,661
Total ASL requests filled	8,853	10,572	8,005
Total ASL requests received	12,979	16,720	13,113
Total requests priority 1-10	804	933	678
Total requests 1-10 filled	493	603	552
Total warehouse refusals	1	20	1
Units supported	79	79	82
Percent demand accomodation	87.7	88.8	88.7
Percent demand satisfaction	68.2	63.2	61.0

(d) Major Accomplishments:

1. Project COUNT was started on 1 May with Phase I, Location Survey, being the first step in the program. The survey served to identify and record 3930 lines including 1801 lines which had not been previously noted. On 1 June 1969, Phase II, inventory, was started. The results of this inventory were very satisfying in that many lines were brought back into the supply

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system saving the government \$446,553 in undiscovered assets (this is the second such inventory, the last taken in March 1969). Significant is the fact that both inventories returned to the supply system over a million dollars of hidden assets now identified. Project COUNT was completed on 30 June 1969. Random sampling will continue to maintain high efficiency in the location system matched with the accounting records.

2. The Forward Support Element (FSE), at Dau Tieng was closed out during the latter part of June. Equipment located on site was either transferred to the 1st Division or exchanged for like items. Supplies and equipment required by the 25th Division were retrograded and placed in stockage in Cu Chi.

3. The employment of additional tactical forces to support the 1st Brigade in the Tay Ninh area necessitated increased shipment of barrier materials and expendables by this battalion to augment the 277th S&S Battalion's support capability.

4. In accordance with 1st Log Command Regulation 740-5, Project Orange Ball, the distribution of batteries through the Class I facility, was put into operation on 19 July 1969, with issues made twice a week.

5. There was an analysis made of the supply posture of the 25th S&T Battalion in comparison with other S&T and S&S DSU's. Of 19 such DSU's analyzed, the 25th S&T Battalion was second highest in demand accommodation, demand satisfaction and customer satisfaction. Of the five divisional S&T Battalions surveyed, the 25th S&T Battalion was number one in overall performance.

(b) POL CLASS III

1. Consumption Rates (Gallons)		<u>DAILY</u>	<u>QUARTERLY</u>
JP/4	Cu Chi	39,300	3,613,535
	Dau Tieng	15,800	947,000
	Duc Hoa	8,000	763,000
AVGAS	Cu Chi	900	78,950
	Dau Tieng	110	6,600
	Duc Hoa	300	25,700
MOGAS	Cu Chi	12,100	1,108,885
	Dau Tieng	2,800	168,000
	Duc Hoa	N/A	N/A
DIESEL	Cu Chi	26,900	2,471,795
	Dau Tieng	6,400	383,000
	Duc Hoa	N/A	N/A

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2. Major Accomplishments

An investigation was initiated during the month of May which uncovered losses in diesel. The investigation revealed that the contractor was shorting the Division on its delivery, by using a non-standard measuring stick. Corrective action was taken to eliminate the theft of approximately 300,000 gallons per month by civilian contract delivery. Now all delivery is made by military transportation from military sources.

Propane gas delivery was increased over previous months due to arrangements made to go direct to the refill station at Nha Be. This enables the Division to truck, refill and return the same day, whereas previously, it meant that empty cylinders were turned in for filled ones at depot. Zero balance at depot resulted in an out of stock position within the Division.

In June, the 25th S&T began supporting a refuel facility established by the Navy at Phu Cuong Bridge to support operations in that area along the Saigon River. However, on the 28th of June, this support function was assumed by the 1st Infantry Division.

(f) Services:

1. Graves Registration:

US Military processed	182
US Civilians processed	0
Enemy processed	1
Vietnamese processed	110
TOTAL	293

2. Laundry Contract (Bundles): 23,307

3. QM Bath Sections

Total showers	257,160
Daily average	2,857

4. Duc Hoa Ammunition Expended:

7.62mm	888,500
2.75inch Rockets	6,398
40mm	2,950
.50 Caliber	11,700

5. Salvage.

Cu Chi:	<u>LOADS</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
S&P's		112	97	102	311
Low Boys		0	1	0	1

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Dau Tieng:	S&P's	52	27	0	79
	Low Boys	4	0	0	4

(g) Transportation:

1. Miles driven:

Total mileage	204,196
Average Mileage per day	2,218

2. Tonnage Hauled:

Average per day	139
Total Tonnage	12,816

(h) Significant Activities:

1. Removal of FSE from Dau Tieng: Through proper planning, the Company A FSE incurred no major difficulties in the withdrawal from Dau Tieng and continued to give full support up to the last day the camp was occupied by 25th Division personnel.

2. Spillage of milk and ice cream was causing a sanitation problem in the Class I yard. A concrete gutter was constructed by PA&E and the area is washed down as spillage occurs.

3. The present system of storage of clothing and TA 50 items in conexas in the Class II & IV yard is inadequate. A large PASCOR building is being constructed for inside storage of these items on shelves. The conexas will be used for unit pile pickups.

4. Supplies stored on the ground and outside are in constant danger of damage and spoilage due to water and mud. All supplies have been placed on dunnage.

5. Bottle gas was being stored in the mud, causing a problem with depot accepting the empty cylinders because of the dirt and grime on the bottles. All bottle gases are now stored on dunnage. A bottle gas building is being constructed utilizing "self help", with the floor of the building the same height off the ground as the bed of a 2 1/2 Ton truck. This will keep the bottles clean and at the same time allow more rapid dispensing and receiving of supplies.

6. The rearm/refuel facilities at Duc Hoa, operated by the 390th QM Detachment, have been improved by the augmentation of one additional 10,000 gallon bladder and by the construction of ammunition storage bunkers. These improvements have increased the support capability of the rearm/refuel point by providing a total fuel storage capacity of 54,000 gallons and by providing better and more protective ammunition storage facilities.

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(19) (U) 725th Maintenance Battalion.

(a) During the recent reporting period, the 725th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide Direct Support Maintenance and Repair Parts Support to the Division in its operations. Continued Command emphasis was placed upon relocation and rewarehousing of DSU Technical Supplies. Implementation of the improvement program was accomplished with the following results as of the end of this reporting period.

1. Project Count Location Survey.

Total number of lines surveyed - 14,273
Total number of lines in agreement with storage location - 11,421

2. Project Count - Inventory Status.

Total number of lines inventoried - 24,153
Total number of lines in agreement with storage location - 13,560

3. A sample survey was performed at each DSO Technical Supply, excluding HQ and Company A, during the last month of this reporting period, resulting in the following accomplishments:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATIONS CHECKED</u>	<u>LOCATIONS CORRECT</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
Co B	200	200	100%
Co C	200	194	97%
Co D	200	182	91%
Co E	200	190	95%

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LINES INVENTORIED</u>	<u>LINES CORRECT</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
Co B	200	198	99%
Co C	200	177	88.5%
Co D	200	170	85%
Co E	200	184	92%

(b) Project Strip personnel were successful in identifying over 10,000 fringe and authorized stockage list (ASL) items in the HQ and Company A Technical Supply. Fringe and excess ASL items turned in to depot amounted to approximately 2,000,000 dollars in value

(c) Radio Set AN/GRC-142 was placed in field operation by Divisional Units during this reporting period. Although support push packages failed to arrive, very few logistical problems have been encountered to date. Turn-in of Radio Sets AN/GRC-46, replaced by Radio Sets AN/GRC-142, was accomplished without delay.

(d) Maintenance and repair parts support rendered to supported units was

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improved during this period. Additional customer assistance facilities were introduced in the Technical Supply area. The 725th Maintenance Battalion External SOP was revised to incorporate new policies and procedures governing support rendered. The major changes were the added policies and procedures regarding combat loss of signal equipment and maintenance float of signal equipment.

(e) The following jobs were completed by the Battalion during the reporting periods:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Wheel Vehicles	303	216	282	801
Tanks and Track	134	125	132	391
Small Arms	900	697	589	2,186
Artillery	65	58	62	185
Engineer	35	20	29	84
Generators	133	336	105	574
Signal	2,320	1,868	2,077	6,265
Office Machines	161	106	93	360
Aircraft	242	287	316	845
Other	256	173	250	679
TOTAL	4,549	3,886	3,935	12,350

Low backlog figure for this period of 234 was achieved on 4 July 1969. This figure represents approximately 1½ days work.

(f) The following list of automotive parts has accounted for an appreciable percentage of this Division's deadline.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>FSN</u>
Voltage Regulator	2920-335-4677
M151 Transmission	2520-678-1808
M151 Engine	2805-678-1820
3/4 Ton Water Pump	2930-632-4048
5 Ton Turbo Charger	2815-999-2275
1/4 Ton Fuel Pump	2910-678-1856
M-706 Axle Shaft	2520-934-1759

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(g) Percentage of Aircraft Operational Ready (OR) during the reporting period is 79.8%. This can be attributed to the fact that many high hour aircraft were replaced during the period as well as increased emphasis on the overall maintenance and continued close scrutiny of repair parts requirements. OH-6A Helicopter Tail/Rotor Assemblies have continued to cause a loss of O/R time. All levels of command are aware of the problem.

H. (C) Revolutionary Development.

(1) The Village Self Development Program has had the effect of considerably tightening the coordination of civic action support offered the GVN throughout the TAOI. In an attempt to encourage the proper employment of their own governmental channels and resources, the Vietnamese people are being required to submit all requests for aid in civic action projects through GVN channels at the village level. When such requests are approved at province level, members of the 2nd Civil Affairs Company II FFORCEV review the need for U.S. support and refer the individual projects to the nearest tactical unit for U.S. support. During the reporting period these restrictions on civic action support offered by 25th Infantry Division personnel in an overall reduction in the number of civic action projects to a level only 40% of that at the beginning of the quarter.

(2) The MACV Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) remains the principal means of measuring progress of pacification within the TAOI. Currently the overall U.S. category ratings for the TAOI (TAOI 25 July 1969) are:

<u>HAMLET</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
A	0	0	00.00
B	88	267,332	49.80
C	132	222,278	41.40
D	32	34,025	06.38
E	8	2,520	00.47
V	16	10,477	01.95
ABANDONED	8	0	00.00
TOTAL	<u>284</u>	<u>536,632</u>	<u>100.00</u>

The above ratings imply that in terms of overall HES security and development ratings 91.2 per cent of the population of the TAOI of 25 July 1969, is within GVN security and administration while less than 2 per cent is under VC control. The remainder is contested in its loyalties with the GVN gaining the advantage.

(3) Phase I of the 1969 Pacification and Development Program drew to a close on 30 June 1969. Of the 73 targeted hamlets which were recorded in the former reporting period, the following progress was made in terms of HES security ratings:

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<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>30 April 1969</u>	<u>30 June 1969</u>
C	17	25
D	25	35
E	3	2
V	19	7
ABANDONED	9	3
DELETED/REPORT	0	1
TOTAL	<u>73</u>	<u>73</u>

(4) Phase II of the 1969 Pacification Plan has been designated the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign during the period 1 July 1969 through 31 October 1969. It is intended that the goals originally scheduled for completion by the end of the calendar year 1969 may be reached by 31 October 1969. There are currently 52 hamlets targeted in the TAOI of 25 June 1969 and their current ratings in terms of HES security factors are:

<u>HAMLET SECURITY CATEGORY</u>	<u>NUMBER OF HAMLETS</u>
C	3
D	36
E	2
V	7
ABANDONED	4
TOTAL	<u>52</u>

The goals of the Pacification and Development Program remain unchanged with the emphasis upon bringing 90% of the population within GVN security. Currently the status of the population is 86% secure, 11% contested and 3% VC controlled.

I. (C) Civic Action.

(1) The change in coordination of civic action operations due to the restrictions introduced with the Village Self Development Program has been noted above and the effect of these restrictions and the attempt to pressure the GVN into employing the channels and resources available within its own system have been stated previously, (I. B. (1)).

(2) MEDCAPS have continued during this reporting period with a total of 685 MEDCAPS conducted during the quarter and 54,365 patients treated. This represents somewhat of a reduced number of MEDCAPS compared with last quarter's figures of 723 MEDCAPS conducted and 56,389 patients treated. The reduction of MEDCAPS is interpreted as being a direct result of increased ARVN and RF/PF MEDCAPS. There has also been a significant increase in the participation of Vietnamese personnel on U.S. MEDCAPS.

(3) In conjunction with the medical civic action operations normally conducted, a special course of instruction for RF/PF medics was coordinated

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through the 12th Evacuation Hospital during May and June 1969. 19 medics were trained and demonstrated through examination to have gained considerable knowledge through the two month course. A similar course is being initiated at the present time.

(4) From 4-6 June 1969, a large cordon and search operation was conducted in An Tinh Village (XT510160) Trang Bang District employing elements of Company A, 2-27th Infantry, 4-49th ARVN Infantry, 493rd, 159th and 118th RF companies. 5000 persons were gathered together, fed, entertained and given gifts while the operation progressed. 50,000 \$VN and several thousand pounds of captured rice were allocated to the operation through this office. The operation was considered a military and political success and HES ratings for the hamlets of An Tinh Village have risen from VC to contested ratings during this quarter. At the current rate of progress the hamlets of An Tinh should attain a secure status in the coming quarter.

(5) As previously stated, construction civic action projects were much reduced during the quarter with 40 kilometers of road constructed or repaired, five bridges completed, 185 dwellings, 8 churches, 6 dispensaries, 2 market places and 42 schools completed.

(6) Distributions were made to Vietnamese civilians in the following categories and quantities from 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969: 101,000 board feet of lumber were distributed throughout the TAOI along with 610 sheets of tin, 41,000 pounds of cement and 98,500 pounds of food.

(7) Civic Action Imprest Fund expenditures totaled 901,453 \$VN for the quarter.

I. (C) Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

(1) PSYOP activities were in support of operations conducted in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia Provinces and Phu Hoa District of Binh Duong Province.

(2) A total of 120,951,353 leaflets were disseminated in the Division TAOI. This is an increase of 26,699,600 leaflets over the last reporting period. Thirty leaflets were developed and printed by ACoFS, G5, while 26 leaflets were developed and produced by the 6th PSYOP Battalion for the Division.

(3) During the reporting period, 864 hours of air and ground loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted. This represents a 124 hour increase over the last reporting period.

(4) A total of 607 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN in the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI, an increase of 312 Hoi Chanh for the previous quarter. The increase in the number of Hoi Chanh is in direct proportion to the number of contacts and the initiation of a PSYOP campaign, "Operation Exploit." on 12 June 1969. The campaign targeted specific enemy units operating in the Division TAOI.

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2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations. (25th Inf Div ORLL, 1 May - 31 July 1969)

A. PERSONNEL.

(1) (U) ITEM: Casualty Accounting.

(a) OBSERVATION: The accounting system for maintaining and reporting operational casualty statistics for the Division required expansion and improvement in close coordination with higher headquarters to assure that consistently accurate data is available on a daily basis at each level of command.

(b) EVALUATION: Statistics used to determine the Division's monthly body count ratio did not clearly differentiate between Divisional and OPCON unit casualties. A system was initiated to maintain casualty accounting simultaneously in three distinct categories. Divisional casualty data is now recorded separately and verified to correspond with casualty feeder reports submitted by organic subordinate units. OPCON unit casualties are also recorded separately for the period such units are under Divisional control. The third category, a total of the first two, represents by day, month and year, all operational casualties charged to the Division. Maintained daily, this system has provided readily accessible information concerning all types of casualty accounting and validates casualty reports submitted by the Division. The resulting format has been adapted for standard use within II Field Force Vietnam.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This system be considered for USARV wide adoption. (See sample format following this page)

B. OPERATIONS.

(1) (U) ITEM: Bunker Line Improvement.

(a) OBSERVATION: Maintenance and improvement of defensive sectors of base camps often does not exceed or meet the rate of deterioration.

(b) EVALUATION: Many units detail a noncommissioned officer on a daily roster basis to perform as the bunkerline NCOIC. This system does not provide the continuity required for maintenance of warning devices, obstacles, sandbags, ammunition, and general police of the area. The appointment of a permanent bunkerline NCOIC, such as an individual with a medical profile, provides the unit with constant supervision over the activities on the bunkerline. The appearance of the area, condition of equipment, ammunition storage, and implementation of policy changes can be continuously improved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this system be considered by any unit with a permanent sector defense responsibility.

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(2) (C) ITEM: Improvement of "Night Hawk" Observation Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: Experience has shown that on "Night Hawk" missions, when no moonlight or other natural illumination is available, the effectiveness of the Starlight Scope TVS-4 is limited.

(b) EVALUATION: During the dry season, when there is very little cloud coverage and available moonlight or starlight is normally readily available, the TVS-4 Starlight Scope is extremely effective in detecting enemy movement. However, with the onset of the rainy season the amount of natural light available is often restricted to the point where an alternate source of light to activate the starlight scope is required. The solution has been to use preplanned artillery flares on an on-call basis from supported units. When this illumination is called for a distance of five (5) to eight (8) kilometers from the area of search, sufficient light is absorbed by the starlight scope for effective employment. An additional advantage to this method is that the enemy is deceived as to the true purpose of the illumination.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units employing "Night Hawk" missions consider the use of artificial illumination as described during periods of limited available natural light.

(3) (U) ITEM: Wet Radios in OH-6A (Light Observation Helicopter).

(a) OBSERVATION: The radios in the OH-6A (LOH) are positioned in such a manner that if the aircraft is on the ground during a rain storm there is a high probability of the radios becoming wet. It has been found that should the radios become wet, it is almost impossible to receive or transmit.

(b) EVALUATION: When the aircraft is to remain on the ground for an extended period of time and rain is forecast, the installation of the front doors would preclude any rain from wetting the radio compartments thus insuring immediate operation of all radios on the next flight mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all aviation units with assigned OH-6A (LOH) aircraft consider using this practical means of preventing water damage to the aircraft radios.

(4) (U) ITEM: Airlift of D-5 Bulldozer.

(a) OBSERVATION: CH-54 pilots have a tendency to release the D-5 dozer before it is properly lined up and prepared for drop.

(b) EVALUATION: If an airmobile dozer is not properly lined up and dropped onto the timber runners prepared at the dropsite, reassembly is extremely difficult.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That it be standard procedure when airlifting

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a D-5 dozer into a virgin work site to strap 3" X 12" timbers under each set of rollers. By rigging a dozer in this manner the guess work and manipulation is reduced extensively and the dozer does not have the tendency to sink into the ground as would one without the timbers.

(5) (U) ITEM: Airlift of D-5 Bulldozer.

(a) OBSERVATION: Requirements for disassembly of D-5 dozer prior to airlift are not standardized.

(b) EVALUATION: On numerous occasions CH-54 pilots will pick up and airlift D-5 bulldozers with only the blade and the tracks removed. On the occasions when this has occurred, pilots have indicated a steady sling load strain gauge measurement of 17,000 pounds. On several other occasions the CH-54 pilots have refused to lift out the D-5 until all removeable items, such as pans, hydraulic arms, grills, towing printle frame and fluid from the tanks had been removed. These different disassembly requirements have been observed when distance to drop and refuel point have been equal and the density altitude has been equal. A unit can be sure the CH-54 will pick the dozer up if the complete disassembly is performed, however the reassembly time is increased by 100%. This increase in time reduces the probability that the dozer will complete its mission within the prescribed time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That standardized D-5 disassembly procedures be formulated.

(6) (U) ITEM: Construction of Fire Support Bases In Areas Formerly Occupied By ARVN Hardspots.

(a) OBSERVATION: The areas around ARVN hardspots are normally heavily mined with anti-personnel mines and attempts to place U.S. sized fire support bases in the exact location has proven to be extremely costly in terms of the magnitude of the effort required to clear the minefields.

(b) EVALUATION: In most instances U.S. forces moving into an ARVN hardspot will require considerably more real estate than is usually available in an ARVN hardspot. To move into the area requires clearing the minefield which is usually around ARVN facilities of this type. The time, equipment and effort involved in an operation of this type appears to offset most of the advantages to be gained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That removal of ARVN minefields to place a U.S. facility in the same location to be held to an absolute minimum.

(7) (U) ITEM: Fire Support Base Access Road Design.

(a) OBSERVATION: Access and interior roads for Fire Support Bases with mechanized elements are difficult to maintain.

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(b) EVALUATION: The primary reason for deterioration of the aforementioned type roads is due to neutral steer by track vehicles.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All access and interior roads being constructed for fire support bases be at a tangent to the berm. This will reduce the natural steer by track vehicles and will reduce the amount of maintenance required for their upkeep.

(8) (U) ITEM: Land Clearing Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Clearing of hedgerows and other light vegetation can be accomplished quite effectively by use of a heavy Navy anchor chain towed by two D7E bulldozers.

(b) EVALUATION: During the initial clearing operations with the anchor chain, M48 tanks were used as prime movers. This placed an excessive strain on the tank transmissions. Dozers were subsequently used with excellent results.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That light land clearing by the use of this method be considered whenever trafficability of the cut area permits.

(9) (U) ITEM: Operator Protection For Land Clearing Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Numerous bulldozers have been damaged or destroyed in land clearing operations. In the majority of cases, the bulldozers suffer extensive damage; however, the operators are seldom seriously injured. Ear damage as a result of the noise has been the most predominate injury.

(b) EVALUATION: The mass of the bulldozer protects the operator from the violence of the explosion and the noise is the major cause of operator injury.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all bulldozer operators involved in land clearing operations be required to wear earplugs as ear protection.

(10) (U) ITEM: Maintenance of Roads and Fire Support Bases During The Rainy Season.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many of the secondary roads in the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, AO were sufficient for the traffic they were required to bear during the dry season but, with the advent of significant rainfall, they rapidly deteriorated, developing ruts and soft spots.

(b) EVALUATION: A cursory examination revealed that in most cases the deterioration was attributable to hasty repair at an earlier date employing inferior material.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Whenever possible, good laterite or even rock

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should be employed in the repair of roads. Even if the repair is expedient rather than deliberate, the use of good material with the concomitant greater time and equipment usage necessitated is more than recompensed by the longer life and greater stability of the roads so repaired.

(11) (U) ITEM: Helipad Construction.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of rubber membrane for helicopter landing pads leads to continual maintenance problems.

(b) EVALUATION: The construction of small helipads at fire support bases has often involved extensive ground preparations as a prerequisite for the emplacement of rubber membrane. The membrane deteriorates rapidly under normal usage and once ripped presents continued inspection and patching problems and a hazard to Army aviation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That M&A1 matting be employed in all further helipad construction. It requires little site preparation, minimal maintenance and is reusable.

(12) (U) ITEM: Drainage Of Extremely Level Fire Support Bases.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is extremely difficult to provide proper drainage facilities for fire support bases which are located in very level areas.

(b) EVALUATION: Level areas provide no differential elevation from which water can drain. Without this runoff, standing water results. Vehicles and personnel turn those areas into muddy quagmires. To insure proper trafficability, it is imperative that the water be removed from the interior of the fire support base as quickly as possible. It has been found that if a dozer prepares a large deep slit trench outside of the fire support base berm, water can be drained into this sump. The water is then forced back into the water table. The effectiveness of this procedure for disposing of runoff decreases as the water table rises and the soil becomes saturated due to the monsoon season. The effectiveness of this procedure is also dependent upon the permeability of the soil in the particular area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above method be considered as an effective means of draining water from level fire support bases.

(13) (U) ITEM: Land Clearing With Divisional Engineer Battalion Bulldozer Assets.

(a) OBSERVATION: The normal employment of the land clearing company, i.e. in mass, is highly effective. However, in some cases where clearing is being done near populated areas, the full impact of this massive clearing capability can create an impression upon the local populace of a vulgar imposition upon their traditional property rights. This unfavorable impression can be alleviated by use of small land clearing exercises conducted with divisional engineer battalion assets.

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(b) EVALUATION: This small land clearing capability maintained within the divisional engineer battalion allows immediate response to requests from GVN officials. This will also provide an aura of restraint which would provide a psychological mood that could greatly assist the pacification effort. Clearing in this manner, however, with dozers organic to the engineer battalion severely detracts from the capability to provide adequate combat engineer support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the divisional engineer battalion be equipped with six (6) D7E dozers complete with Home Flow kits to accomplish the clearing requirements described above.

(14) (U) ITEM: Self Help On Fire Support Base Drainage Problems.

(a) OBSERVATION: The drainage problems at fire support bases can be lessened considerably if tenant units apply self help toward this end.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to accomplish the above, units must prepare small runoff trenches from low areas so that drainage will occur. A good quality fill can then be provided in small quantities with organic vehicles. The fill must be compacted with vehicles. This compaction will preclude quagmires. If drainage cannot be accomplished with trenches, small centrifugal pumps can be used to move the standing water outside of the fire support base. Tenant units must have proper driver discipline to preclude culvert ends from being crushed and to preclude vehicles from driving in drainage ditches.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That tenant units in fire support bases apply self help to the maximum extent possible to assist in alleviating their drainage problems.

(15) (U) ITEM: Bunker Construction.

(a) OBSERVATION: Bunkers constructed by non-engineer units are quite often structurally unsound and constitute a safety hazard.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to insure adequate bunkers in the Division ACP, constructing units must adhere to sound construction procedures which have been published by the Division Engineer. Technical assistance will be provided by the supporting engineer elements. This guidance must be followed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be placed on sound bunker construction procedures and that supporting engineer elements continue detailed technical inspections to insure proper construction procedures are being followed.

(16) (U) ITEM: PSYOP Exploitation of Base Camp Employees.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, PSYOPS were conducted

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at Cu Chi Base Camp main gate, targeting base camp employees. JUSPAO tapes consisting of music, news and information were used.

(b) EVALUATION: It was discovered that the music on the tape was quite dated. The average base camp employee is exposed to current news and music via radio and sometimes television. It was discovered in the course of playing the prepared JUSPAO tapes that there was an adverse reaction to this on the part of the base camp employees. The overwhelming majority of the workers questioned indicated that they would rather hear current popular Vietnamese music rather than old songs and GVN propaganda. New tapes with popular music were purchased and the base camp employees were immediately receptive to this.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When trying to reach a target audience through various PSYOP media, the product should be thoroughly pretested to insure that the message, whether it is music, news or information, is effective.

(17) (C) ITEM: Leaflets Disseminated By Artillery.

(a) OBSERVATION: Tests conducted utilizing the 105mm M84 leaflet round show high malfunction rates. Only one round of ten functioned properly. Three rounds failed to fire and six failed to detonate.

(b) EVALUATION: The leaflet round of ~~ammunition~~ ~~is~~ ~~extremely~~ ~~old~~. New type fuzes are not interchangeable with the fuzes on the leaflet rounds.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Further testing is required utilizing different lots of ammunition.

(18) (C) ITEM: Air Scout Teams.

(a) OBSERVATION: Air scout teams are currently targeted and directed by the S-2 Section at brigade. Teams are targeted over several suspected areas during a mission to insure the broadest utilization of air time.

(b) EVALUATION: This concept maximizes the target acquisition capacity of the air scout team. It does not provide effective controls for the ground commander over the air scout team when it is operational in his area. The team, because of its multiple targeting often transits several areas of operation during each mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the scout teams continue to be targeted by the brigade S-2 but each must be thoroughly briefed on all ground elements operating in its reconnaissance zone. During the reconnaissance, the team must contact each element by radio as it enters a new area. Radio contact is established to insure that the team possesses the latest friendly and enemy information and to establish a channel for clearance for fires. Troop safety thus is enhanced and more rapid response to sightings is assured.

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(19) (C) ITEM: M-72 LAW.

(a) OBSERVATION: When in contact, the M-72 LAW is often not employed because individual riflemen who carry the LAW think only of using their M-16 rifles when in contact.

(b) EVALUATION: The LAW is a highly effective weapon and its use should not be overlooked. The problems of employment can be solved if one rifleman per squad is permanently designated to employ LAWS when the unit is in contact with the enemy. This method not only insures that the M-72 LAW will be employed as early in the contact as possible but also facilitates control of the weapon by the unit leader.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That one rifleman per rifle squad be designated specifically to employ the M-72 LAW.

(20) (C) ITEM: Combined Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: During combined operations, command relationship problems hinder and confuse the situation due to the lack of clear-cut command channels or dual command channels.

(b) EVALUATION: When U.S. and ARVN elements conduct combined operations, the lack of a definitely stated command group hinders the operations. Reaction and control responsiveness for the entire command is hampered. With one single command group, all force commanders are able to operate more effectively.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a clearly established command group including both U.S. and Vietnamese elements be employed to control each operation. The commander of the largest element of the operation should be designated to control the operation.

(21) (C) ITEM: Kit Carson Scouts.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Kit Carson scout has proved to be an invaluable asset. His ability to search the terrain for information concerning mines and booby traps and his ability to gain information from the local population have assisted greatly in daily operations.

(b) EVALUATION: More Kit Carson scouts should be assigned to each platoon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That at least two Kit Carson scouts be assigned to each platoon.

(22) (C) ITEM: Ambush Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel on ambush missions have been engaging the enemy before the enemy is within the "kill zone."

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(b) EVALUATION: The ambush can be a highly effective tactic. However, premature engagement yields fewer body count and compromises the ambush location.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All personnel, especially newly-arrived replacements, must be trained not to engage until the enemy is well within the "kill zone." Authority to engage should not be delegated below the level of squad leader and under ideal circumstances, should be retained by the ambush leader.

(23) (C) ITEM: Command Armored Personnel Carriers.

(a) OBSERVATION: When a mechanized unit is in contact with the enemy, the enemy concentrates his fire on the command vehicles.

(b) EVALUATION: The command APC's are easily identified by their antennas and location in the formation making them a prime target.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That command APC's tie down their antennas and vary their location in the formation. It has been determined that with the antennas tied down the units are still able to communicate with their elements.

(24) (C) ITEM: Continued Combined Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The combat efficiency of ARVN and RF/PF has greatly increased through continued emphasis on combined operations.

(b) EVALUATION: ARVN and RF/PF can be utilized to good advantage in reconnaissance and airmobile operations to increase operational area coverage. Utilization of these forces results in an economy of U.S. forces without the resultant loss of aggressiveness and coverage in an operational area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be placed on combined operations as both an operational and training consideration.

(25) (C) ITEM: Execution Of An Intelligence Orientated Raid.

(a) OBSERVATION: A comprehensive plan of maneuver and fire support must be implemented in order to insure a reasonable chance of success when exploiting intelligence. Surprise must be considered.

(b) EVALUATION: A hastily executed reaction to intelligence information often produces little, if any, results. In addition, reaction which achieves little gain discredits intelligence oriented operations, compromises potential sources of further information, and squanders combat assets more profitably employed in other areas against other targets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That operations reacting to intelligence

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information be well planned and coordinated and capitalize on the principle of surprise. The operation described in the report at Tab F was built around the principle of surprise. Current operational techniques by the implementing battalion were altered to hit the enemy where and when he least expected. Detailed planning was evident throughout the operation. Close coordination between the maneuver commander and his various fire support agencies produced overwhelming effective firepower at the critical area at the critical time. The plan was followed exactly, especially during the crucial, initial five minutes when the gunships and artillery fires achieved the initial surprise and destruction and the infantry troops gained entry into the objective area. Once the troops were on the ground, the commander was able to direct the massive fires available to him to destroy the maximum number of enemy. His maneuver elements were directed to areas to exploit this firepower to the maximum. The maneuver elements were able to stay on the ground for an extended period of time to gain maximum advantage of the enemy in confusion and the supporting fires. The flexibility of the airmobile concept enabled the troops to be extracted at any time. Command and control was near perfect throughout the operation. Operating from the C&C ship, the commander was able to adequately control his maneuver elements and all supporting aircraft. Sitting next to him the artillery LNO delivered decisive firepower at the time and place desired. The commander of the assault helicopter company flying the C&C ship was able to pass essential information, such as target description, artillery air data, and holding patterns to other supporting aircraft on UHF rather than clogging the battalion FM command net with this traffic. Only fire commands were necessary on the command net. The entire operation was a model of combat efficiency and effectiveness - a goal constantly sought but seldom achieved.

(26) (C) ITEM: Targeting and Destruction of Small Groups of Enemy.

(a) OBSERVATION: Recently, the enemy has begun to operate in many small groups.

(b) EVALUATION: Continuous sweep operations by friendly forces have forced the enemy to disperse his main force units to avoid annihilation. This presents an outstanding opportunity to isolate these groups, target against them, and destroy them with massive firepower.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That once small groups of enemy are known to be in an area, they should be fixed by ground forces and destroyed by firepower. Close coordination between all available intelligence sources and the operations section is essential to the success of the mission.

(27) (C) ITEM: Rapid Reaction To Intelligence.

(a) OBSERVATION: Much of our current intelligence has little or limited value unless appropriate immediate reaction is implemented.

(b) EVALUATION: Information from Hoi Chanh's, PW's, agents and

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other sources becomes valueless unless we exploit it quickly. The enemy realizes that PW's and Hoi Chanh's reveal his locations and plans and will not remain static once he has been compromised.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all critical information must be immediately available to the operations sections. Without this information, it becomes difficult if not impossible to provide an effective reaction to exploit the information or intelligence. Constant emphasis must be placed on accurate reporting and sharing of intelligence at all levels.

(28) (C) ITEM: Upgrading Vietnamese Forces.

(a) OBSERVATION: Combined operations are an effective means of upgrading Vietnamese forces.

(b) EVALUATION: Combined operations, when coordinated properly will lead to Vietnamese recommendations as to targets and planning, and to an increase in independent Vietnamese operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That whenever possible, combined operations stress active Vietnamese participation. For example, Vietnamese commanders and staff should ride side by side with U.S. counterparts when conducting airmobile operations.

(29) (C) ITEM: Reduction Of Booby Trap Casualties:

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy is extremely proficient in the employment and camouflage of booby traps.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy habitually employs mines and booby traps in areas that friendly forces normally pass through or use as night defensive positions, and surrounding those areas he intends to utilize himself as cache sites or base camp areas. All of these devices are expertly rigged and camouflaged.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When on the move, units should stay in areas covered with heavy grass and should heed areas in which grass appears a different color from surrounding areas; these areas normally contain mines or booby traps. Any item encountered outside a friendly perimeter should be considered booby trapped and treated as such. Troops must be made aware that junctions of paddy dikes and old APO and tank tracks are usually mined. Kit Carson scouts are an excellent means of gathering intelligence from the local populace concerning booby traps. Constant emphasis on the subject combined with the buddy system of having one experienced soldier work with a new man is an effective means of reducing friendly casualties. In addition, liberal reconnaissance by fire with M-79's and in some cases by M-72 LAW's is an effective method of defoliating thick hedgerows and detonating or exposing hidden mines and booby traps.

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(30) (C) ITEM: Destruction of the Enemy When Fighting In Built Up Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION: In built up areas, the enemy often utilizes bunkers and tunnel systems to defend the area and move from one position to another.

(b) EVALUATION: In built up areas, a large majority of the houses contain extremely well-built bunkers and are connected by tunnels. The enemy often fires on friendly forces from one area, and once his location is pinpointed, will rapidly move to another point in the village to fire on the flanks or the rear of friendly forces.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When fighting in built up areas, maximum use should be made of medium and heavy artillery with delayed action fuzes. Air strikes with 750 pound delay fuzed bombs should be requested. Troops searching the area must move slowly and search several buildings concurrently. Flame throwers are extremely useful in clearing bunkers, but because of the weight factor, should be retained in the rear and sent forward as requested.

(31) (U) ITEM: The Frequency of Road Mining Incidents On Unimproved Roads.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been observed that the frequency of mining incidents is inversely proportional to the quality of the road surface.

(b) EVALUATION: TL 6A was recently upgraded with rock and laterite fill and then capped with a peneprime coating. The decrease in mining activity was immediately evident. TL 7A, which received only periodic grading, was mined seventeen (17) times during the month of June despite increased emphasis on countermining activities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That efforts be made to continuously upgrade secondary roads to fire support bases and other facilities in an effort to reduce road mining incidents.

C. TRAINING.

(1) (U) ITEM: Replacement Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: In spite of the excellent school system for replacements, there exists a need for further orientation of replacements upon their arrival in the unit.

(b) EVALUATION: Newly arrived personnel must be made aware of what is expected of them during operations. They must be continually advised and supervised until they can be expected to carry out their duties with a minimum of supervision. In addition to interviews and briefings by platoon and squad leaders, replacements should be assigned a "buddy", i.e. a combat experienced squad member who will guide the replacement until he is able to function without his "buddy's" assistance.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units institute a "buddy system" to guarantee the effective assimilation of replacements into their new unit.

(2) (C) ITEM: Booby Trap Casualties.

(a) OBSERVATION: There has been an increase in booby trap casualties during the past 90 days.

(b) EVALUATION: Investigation reveals an increase in the enemy's employment of booby traps within the TAOR. In at least one instance several casualties resulted by a new man not giving warning to others when he had tripped a wire and "froze". Other similar incidents were caused by experienced personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That increased emphasis be placed at unit level on booby trap detection and immediate action to be taken should one be tripped. In addition, continued emphasis be placed on adequate dispersion of individuals while on operations in the field.

(3) (C) ITEM: Maintenance of a High Level of Individual Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Turnover in troop strength is so rapid that many basic fundamentals are not stressed.

(b) EVALUATION: As a result, the combat effectiveness of the unit is reduced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The Division's cavalry squadron has alleviated this problem by using stand downs for informal instruction in basic fundamentals such as headspace and timing, fields of fire, construction of effective foxholes.

(4) (U) ITEM: Training of Generator Operators.

(a) OBSERVATION: Replacement personnel, regardless of rank, are arriving at Division units completely unfamiliar with maintenance and operational procedures for power generating equipment. This lack of prior training, coupled with the extreme operating conditions that exist here in Vietnam, has been the cause of ninety percent of all generator failures within the Division.

(b) EVALUATION: There are numerous generators in operation throughout this Division, in various sizes and manufactured by a multitude of companies. No matter what size, or the manufacturer, the principles of operation and the preventive maintenance services are very similar on all generators. The Army has designed their generators to operate under extreme conditions and they will, providing they are maintained daily by trained, competent operators.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The 725th Maintenance Battalion has developed and

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put into action a continuing formal training program for all generator operators and supervisors throughout the Division. These classes have helped in reducing generator failure but additional command emphasis at unit level must be placed on operator training, maintenance programs and supervision. In addition, commanders must ensure that only qualified personnel, properly licensed, are operating generators. The additional command emphasis on this problem will ensure that the units attain the maximum operational life from their generators.

(5) (U) ITEM: Night Firing.

(a) OBSERVATION: Inexperienced personnel have a tendency to fire high during the hours of darkness.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience has shown that programmed practice night firing at 55 gallon drums increases accuracy and confidence in engaging targets during the hours of darkness.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a continuous night firing training program is necessary to maintain the required level of proficiency.

(6) (U) ITEM: Training in the Transportation of Volatile Fuels.

(a) OBSERVATION: The requirement to transport volatile fuel necessitates additional training of driver personnel in the handling of this commodity.

(b) EVALUATION: The high volatility of fuels transported by the Supply and Transportation Battalion, especially JP4, continues to present a safety problem to the tanker operator. By TOE and MOS the tanker operator is only a heavy vehicle operator; however, he is required to handle the loading and discharging of his tanker in addition to the operation of its equipment. To insure the highest state of safety exists in this area, extensive training has been initiated by qualified petroleum personnel on a continuing basis. This training provides, in addition to the Vehicle Operator's Permit, Standard Form 46, qualifying training on the tankers' pumping system, and terminates with the issuance of a Fuel Handler's Permit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all tanker or fuel dispenser operators be required to attend similar training and that consideration be given to submitting a recommendation to Department of the Army to provide this training for all heavy truck operators destined for RVN duty.

(7) (U) ITEM: Training for Forklift Operators.

(a) OBSERVATION: Additional OJT is required for forklift operators.

(b) EVALUATION: Personnel arriving in RVN as qualified forklift operators (MOS 76V20) are found to be lacking sufficient training applicable to a tactical situation. In order to effectively utilize these personnel, it is necessary to provide them with approximately two weeks of supervised OJT to insure

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proper equipment utilization. This training period, although necessary, reduces the unit's operating capability while it is in progress.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That forklift operators destined for RVN be given additional MOS training applicable to operations in a tactical environment.

D. INTELLIGENCE

(1) (C) ITEM: Order of Battle Handbooks.

(a) OBSERVATION: S2's at both brigade and battalion level needed a readily available listing of enemy codes, letter box numbers (LBN's), and infiltration group numbers which could be used for field exploitation of documents.

(b) EVALUATION: In response to the above requirement, the Order of Battle Section, 25th Military Intelligence Detachment, compiled a listing of enemy codes, letter box numbers, and infiltration group numbers from organic files and published these listings in the form of three handbooks. The handbooks were designed so that they could easily be carried to the field in the pockets of the standard jungle fatigues. This portable data base provided S2's with a capability of conducting immediate field exploitation of documents.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this procedure be made a practice in other divisions.

(2) (C) ITEM: Duffel Bag Targeting Procedures.

(a) OBSERVATION: Camouflaged seismic, magnetic, acoustic and infrared sensors continue to be employed in the 25th Infantry Division TAOR to detect activity along enemy routes of infiltration and lines of communications. Sensors were used for offensive, defensive, and intelligence missions during the period 1 May to 31 July 1969.

(b) EVALUATION: Thirteen areas were seeded with a total of 282 sensors. Each sensor site was provided with coverage by artillery fire. Artillery responded to sensor activations as a result of fire mission requests from monitoring stations. Confirmation of enemy activity and results were obtained through the use of ground forces or aerial reconnaissance. It is reasonably certain from blood trails and graves in the vicinity of sensor locations, and destroyed equipment, that Duffel Bag devices contributed significantly to the preemption of the enemy's movements in the Division TAOR. Sensor activations have directly resulted in increased attrition of enemy forces and material, at the same time acting in an economy of force role.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Operations using Duffel Bag devices should be increased, and the devices should be made an item of issue to Division units.

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(3) (C) ITEM: Use of Hand Held Aerial Photography.

(a) OBSERVATION: A difficulty associated with air implaced sensors has been in obtaining accurate sensor locations for precision artillery engagement of targets developed. To obtain the accuracy needed, a CS grenade was attached to each sensor which produced desired marking of the area where the sensor impacted. A hand-held camera was used to take a photo of the CS cloud where the sensor impacted and then the photo was compared to a mosaic of the same area. A CS grenade was used because of its long burning fuse element bursting the cannister at ground level when dropped from 1500 feet. Artillery was adjusted into the area after implantation to mask the sensor mission and deceive any enemy who may have observed the CS cloud marking the sensor location.

(b) EVALUATION: This method has proven very effective and extremely accurate. Comparison of hand held photographs with a photo mosaic of the same area has provided UTM coordinate readout accurate to the nearest 10 meters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That CS grenades be attached to air delivered sensors to provide marking of sensor locations and that hand-held photos be taken of CS clouds and be compared against photo mosaics of the same area to provide accurate sensor location readouts.

(4) (C) ITEM: Sensor Operations to Reduce Mine Incidents.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sections of main supply routes showing a high mine incident rate are seeded with sensors to reduce enemy mining activity.

(b) EVALUATION: Six sensor devices were employed in the vicinity of Convoy Check Point 36 (XT3472) to reduce mining activity. During the 30 day period prior to Duffel Bag employment, Division elements recorded 11 mining incidents near Check Point 36. During the month following Duffel Bag employment, only three undetected mining incidents occurred, and during the second month no undetected incidents occurred.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Duffel Bag sensors continue to be used in anti-mine roles along main supply routes to discourage enemy mining operations.

(5) (C) ITEM: Red Haze Imagery.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is imperative that targets from Red Haze Imagery be disseminated to subordinate units as rapidly as possible to insure timely combat response. Imagery from the Ground Sensor Terminal (GST) must be processed while the mission is in progress.

(b) EVALUATION: Imagery is removed from the GST as target areas are completed. It is processed and interpreted while the aircraft is flying subsequent target areas. This innovation permits dissemination of targets within forty-five minutes of target area completion as compared to three to four hours

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then imagery was processed after mission completion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the system of processing Red Haze Imagery through the Ground Sensor Terminal be continued.

E. LOGISTICS.

(1) (U) ITEM: M551 Sheridan Vehicle.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, a drive sprocket problem was identified. The sprocket life is not predictable. One set of sprockets was worn beyond wear limits with only 160 miles while other sprockets remained serviceable with over 2,000 miles of use.

(b) EVALUATION: The drive sprocket problem indicates a lack of quality control by the manufacturer. The sprockets must be case hardened and quality control measures instituted to insure a quality product.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That drive sprockets be replaced with a wider, stronger sprocket to insure extended life. That quality control measures be taken to insure sprocket life that can be forecasted with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

(2) (U) ITEM: XM706 Commando Car.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period a high deadline rate was experienced. This was due to a lack of repair parts in the supply system. At the end of the period six (6) of the ten (10) vehicles were deadlined for parts. The greatest contributor to the high deadline rate was the non-availability of axle shafts.

(b) EVALUATION: The rear axle should be modified to eliminate the positive traction. The rear axle locks when turning and breaks the axle shaft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That repair parts for the Commando Car be made available through supply channels to using units. Also, that further vehicles not be accepted into the inventory without an adequate quantity of repair parts to preclude restricting the capability of using units to perform security and other type missions.

(3) (U) ITEM: AH-1G "Cobra" Aircraft-5th Mount Beam Cracking.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 5th mount beam has been cracking in the damper mount attaching area of the AH-1G aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION: Cracking has resulted from oscillatory loads caused by rotor system feed-back. This is not considered a safety-of-flight condition at this time.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a new 5th mount support fitting be rapidly integrated into the supply system, and during the interim period unit technical inspectors must closely inspect this area at each Intermediate Inspection. Pilots should be cautioned against high speed, steep dives and abrupt pullouts.

(4) (U) ITEM: Preventive Maintenance - 801 Tail Rotor Hub with 1100 hour TBO.

(a) OBSERVATION: When flying in rain, water may leak into the lubricant, causing contamination or leaking grip bearings. This condition can result in failure to the bearing.

(b) EVALUATION: When the aircraft crew chief purges the tail rotor hub after flying in the rain, or every ten (10) to twelve (12) hours under dry flight conditions, maximum hub life is insured.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other aviation units using the 801 Tail Rotor Hub consider using the same or similar procedures to insure maximum hub life.

(5) (U) ITEM: Loss of Tension in AH-1G Tail Rotor Cables.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noticed recently that AH-1G tail rotor cables are losing tension rapidly. When this occurs the quick disconnect assembly hits the vertical drive shaft and scores it, resulting in mandatory replacement of the vertical drive shaft.

(b) EVALUATION: A brief inspection of the tail rotor cable tension every 25 hours has alleviated this problem.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all aviation units with assigned AH-1G aircraft consider implementing a similar inspection procedure.

(6) (U) ITEM: Electrical Malfunctions in AH-1G Firing Circuits.

(a) OBSERVATION: Increased malfunctions in the AH-1G electrical firing circuits have been experienced with the onset of the rainy season.

(b) EVALUATION: All connections under the right front stress panels and front right fuselage are now being inspected at all PMP's. Further inspection of contact pins for moisture and corrosion is made at this time. These inspection procedures have reduced the malfunction rate.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units with assigned AH-1G aircraft experiencing similar malfunctions consider implementation of this inspection procedure.

(7) (U) ITEM: Low Hour Life of Helicopter Armament Intervolometers.

(a) OBSERVATION: An increasingly low hour life of helicopter armament intervolometers has been experienced during the onset of the rainy season.

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(b) **EVALUATION:** The need for a preventive maintenance procedure was evident. Consequently, all intervolometers are now removed at PMP's. The covers are removed and placed in a drying oven for two (2) hours. Upon remounting, care is taken to insure that the seal is moisture proof. A significant reduction in malfunctioning is now being experienced.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That all aviation units utilizing armament intervolometers consider implementation of this preventive maintenance procedure if the incidence of malfunctioning has increased significantly during wet weather.

(8) (U) **ITEM:** Failure of Armored Personnel Carrier Engines.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** In recent months an excessive failure of armored personnel carrier engines was detected among those received from Sagami Army Depot. Specifically numerous engines have failed because of cylinder blow-by. Further examination has shown various rings and seals to be improperly adjusted and/or positioned.

(b) **RECOMMENDATION:** Return all unsatisfactory engines to Sagami Army Depot preceded by a priority message indicating defects discovered during inspection. Document and keep a file of all such messages. Request USARV to research possibilities of investigating quality control at Sagami Army Depot.

(9) (U) **ITEM:** Use of Tow Cables and Steel Clamps.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The 100 foot tow cables presently used by mechanized units for "muck out" are made from 100 foot steel cables and cable clamps.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The cable clamps are often incapable of carrying the required stress, making the cable ineffective.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Commercially manufactured tow cables with welded steel eye hooks should be added to mechanized infantry and Cavalry TO&E's at the rate of 2 per platoon.

(10) (U) **ITEM:** Excess ASL and Fringe Items in Stock.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Many fringe and excess ASL items were found stocked in the Technical Supplies of the 725th Maintenance Battalion.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Many fringe and excess items were allowed to accumulate in the Technical Supplies. This created extreme over-crowding and made accurate inventories and location surveys impossible. Good supply procedures demand that only ASL items be stocked and only in authorized stockage levels.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** In order to properly sort and separate stocks to determine what should be retained or retrograded, all stocks must be located and inventoried. In all congested areas all stock should be moved to holding areas and only ASL items returned to storage locations. All items that are to be

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retrograded should be moved to a separate holding area. This procedure was used in the 725th Maintenance Battalion with excellent results.

(11) (U) ITEM: Shortage of Track for Armored Personnel Carriers.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period an unforeseen shortage of APC track manifested itself.

(b) EVALUATION: The amount of track programmed for use in Vietnam has not been equal to the demand. Probable cause can be attributed to inadequate anticipation of the increased usage of tracked vehicles, as well as unnecessary replacement of track when not required.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Attempt to develop a more responsive supply of track at Depot level based upon demand information. Advise all units requiring track that conservative usage can be practiced by replacing individual track blocks only when absolutely necessary and only that which is unserviceable in accordance with applicable regulations.

(12) (U) ITEM: Control of Available Supply Rate.

(a) OBSERVATION: Each month, comparison of available supply rate (ASR) records of the Division Ammunition Office with the Ammunition Section of II FFV showed large discrepancies. These discrepancies resulted in the Division being overdrawn or overcharged on some items at the end of the ASR period.

(b) EVALUATION: There were two causes of the problem. First, the DAO was accounting for items on the date they were actually drawn. Saigon Support Command, 1st Logistics Command, and II FFV were accounting for items on the date the ASP reported the draws. This was usually one day later. Therefore items drawn on the last day of the ASR were being charged against the subsequent period by II FFV. Second, errors were being made at all levels in recording and reporting issue quantities and units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: II FFV has taken steps to assure that the actual date of the draw is reported to them. The DAO now has his representatives at the ASP's compare their records with those of the ASP to assure accuracy. Saigon Support Command, 1st Logistics Command, and II FFV are aware of the problem of quantities and units not being accurately reported and are taking steps to solve it. In addition, steps are being taken to reconcile all books frequently during the month.

(13) (U) ITEM: Allocation of Transportation Assets for a Unit Move.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the Third Brigade's move from Dau Tieng to Cu Chi, the requirements to transport men and material exceeded the capacity of the assets organic to the various brigade units.

(b) EVALUATION: In augmenting organic transportation assets, it is

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customary to commit vehicles from outside sources for the duration of the move. However, since depot transportation runs vehicles to forward area base camps like Dau Tieng, it is logical that a large percentage of the requirements can be taken up by use of the depot transportation assets. However, this requires strict organization of unit property and quick on-loading and off-loading to insure that these vehicles meet convoy entry times and return quickly to 48th Group Control. This was the system used in relocating the 3d Brigade from Dau Tieng to Cu Chi. It worked extremely well.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Utilization of through-put assets on their return trip is by far the most efficient means of effecting a unit move from a forward area; provided sufficient time is available to allow movement by phases. This method requires close coordination between shipper and receiver to be successful.

(14) (U) **ITEM:** Resupply by CH-47 Aircraft.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Units receiving resupply in the field by CH-47 aircraft are often unable to properly reload the cargo net for backhaul.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Personnel properly trained in reloading methods can preclude hazards to the aircraft and loss of equipment. Unit S4's have trained key personnel at platoon and company level in proper loading techniques.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That other units consider this method of improving field reloading of CH-47 cargo nets.

F. **ORGANIZATION:** None

G. **OTHER.**

(1) (U) **ITEM:** Vietnamese Participation in Civil Affairs.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Increased efforts should be made to transfer more responsibility to the Vietnamese for Civil Affairs.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Vietnamese medics should be trained and become self-sufficient in attending to the medical needs of the people.


(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Participation by Vietnamese medics in MEDCAPS has been paramount in our efforts. Vietnamese medics are currently participating in MEDCAPS conducted by the 25th Medical Battalion which has also taken on the responsibility for on the job training of the new medics. It is expected that Vietnamese medics will soon conduct their own MEDCAPS and

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that nurses will be trained in classes held by the 25th Medical Battalion to work in the local dispensaries.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT L. FAIR
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

- 4 - CG, II FFV, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H
- 3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-(DST)
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- 2 - CG, RTAVF, ATTN: G3
- 2 - CG, ATF, ATTN: G3

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AVFBC-RE-H (4 Sep 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the Period
Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 [2 SEP 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 25th Infantry Division for the period ending
31 July 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


B. G. MACDONALD
ILT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (1 Aug 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 21 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96557

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Casualty Accounting," section II, page 82, paragraph 2A(1); nonconcur. While there is merit in adopting a form for USARV-wide use, the data required by this headquarters is summary in nature and can be derived from whatever form has been devised by the subordinate commander to meet his specific needs.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Airlift of D-5 Bulldozer," section II, page 84, paragraph 2B(5); concur:

(1) Procedures for the preparation of the D-5 Dozer are not contained in any of the Army publications covering external helicopter load preparations. A recommendation is being forwarded to the US Army Transportation School, the proponent of the publications, to include in future publications a standard procedure for the preparation of the D-5 Dozer for movement.

(2) The standardized D-5 bulldozer configuration for airlift has been established as a relatively clean bulldozer minus blade, tracks, tools, and loose equipment. Deviations will be required when the dozer is not relatively clean, is to be carried a long distance, or delivered to a higher elevation.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Fire Support Base Access Road Design," section II, page 84, paragraph 2B(7); concur. The objective of developing a road network design for fire support bases which will reduce maintenance requirements is sound. The concept presented by this recommendation is that the entrance road be constructed at a tangent to the interior perimeter road. This would require the construction of a separate exit road in order to accomplish the objective, with the disadvantage of creating a second opening in the perimeter. The Division will conduct further studies and tests of this concept to determine the optimum solution.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Operator Protection for Land Clearing Operations," section II, page 85, paragraph 2b(9); concur. This item was published in the USARV Commander's Notes for September 1969.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the
Period Ending 31 July 1969, KCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Helipad Construction," section II, page 86, paragraph 2B(11); concur. M8A1 matting is a command controlled item and heliport construction is an authorized use of this item. USARV Letter, AVHEN-CD, dated 1 December 1968, subject: T-17 Membrane, prohibits the use of rubber membrane for helipad construction without approval of this headquarters.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Land Clearing with Divisional Engineer Battalion Bulldozer Assets," section II, page 86, paragraph 2B(13); nonconcur. The divisional engineer battalions are presently authorized six Rome Plows and fourteen bulldozers, D7E. The Rome Plow kits may be attached to any of the D7E tractors. The provision of six additional D7E tractors equipped with the Rome Plow blade would require authorization for additional operators and maintenance capability.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Kit Carson Scouts," section II, page 89, paragraph 2B(21); concur. Unit Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) allocations were originally established by HQ, MACV. The allocations were 200 KCS per division and 100 per separate brigade. Some units were able to recruit more KCS than their original allocation of spaces. These units had their allocations increased while others were correspondingly decreased. Subsequently HQ, USARV was delegated authority to allocate KCS space authorizations to US Army units within a 2200 space ceiling. HQ, USARV has accepted a basis for employment of two KCS per platoon. Though the space ceiling does not allow sufficient spaces to fully implement this basis, the practical limit on KCS employment is the inability of some units to recruit two KCS per platoon. Allocations have been reduced for units unable to recruit sufficient KCS and increased for those able to exceed their normal allocation.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Training in the Transportation of Volatile Fuels," section II, page 95, paragraph 2C(6); concur. This type training is given at unit level and is not uniform throughout the command. DD Form 46's (Vehicle Operators Permits) are not annotated by all units to indicate that drivers are qualified to handle POL. Recommend DA forward this item to CONARC for consideration and possible inclusion in the POI for heavy truck operators.

i. (C) Reference item concerning "Order of Battle Handbooks," section II, page 96, paragraph 2D(1); concur. Pocket-size Order of Battle handbooks for use by intelligence personnel in the field have a distinct practical value. The handbooks must, of necessity, be written by the division intelligence personnel to provide basic background data which pertains to the operational area. Additionally, the constantly changing enemy situation requires continuous monitoring of the material in the handbooks to insure that it is current. This item will be included in the next issue of the USARV publication Combat Intelligence Lessons with the

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AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

recommendation that other division G2's in Vietnam consider publishing a pocket-size Order of Battle handbook. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

j. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of Hand Held Aerial Photography," section II, page 97, paragraph 2D(3); concur. The use of hand-held photography to assist in determining implaced sensor locations has been reported by other units but this is the first report of attaching a CS grenade to the sensor. There is little doubt that the photographed CS cloud permits the most accurate location possible at this time. Also, the placing of artillery on the site after implantation is an excellent deception. This item will be included in the next issue of the USARV publication, Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

k. (C) Reference item concerning "Sensor Operations to Reduce Mine Incidents," section II, page 97, paragraph 2D(4); concur. This item was previously reported in a separate 25th Infantry Division document and has been included as an article in the current issue of the USARV, Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

l. (U) Reference item concerning "M551 Sheridan Vehicle," section II, page 98, paragraph 2E(1); concur. The drive sprocket problem was identified during the 90 day evaluation of the initial 60 Sheridans deployed in RVN. The sprockets were designed to last for approximately 1000 miles. In some cases, sprockets were worn beyond use after 200 miles. Poor quality control during manufacture was suspected and reported to the Project Manager Sheridan Weapon System. User units have been directed to reverse the sprockets periodically to prolong sprocket life and to continue submitting EIR's on each early failure. Project Manager, Sheridan has been tasked by DA to investigate the reports of early sprocket failures and to take appropriate corrective actions to provide a more reliable sprocket. No further action is required at this time.

m. (U) Reference item concerning "XM706 Commando Car," section II, page 98, paragraph 2E(2); nonconcur. Deliveries of new vehicles should not be held up pending USARV fill on repair parts. AMC states that 95 percent of the programmed spare parts had been shipped by 30 September 1969.

n. (U) Reference item concerning "AH-1G 'Cobra' Aircraft-5th Mount Beam Cracking," section II, page 98, paragraph 2E(3); nonconcur. Paragraph 27, TB 750-992-4, dated 1 November 1968, addresses this problem and provides information on improved dampers and procedures for inspecting. If these procedures are found to be inadequate, an EIR should be submitted.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "Preventive Maintenance-801 Tail Rotor Hub with 1100 hour TBO," section II, page 99, paragraph 2E(4); concur. TB 55-1500-301-25 and TM 55-410 establish criteria for inspecting and purging the tail rotor hub.

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AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 25th Infantry Division for the
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


p. (U) Reference item concerning "Loss of Tension in AH-1G Tail Rotor Cables," section II, page 99, paragraph 2E(5); concur. TB 55-1500-301-25 and TM 55-410 establish cable tension inspection criteria.

q. (U) Reference item concerning "Low Hour Life of Helicopter Armament Intervalometers," section II, page 99, paragraph 2E(7); concur. This is an acceptable process when the new intervalometer (FSN 4933-133-9867) is not available for issue.

r. (U) Reference item concerning "Failure of Armored Personnel Carrier Engines," section II, page 100, paragraph 2E(8); concur. Several units have reported receiving faulty rebuilt APC engines from the Sagami rebuild facility. A report describing the causes of early engine failures has been forwarded to Sagami. In addition, the 1st Logistical Command conducted run-in tests on a sample of Sagami. Several deficiencies were detected and reported to USARPAC. All unsatisfactory engines are being returned to Sagami as recommended in this ORLL. In addition, representatives from Sagami are scheduled to come to RVN to conduct run-in test on engines in-country.

s. (U) Reference item concerning "Use of TOW Cables and Steel Clamps," section II, page 100, paragraph 2E(9); nonconcur. MTOE action is not appropriate. This is the first reported instance of tow cable failure received by this headquarters. An EIR should be submitted as prescribed in TM 38-750 to properly document the failure and to insure that corrective action is initiated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


for C. D. WILSON
LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
25th Inf Div
II FFV

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
GPOP-DT (1 Aug 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Infantry Division
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 NOV 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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TROOP LIST
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
1 MAY - 31 JULY 1969

I. ORGANIC

- a. Command & Control Elements
 - HHC, 25th Inf Div
 - HHC, 1st Brigade
 - HHC, 2nd Brigade
 - HHC, 3rd Brigade
- b. Combat
 - 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav
- c. Combat Support Elements
 - HHC, 25th Inf Div Arty
 - 1st Bn, 8th Arty
 - 7th Bn, 11th Arty
 - 3rd Bn, 13th Arty
 - 2nd Bn, 77th Arty
 - 25th MP Company
 - 25th Aviation Battalion
 - 65th Engineer Battalion
 - 125th Signal Battalion
- d. Combat Service Support Elements
 - HHC & Band, 25th Div Spt Cmd
 - 25th Admin Company
 - 25th Med Battalion
 - 25th S&T Battalion
 - 725th Maint Battalion

II. ASSIGNED

AUTHORITY

- a. Command & Control Elements - None
- b. Combat Elements
 - 1st Bn, 5th Inf (Mech)
 - 4th Bn, 9th Inf
 - 2nd Bn, 12th Inf
 - 2nd Bn, 14th Inf
 - 2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (Mech)
 - 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf
 - 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech)
 - 1st Bn, 27th Inf
 - 2nd Bn, 27th Inf
 - 2nd Bn, 34th Armor (-)

USARV GO 5063 3 Oct 67

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II. ASSIGNED (Cont)

AUTHORITY

Co B attached to 1st Inf Div	USARV GO	869	31 Jan 69
Co C attached to 1st Bde, 5th Div (Mech)	" "	1836	21 May 69
Co F, 75th Inf (Ranger)	" "	557	17 Feb 69
c. Combat Support Elements			
9th Chemical Det	USARV GO	503	4 Feb 68
38th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)	" "	5423	24 Oct 67
44th Inf Flt (Scout Dog)	" "	4801	10 Aug 67
46th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)	" "	5425	15 Oct 67
66th Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)	" "	821	21 Feb 68
265th FA Arty Det (Radar)	" "	1412	22 Apr 69
d. Combat Service Support Elements			
15th Public Information Detachment	USARV GO	503	4 Feb 68
18th Military History Detachment	" "	"	"
20th Public Information Detachment	" "	"	"
25th Military Intelligence Detachment	" "	"	"

III. ATTACHED

a. Command & Control Elements - None			
b. Combat Elements			
60th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)	USARV GO	1378	18 Apr 69
c. Combat Support Elements			
Btry B, 5th Bn, 2d Arty			
Btry I, 29th Arty (1 Plt)			
44th EOD Det	USARV GO	1357	10 Apr 67
159th Med Det, Helicopter Ambulance	" "	5121	4 Nov 68
258th FA Det (Radar-CM)	" "	4263	10 Sep 68
341st Avn Det	" "	931	16 Mar 68
362nd Avn Det	" "	1268	11 Apr 69
d. Combat Service Support Elements			
5th Weather Sqdn Det (USAF)	USARV GO	1122	1 Apr 69
20th Preventive Med Det	" "	4701	9 Oct 68
40th MED Det	" "	5166	9 Oct 67
390th Quartermaster Det (Petroleum)	" "	5406	23 Oct 67
USA Special Security Det	" "	4182	3 Sep 68
372nd Radio Research Co	" "	2433	6 Jul 69

IV. DIRECT SUPPORT

LOCATION

4th Med Det	Cu Chi, RVN
Co B, 86th Signal Battalion	Cu Chi, RVN
53rd Signal Det	Cu Chi, RVN

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IV. DIRECT SUPPORT (Cont)

LOCATION

61st Trans Det	Cu Chi, RVN
HQ Co, 86th Signal Bn, Support	Cu Chi, RVN
94th Maint Co, Support	Cu Chi, RVN
116th Assault Helicopter Co	Cu Chi, RVN
242nd Assault Helicopter Co	Cu Chi, RVN
277th Resupply Bn, Service	Cu Chi, RVN
283rd Sig Det	Cu Chi, RVN
319th Avn Det	Dau Tieng, RVN
325th Weather Det	Cu Chi, RVN
501st Land Clearing Co	Cu Chi, RVN
578th Sig Co, Support	Tay Ninh, RVN
587th Sig Co, Support	Dau Tieng, RVN
720th MP Bn, Co A, 3rd Plt	Dau Tieng, RVN

V. GENERAL SUPPORT

8th Aerial Port Sqdn	Cu Chi, RVN
12th Med Hospital Evac	Cu Chi, RVN
Btry B, 2nd Bn, 12th Arty	Dau Tieng, RVN
HQ & Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty	Tay Ninh, RVN
20th TC Co, Aircraft	Cu Chi, RVN
45th Sigr MA (MUST)	Tay Ninh, RVN
104th Engr Co, Dump Truck	Cu Chi, RVN
113th Engr Det, Concrete	Dau Tieng, RVN
267th Cable Construction	Dau Tieng, RVN
269th Avn Bn, Assault Helicopter	Cu Chi, RVN
362nd Engr Co	Tay Ninh, RVN
515th Engr Plt, Asphalt Construction	Cu Chi, RVN
554th Engr Bn, Construction	Cu Chi, RVN
588th Engr Bn, Combat, Co C	Tay Ninh, RVN

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION 1 May - 31 July 1969

Results of the 25th Infantry Division Operations, 1 May to 31 July 1969

Division Losses

Killed in action	-	179
Wounded in action (evacuated)	-	572
Missing in action	-	None
Helicopters destroyed	-	10
Helicopters damaged	-	25
Aircraft damaged	-	2
Armored personnel carriers destroyed	-	27
Armored personnel carriers damaged	-	33
Tanks destroyed	-	7
Tanks damaged	-	15
Trucks destroyed	-	13
Trucks damaged	-	13
Rome Plows damaged	-	2
Bulldozers destroyed	-	2
Bulldozers damaged	-	6
Vehicle Track Recovery damaged	-	1
Flame Track destroyed	-	1
Boats damaged	-	1

Enemy Losses

Killed in action (body count)	-4,516
Prisoners-of-war	- 114
VCI captured	- 9
Hoi Chanhs	- 23
Detainees	- 418
Individual weapons, captured and destroyed	- 940
Crew served weapons, captured and destroyed	- 267
Documents captured	- 435 pounds
Rice, captured and destroyed	- 132.01 tons
Grain, captured and destroyed	- 20.38 tons
Salt, captured and destroyed	- .94 tons
Medical supplies, captured	- 512 pounds
Small arms rounds, captured and destroyed	-51676
HE rounds, captured and destroyed	-1,856
Rockets, captured and destroyed	- 58
RPG rounds, captured and destroyed	-1,232
RPG boosters, captured and destroyed	- 382
Explosives, captured and destroyed	- 557 pounds
Mines, captured and destroyed	- 474

nclosure 2

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Hand Grenades, captured and destroyed	-	805
Bombs destroyed	-	29
Cluster bomb units destroyed	-	6
Blasting caps destroyed	-	236
Mortar fuzes, captured and destroyed	-	216
Rocket detonators destroyed	-	1
Gas masks, captured and destroyed	-	24
Uniforms captured	-	582
Cloth, captured and destroyed	-	400 yards
Cans of food captured	-	2,255
Motorcycles captured	-	3
Bicycles, captured and destroyed	-	38
Oxcarts destroyed	-	43
Sampans destroyed	-	118
Radios captured	-	13
Telephones captured	-	3
Batteries captured	-	49

Incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
18TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AWDCMH
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report

25 June 1969

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: Command Historian
APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: O.C.M.H.
Washington, D.C. 20315

1. NAME AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION: Team 23, Company F, 75th Infantry (Ranger) - Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol.
2. INCLUSIVE DATES OF OPERATION: 030455 June - 051917 June 1969.
3. LOCATION: Ref: Map Series L8020, Sheet Number 6231 11S. Insertion XT 398186, Operations Vicinity XT 3917, XT 3919, XT 3920; Extraction XT 396205.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 25th Infantry Division (ACofS-G2).
5. PERSON BEING INTERVIEWED: Sgt. Darrell Damron, RA 15 794 788, Assistant Team Leader, Team 23.
6. INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Division Historian.
7. TASK ORGANIZATION: 10 Man Patrol (See Inclosure 2).
8. SUPPORTING FORCES:
 - a. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery - F.S.B. Jackson (XT 425168).
 - b. Two River Patrol Boats (PBR) from U.S. Navy River Division 592 for insertion and extraction.
 - c. One Night Hawk Helicopter, Co A, 25th Aviation Battalion.
9. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Team 23 had concluded a prior patrol mission 48 hours before beginning this mission.

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10. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy - There had been previous sightings of small groups of VC in the vicinity of the insertion point. This area is a heavily used infiltration corridor out of Cambodia.

b. Terrain - This area lies along the west bank of the Vam Co Dong River. There are numerous small canals and streams feeding into the river. Swamp, hedgerows, and thickets of secondary growth are mixed throughout the area. Movement is difficult in this area. Fields of observation and fire vary from generally poor to good in some portions of the area.

c. Weather - The weather during this operation was generally good, with no heavy precipitation. The only rainfall occurred in the late afternoon of 5 June. The weather did not hinder operations.

11. MISSION: Team 23's mission was to gather information on the movement and activities of the enemy in this area, and within their capability, to capture or kill enemy personnel.

12. CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND EXECUTION: At 0455 hours on 3 June 1969, the Team, consisting of ten men, was inserted by River Patrol Boats along the west bank of the Vam Co Dong River (XT 398196). The team moved to the south-southwest for 200 meters and established an observation post at grid XT 398196. After the observation post was fully established, the team sent a three man reconnaissance patrol to check the surrounding area. This patrol discovered that the O.P. was on the edge of an enemy base area. They found four bunkers which had evidence of occupation within the past 24 hours. There was also evidence of heavy trail activity in the area. When the reconnaissance patrol returned and reported this information, the team shifted into an ambush position along a hedgerow which commanded one approach to the bunkers. The team maintained this position throughout the day without contact. At 2116 hours the PBR's patrolling the river were engaged by an enemy force 500 meters south of the team's location, and their return fire from caliber .50 machineguns began impacting around the team's position. The team radioed the naval patrol, informed them of the situation, and the PBR's shifted their firing position. No further action occurred during the night. Due to a planned ARVN operation in the area, the team was extracted at 0902 hours on 4 June, and returned to the Naval Patrol Base at Go Dau Ha (XT 3825) to plan for an insertion in another area. They selected an area further south along the river, but as they approached this insertion point at 1930 hours, the PBR's received automatic weapons fire from the bank. Five (5) VC were observed, and the area was engaged with automatic weapons and artillery. Due to the approaching darkness, no further insertion attempts were made, and the patrol returned to Go Dau Ha.

The following morning, 5 June, the team was inserted to the north of the original insertion point (XT 397207) at 0525 hours. The team moved 75 meters to the south and established a circular observation post. During the day, the team dispatched a reconnaissance patrol which found a group of four bunkers 300 meters southwest of the observation post. There were also signs of heavy trail activity in this area.

At 1700 hours, the team observed 30 VC walking along a rice paddy dike from south to north, approximately 50 meters west of their position. They were moving

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in groups of three to four individuals with approximately 20 meters between groups. The enemy were dressed in mixed clothing/uniforms, but were well-armed, carrying 21 AK-47's, three light machineguns, three Browning Automatic Rifles, seven R.P.G.-7 and two R.P.G.-2 launchers.

The team leader (SSG Lemonds) requested an artillery fire mission and helicopter gunships to engage the enemy. At this point the enemy were bunching up as they prepared to cross a log over a small stream 150 meters west of the team's position. The team leader made a rapid assessment of the situation. Once across the stream, the target would be lost due to the heavy underbrush. At this point, they presented a compact target and they were completely absorbed in crossing the stream. The team leader quickly moved the team on line, and at his command they hit the enemy with an intense volume of machinegun, M79, rifle grenade, and M16 fire. The physical and psychological shock was so great that the enemy force was knocked to the ground and their return fire was wild and completely ineffective. The enemy regained just enough composure to drag their dead (observed to be 15) down into the brush along the stream bank and crawl into the thickets on the far side. The team maintained a heavy volume of fire against the withdrawing enemy.

At 1725 hours, a Night Hawk helicopter arrived over the area and began strafing the likely withdrawal routes, at the same time the team leader began adjusting artillery fire onto the area into which the enemy had withdrawn. A total of 72 HE rounds were placed on the target. At 1837 hours, the team began a sweep into the area. They found one enemy body with an AK-47 rifle and heavy blood trails leading out in several directions.

At 1917 hours, after completing their search, the team moved on an azimuth of 90 degrees to an extraction point on the river (XT 396205) and were picked up by the PBR's. The team had sustained no casualties.

13. ANALYSIS: This operation had several notable features, in addition to the results achieved. The smooth coordination between the patrol and the PBR's, working along the river, allowed for flexibility in making the insertions and extractions. The patrol could choose any point along the river for a rapid drop-off or pick-up and have covering fire available from the patrol boats. The use of reconnaissance patrols in addition to observation posts extended the team's surveillance over the area, produced more information, and allowed the team to adjust their activity based on a greater knowledge of the area. The most significant aspect of this operation was the mental and physical flexibility of the team members which allowed them to shift from a circular surveillance posture to a linear ambush in a matter of seconds, and with strict fire control defeat an enemy force three times their size.

Incl

1. ~~Overlay~~ (Incl wd HQ, DA)
2. Team Roster
3. List of Weapons
4. Equipment SOP

CF:

- 2 - CG, USARV, ATTN: G3
- 2 - CG, II FFV, ATTN: G3

Michael D. Keating

MICHAEL D. KEATING
Major, Armor
Commanding

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Inclure 2

Personnel of Team 23
Co F, 75th Inf. (Ranger)

SSG Lemonds - Team Leader - RTO

SGT Damron - Assistant Team Leader - RTO

SP4 Doyoung - (Not on operation 5 June 69)

SP4 Gentile

SP4 Porter

SP4 Stuckey

PFC Evans

PFC Harjo

PFC Holland

Kit Carson Scout Ly

Incl 2 to Incl 3

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Inclosure 3

Weapons used by Team 23 and
by NVA engaged, 5 June 1969

Team 23

Weapon	Number Carried	Number Fired
M-16 5.56mm	3	3
CAR-15 5.56mm	4	3
M-14 7.62mm	1	1
Sniper Rifle .22LR	1	0
M3A1 .45ACP	1	0
M79 .40mm	2	2
M60 7.62mm	1	1
M72 LAW 66mm	2	1
M18A-1 Claymore Mine	9	0

NVA

Weapon	Number Carried	Number Captured
RPG-7	7	0
RPG-2	2	0
ChiCom MG	3	0
BAR	3	0
AK-47	21	1
Pistols	3	0

Incl 3 to Incl 3

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Inclosure 4

COMPANY F (RANGER) 75TH INFANTRY
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

ACDCCV-L
SUBJECT: Equipment SOP

1 MARCH 1969

1. Inclosures 1 & 2 are listings of equipment which will be carried on operations by teams and team members of this company.

2. The attached lists reflect the minimum equipment in minimum quantities. Equipment may be added and quantities may be increased at the discretion of any one in the tactical chain of command on a mission basis. Platoon Leaders and/or Platoon Sergeants are responsible for informing the Company Commander or the Operations Officer prior to a team's departure if the team is unable to comply with this SOP.

s/ Marshall L. Sharp
t/ MARSHALL L. SHARP
CPT Infantry
Commanding

A TRUE COPY:

Michael D. Keating
MICHAEL D. KEATING
Major, Armor
Division Historian

Incl 4 to Incl 3

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COMPANY F (RANGER) 75TH INFANTRY
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCCV-L
SUBJECT: Team Equipment

1 MARCH 1969

1. 2 PRC-25 Radios w/3 batteries each
2. 2 PRC-25 Long Antennas w/base
3. 4 PRC-25 Handsets
4. 1 Starlite Scope
5. 4 WP Hand Grenades
6. 1 M60 MG
7. 1 M-79
8. 4 Star Clusters
9. 4 Parachute Flares
10. 1 Cal. 22 Sniper Rifle (22LR - Silencer Equipped - 1 Box of Ammo Carried)
11. 2 Strobe Lights
12. 2 VS-17 Panel Markers
13. 1 Litter (Collapsible)
14. 6 Trip Flares
15. First Aid Kit (Special Kit for Jungle Operations)
16. 4 CS Grenades
17. 2 LAW's
18. 2 Flashlights w/red filters or 2 Pen-Lites
19. 1 Pair Binoculars 6X30
20. 2 Maps
21. 2 SOI's
22. 2 WP Rifle Grenades w/crimped cartridges for M-16

Inclosure 1 to Incl 4 to Incl 3

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COMPANY F (RANGER) 75TH INFANTRY
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCCV-L
SUBJECT: Individual Equipment

1 MARCH 1969

1. Pistol Belt
2. 2 Battle Dressings
3. 5 Quarts Water
4. 6 M-26 or M-33 Hand Grenades
5. Ammunition
 - a. 450 rounds M-16 (30 + Mag. for each M16/CAR 15)
 - b. 100 HE & 100 Canister M-79, 12 rounds CS. (per Grenadier)
 - c. 100 rounds M-60 MG (100 per man)
6. 2 Smoke Grenades
7. 1 Bottle Insect Repellent
8. 1 Bottle Water Purification Tablets
9. Malaria Prophylaxis Tablets (sufficient for mission)
10. 50 Salt Tablets
11. Compass
12. Wrist Watch
13. Weapons Cleaning Equipment to Include Cleaning Rod
14. 1 Claymore Mine
15. Signal Mirror
16. Knife or Bayonet
17. Protective Mask (XM28E-1 for Riot Control Agents)
18. Length of Parachute Suspension Line
19. ID Card and ID Tags

Inclosure 2 to Incl 4 to Incl 3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
18TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

30 June 1969

AVDCMH

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: Command Historian
APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: O.C.M.H.
Washington, D.C. 20315

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Fire Support Base Crook (Offensive-Defensive).
2. INCLUSIVE DATES OF OPERATION: 052000 June - 072130 June 1969.
3. LOCATION: Tay Ninh Province, RVN. Map Series 1501, Sheet Number NC48-3. Grid - XT055595.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. PERSON BEING INTERVIEWED: MAJ Joseph E. Hacia, 05311008, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (officer in command of FSB Crook).
6. INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Division Historian
7. TASK ORGANIZATION:
 - a. Company B, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry.
 - b. Battery A, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery.
 - c. Elements of the 3-22 Infantry communications, medical, support, and mortar platoons.
8. SUPPORTING FORCES: Artillery, aviation and Air Force support was allocated from normal brigade and division assets as the action developed at FSB Crook.
 - a. U.S. Artillery

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Incl 4

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(1) Battery C, 1-27 Artillery (155mm), FSB Washington (XT146568), II FFV GSR.

(2) One platoon, Battery A, 2-32 Artillery (175mm), FSB St. Barbara (XT272683), II FFV GSR.

(3) One platoon, Battery B, 3-13 Artillery (8 inch), Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT165515), 25th Division Artillery.

b. ARVN Artillery: One platoon, Battery C, 3-38 Artillery (155mm), Cao Ia (XT125502).

c. U.S. Aircraft

5-6 June

6-7 June

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| (1) 2 Night Hawks, A/2-25 Avn Bn. | 2 Night Hawks, A/2-25 Avn Bn. |
| (2) 2 AH1G (Cobra), B/2-25 Avn Bn. | 2 UH1H (Gunships), B/2-25 Avn Bn. |
| (3) 2 AH1G (Cobra), 187th Aslt. Hel. Co. | 1 UH1H (Flare), B/2-25 Avn Bn. |
| (4) 2 AH1G (Cobra), D/3-4 Cav. | 2 AH1G (Cobra), 187th Aslt. Hel. Co. |
| (5) 2 AH1G (Cobra), 334th Aslt Hel. Co. | 4 AH1G (Cobra), D/3-4 Cav. |

d. U.S. Air Force Aircraft

5-6 June

6-7 June

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|
| (1) 2 F4C Fighters | 2 F4C Fighters |
| (2) 8 F-100 Fighters | 10 F-100 Fighters |
| (3) 2 AC-119 Gunships | 1 AC-119 Gunship |
| (4) 2 AC-47 Gunships | 2 AC-47 Gunships |

9. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy - Prior to the beginning of the attacks of Fire Support Base Crook, intelligence indicated that a high point of enemy activity was to occur between 1 and 10 June 1969. Information received from documents captured on 23 and 28 May by the 1st Air Cavalry Division revealed that the 88th NVA Regiment would attack a U.S. position in the Tay Ninh area. A specific time frame for the attack was not mentioned in the documents; however, they did disclose that the cadre of the 88th Regiment were to finish training courses conducted at the Regimental Headquarters by 1 June. At this time the Regiment was believed to be dispersed in central War Zone C. The remaining two regiments of the 9th VC/NVA

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Division, the 271st and 272nd, were believed to be located in base areas in Cambodia, also preparing for attacks in the Tay Ninh area.

Information received from P.W.'s and documents after the attacks on FSB Crook identified the 3rd Battalion, 272nd NVA Regiment as the attacking force on 5-6 June, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 88th NVA Regiment as the attacking forces on 6-7 June. The actions and location of the 3rd Battalion, 272nd NVA Regiment just prior to the 5-6 June attack are uncertain; however, the 2nd Battalion, 88th Regiment with a strength of 180 men, had moved to the vicinity of XT049678 on 4 June and built defensive positions and continued training. The 3rd Battalion, 88th Regiment with a strength of 200 men had moved to a temporary base camp in the vicinity of XT1061 on 4 June. A 50-man company from the 271st NVA Regiment was attached to the 3rd Battalion. The attacks on FSB Crook coincided with the Midway meeting of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Presidents. It is likely that the enemy objective was to gain a moral or psychological victory, in order to counter the impact of this meeting.

b. Terrain - The area surrounding Fire Support Base Crook is flat and generally forested. The area to the east is triple-canopy jungle. To the north, there is scattered double-canopy jungle. The area to the south is secondary growth, while to the southwest and west are abandoned rice paddies. The Soui Ben Da stream flows from north to south, 300 meters to the west of the base. Fields of observation and artillery direct fire are good, extending from the minimum of 220 meters on the east to 350 meters on the north and south and up to 1000 meters to the southwest. Fields of fire for small arms are excellent out to 200 meters. The wooded areas on the east and northeast offer the best avenues of approach; however, there is a destroyed village to the south with broken ground and brush which offers a secondary approach to within 200 meters of the base. The base is positioned astride an east-west road, and there is a north-south trail east of the base which provide rapid approaches into the general area. The only significant obstacle to movement in the area is the Soui Ben Da stream on the west which is not fordable in the immediate vicinity of the base, although there is a footbridge at the road crossing (See Inclosure 2).

c. Weather - During the period 5 to 8 June the area around FSB Crook was characterized by partly cloudy skies in the morning and afternoon with a general overcast (ceiling 1000 feet) by 1900 hours. There were intermittent rain showers in the late afternoon and early evening in the area. At approximately 2400 hours, however, the sky would clear for a radius of five miles around FSB Crook, providing excellent observation and flying conditions.

10. MISSION: Fire Support Base Crook was established in April 1969 to interdict VC/NVA movement northwest of Tay Ninh City and to support the platoon and company sized offensive operations conducted in that area.

11. EXECUTION: The first indication of the impending attack on Fire Support Base Crook came at 2000 hours on 5 June when the base monitored seismic sensor activations, indicating heavy activity 950 meters east and 550 meters north-

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west of the base. These two areas were engaged with supporting artillery and the activity ceased. At this time, the AN/PFS-4 radar mounted on the observation tower began to detect groups of 3-4 personnel moving in the woodlines all around the base. Approximately 18 sightings were made between 2000 hours and 0100 hours. The direction and distance of each sighting was relayed to the artillery battery within the base which engaged each location with time fused direct fire (Killer Junior). Beginning at 2130 hours, the Battalion Executive Officer requested interdictionary artillery fires on the trails and likely assembly areas around the base, and placed the base on 100% alert. As the cloud cover cleared shortly after midnight, an observer with a starlight scope in the tower began to sight the same small groups that had been detected by radar. From 0130 hours to 0255 hours the movement around the base generally ceased, but the interdictionary fires were continued.

At 0255 hours, the enemy initiated an attack by fire. 107mm and 122mm rockets, 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 82mm and 60mm mortar rounds, RPG's and small arms fire began to impact in and around the base. The rate of indirect fire was 80 rounds per minute for the first five minutes and approximately 50 rounds per minute for the next one and one-half hours. Most of the rockets passed over the base and impacted outside the wire to the east. One man was killed by a mortar round as an L.P. to the west was being withdrawn. There was little damage and were few casualties within the perimeter. Coordinated with the attack by fire, the enemy launched a battalion sized assault from the south and east. (See Inclosure 3). The troops within the base laid down a heavy volume of grazing fire, as the howitzers fired "Killer Junior" to the depth of 150-200 meters all around the base. The supporting 155mm artillery was used to hit the enemy attack positions in the woodline to the south, while the 8 inch artillery fired deeper into this area. The bases's 81mm and 4.2" mortars fired on the woodline to the east, and 175mm artillery was used to suppress the enemy firing positions to the north. The intense defensive fires slowed the enemy ground assault but a 16 man element did breach the outer wire on the south with bangalore torpedoes. The men on the bunker line stopped this group with automatic weapons and claymore mines. Although their attack was stopped, the bulk of the enemy force remained in the open, firing small arms and RPG's at the bunkers. At approximately 0400 hours, AC-47 and AC-119 gunships, helicopter fire teams, and Air Force fighters arrived over the area. The 175mm artillery fire was shifted 1 kilometer to the north, thus clearing the area to the north and west for engagement by the gunships. The AC-47 gunship poured fire into the open area around the base for 360 degrees. As the helicopters moved in, they were engaged by numerous .51 caliber machineguns (estimated 15) around the area, with the heaviest concentration on the west. One observation helicopter was damaged and the Brigade command and control ship received five hits. As the helicopters suppressed the anti-aircraft fire, the intense supporting fires forced the enemy to withdraw into the jungle. (See Inclosure 4). By 0530 there was only sporadic fire from the surrounding area, but artillery and TAC air continued to hit suspected targets. At 0645 hours, Company B sent a platoon through the break in the wire to search through the area to the south. As they moved into the old village area they were engaged at close range by a group of 10-15 NVA who had remained concealed in spider holes. The Company B Commander and three radio operators were wounded by grenades. The platoon moved back to the bunker line by bounds and the

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area was engaged with 155mm artillery and TAC air strikes, forcing the remaining NVA to flee into the forest to the south. After the search of the battle area was resumed, 76 NVA bodies, 15 small arms, 1 RPG launcher, 10,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and numerous RPG rounds were recovered. The NVA soldiers were dressed in khaki uniforms and wearing "Ho Chi Minh" sandals. Each man had been equipped with an AK-47 rifle, a bandolier, 8 to 10 hand grenades, a cup-type gas mask, and was carrying an extra 5 RPG rounds. The bodies were significantly free of extraneous material such as documents, diaries or other personal effects. Three infiltration passes were found, which identified the battalion as an element of the 272nd NVA Regiment.

Later that morning, Companies A and C of the battalion were air-landed approximately 5 kilometers north of FSB Crook to search south toward the base. At 1245 hours, Company A became engaged with an unknown sized enemy force and light contact continued until 1545 hours. Due to this contact the search north of the base was not completed on 6 June. On the evening of 6 June, the pattern of activity resumed in an almost identical fashion. From 2000 to 2030 hours, the seismic sensors northwest and east of the base transmitted heavy activity. The radar detected two groups of approximately 40 personnel moving 1500 meters north of the base. From 2000 to 0100 hours, the radar continued to detect groups of 3 to 5 men in the woodlines all around the base. Each area of activity was engaged with mortar and artillery fire, or direct fire from the howitzers within the base.

By 0100 hours, the majority of the movement had ceased, but all areas continued to be engaged with direct (Killer Junior) and indirect fires. At 0200 hours, a Night Hawk helicopter, flying in to support the action, detected large groups of enemy moving toward the base along the road from the east. Artillery fires were immediately shifted to attack these groups. At 0255 the enemy attack by fire began with greater intensity than the previous night. For the first five minutes the rate of fire was 150 rounds of rocket, mortar, and RPG fire per minute, and approximately 50 rounds per minute for the next one and one-half hours. Three U.S. soldiers were wounded by the initial volley. Coordinated with the attack by fire, the enemy launched a two battalion ground assault, one battalion moving out of the woodline to the northeast, and the other attacking from the northwest. (See Inclosure 5). The base engaged the attacking enemy with "Killer Junior" and automatic weapons. The Night Hawk helicopter strafed the enemy coming out of the jungle to the northeast, while two helicopter fire teams hit the battalion on the northwest with machinegun and rocket fire; these gunships were followed by TAC air strikes which dropped napalm and fragmentation bombs on this force. An AC-47 gunship and helicopter gunships engaged the .51 caliber machineguns which had begun firing from the west of the stream. 175mm artillery was placed on the jungle to the northwest, while mortar fire, 155mm and 8 inch howitzer fire was used to suppress the enemy firing positions to the east and south. The area was under continuous illumination by the AC-119 gunship, which engaged the area outside the wire with machine gun fire. (See Inclosure 6) The enemy coming from the northwest breached the first wire barrier, but were stopped by the intense defensive fires. The attack from the northeast was stopped before it reached the wire. The continuous defensive fires forced the enemy to attempt to withdraw, but the volume of automatic fire and bursting munitions

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was so great that the majority were trapped and cut down in the open. Those who did reach the jungle had to move through concentrations of mortar and artillery fire, which was shifted out in pursuit of them.

By 0530 hours, those enemy who could, had withdrawn. At 0815 hours, Company A of the battalion was air-landed southeast of the base and began a sweep to the west. Company C landed east of the base at 0845 hours and began a search of that area. The Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon, and two platoons from Company D were brought into reinforce Company B, and to assist in the sweep to the north.

As the sweep around the base concluded, 323 NVA bodies, 10 PW's, 39 AK-47 rifles, 2 light machineguns, 2 60mm mortars, 90 rounds of 60mm ammunition, 2 RPG launchers, 230 RPG's, 500 hand grenades, 84 satchel charges, 10 bangalore torpedoes, and 3000 rounds of small arms ammunition were recovered. That evening at 2000 hours, the Base Commander (MAJ Hacia) ordered a test firing of all weapons as a precaution in the event of continued enemy attacks. Moments after the test firing began, the base received small arms fire from 360 degrees and several 75mm recoilless rifle rounds. Within 15 minutes they also received a light volume of mortar and rocket fire. The base returned the fire with automatic weapons, "Killer Junior", and artillery. This duel lasted until 2130 hours, when firing ceased. A third enemy attack had been aborted by the initiation of the test fire. 3 NVA bodies were recovered from this attack.

12. **COMMAND:** The base was under command of Major Joseph E. Hacia, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry. CPT Larry B. Thomas commanded B Company of the Battalion and CPT Dickson A. Neal commanded Battery A, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery. Major Hacia alternated his position between the observation tower and the TOC bunker. CPT Thomas positioned himself along the bunker line at the point of the main attacks. The battery commander remained at the battery firing position.

13. COMMUNICATIONS:

a. **Radio** - The operation was controlled on the Battalion (3-22 Inf) Command Net. The TOC bunker had one radio on the Battalion Command Net, one radio on the Battalion Logistics Net, and one radio on the Company B Command Net. On the tower there were two radios, one on the Battalion Command Net and one on the Battery A Fire Direction Net. The Company B CP had one radio on the Company Net and one radio on the Battalion Command Net. Battery A operated on their Fire Direction Net and monitored the Infantry Battalion Command Net.

b. **Wire** - The communications bunker was located 15 meters from the TOC. The switchboard had connections to the TOC, the tower, the FDC, the Company B CP, and the platoon CP's. In addition to this wire net, there was a "Hot Loop" connecting the TOC, Company B CP, FDC, and platoon CP's. There were also direct lines from the tower to the TOC and FDC. The switchboard operators in the communications center had been instructed to connect all stations in a conference call at the first sign of enemy contact, this addition to the "Hot Loop", provided two open circuit telephone systems.

14. **RESUPPLY:** Seven CH-47 sorties were required to resupply FSB Crook on the

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mornings of 6 and 7 June. Infantry and artillery expenditures for the period of 5-8 June are as follows:

a.	M16	5.56mm	-	170,360 rounds
b.	M60	7.62mm	-	120,820 rounds
c.	Hand Grenades (Frag)		-	300
d.	Caliber .50 MG		-	13,000 rounds
e.	66mm Rocket (LAW)		-	156
f.	4.2" Mortar:	HE	-	477 rounds
		ILLUM	-	353 rounds
		WP	-	57 rounds
		CS	-	34 rounds
g.	81mm Mortar:	HE	-	822 rounds
		ILLUM	-	567 rounds
		WP	-	93 rounds
h.	40mm Grenades:	HE	-	5197 rounds
		CS	-	114 rounds
i.	90mm RR:	HE	-	38 rounds
		BEEHIVE	-	192 rounds
j.	Claymore Mines:		-	274
k.	Trip Flares		-	328
l.	Hand Flares		-	324
m.	105mm Howitzer		-	1764 rounds
n.	155mm Howitzer		-	843 rounds
o.	8 inch Howitzer		-	96 rounds
p.	175mm Howitzer		-	75 rounds

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15. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. "Super Claymore". A 15 pound electrically detonated shaped charge pointed in the direction of the enemy with a roll of barbed wire placed in front of the shaped charge. The roll of wire has a block of C4 explosive in the center, fused with a nonelectric blasting cap, and connected to the shaped charge with detonating cord. Upon ignition, the C4 ruptures the rolled wire as the shaped charge blows the disintegrating mass in the direction of the enemy. Thirty of these devices were positioned around Fire Support Base Crook and used with devastating effect on the enemy assault troops.

b. Fougasse. Eight 55 gallon drums of Fougasse were positioned around the base, but the enemy troops took great care in avoiding the ground in front of these devices.

c. Six of the eight M-60 machineguns belonging to the artillery battery were placed on the bunker line and manned by the rifle company. This doubled the number of machineguns firing from the bunker line.

d. The rifle company 1st Sergeant maintained a P.L.L. for small arms and established a repair point in a bunker. Weapons which malfunctioned were immediately brought to this point for on site repair.

e. Three smudge pots were kept at each perimeter bunker, allowing the outline of the camp to be marked throughout the night.

f. This Battalion had adopted a policy of rotating rifle companies in and out of the Fire Support Base at two to three week intervals. This periodic change increased the morale and alertness of the troops and caused them to view their new surroundings with a critical eye. Constant improvements were made in the defenses and internal arrangements of the base, in a spirit of competition between the companies.

g. A ready reaction force was composed of support personnel and organized into three squads with an AN/PRC-25 radio and M-60 machinegun each. They were rehearsed to react as squads, reinforcing designated sectors, or to react as an entire platoon to a major threat from any direction.

h. The Battalion maintained a forward aid station at Fire Support Base Crook, manned by the Battalion Surgeon and three senior aid men from the Battalion Medical Platoon. Thus they had the capacity to perform life saving surgery in the event that the enemy anti-aircraft fire would delay medical evacuation. There were landing zones inside and outside the perimeter. Medical evacuation was performed at 0530 hours each morning from the interior landing zone. Gunships provided cover for the MEDEVAC helicopters.

i. Ammunition was prestocked in three main ammunition supply points and in eighteen small supply points positioned behind the fighting bunkers. This precluded any heavy loss of ammunition from enemy fire and reduced the amount of time and exposure of personnel in resupplying the fighting bunkers.

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16. RESULTS:

a. U.S. KIA - 1, WIA - 7, Heavy Damage to 1 L.O.H., Light Damage to 1 UH1H.

b. Enemy: KIA - 402, P.O.W. - 10.

Weapons Captured:

AK-47	- 54
Light MG	- 2
.51 Cal. MG	- 1
R.P.G. Rocket Launcher	- 3
60mm Mortar	- 2

Ammunition Captured:

60mm rounds	- 90
R.P.G. rounds	-230
Hand Grenades	-500
Satchel Charges	- 84
Bangalore Torpedoes	- 10
Small Arms Ammunition	- 13,000

17. ANALYSIS: The overwhelming victory achieved at Fire Support Base Crook is attributable to planning and motivation. The personnel at FSB Crook were physically and mentally prepared for any contingency. When the enemy moved en masse against them, they calmly and efficiently destroyed them.

a. The physical structure of the base provided excellent frontal, rear, lateral and overhead protection for the personnel, and it was constantly being improved. Three wire obstacles stood between the bunker line and the enemy. Flat, well-cleared fields of fire surrounded the base. The fire power of all weapons in the base could be used against an attacking force. Six howitzers, four mortars, twelve machine guns, automatic rifles, recoilless rifles, grenade launchers, claymore mines, and "Super Claymores" provided a shield of fire around the base.

b. A well-equipped and trained reaction force was available to reinforce any sector of the base.

c. Communications, ammunition supply, weapons maintenance, and medical aid were specifically structured to function efficiently under heavy attack.

d. Not only was the system of fire support preplanned, it was thoroughly understood by all concerned. The Rifle Company Commander, Battery Commander, the Artillery Liaison Officer, the Brigade Air Liaison Officer, the Brigade Aviation Officer, the S3 Air, platoon leaders and forward observers had all been briefed that, in the event of an attack on the base, the 155mm and 8 inch support-

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ing artillery, and the mortars within the base would fire to the south and east of the base, the 175mm artillery would fire to the north and west until air support arrived, and then be shifted to the north to clear the air space on the north and west for the use of TAC air and helicopter gunships. The area immediately around the base would be engaged with small arms, "Killer Junior", and AC-47 or AC-119 gunships flying above the path of incoming artillery. In this manner there would be continuous fire in concentric rings around the base, and all available supporting fires could be employed simultaneously. When this system had to be implemented, it was done rapidly and smoothly, since everyone understood the plan.

e. Early warning from radar, seismic sensors, and night observation devices enabled the base to initiate a preemptive attack by fire on the enemy weapons emplacements and attack positions. Although this did not prevent the enemy attack by fire or ground assault, it did severely reduce their coordination and effectiveness as evidenced by a 400 to 1 KIA ratio.

f. After the enemy ground attack failed, the supporting fires were employed to pursue and destroy the withdrawing enemy. This retention of an offensive spirit was the most significant factor in this operation. A defensive situation was turned into an offensive situation in which the destruction of the massed enemy forces became the objective.

- 7 Incl
- 1 - Situation Overlay
- ~~2 - Terrain Photograph~~ (Incl wd HQ, DA)
- 3 - Enemy Situation 5-6 June
- 4 - Friendly Fire 5-6 June
- 5 - Enemy Situation 6-7 June
- 6 - Friendly Fire 6-7 June
- 7 - Air Photograph of FSB Crook


Michael D. Keating
MICHAEL D. KEATING
Major, Armor
Commanding

CF:

- 2 - COMUSMACV, Attn: J3
- 2 - CG, USARV, Attn: G3
- 2 - CG, II FFV, Attn: G3
- 1 - CG, 1st Inf Div, Attn: G3
- 1 - CG, 9th Inf Div, Attn: G3
- 1 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div, Attn: G3
- 1 - CG, CMAC, Attn: G3
- 1 - CG, 199th LIB, Attn: G3
- 1 - CO, 11th ACR, Attn: S3
- 1 - CG, RTAVF, Attn: G3
- 1 - CG, ATF, Attn: G3

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
INCLOSURE 1

Incl 1 to Incl 4

FSB CROOK

Situation Overlay
 MAP SERIES 1501

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Incl 3


Incl 3 to Incl 4

FSB CROOK

ENEMY Situation

5-6 JUNE 1969

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Inclsure 4

Incl 4 to Incl 4

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F.S.B. CROOK

FRIENDLY FIRES

5-6 JUNE 1969

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Incl 2 to Incl 4

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IPW SECTION
25TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
APO 96225

INTERROGATION REPORT

1. Report Number: 25-246-69
2. Date of Report: July 69
3. Reference: VIETNAM 1:50,000 6230 I, Series L7014
4. Status: Returnee
5. Disposition: PWCP
6. Biographical Data:
 - a. TRAN MINH DAO Alias: BAY DAO
TRAN MINH DAOV
 - b. Position/Rank: Senior Captain
 - c. Unit/Organization/LBN: Combat Tactics Section SR-1
 - d. Date/Place of Birth: 1934/Saigon
 - e. Place of Residence: Same as POB
 - f. Occupation: Student
 - g. Education: 7 years
 - h. Religion: Buddhist
 - i. Marital Status: Single
 - j. Number of Children: None
 - k. Father: TRAN VAN THANH (D) Mother: DUONG THI DUOC (D)
 - l. Relatives Working for the VC or GVN: TRAN VAN HAI-Brother-in-law
VC cadreman in an unknown location.
7. Circumstances of Capture:
 - a. Capturing Unit: B/2/14 Inf OPCON to 1/5th Mech, 25th Inf Div
 - b. DTG/Place of Capture: 10 1000 Jul 69 XT 577 270
 - c. Activity at Time of Capture: Hiding in a tunnel
 - d. Weapons/Equipment in Possession: None
 - e. Documents/Identification Papers: 5 Pounds Documents

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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8. Past Activities:

SOURCE was born in Phu Nhuan (D) Gia Dinh (P) of Saigon City. He attended the Huynh Ninh elementary school at Dac Kac (D) Saigon City for 7 years.

In 1949, SOURCE joined the Viet Minh. He had the position of Military Security Secretary of the 306th Viet Minh Bn. As Security Secretary, his position was on the same rank basis as squad leader.

Approximately Sept 1950 until June 1951, SOURCE took Officers Training in the Viet Minh. SOURCE states that his training consisted of weapons, discipline and tactics training. Training was given at SR-7 at Ba Ria (P).

June 1951 until December 1952 SOURCE attended Combat Leaders School at Bon Cat (D), SR-7. This training consisted of classes on attack principles and leadership capabilities, also infantry training.

From January Of 1953 until October of 1954, SOURCE served as Co XO of the 916th Co, 306th Viet Minh Bn. In October 1954, SOURCE went to NVN. He received orders with 5 other officers in his unit.

From Dec 1954 until March of 1956 he took training on how to become a Battalion Commander. Training consisted of classes and practical exercises on how to maneuver a large force. SOURCE also stated that there were also political classes involved. This training was given at Thai Nguyen Province.

In March 1956, SOURCE was assigned to the 1st Bn, 305th Viet Minh Div as its Commander. SOURCE served in this capacity until 1957. In 1957 SOURCE was assigned to the 338th Div in the capacity of G-1.

Due to SOURCE's many positions in the Viet Minh and his other outstanding accomplishments, time is not available to cover them all in this report. SOURCE has devoted his entire life to military service.

9. Information Gained:

SR-1 Organization: In August 1967, SOURCE joined SR-1 in the capacity of Tactics training officer. He was assigned to this position by the military command of North Vietnam

SR-1 has 3 main sections: 1) Staff Section; 2) Political Section; and 3) Rear Service Section.

(1) Staff Section has 12 sections subordinate to it:

1. Message and decoding section
2. Combat Arms section
3. Recon section
4. Engineers section
5. Information section
6. Military Intelligence section
7. Administrative section
8. Sapper section
9. Militia section
10. Military mobile advisory section
11. Military Tactics section
12. Military force section

1. Message and decoding section is responsible for sending and receiving messages. They also see to it that all messages go to the correct LBN.

2. Combat Arms section is responsible for seeing to it that all units are kept up to strength.

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3. Engineer section is responsible for seeing to it that all installations are built safe and proper.
4. Recon section is responsible for collecting information on all enemy held territory.
5. Information section is responsible for items such as where to find people and photography on the battlefield.
6. Military intelligence section is responsible for gathering tactical information on US and ARVN units.
7. Administrative section is responsible for all dissemination of orders and paperwork pertaining to units subordinate to SR-1.
8. Sapper section is responsible for training and equipment of sapper personnel.
9. Militia section is responsible for grouping people in hamlets to join reactionary forces and their political indoctrination.
10. Military mobile advisory section is responsible for advising units on what areas they should operate in and on movement.
11. Military tactics section is responsible for training infantry officers on what type of tactics to use on the battlefield.
12. Military forces section is responsible for assigning soldiers of infiltration groups to their units.
- (2) The Political section: Composed of 6 subordinate sections. They are as follows:
 1. Propaganda and training section. This section is responsible for dissemination of propaganda and the political indoctrination of civilians.
 2. Organization section. This section is responsible for screening and checking on people who want to join the VC organization and the communist party. Also they check on the actions of the people who are already members.
 3. Cadreman section. This section is mainly responsible for taking the best soldiers and putting them in positions which are fitting to their qualities. They also handle the personal affairs of high ranking cadre.
 4. Civilian proselyting section is responsible for recruiting villagers for VC labor.
 5. Military proselyting serves the same purpose as the draft board.
 6. Security section is responsible for maintaining unit security. They serve the same purpose as our military intelligence and counter-intelligence detachments.
- (3) Rear Service section is composed of 5 subordinate sections:
 1. Planning section. This section is responsible for making plans on how to get supplies from one point to another. This is done by the use of civilian laborers.
 2. Quartermaster section. This section is responsible for the dissemination of supplies, such as ammo, food, clothing and weapons.
 3. Ordnance section. This section is responsible for procurement of weapons and means of communication.
 4. Finance section. This section is responsible for collecting taxes

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and payment of funds to soldiers and cadromen.

5. Transportation section. This section is responsible for the evacuation of WIA's and KIA's from the battlefield to the hospital.

Mission: SOURCE was to be taken by means of a commo-liaison personnel to an unk area of the Boi Loi Woods. This commo-liaison was to meet him at 101800 July 69 at Sa Nho (1) (H) XT576275. SOURCE was captured prior to meeting this commo-liaison. He states that his commo-liaison was to take him to a meeting between himself and all the officers (company grade and higher) of the 1st and 3rd Bns, 268 Regt. SOURCE was to advise them on new tactics of combat devised by the Military Tactics Section of the Staff Section, SR-1. These tactics included: 1) choosing ambush sites, 2) open field combat and night movements. SOURCE states that due to heavy losses suffered, new tactics were being devised for each unit under the control of Sub-Region 1.

Locations: SR-1 Headquarters: XT5638

Quyét Thang Regt HQs: XT814084

268th Regt HQs: XT532315, XT506332, and XT5132. SOURCE stated that the three above areas are all used as Regt headquarters because they frequently move from place to place. They are now located at XT506332. Locations of the 101st Regt and 88th Regt are unknown.

Unit organizations and designations:

SR-1 is composed of 4 regiments. They are the Quyét Thang Regt, the 268th Regt, the 88th Regt and the 101st Regt.

The Quyét Thang Regt with 3 Bns is also known as the Thang Dong Regt. The 1st Bn is designated as the Thang Dong 1 Bn; 2nd Bn as the Thang Dong 2 Bn; the 4th Bn is designated as the Gia Dinh 4 Bn. SOURCE states he has no knowledge of the Bns' areas of operations.

The 101st Regt has three Bns and is also known as the 16th Regt. SOURCE knows no other Bn designation other than 1, 2, and 3. Bns areas of operations are not known to SOURCE.

268th Regt has three Bns. The 268th Regt is also designated as the D268 and Ben Tre Regt. Three Bns are designated K-1, K-2, and K-3, also Ben Tre 1, 2, and 3. Bns areas of operation are unknown to SOURCE.

SOURCE states that the 88th Regt is not now part of SR-1. The 88th was sent to Tay Ninh (P) and is now part of the 9th VC/NVA Div.

SOURCE states that each regt has its own Political Staff and Rear Service sections. He has no knowledge of their locations.

Replacements: SOURCE states that sometime in July 1969, the 268th Regt will receive 450 new replacements. He could not give information on the exact time or place. They will go to the 268th AO. Source has negative knowledge of any other replacements.

Personalities:

SR-1 Commanding Officers

TAM LE THANH Division Commander (Rank), SR-1 CO, a/w K-54, located vicinity of the southern part of Dau Tieng District. Source states this man is forty-seven years old, tall, and has graying hair.

NAM LE, Asst SR-1 CO, located same as TAM LE THANH, a/w K-54, 45 years old, medium height, black hair.

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Staff Section Chief: NAM LE is Chief of Staff of SR-1
Political Section Leader: PHU, 43 years old, a/w K-54, loc unknown, has brown hair, medium build.
Rear Service Section Chief: HAI NHOM, 46 years old, a/w K-54, loc unknown.
Military Tactics Section Chief: BA HUNG, 41 years old, a/w K-54, loc unknown.

INTERROGATOR COMMENTS:

Interrogation was ended because due to lack of sleep and rest, source became groggy. Source was in good health and answered questions willingly.

DTG of Interrogation: 10 1300 July 1969

Interrogator/Interpreter: JOHN HAMPTON/SSG TUOU (ARVN)

Report Number: 25-246-69 (Part II)

Additional Information Report on TRAN MINH DAO, captured by B/2/14 Inf and 1/5 Mech, 25th Inf Div, at XT 577 270 on 10 1000 Jul 69, VCPW

In the devised new tactics of SR-1, Source gave the following information: He stated that the Quyet Thang Regt has the responsibility of operating from Hwy #8 down to Northern Saigon (he stated that the VC call that area the "Perimeter Frontline"). The 268 Regt operates in the Phu Hoa (V) area over to Trang Bang and the VC call this area the "Middle Frontline of SR-1". The 16th or 101st Regt operates in the Bon Cat and Dau Tlong area (which the VC call the "Installation Protection Frontline"). He stated that besides these three regts in SR-1 they have 2 Artillery Bns (the 8th and 9th) to support and move according to Frontline requirements.

Source stated that the new tactics in SR-1 were brought about because Allied troops were clearing away most of the terrain. He stated that most of the units of SR-1 are going to change to guerrilla and sapper tactics rather than Main Force ground attacks. He also stated that they plan to have more sniper activity and more use of mines.

(A) Choosing Ambush Sites:

Source stated that the VC have devised plans to attack small units rather than large units. Source also stated that the attacks would depend on the road situation and the area they are in.

(B) Open Field Combat:

Source stated that in open field combat they are going to rely more on mine fields rather than troop combat.

(C) Night Movements:

Source stated that their attacks at night will now be sapper attacks rather than by strength. He also stated that in traveling at night they will break down into small units and travel different directions to reach their destination.

Source stated that the reason they were changing their tactics was because most of the terrain had been cleared away and heavy losses have been

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Report Number: 25-246-69 (Part II)

incurred. In this way they will be trying to cut down on casualties. He stated that in the past they used to attack in force rather than use guerrilla and sapper tactics as they plan on doing now.

Source stated that they do not have a school to train officers, so they send them letters of instruction on counter-attacks.

Added Information:

Source stated that the 268 Regt is an Infantry unit, but they are planning to change the 268 Regt to a sapper unit. He also stated that the Quyet Thang Regt will also be changed. The 101 Regt will remain an Infantry unit.

Source stated that at the time of his capture, he was on his way to the HQs of the 268 Regt to tell them of the new plans and to give the CO the letters of instruction. He said he was intending to give sapper training.

DTG of Reinterrogation: 11 0915 Jul 69
Interrogator/Interpreter: SMITH/NHO (ARVN)

Additional Information Report on TRAN MINH DAO, Captured by B/2/14 Inf and 1/5 Mech, 25th Inf Div at XT 577 270 on 10 1000 Jul 69, VCPW

Source said that SR-1 get civilian laborers and collects taxes from people. Source knew little about the people's association with his unit because the people were handled by the rear service section.

Source said the psychology of SR-1 is to win the people to their side. Source said they do this by using much propaganda. Source said this is done by the propaganda and training section of SR-1. Source did not know the specific methods this section uses.

Source said the VC and SR-1 think they can win the war politically by getting the people to the communist side, but the source said he did not think they could win the war militarily.

Source said his unit, SR-1 is making contribution to the war effort by training good soldiers for the communist side. He did not know if the people in the Citadel were making worthwhile contributions because the planning section takes care of the people.

Source stated that SR-1 can hold out until the coalition government is formed, because his unit has enough supplies and spreads enough propaganda to keep the war going.

Source said the degree in which the Communist are Anti-US and Anti-GVN is absolute. Source said the communists are more Anti-US and Anti-GVN than anything else they might believe in.

Source believes there is no psychological way for us to appeal to SR-1, because they are so thoroughly indoctrinated with Communism and so Anti-US and Anti-GVN.

Source said the best way to appeal to the Citadel people is to use counter-propaganda and when US troops go on operations, they should not bother the Citadel people any more than is absolutely necessary.

The biggest factor of motivation to the people in the Citadel is propaganda.

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Report Number: 25-246-69 (Part II)

Interrogator's Comments:

Source answered questions without hesitation. Source seemed of high intelligence and was very cooperative.

DTG of Reinterrogation: 15 1200 Jul 69

Interrogator/Interpreter: STADTHER/SSG HUU (ARVN)

Additional Information Report

Source was re-interrogated on locations of major Sub-Region 1 units: Sub-Region 1/COSVN Communications, and Codes and LBN's of Sub-Region 1 Sections.

LOCATION OF MAJOR SUB-REGION 1 UNITS:

The headquarters of SR-1 and its major units are small highly mobile groups which have no fixed location. The units movements are all guided by commo-liaison directed through SR-1 Communications Center. The only semi-permanent location in SR-1 is the Communications Center. Two months ago it was located at XT 605 393. Source believes it is still located there.

SR-1/ COSVN COMMUNICATIONS:

All communications between SR-1 headquarters and its higher and subordinate units is done through the communications center.

SR-1 receives its orders from COSVN. Plans or major strategies or offensives come down by letter. All other communications between SR-1 and COSVN are by radio-teletype. Only the teletype radio is used for signal communications between SR-1 and COSVN. Communications between SR-1 and lower units is effected by use of vocal transmission radios and commo-liaison only. There are no telephones or field phones using wire communications in Sub-Region 1. Communication is made mostly at night. Source received his orders and training plans directly from the Chief of Staff of SR-1 NAM LE. They would meet at the trail junction vic XT 568 366. He was always taken to the units or meeting places where training was to be conducted by commo-liaisons.

SUB-REGION 1 COMMUNICATIONS CENTER:

The SR-1 communications center was located at XT 605 393 two months ago. Source believes that it is still there. The unit designation is H-7 and the LBN of the unit is HT A7/78235ZC. The mission of this unit is to maintain communications between COSVN and SR-1 and between SR-1 and all of its subordinate units. It also controls the dispatching of commo-liaison and sees that mail reaches the proper LBN. The S-2 Section of the unit is responsible for monitoring US/ARVN radio transmissions.

The Commo-Center is located in a bunker-tunnel complex which is well camouflaged and very difficult to see on the ground. It cannot be seen from the air. Friendly operations have passed right over the center but have not seen it. The entrance is a camouflaged tunnel. The main center is a large bunker which is fortified by large beams as overhead cover. Three months ago it was hit directly by a B-52 strike and was partially caved in. Several people were killed and wounded in the B-52 strike but the Commo-Center was soon rebuilt in the same location. The center is protected by a minofield and boobytraps. Observation posts in the area are manned by a few snipers to delay and provide advanced early warning of approaching US/ARVN troops. If troops

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approach the bunkers from one or two directions the VC will try to sneak out of the bunker and evade the approaching troops. If the bunker is surrounded they will go deep into secret tunnels within the complex. These tunnels also have secondary exits in the area. Between 1500-1700 hours daily the unit cooks rice with an oven in the complex. On rainy days the smoke rises and could be seen from the air. There were other bunkers on both sides of the road in grid square XT 6039 within a few minutes walk from the road. They may be alternate locations of the Commo-Center or other sections of SR-1.

CODES/LBN'S of SR-1 SECTIONS:

Sub-Region 1 consists of three sections and their sub-sections. They are: (1) Staff Section, (2) Political Section, and (3) Rear Service Section. Their unit designations and LBN's are as follows:

Staff Section Unit K-10 LBN HT78235ZC
Combat Section LBN A/1 78235ZC
Military Intelligence LBN A/2 78235ZC
Military Force Section LBN A/3 78235ZC
Militia Section LBN A/4 78235ZC
Engineers Section LBN A/5 78235ZC
Artillery Section LBN A/6 78235ZC
Communications Section (H-7) LBN A/7 78235ZC
Source does not remember other Sub-Sections codes.
Political Section Unit K-20 LBN HT 78236ZC
Source does not know the sub-sections codes.

Other Information:

An NCO Training School is usually located on NUI CAU (location unknown) Mountain north of Dau Tieng. There is no training there presently since people cannot be spared to go to school.

INTERROGATORS COMMENTS:

Source was very intelligent and in good health. He answered all questions readily and was cooperative.

DTG of Interrogation: 12 2130 July 69
Interrogator/Interpreter: 1LT FLY/SSG NHO (ARVN)

Additional Information Report on TRAN MINH DAO, Chieu Hoi, detained by B/2/14th Inf, 25th Inf Div, on 10 1000 July 69 at XT 577 270

Source was reinterrogated on the (1) Effectiveness of US operations and tactics in the Citadel area, and (2) VC units and missions in the Citadel area.

The US forces in the Cu Chi, Trang Bang, and Tay Ninh areas have been very successful according to the source. They have constantly inflicted heavy casualties on the VC Main Force, Local Force and Guerrilla Forces in these areas. Of the 3 Main Force Regiments in Sub-Region 1, the 268th Regiment has the worst record for consistently sustaining heavy casualties and being unable to mount large operations. The Quyet Thang Regiment also has sustained heavy casualties

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and is not able to mount large scale operations. The 16th or 101st Regiment has fared the best of the three in being able to keep its units together without sustaining heavy casualties.

Tactics:

The Rome Flow land clearing operations are causing the VC strategists the greatest problems of any US tactics. They hurt the Main Force troops because they eliminate their ability to concentrate. This enables the US Forces to operate safely in Company and Platoon size elements and still defeat the VC elements they come in contact with. The 268th Regiment in particular has much difficulty in operating in cleared areas. The clearing operations have forced them to break down into squad and platoon size elements and spread out in the hamlets of the Citadel area and the Boi Loi Woods

Source recommends that continued and more extensive clearing of the following areas would greatly damage the ability of the VC to operate in these areas:

Phuoc Hiep
Phuoc Thanh
An Tinh
Gia Loc
Loc Hung
Trung Lap
Ap Rang
Dong Lon (Bau Soi)
Rung Tre (Rung Cay) XT 505 201
Gia Dinh
Go Noi

Suggestions for US Operations:

Source says the Citadel units always avoid contacts with US Forces in the daytime. When they are forced to fight it is called counter-sweep operations and they use counter-sweep tactics. Their attacks against US installations will be at night using sapper tactics. The way to make them fight during the day is by first locating a specific target through intelligence. When it is located attack with artillery and airstrikes using napalm to destroy boobytraps, mines, bunkers, and flush out the enemy. The infantry should be divided into two elements:

- (1) attacking the objective, and
- (2) blocking the rear routes of retreat.

In the rainy season especially, the infantry is better than armor for such operations, because the armor is restricted to fewer avenues of approach, is easily detected, and always leaves holes for the VC to escape. Source believes in the final analysis it is the infantry on the ground who can decisively engage and defeat the VC forces. The VC, those who are well-trained in operations against armor, have little fear of tanks. He thinks that of all US tactics against a small target, artillery preparation followed immediately by a heliborne assault into the target area is the best tactic.

Trung Hung Attack:

The 268 Regiment has the mission of counter-ambushing and annihilating a US night ambush patrol in the vicinity of the Bo Heo (H) vic XT 545237, between

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the 20th of July and the 1st of August 69. In the source's opinion, they don't have the capability of mounting this operation. K-1 and K-3 Battalions are resting and training while awaiting replacements. K-2 Battalion would have to be the battalion utilized and they are ill-equipped for an operation at this time. They may be able to fire some mortars on US Forces in that area.

Future Plans:

The VC will not be prepared for any large scale attacks before September. In September they plan for attacks in the Cu Chi and Tay Ninh areas. These attacks are just in the preliminary planning stage now. They still plan for attacks on Saigon, but any future attacks will not follow the pattern of the tactics of TET '68. The next time they will use smaller units and sapper tactics. Future attacks will be directed mainly against ARVN weapon and ammunition concentrations. At the same time, they will launch attacks against small US units in order to prevent the US from reinforcing ARVN units.

Their goals are:

- (1) To destroy the increasing capability of ARVN Forces.
- (2) To make good propaganda material for use in the political struggle against the ARVN's and US's.

The Viet Cong are very concerned about the increasing capability of the ARVN's, especially their use of modern and sophisticated weapons.

VC Capabilities in the Cu Chi (D), Trang Bang (D) Area:

(1) Trang Viet (Giong Viec (H), vic XT 608155) normally has 1-2 squads of Cu Chi District Forces.

(2) Xom Moi (H) vic XT 615170, 1 squad of Cu Chi District Forces.

(3) Gia Be (H) vic XT 598183, 1 squad of Cu Chi District Forces.

(4) Mit Nay (Ap Cay Mit Nay) (H), vic XT 565182, 1 squad of Cu Chi District Forces. Before this hamlet was rone plowed but now the grass and trees are growing back enough to enable the guerrillas to operate again.

(5) Duong Trau (Ap Dong Trau Nho (H)) vic XT 549192. Also was rone plowed but now is being used by 1 squad of the Cu Chi District Forces.

They use this area to launch operations along Highway 1 from Cau Suoi Sau Bridge (XT 543176) to the crossroads at Highway #7 (XT 563167).

Their operations consist of planting mines and forcing people to dig road-blocks. Their main mission is to counter the pacification program in the Cay Trom (H), Phuoc Hiep (H), and Mit Nay (H) area.

(6) Tinh Phong or Bau Me (Ap Tinh Phong) vic XT 5319, XT5320.

1. Guerilla force - about 2 squads operate along Highway 1. Sometimes they infiltrate into pacified hamlets to attack the pacification force.

2. Trang Bang District Unit keeps about 2 squads there on different occasions. They assist the guerrillas in infiltrating into Suoi Sau Strategic Hamlet, to lay mines along Highway #1 and to counter the pacification program.

3. SR-1 Military Intelligence Unit--assigned to COSVN--size unknown, contains (a) a liaison section to liaison with the Saigon Intelligence, (b) a Military Proselyting section.

MI Chief is MUOI BAU (MUOI LEN), Senior 1LT, age 45, a/w K-54 pistol.

Mission: In charge of recon and tactical information of Saigon area. They operate an agent net in Saigon and forward intelligence directly to COSVN.

Organization: The section is headed by TU SAC and located in Bau Me.

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There are two other subsections. One is located in the Thoi Tam Than (V) area vic XT 7633, 7634, 7733, 7734, is commanded by MUOI BAU, operates an agent net in Saigon, and has a signal capability with an AP-67, 4 watt radio. The second subsection is located in An Phu Dong (vic XT 8600). It is not known if they also have a radio.

The two subsections are responsible for gathering information from Tan Son Nhut Airbase, Quang Trung Training Center, Camp Co Loa and other locations in Saigon. They forward the information through the section in Bau Me (H) to COSVN.

From May through July 1969, intelligence provided by the section at Bau Me to Gia Dinh 4 Sapper Battalion resulted in three sabotage attempts on the ARVN ammunition dump at Co Loa Base near Tan Son Nhut.

MUOI BAU, the leader of the section at Thoi Tam Than (V) was selected to operate there because he was born and raised there and knows the area and the people well.

TU SAC's section is responsible for intelligence only in the northern Saigon area.

Source has heard about the recent large US operations in the Tinh Phom (H), Trang Bang (D) area. He heard that a few guerrillas and District cadre were captured, but none of the members of the MI Section were captured. The MI section is able to avoid capture in the following three ways:

(1) They all have civilian ID's. Using these they can walk or ride down the main highways to Trang Bang (V), Cu Chi (V) or Saigon city when there are operations in the area and mingle with all the people.

(2) They all have ARVN identification and uniforms and sometimes pose as ARVN officers and enlisted men.

(3) They are able to borrow an ARVN military truck to help them escape. Source does not know how they do this or from whom they borrow the truck.

Personalities Description:

1. TU SAC - source does not know him.
2. MUOI BAU - about 45 years old, bald to about the middle of his head, 1 meter 68 cm tall, thinning black hair, big build, not fat (used to be a soccer player while studying in NVN), brown eyes, big bushy black beard. Clothing - in Bau Me wears black pajamas.

Source last met MUOI BAU in Bau Me a few months ago. They had been friends in NVN and accidentally met in a store in Tinh Phong (loc approximately XT 533195) about 1800 hrs. MUOI BAU bought source 5 Vietnamese beers in one hour and then separated. The store is a miscellaneous store which sells charcoal, beer, rice, fish sauce and other miscellaneous items. Source had been in Ap Rang (H) (XT 575 232) and was invited down to Tinh Phong to rest by BA XUYEN, 1LT, intelligence cadre of SR-1 when he met MUOI BAU.

3. BA XUAN -- about 45 years old, long black curly hair, thin, black eyes - very deep, thick black eyebrows, usually a stubby black beard and moustache, no other distinguishing marks.

- (7) Cay Duong (X. Ong Dam) vic XT 539232
1 squad hamlet guerrillas
Trang Bang District Force (Unknown size)
Operate together with Ong Dam Force
- (8) Ap Ong La (vic XT 528238)

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1. The same units operate here as in Cay Duong.
2. Sometimes a battalion of the 268 Regiment stays here. Now probably a company would be the size located there.

Mission: Counter US sweep operations in the area.

3. 83rd Rear Service Group

There is a liaison system there which organizes contacts with merchants in Trang Bang to supply food and equipment to the VC. They sometimes buy food and supplies directly off the trucks coming from Saigon.

(9) Ap Rang (Xom Rang (1) & (2) vic XT 5623)

1. A few district cadre from Cu Chi District and 2 recon squads of the Cu Chi District Force are located in a few abandoned houses in Bao Gao (XT 565 236) in Ap Rang (2). Source can point out the houses from photos or the air.

Targets at Bao Gao (XT 565236) and Dong Lon (H) (XT 572245):

Bao Gao Personalities:

THE - Asst CO of the Cu Chi Local Forces and Guerrillas.

MANH - Same as THE.

10 other unknown cadres of Cu Chi (D).

-all cadres are armed with K-54's or AK-47's

2 recon squads of Cu Chi District Force

-7 men in each (names unknown)

-armed with AK-47's and B-40's (RPG-2's)

1 house and 1-3 bunkers

Dong Lon: one platoon - about 20 men a/w AK-47's and B-40's

tunnels located in thick bushes; source can point out the area.

Miscellaneous Information:

BA DINH, CO of SR-1 and TU TRUONG, PO of SR-1, were killed in a US night ambush along the Vam Co Dong River in the vicinity of Tre Cao in May 69. They were on their way to COSVN HQ's where they had been summoned for a meeting.

Interrogator's Comments:

This is the most cooperative and knowledgeable source this interrogator has met. His information is factual and accurate. It has been proven in field exploitation. The potential value of this source has only begun to be realized.

DTG of Interrogation: 20 2000 Jul 69

Interrogator/Interpreter: 1LT JOHN M. FLY/SSG TUAN (ARVN)

Additional Information Report

Source was reinterrogated on the organization of SR-1. Seven districts make up the SR-1. These are: Dau Tieng, Ben Cat, Trang Bang, Bac Chi, Nam Chi, Tay Mon, and Dong Mon. A map was drawn of these districts and will be given to the Order of Battle Section.

District Breakdown:

1. Dau Tieng District has:

- a. One local force infantry company

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- b. One sapper recon platoon
- c. One special action platoon
- 2. Ben Cat District has:
 - a. One local force infantry company
 - b. One sapper recon platoon
 - c. One special action platoon
- 3. Trang Bang District has:
 - a. Two local force infantry companies
 - b. One sapper recon platoon
 - c. One special action platoon
- 4. Bac Chi District has:
 - a. One local force infantry company--letter designation C15.
 - b. One special action company--letter designation C20.
 - c. One sapper recon platoon
- 5. Nam Chi District has:
 - a. Two local force companies--letter designations C25 and C10.
One company infantry and the other sapper recon
- 6. Tay Mon District has:
 - One special action company
- 7. Dong Mon District has:
 - One special action company

Areas of Operation:

The 16th Regt operates primarily in Dau Tieng and Ben Cat Districts. On occasion, operations are conducted in Boi Loi Woods in Trang Bang District. Two artillery battalions support this regiment and the other districts in SR-1. The D8 Artillery Battalion is organized with four companies as follows:

- 1 x 82mm Mortar Company
- 1 x 75mm RR Company
- 1 x 120mm Mortar Company
- 1 x 12.8 Antiaircraft Company

The battalion is currently understrength as each company is operating with only two platoons.

The D9 Artillery Battalion is organized with 3 companies as follows:

- 2 x 122mm Rocket Companies (DKB)
- 1 x 107mm Rocket Company (H-12)

This battalion is also understrength.

The Quyet Thang Regiment operates in Nam Chi, Tay Mon and Dong Mon Districts.

The 268th Regt operates in Trang Bang and Bac Chi Districts. The rear base camp of the 268th Regt is located in an unknown location in the Boi Loi Woods. Source stated all of the local force units are currently understrength. A local force company is composed of approximately 60 persons, however these same units are currently operating with approximately 30 men and organized in 2 platoons.

VC Capabilities in Cu Chi (D), Trang Bang (D) Area:

In addition to the interrogation report on 20 July 1969, source stated that the following areas have been used frequently by VC units:

- (1) Rung Tre, XT 5730 - one company of the K-2 Bn of the 268th Regt is often located in this area. The terrain is able to conceal a battalion size

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force. When an entire battalion is in the vic of Rung Tre, 2 companies disperse and operate to support the local guerrillas in Bac Chi and Trang Bang Districts. Source believes both the K-1 and K-3 battalions of the 268th Regt are in training and refitting in Ba Thu, Cambodia.

(2) Rung Cay Sop, Rung Sen, XT 6029. Terrain is capable of concealing a company size force. Units of the K-2 Bn, 268th Regt have frequently operated in this area. A unit using this location as a staging or base area is broken down into groups of 10-15 people for concealment purposes.

(3) Rung Hang, XT 6326. Although the Quyot Thang Regt usually operates in Nam Chi, Tay Mon and Dong Mon Districts when they refit and train this area plus Bon Muong XT 6524, Go Dinn from XT 6318 to XT 6222 are used. The Saigon River is used in going back to their area of operation.

(4) Ba Song, XT 6123 to XT 6025. This area is used for administration cadre of Bac Chi District. Source does not know of any specific target locations in this area.

Additional Targets:

1. BA TINH, Political Officer in charge of all districts in SR-1, lives in the vicinity between Xom Bau Soi (1) vic XT 577 246 and Xom Rang (1) vic XT 578 233. BA TINH is in charge of all proselyting activities in SR-1. BA TINH also knows of many people who work for the VC as spies and VC informants in ARVN units. This person lives in a house and source states he can identify the house from aerial photos. Physical description of BA TINH is as follows:

Tall, pale complexion, short black hair, usually wears black pajamas, has legal ID card, has pistol (unknown type).

Usually BA TINH is home and source thinks if enemy troops approach TINH's house he hides in a secret tunnel (unk location) near his house.

2. MOC SON, Political Officer in charge of proselyting activities in Tay Mon and Dong Mon Districts. The exact location of SON's residence is unknown, however, source is certain BA TINH knows the specific location. SON does not live in a house, rather he lives in a tunnel. Physical description is as follows:

Short, fat, black hair, wears black pajamas, has legal ID card, armed with K-54, is usually in area of Xom Bao Soi (2), XT 570 246.

VC Terminology in SR-1:

1. Tay Mon and Dong Mon Districts usually called "Neighboring Line Area"
2. Nam Chi District referred as "Hing Area"
3. Bac Chi, Trang Bang Districts referred to as "Disputed Area"
4. Dau Tieng, Ben Cat Districts referred to as "Rear Base Area"

These determinations are made by the SR-1 Commander.

Interrogators Comments:

Interrogation continues to develop targets. Source is the most knowledgeable informant this interrogator has ever talked to and displays a definite willingness in helping to develop information.

DTG of Reinterrogation: 21 2200 July 69

Interrogator/Interpreter: SINGER/SSG TUAN (ARVN)

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Additional Information:

Concerning local force company strength, source has knowledge of the following:

- C15 - approximately 35 people
- C20 - approximately 30 people (No base areas known by source)
- C25 - approximately 45 people
- C10 - approximately 25 people

These local force units are composed strictly of VC. There are no plans to bring NVA personnel into these units. All of these above mentioned local force companies are understrength.

Replacements are obtained in primarily two ways:

1. Forcing people from local population to join unit.
2. Directing propaganda efforts to those people who are dissatisfied with the SVN Government thus encouraging these people to voluntarily join.

This method is preferred as the VC think these people will be more loyal.

Function of District Military Headquarters:

Each of the 7 VC districts has a district military headquarters. This is composed of 3-4 people broken down as follows:

- (a) The district military headquarters head who is also the district chief.
- (b) An assistant district chief.
- (c) A political officer for the district.
- (d) Sometimes, an assistant political officer.

Each district military headquarters receives orders from SR-1 headquarters, located in an unknown location in Bon Cat or Dau Tiong district. Commo-liaison personnel are utilized for this. Local force companies are subordinate to their respective district military headquarters. Local Force units never leave SR-1 or go to Cambodia. They operate only within their own district. Each district military section gives orders to guerrillas as well as local force units. After the district military section receives strategy from SR-1 headquarters it is passed on by commo-liaison people to both local force and guerrilla units. There is coordination between guerrillas and local force units as the guerrillas often guide local force units into their area.

Location of District Military Headquarters:

Source believes the district military headquarters for Bac Chi District is located at Bao Gao vic XT 565 236. Other headquarters locations unknown to source.

Training for Local Force Units:

SR-1 headquarters has a training section with approximately 10 people in this section. Training instructions are prepared by this section and sent in document form with commo-liaison personnel to each district military headquarters between 2-3 times a year. From the district headquarters a commo-liaison person takes the document to each company where instructions are studied by company commanders and platoon leaders before they instruct their units.

Training includes:

1. Infantry tactics
2. Sniping at helicopters
3. Anti-Tank tactics
4. Use of boobytraps

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Local Force Supplies:

SR-1 supplies equipment to local force units. When supplies are needed each military district headquarters puts in a request to SR-1. Each request is geared for a three month period. Ammunition requests are usually met but there is a lack of weapons and medical supplies. SR-1 receives supplies from COSVN. No other specific information could be furnished by source.

Armament of Local Force Units:

The usual armament consists of AK-47's, RPD (LMG), B-40's, and 2 x 60mm mortars.

Tactics:

Currently, if an attack is not planned local force units usually disperse in smaller groups. However, these local force units do on occasion work together if offensive action is planned.

The VC Main Force units' goals are still to penetrate the Saigon area. In the past trying to penetrate the Saigon area with battalion size units has not been too effective. Units of this size are too easily detected. Tactics are now being changed to employ smaller units. Emphasis will be placed on speed of movement, shock attacks, and rapid withdrawal. In SR-1 all of the VC Main Force units (16th Regt, 268th Regt, Quyot Thang Regt) will be broken down into groups of 45-50 men. Each group will be commanded by a 1LT. Each group will also have an assistant group commander and PO. Three groups will compose a battalion. Battalion designations will be kept. The groups will not operate together in a battalion size force. Using these smaller units they will be harder to detect and engage. Current VC strategy has set a target date of September 1969 for implementing this change. Source indicated one big problem facing the VC now is finding secure areas to conduct training.

Additional Personalities :

BA XUYEN - in charge of reconnaissance on Highway 1 from Hoc Mon to Trang Bang. The number of people working for this person is unknown to source as well as his location. Source stated sometimes BA XUYEN is in Bao Gao area vic XT 565 236. After BA XUYEN gathers information on US/ARVN units on Highway 1, a commo-liaison (unknown to source) takes information to SR-1 headquarters.

Physical description of BA XUYEN follows:

Black hair, 34 years old, medium build, sunburn complexion, has legal ID card, no other alias name, a/w K-54 pistol.
BA XUYEN works for SR-1 Military Intelligence unit.

Interrogator's Comments:

Source continues very willingly to help develop information.

DTG of Reinterrogation: 22 2200 July 69

Interrogator/Interpreter: 1 LT MICHAEL SINGER/SSG TUAN (ARVN)

Additional Information on TRAN MINH DAO, Chieu Hoi, Detained by B/2/14th on 101000 July 69 at XT 577 270

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VC STRATEGY:

With new VC strategy, the 268th Regt and Quyét Thang Regt will receive special sapper-recon training. Sapper-recon cadre from SR-1 headquarters will give this instruction. This training group will consist of between 8-10 cadre and they are first going to train the 268th Regt. Source indicated K-1 and K-3 Bns, 268th are now receiving this training in Ba Thu, Cambodia. The targeted completion date for this special training is 30 July 69, for these two Bns. Source believes K-2 Bn, 268th Regt is located in Trang Bang and Bac Chi Districts with 1 company located in Rung Treo vic XT 5730 and the other 2 companies of the K-2 Bn scattered throughout both districts. Possible locations for these two companies are Bao Gao vic XT 565 236 and Dong Lon area vic XT 5319, Ap Tinh Phong area XT 5319, Xom Ong Dam vic XT 539 232 or the Ap Ong Dam area vic XT 528 238. The K-2 Bn will not go to Ba Thu, Cambodia to receive this training. Approximately 16 officers and NCO's from the K-2 battalion were sent to Ba Thu to receive this training with the K-1 and K-3 Bns, 268th Regt. These personnel upon completion of training will rejoin the K-2 battalion to train their units.

The scheduled starting date for training the Quyét Thang Regt is uncertain, however by the end of August it is scheduled to be completed. Source believes the VC will have great difficulty in meeting this timetable with the Quyét Thang Regt as finding secure areas for the training is a major problem. Due to this situation, training by these cadre members will be conducted in company rather than in battalion size units. The cadre will travel from Ba Thu to predetermined locations (unk to source) to meet each company. Possible training locations given by source include southern half of Ben Cat District, Rung Lang area vic XT 6326, Ben Muong area vic XT 6524 and the Go Dinh area vic XT 6318. After completion of training with the Quyét Thang Regt the instructional cadre will return to SR-1 headquarters. Source indicated the 16th Regt will not receive any of this sapper-recon training.

Members of the 268th Regt and Quyét Thang Regt will receive training in land mines only. The H-5 Sapper Battalion is trained in the use of water mines. Most of the H-5 Sapper Battalion members were trained in North Vietnam.

Sapper Training:

The new sapper-recon training will be divided into two parts:

1. Techniques of Fighting--Special emphasis on using explosives. Every person will receive this training. All types of mines that US forces now have will be covered. The objectives are not to only teach VC methods of neutralizing these mines but also employing them against US Forces.
2. Reconnaissance Tactics--Special emphasis on small unit movement, how to move on any type of terrain and weather conditions, how to camouflage as well as penetrating enemy positions (getting through mine fields, lighted areas, and barbed wire). Penetration tactics will include using terrain features to gain close access to installations, instruction on cutting barbed wire and neutralizing early warning

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devices. Once inside an enemy position techniques on how to destroy tanks, helicopters, and ammo caches are also being taught.

Another important point that these instructional cadre are trying to develop is a high morale for these 45-50 men sapper-recon groups. Source doubts if this can be accomplished, rather Source believes the VC hope that at least 4-5 members of each group will attain this to act as a unifying force within each group.

Tactics after Sapper-Recon Training is Completed:

The 268th Regt will operate primarily in Trang Bang, Bac Chi, and Nam Chi Districts. The Quyet Thang Regt will concentrate primarily in penetrating the Saigon area in these sapper groups. The Gia Dinh 4 Sapper Bn will also concentrate on infiltrating the Saigon area. The 16th Regt will operate in the same area as now.

Under this new operational plan after the 268th Regt and Quyet Thang Regt are trained they will train local force companies in these sapper-recon tactics. These local force units will use these new tactics in attacks. Local force units will operate in company size elements. When not in contact units will be broken down into smaller units for hiding purposes. Local guerrillas will not receive any training of this type from local force units. The guerrilla units responsibility is primarily providing hamlet and village security.

Main targets in the Saigon area will include:

1. Tan Son Nhut complex
2. Quang Trung Basic Infantry Training Center
3. ARVN ammo cache in Go Vap District
4. Co Loa, where ARVN tank units and ammo caches are located.

The 268th Regt will operate against small US/ARVN units in Trang Bang and Bac Chi (D). Source does not know when K-1 and K-3 Bn/268th Regt will relocate from Ba Thu, Cambodia.

UNIT STRENGTHS:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>PRESENT STRENGTH</u>
16th REGT	1200	750
268th REGT	1200	750
QUYET THANG REGT	820	500
D8 ARTILLERY BN	200	130
D9 ARTILLERY BN	200	130
GIA DINH 4 BN	220	180
H5 SAPPER BN	(Source Uncertain)	50
83rd REAR SERVICE GROUP	(Source Uncertain)	(Source Uncertain)
HQ, SR-1	(Source Uncertain)	(Source Uncertain)

INFORMATION ON PRESENT SR-1 COMMANDER:

TAM LE THANH, Deputy Colonel, is the new commanding officer for SR-1. COSVN sent him in March 68 to serve as assistant SR-1 commander. THANH inherited his present position when BA DINH, the previous SR-1 Commander was killed in May 69. THANH has many past military achievements. In 1954 THANH

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was an assistant company commander but did not return to North Vietnam. THANH has gained the vast majority of his knowledge through battlefield experience. THANH has received no formal military schooling in North Vietnam or Communist China.

COSVN sends strategy to SR-1 headquarters. THANH's responsibility is in implementing these tactics. As COSVN controls the overall strategy THANH's flexibility to introduce new tactics is limited.

Assistant Commanders for SR-1:

1. BA KIEN, 45 years old, a/w K-54, assistant SR-1 commander, LT Colonel. KIEN was the 16th Regt commander for 2 years and has been in the present position for 8 months.
2. NAM LE, 45 years old, a/w K-54, assistant SR-1 commander, LE has been in this position for 4 years. LE attended an artillery school in Communist China before assuming his present position. Source considered LE has the best abilities of any of the leaders in SR-1.
3. BAY TUNG, 49 years old, a/w K-54, political commander for all SR-1.
4. BA TINH- in charge of all proselyting activities in SR-1. TINH's house location has been determined from aerial photos by source. Other locations for these personalities are unknown.

Additional Personalities:

268th REGT

CO, HOANG CHI THANH, 43 years old, a/w K-54, Major
XO, BA DAU, 43 years old, a/w K-54, Captain
PO, PHAM THIEP, 42 years old, a/w K-54, Major
Asst PO, BAY GA, 33 years old, a/w K-54, Captain

K-3 BN/268th REGT

CO, HAI KHOI, 38 years old, a/w K-54 Deputy Captain
PO, HAI THONG, 30 years old, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain
XO, BAY THEO, 28 years old, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain

QUYET THANG REGT

1 BN:

CO, TAN, a/w K-54, Captain
XO, CHEO, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain
PO, NHAN, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain

2 BN:

CO, THANH, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain
XO, BA MO, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain
PO, NAM THOI, 36 years old, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain
Asst PO, BA SINH, 31 years old, a/w K-54, 1LT

GIA DINH 4 BN:

CO, BA THON, 30 years old, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain
XO, LO, 29 years old, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain
PO, THO, 35 years old, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain

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Asst PO. HUNG, 36 years old, a/w K-54, Deputy Captain

16th REGT

CO, BA TAM, 38 years old, a/w K-54, Major

Source has no knowledge of other personalities or their locations.

Interrogator's Comments:

Source continues to be extremely cooperative.

DFG of Interrogation: 23 2000 July 69

Interrogator/Interpreter: 1LT MICHAEL H. SINGER/SSG TUAN (ARVN)

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY

M. D. Keating

MICHAEL D. KEATING
Major, Armor
Division Historian

s/ Michael Singer 1LT
t/ JOHN P. SEAWELL
CPT, MI
Chief, IPW Section

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
18TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCMH

22 July 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: Command Historian
APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: O.C.M.H.
Washington, D.C. 20315

1. TYPE OF OPERATION: Airmobile Raid.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 19 July 1969.
3. LOCATION: Grid: XT589269; Sheet Number NCL48-1, Map Series 1501; 25th Infantry Division TAOR.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. PERSONS BEING INTERVIEWED:
 - a. MAJ Ronald L. Eaker Jr., 503403348, S3, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.
 - b. CPT Bruce R. Richardson, 516529365, Arty LNO to 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.
 - c. CPT John S. Regan, 001304764, CO, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry.
 - d. CW2 James H. Hineline, 027264459, Chief, Imagery Interpretation Section, 25th Military Intelligence Detachment.
6. INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Division Historian.

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7. TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Command Group, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry (CO, S3, Arty LNO, SOM, RTO) airborne in a UH1H helicopter.

b. Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry (OPCON to 1-5 Mech).

8. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery.

(1) Battery C, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery (105mm), FSB Devin (XT557170).

(2) Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery (105mm), FSB Pershing (XT518256).

(3) Battery A, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (155mm), FSB Patten II (XT582195).

(4) One Platoon, Battery D, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (8 inch), FSB Stuart III (XT499197).

b. Army Aviation.

(1) 9 UH1H helicopters (Troop Lift), 187th Assault Helicopter Company.

(2) 1 UH1H helicopter (C&C Ship), 187th Assault Helicopter Company.

(3) 6 AH1G Cobra gunships, Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion.

(4) 2 AH1G Cobra gunships, Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry.

(5) 2 AH1G Cobra gunships, Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

(6) 1 UH1H helicopter (PSYOPS), Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion.

c. U.S. Air Force.

(1) 1 AC-47 gunship.

(2) 2 F-100 fighters.

(3) 2 A-37 fighters.

(4) 1 OV-10 forward air control aircraft.

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9. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy - On 5 June 1969, the Tactical Imagery Interpretation Section of the 25th Division Military Intelligence Detachment was performing a routine read-out of low level aerial photographs taken over Tu Duon Hamlet (XT589269) when they noticed that the last two frames indicated a newly constructed hut which was larger than the other huts in the area, and was distinguishable by its wooden roof, in contrast to the thatched roofs of the other huts in the vicinity. It was also noted that two heavily used trails by-passed this structure and converged at a point approximately 50 meters to the southwest; however, there were no trails leading directly to this structure. Four excavations were also noted: (1) a trench approximately 20 feet long, four feet wide, and four feet deep along the southwest side of the house; (2) two holes, one at the west corner and one at the south corner of the hut; and (3) a hole at the north corner of the structure. (See Inclosure 1)

On 13 June, a hand-held photograph of the same structure was taken by the Aerial Surveillance Section, G-2 Air, and the results indicated that (1) a trench leading from the door of the hut to the trail which passed to the southeast had been excavated, as well as (2) three mounds which resembled graves appeared at the northeast side of the house.

On 1 July, an Air Force photo reconnaissance mission revealed the addition of approximately twelve excavations which resembled graves on the northeast side of the hut under surveillance. Also a possible "well" was observed on the northern edge of these excavations, as well as three new mounds just north of the hut.

On 10 July, a prisoner, Truong Van Thang, was captured by Company B, 2-14 Inf, in the vicinity of Sa Nho (XT575275). After several interrogations, Thang admitted that he was a member of the 1st Company, 83rd Rear Service Group, and stated that his unit had the responsibility of supplying food for NVA units operating in the Tu Duon/Sa Nho area. Thang additionally revealed that he knew the location of a house where 20-25 members of his unit stayed each night. These personnel arrived each night at approximately 1800 hours and remained until dawn the following morning. He indicated that this house had been used every night for the past seven months. On 16 July, a Visual Reconnaissance mission was flown by the IPW Section and hand-held photographs were taken of the Sa Nho area. The photographs were shown to Thang, who immediately identified the same hut which had been under surveillance by the Imagery Interpretation Section.

On 12 July, the Aerial Surveillance Section, G-2 Air, had taken a second set of hand-held photographs of the hut. These photographs revealed that (1) the trench previously noted as being 20 feet long had been filled in; (2) the hole on the south corner of the house had also been filled in; (3) the hole on the north corner of the house was covered with an unidentified material; and (4) the area of the suspected graves now resembled

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row crops. The area extending from the trench had also been excavated and appeared to be a garden. The mounds located north of the hut were the same as they had appeared on 1 July. (See Inclosure 2)

The above information was passed by the Counter-Intelligence Section to the S2 of the 2nd Brigade who in turn recommended the target to the Brigade S3 for response. The Brigade decision was to conduct an early evening airmobile raid and the mission was given to the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.

After a careful reconnaissance and evaluation of the objective, the Battalion Commander decided to employ heavy preparatory gunship and artillery fires, a close troop insertion, continuous close fire support, and a rapid troop extraction. Two platoons from Company B, 2-14 Inf, would be employed.

b. Terrain - The terrain in the target area is flat with no dominating features. There is heavy brush northeast, east and southeast of the hut, while the area to the west is open, being abandoned rice fields. There are several abandoned huts approximately 150 meters south of the target hut and a single abandoned hut approximately 80 meters to the north. Ground observation and fields of fire are excellent on the west side of the target and poor on the east side due to the brush. Aerial observation over the brushy area is fair since the continuity of the vegetation is broken by many small trails and shell craters. There are no obstacles to movement by foot in the area.

c. Weather - The skies were partly cloudy with light winds from the southwest and no precipitation in the area on 19 July. Observation and flying conditions were good. Sunset was at 1922 hours.

10. MISSION: Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry (OPCON 1-5 Mech) was to conduct an airmobile raid at 1800 hours, 19 July 1969, to capture or destroy personnel and equipment of the 83rd Rear Service Group in and around the target structure.

11. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Maneuver - Company B was to conduct a nine ship (54 man) combat assault to an LZ approximately 100 meters west of the target area (XT587-270), assault the target structure and the adjacent area, complete a search of the target area and return to the pick-up zone (XT587270) for extraction.

b. Fires -

(1) Helicopter gunship preparatory fires on the target hut - H-6 minutes.

(2) Artillery preparatory fires on the target hut - H-4 minutes. Preparatory fires shifted east H-4 minutes to H-1 minute.

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(3) Helicopter suppressive fires around the landing zone - H-4 minutes to H-Hour.

(4) Artillery, helicopter gunship, and Tac air fires on call.

12. EXECUTION:

a. At 1730 hours, the command and control helicopter containing the 1-5 Mech Command Group (CO, S3, Arty LNO, SGM, and RTO) took off from FSB Devin enroute to the target area.

b. At 1745 hours, the 1st Platoon, 3rd Platoon and Command Group of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, took off in a nine ship lift from FSB Patton enroute to the target area.

c. At 1746 hours, the Arty LNO began a nine minute countdown to the time on target for the initial preparatory fires. Two batteries of 105mm howitzers, one battery of 155mm howitzers, and two 8 inch howitzers were laid on the target hut.

d. At 1754 hours, two Cobra gunships made a firing run from west to east against the target hut and the hut to the north. Their rockets blew the roofs off of both structures, and as they cleared the target area, the Arty LNO gave the waiting batteries the command to fire.

e. At 1755 hours, the target hut and an area for 80 meters around it was hit by 34 rounds of artillery. The battery fires were then shifted into the brush north, northeast, and east of the hut (See Inclosure 3). Immediately after the artillery fires were shifted, the escorting gunships moved in and placed suppressive fires on the huts and on the area around the landing zone.

f. The troop ships approached the landing zone from the north and touched down 30 seconds after the last preparatory artillery round impacted. At this time, numerous enemy were observed fleeing to the east and south through the brush. The gunships began firing passes over the area to the east and the Arty LNO shifted all batteries and resumed fire to the south to block that area. (See Inclosure 4)

g. As the troops hit the ground, the Company Commander realized that instead of landing in a trail formation as planned, they had landed in a split trail and his 1st Platoon was advancing behind the 3rd Platoon. He quickly ordered this platoon to move on line to the left, as the company continued the assault. They received only sporadic and ineffective fire from the withdrawing enemy and they rapidly overran the objective, killing several fleeing enemy. As they secured their positions around the huts, they began to check the rubble and numerous holes and bunkers in the area, collecting prisoners (10 detainees), recovering abandoned equipment, and counting the enemy dead (47 KIA). When the immediate target area had been

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policed, both platoons moved forward on a clockwise sweep through the edge of the brush. Several of the enemy bodies were located in the brush south of the hut. As the troops advanced, the artillery fires were shifted south along several hedgerows to block enemy escape. The company completed the sweep back to the LZ without contact and were extracted at 1915 hours, while the gunships again provided suppressive fires. The troop ships received light fire from the east as they lifted off. (See Inclosure 5)

h. As the troop ships cleared the area, two F-100 fighters hit the area with fragmentation bombs and napalm. This strike was followed by another at 1935 hours by two A-37 fighters. At 2000 hours, the Division G5 Section diverted a UH1H PSYOPS helicopter to the contact area and broadcast "Surrender or Die" appeals for 30 minutes. At 2100 hours, an artillery attack of 145 rounds was made on the contact area, and this was followed by another PSYOPS mission at 2300 hours consisting of surrender appeals and 30,000 safe conduct passes and "Chieu Hoi" leaflets being dropped.

i. On the following day, 20 June, the 1-5 Mech conducted a reconnaissance-in-force through the contact area with one mechanized and two rifle companies. No contact was made with the enemy, but several additional enemy bodies and weapons were found, and large amounts of rice and medical supplies were evacuated. Another PSYOPS leaflet mission was flown specifically targeted against the 83rd Rear Service Group.

13. RESULTS:

a. Friendly Casualties and Losses: None.

b. Enemy Casualties:

(1) KIA - 54.

(2) Captured - 10.

c. Enemy Equipment and Supply Losses:

(1) 28 Ak-47 Rifles.

(2) 10 RPG-2 Rocket Launchers.

(3) 1 RPD Light Machine Gun.

(4) 2 K54 Pistols.

(5) 2 RPG rounds.

(6) 1 M1 Carbine.

(7) 1 Chicom Radio.

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(8) 30 lbs medical supplies.

(9) 3000 lbs rice.

(10) 6 lbs documents.

d. Results of Detainee Interrogat

Le Van Cung Alias Sau Cuong Status: VC PW

Position: Pvt/Laborer.

Unit: C-130, 83rd Rear Service Group (C-130 transports supplies).

Weapons: 2 Hand Grenades.

Information Gained: C-130 has about 30 men; the unit is subordinate to the 83rd Rear Service Group. Subject stated his mission was to transport rice by boat on the Saigon River where it would be picked up by civilian laborers at various spots.

No other significant information.

Nguyen Van Thanh Alias Hai Status: NVA PW

Position: Squad Leader-Rifleman.

Unit: 3rd Squad, 2nd Platoon, 1st Company, 2nd Battalion, 250 Regt, AKA Bac Son Regt.

Weapons: 1 AK-47 Rifle.

Information Gained: Subject was to recon terrain in vicinity XT5727 for unknown reason. His unit now located in woods north of Tay Ninh.

No other significant information.

Dang Thi Mung (F) Alias Hai Mung Status: VCG PW (WIA)

Position: Nurse.

Unit: A-17 Dispensary.

Weapons: None.

Information Gained: Subject was a nurse; worked in the A-17 dispensary located XT589268 in a bunker. A-17 is in support of Kon Trai Local Forces who are in support of Cu Chi District Forces.

No other significant information gained.

Le Thi Sung (F) Status: CD

Information Gained: Denies knowledge, participation or support of VC activities. Subject works in her mother's rice fields XT589266 and as a hat maker. Classified CD because she lacked the proper ID card; had only a temporary ID issued in 1966.

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Nguyen Thi Bay (F)

Status: CD

Information: None.

Classified CD because she had no ID card; had not taken the time to get an ID card.

Tran Thi Trung (F)

Status: VCS CD

Information: None.

Classified CD because she had no ID card; subject claimed she did not think she had to have an ID card until she was 18 years old. She is 16 years old.

Three other detainees were classified as innocent civilians and released.

e. Intelligence Summary:

The installation destroyed in this raid had housed the A-17 Local Force Dispensary, served as a supply point for the 83rd Rear Service Group, and as a way station for VC/NVA elements moving through the area.

14. ANALYSIS:

a. The acquisition of this target resulted from the alertness of the imagery interpreters, the patient surveillance of a suspected target, and the efficient teamwork of the various sections of the military intelligence detachment. A suspicious structure had been developed into a confirmed, lucrative target.

b. The success of the operation was due to detailed planning and violent execution. The precise timing and heavy volume of preparatory fires produced a shock effect from which the enemy was given no opportunity to recover; the assault troops were inserted close to the objective under covering fire from the gunships while the artillery pursued the disorganized enemy and blocked their escape. The objective was seized rapidly, while the continuous supporting fires prevented any enemy re-organization. The ground search was conducted thoroughly and swiftly and the troops were extracted before the enemy could develop any counter action.

c. It is interesting to note the statements of an enemy senior captain of Sub-Region 1, captured by the 2-14 Inf on 10 July, concerning the efficiency of U.S. operations against the VC/NVA. Under interrogation, the prisoner stated that, from his long experience, the most effective

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U.S. tactic against a small target was an artillery preparation followed immediately by a heliborne infantry assault into the target area. The prisoner had further stated that the VC/NVA could best be engaged during daylight hours by locating specific targets through intelligence resources.

M. D. Keating

MICHAEL D. KEATING

Major, Armor

Commanding


- 6 Incl.
1 - ~~Initial Air Photo~~ } Incls wd
2 - ~~Air Photo of 12 July~~ } HQ, DA
3 - Sketch - Preparatory Fires
4 - Sketch - Troop Insertion
5 - Sketch - Assault, Search
and Extraction
6 - Ammunition Expenditure List

CF:

- 1 - COMUSMACV, ATTN: J3
- 1 - CG, USARV, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, II FFV, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, 1st Inf Div, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, CMAC, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CO, 199th LIB, ATTN: S3
- 1 - CO, 11th ACR, ATTN: S3
- 1 - CO, 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div, ATTN: S3
- 1 - CG, RTAVF, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, ATF, ATTN: G3

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Incl 3

Arty Prep Fires Shifted
H-4 MIN, 250 Rounds

Initial Arty Prep Fires
34 rounds H-5 MIN

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
Helicopter Gunship Prep Fires
H-6 MIN

Incl 3 to Incl 6

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Scale 1:1,300

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Incl 4

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
Incl 4 to Incl 6

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Scale 1:1,300

Incl 5



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Incl 5 to Incl 6

Scale 1:300

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Arty Shifted South



Assault, Search + Return to PZ

Gunship Fires

Gunship Fires

Gunship Fires

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AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE LIST

1. Artillery Ammunition:

105mm - 1163 rds HE
155mm - 152 rds HE
8 inch - 18 rds HE

2. Air Force Ordnance:

500 lb bomb - 12 ea
500 lb napalm - 4 ea
750 lb napalm - 4 ea

3. Infantry Weapons:

Hand Grenades (Frag) - 10
7.62mm, M60 M.G. - 500
5.56mm, M16 Rifle - 500
M-79 Grenades - 30

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25th INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

ADVCCS

8 June 1969

SUBJECT: Computerization of Data for
Operational Planning (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) GENERAL: During the first week of April 1969, the 25th Infantry Division initiated a program to computerize the large volume of data which results from operations in the Division area. The ultimate objective of this program is to achieve the highest operational efficiency. The more immediate goals are to draw accurate conclusions on the efficiency of tactical operations, to identify trends of enemy activity, to provide accurate data for operational reports, and to formulate a sound basis upon which the Division can plan its operations.
2. (U) PROBLEM: The nature of the Vietnam conflict poses unique problems for those who must interpret what is happening and for those who must plan to do something about it. The fluctuating contact with a variety of enemy forces over differing terrain produces a great volume of unassimilated information. Friendly operations also generate a great deal of valuable information, but due to the pressures of combat, it is often not recognized. Present methods of analyzing and interpreting this mass of information consume much time and effort, and often fail to exploit its full value.
3. (C) SOLUTION: In order to reduce the time and effort involved in analyzing and interpreting this information, and to exploit its full potential, the Division developed a system employing the UNIVAC 1005 computer. The raw data for each program is obtained from a careful screening of the daily Intelligence Summary, the Operational Situation Report, and the G2 and G3 Journals, by the G3 Doctrine and Training Division. There are no additional report requirements imposed on the field commanders. The raw data is extracted from these source documents and recorded manually on work cards on a daily basis. These work cards are then delivered to the AG Machine Records Branch where they are converted to punch cards and processed through the computer which produces the desired programmed data in a tabular form. The data is then analyzed by the G3 Doctrine and Training Division and applied to graphs, charts and map overlays for ease of interpretation by G2 and G3 personnel.

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

Incl 7

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a. Existing Programs: The following programs have been implemented since the first week in April. Although this entire effort within the Division is still in the developmental state, certain lessons have been learned and some immediate benefits have been realized.

Program 543A - Mines and Booby Traps - One of the most serious problems faced by this Division has been the extremely heavy incidence of mines and booby traps in the Division area. The first effort of the computerization program was to develop some method or methods to counter this threat. The input data for this program consists of the unit involved by size and type, the location of the mine or booby trap, the time of day encountered, the type of mine or booby trap, the manner in which it was located or detonated, casualties produced and/or equipment damaged. The tabulated output data provided the Division with information concerning the most critical areas for this type of incident, the greatest casualty producing devices, some indication of the emplacement times and, correlated with G2 information, it provided indications of the best method of counteracting this activity. In unpopulated areas, seismic sensors were emplaced in areas of heavy activity. When sensor activation was monitored, air burst artillery would be fired over the area. In populated areas, ambush patrols were employed between the mined or booby trapped areas and the adjacent hamlets. These tactics have definitely discouraged enemy mine laying teams. One month's experience with these countermeasures resulted in reductions from 15 to one mine encountered along Highway 6A, from 11 to three mines encountered along Highway 249 and from 20 to eight mines encountered along Highway 7A. At a critical intersection the Division MSR, mining incidents dropped from an average of ten per month to three for the month of May.

Program 543B - Maneuver Unit Operations Summary - This program was designed to indicate the type of operation which would be most effective in a particular area. The raw data used in this program consists of the date and time of the operation; the size, type and identity of the unit; the type of terrain; the type of operation; the type of support used, and the results. Thus far, this program has indicated the most successful type of operations that have been conducted in any one of the twenty-six geographical subdivisions of the Division area of operations. It has also indicated those areas in which the Division troops incur the greatest casualties, and has indicated the productivity of the various units within the Division. Indications are also developing of the areas which require greater fire support and of the types of fire support which are most effective in a given area. This program is developing into a very valuable planning tool. (See inclosure 1)

Program 543C - Statistical Summary - This program provides a daily record of the results of combat operations by brigade, battalion, squadron, and division totals. The input data consists of the date of the operation, the major unit designation, the ratio of possible days to actual days operation by company, the number of contacts by day and night and the results, the results of friendly and enemy initiated contacts and the ratios

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between friendly and enemy initiated contacts, and the ratios between friendly and enemy killed. The data provided by this program is a record of the results of combat operations by major units, indicates patterns and trends of friendly and enemy success within the major units, and serves as an overall statistical record of the Division's operations.

Program 543B5 - Enemy Base Camp Denial - Data is recorded on the combat operations which are conducted in each of the ten enemy base camp areas within the Division's area of operations. This data is similar to that used in Program 543B - Maneuver Unit Operations Summary. The date and time; unit by size, type and designation; the type terrain and grid; the type of operation; the type of fire support used, and the results of contacts are tabulated. This program has provided guidance as to which type of operation will be most successful in a given base camp area. It has also served as a record of the results of these operations, and provides an indication of which areas will be the most lucrative for exploitation; again offering the commander a valuable tool in planning operations.

Program 544A - Enemy Initiated Incidents - Another program which has produced a highly useful document is Program 544A, which analyzes certain aspects of each enemy initiated contact. Time and light data, along with grid, type of incident, target of the incident, the type of weapons used, and the number of rounds fired are recorded and tabulated. From this data, the Division has begun to develop indications of what types of incidents can be expected in particular areas and the times at which they are most likely to occur.

The success of the computerization program has led the Division to identify other areas which will provide data that can readily be applied to intelligence and operational planning.

b. Programs In Process Of Development

Program 543B1 - Tactical Summary - This program is being designed to provide a comparison between friendly and enemy casualties and damage expressed in nine separate ratios for each day.

Program 544B - Caches - Trends and indicators in the location, the method of emplacement, and the method of protection of enemy caches will be developed.

Program 543H - Casualties - This program will produce a constant measurement of friendly casualties.

c. Programs Scheduled For Development

Program 544C - Contact - This program will be designed to allow the Division to trace the movement and activity of any enemy unit once unit identification is made and contact is not completely broken in the area of operation. This data will be correlated with all other intelligence sources.

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Program 543E - Duffcebag - The results of the use of seismic sensors will be measured by time and location.

Program 543C and 543G - These programs will provide data on the results of sightings from Side Looking Airborne Radar and ground radar which will give additional indications of the trends of enemy activity.

Program 544J - Psyops - The effectiveness of current psychological operations and indications of the most effective means in relation to specific areas will be developed.

d. Planned Programs

Program 544F - Terrorism - This program will indicate patterns of terrorist acts and possible countermeasures.

Program 543G - Scout Dogs - This program will measure the success of the scout dog effort and indicate those areas in which their use will be most effective.

Program 543F - 25th Aviation Battalion Support - The Division will gain data on the most efficient use of its organic aviation resources.

Program 543D - Artillery Support - Measurements of the comparative effectiveness of the different types of fire missions will be developed as a guide to the employment of this resource.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS: This system is not designed to supplant normal staff procedures or sound judgement. It does, however, reduce a great amount of data to manageable proportions and presents it in a manner in which it can be more rapidly and efficiently analyzed, interpreted, and put to use in planning operations. The initial results of the program have been highly encouraging. Several operational problem areas have been brought under control and the utility of the system is becoming more apparent as the program expands.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Operational Effectiveness
Chart

Robert L. Fair
ROBERT L. FAIR
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
15 - COMUSMACV, ATTN: J3
15 - CG, USARV, ATTN: G3
15 - CG, II FFV, ATTN: G3

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OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

<u>TYPE OPERATION</u>	<u>CO DAYS</u>	<u>EN KIA & PW</u>	<u>BC RATIO</u>
Recon in force	2206	2556	25.8
Security Ops	1246	550	19.3
Combat Assault	576	402	17.4
Ambush Patrol	480	138	13.8
Fire Spt Base	1612	437	14.9
Patrol Base	121	679	21.2
Convoy Scty Ops	59	133	19.0
Riverine Ops	12	4	100%

Chart Depicting Cumulative Data For Division
Area Derived From Program 543B - Maneuver
Unit Operations Summary

Incl 1 to Incl 7

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
18TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AFDCMH

June 18, 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: Command Historian
APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: O.C.M.H.
Washington, D.C., 20315

1. (C) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Night Hawk Operations - Night offensive helicopter operations employing the Xenon Searchlight and Night Observation Device.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 15 April 1969 - 15 June 1969.
3. (C) LOCATION: 25th Infantry Division TAOR.
4. (C) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 25th Infantry Division.
5. (U) PERSON BEING INTERVIEWED: Major Robert P. Greene, S3, 25th Aviation Battalion.
6. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Historian, 25th Infantry Division.
7. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION: Six (6) UH1H helicopters, four (4) provided by Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion, and two (2) provided by Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, are allocated, two (2) per brigade, nightly.
8. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES: No specific supporting forces are designated for Night Hawk operations. Mortar and artillery fires from the battalion fire support bases, Army Aviation and Air Force support are available to exploit Night Hawk contacts.

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9. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy - 15,000 VC/NVA and 1,200 local force guerrillas normally operate within the 25th Infantry Division TAOI. The preponderance of enemy tactical, logistical and liaison movement occurs during the hours of darkness.

b. Weather - Fog, haze and rain will seriously limit the effectiveness of Night Hawk operations due to the difficulty of observation and orientation. The infra-red capability, however, will permit effective operations in the absence of ambient light, as will the night observation device if used in conjunction with flare illumination.

c. Terrain - Night Hawk operations are most successful over open terrain where observation is unrestricted, or over roads, trails, and streams in vegetated areas along which the enemy is likely to move.

10. (C) MISSION: Night Hawk operations are conducted to interdict enemy movement during the hours of darkness by detection and destruction of his personnel and vehicles. Night Hawk helicopters will also react to radar sightings, seismic sensor activations, visual sightings of enemy indirect fire positions, and to contacts by ground forces.

11. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Configuration of Night Hawk Helicopters - The UH1H helicopter is equipped with an AN/VSS-2 Xenon Searchlight and an AN/TVS-4 Night Observation Device mounted coaxially (N.O.D. over the Xenon Searchlight) on the swivel mount in the left gunner's well of the helicopter. An operator seated in the left gunner's seat operates both pieces of equipment. An M-134 7.62 "minigun" is mounted on a swivel mount in the left cargo door and manned by a gunner seated on the left side of the cargo compartment (see photograph 1). An M-60 machine gun is mounted on the swivel mount in the right gunner's well of the helicopter and manned by the crew chief. A sniper with an M-14 rifle with starlight scope is seated in the right cargo door of the helicopter (see photograph 2). This provides the helicopter with a night vision capability and firepower on both sides; however, the infra-red and white light capability exist only on the left side. (Note: This describes the present standardized configuration. There were several previous versions, but this has proven to be the most effective with the current available assets.)

b. Concept of Employment - Six (6) UH1H helicopters are configured as above each evening beginning at 1600 hours. Total aircraft preparation time to include fueling, arming, and the pre-flight check is approximately two (2) hours. Four (4) helicopters from Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion, and two (2) helicopters from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, are tasked for Night Hawk missions each night. Normally two (2) Night Hawk helicopters are allocated to each brigade. The brigades may

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assign brigade level missions or further allocate the aircraft to battalions. The mission crews are briefed each evening by the brigade/battalion representatives on the areas of search, the number and times of missions to be flown, the enemy situation, all friendly locations, and the necessary fire clearances which must be obtained for given areas. The brigade/battalion representative accompanies each mission to perform necessary liaison, to identify friendly locations and to give clearance to fire. Flight paths for each mission are planned along known or suspected enemy lines of communication, and if possible, planned to avoid flying directed over friendly locations. Each Night Hawk aircraft flies 2 to 3 missions nightly.

12. (C) EXECUTION: The Night Hawk aircraft flies over the area of search at an altitude of from 500 to 700 feet and at a speed of approximately 60 knots. This has been found to be the optimum altitude/speed combination for target detection. The pilot maintains location orientation at all times. The observer on the left side scans the area to the left front of the flight path through the Night Observation Device. When a possible target is acquired, the observer notifies the pilot who immediately goes into a left orbit around the target and informs the unit representative of their present location. If the observer confirms the target, and the unit representative gives clearance to fire, the observer illuminates the target with white light and the gunner engages the target with the minigun. Target acquisition and engagement on the right side of the ship follows the same sequence, except that the target is marked by tracers from the M-14 rifle and engaged with the M-60 machine gun. If there is insufficient ambient light for the use of the night observation device, two alternate methods may be employed. The observer on the left side can illuminate that area with the Xenon Searchlight in the infra-red mode and observe the area with the AN/TVS-4 Night Observation Device. The other method involves the use of preplanned 4.2" mortar illumination to augment the ambient light. The Night Hawk can search areas up to four (4) kilometers from the point of illumination, with the Night Observation Device.

13. (C) RESULTS: Since Night Hawk operations began on 15 April, 106 VC/NVA (body count) have been killed and 22 sampans have been destroyed in 62 separate contacts. There have been no U.S. casualties and one helicopter has sustained light damage from enemy fire.

14. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. One continuing problem for Night Hawk operations is that in areas containing ARVN forces or concentrations of friendly civilians, clearance to fire, which must be obtained from the ARVN or Sector Headquarters, often is not received until after the target has been lost.

b. Supply: Four thousand (4,000) rounds of 7.62 ammunition are loaded for the minigun. One thousand, five hundred (1,500) rounds of

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7.62 ammunition are loaded for the M-60 machine gun. The aircraft fuel load allows approximately two hours of mission time with the personnel and equipment weight.

c. Observer Training: An average of seven (7) nights of operation are required for the observers to become proficient in acquiring targets.

15. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Described above.

16. (C) ANALYSIS: In terms of results vs. effort, these operations have been highly successful. One hundred and six (106) enemy have been killed, while the division has incurred only light damage to one helicopter. It is also significant that the majority of engagements have been with groups of 2 to 3 enemy, many moving by sampan, indicating that the enemy liaison, communications, reconnaissance and supply elements are the most seriously effected. The interdiction of this type of enemy activity is proportionately more damaging to his operations, for it strikes at his ability to control and coordinate his military and political efforts. Night Hawk operations have significantly expanded the Division's control over the area of operations at night. Night Hawk operations in conjunction with radar, sensory devices, night patrols, and ambushes are developing into a system of night surveillance and control over the battlefield.


2 Incl

1. Photograph - Night Hawk (left side)
2. Photograph - Night Hawk (right side)

CF:


- 2 - CG, USARV, ATTN: G3
- 2 - CG, II FFV, ATTN: G3

Michael D. Keating
MICHAEL D. KEATING
Major, Armor
Commanding



Incl 1. to Incl 8

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Incl 2 to Incl 8

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCCS

3 June 1969

SUBJECT: Hedgerow Clearing Operations (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) GENERAL: In order to assist operations and improve security in the 25th Infantry Division TAOR, a program of hedgerow and jungle clearing was initiated by the 65th Engineer Battalion supported by Rome plows from the 20th Engineer Brigade. While the Rome plow operations were successful in clearing fields of fire around the Division's fire support bases and denying the enemy concealment from which to ambush the Division's supply routes, certain problems were noted.

2. (C) PROBLEM: Rome plow operations have inherently three basic problems. First, Rome plow operations necessitate the modification of a large number of D7 bulldozers. This consigns the bulldozers to jungle clearing operations, the Rome plow configuration having only a limited usefulness in general combat engineer missions. Second, a large number of bulldozers are needed to clear hedgerows. The Rome plows use an echelon formation with overlapping sectors when clearing a thick hedgerow. This necessitates the use of much time and equipment. The third problem in Rome plow operations is the vulnerability of the equipment and operators to mines and booby traps. An alternate method of clearing hedgerows which would alleviate some of these disadvantages was desired.

3. (C) SOLUTION: On 2 June 1969, Company E, 65th Engineer Battalion began using a new method for clearing hedgerows. This new method utilizes a heavy naval anchor chain and two M48 tanks. In operation, the tanks form a line, parallel to and at the end of the hedgerow to be cleared; one end of the anchor chain is attached to each tank and the chain thus trails out behind the vehicles in an elongated "U". (See Inclosure 1) As the tanks move down the length of hedgerow on either side, the chain cuts under the hedgerow itself. This operation uproots trees and clumps of bamboo exposing tunnels and caches and also safely detonates mines and booby traps planted in hedgerow. Large areas of foliage are handled in much the same manner. The chain is pulled through the area with one tank in the cleared area and one in the foliage. (See Inclosure 2) All areas and hedgerows to be cleared are first reconnoitered by direct and indirect fire.

The effectiveness of this new method for hedgerow clearing was recognized immediately. However, it was found that the use of tanks for this operation resulted in excessive maintenance problems; the transmission of the M48 tank not

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being designed for this type of work. The D7E bulldozer with standard bullblade was substituted and found to be an effective vehicle for this type of operation. Company E has assembled a team for hedgerow clearing utilizing the chain. There are two chain units in this team; each unit consists of two D7E bulldozers towing a 75 meter length of naval anchor chain weighing approximately three tons. followed by a Rome plow approximately 150 meters behind the chain. The Rome plow is used to clear any heavy obstructions which the bulldozer drawn chain is unable to move. Each of the vehicles is equipped with an AN/PRC-25 radio which facilitates command and control by the officer in charge. The crew of each bulldozer consists of a driver and guard who, for personal safety, are equipped with steel helmets and flak jackets. In addition to the vehicle operators, the engineers also supply a demolition team responsible for destroying all mines and booby traps not detonated by the chain and all bunkers and tunnels uncovered in the operation. Security for the team is provided by a mechanized infantry company.

4. (C) RESULTS: Hedgerow clearing using the chain method was initiated along Highway 6A between Trang Bang and FSB Pershing and in the area southwest of FSB Pershing (XT 5024, XT 5025, XT 5124, XT 5125). The AO for chain clearing has been expanded to encompass large areas of the Citadel (XT 5424). Between 2 June and 30 June 1969, approximately 1250 acres have been cleared of hedgerows with up to 160 acres a day being cleared. 100 meters of hedgerow can be cleared in approximately five minutes. However, large trees, which require several attempts before falling and the maneuver to turn the chain around at the end of each pass through a hedgerow, are both time consuming parts of the operation. The weight of the chain used allows not only for rapid clearance of foliage in the hedgerows but also safe detonation of mines and booby traps. The use of the anchor chain provides a safe stand-off distance from the detonation for the bulldozer operators, who are further protected by steel helmets, flak jackets and radio headsets. The speed of the operation makes it possible to clear an entire assigned area in a single day thereby preventing the enemy from knowing beforehand which areas are to be cleared. This lessens the possibility of ambushes and mining incidents. These factors combine to significantly decrease the number of casualties sustained by combat engineers engaged in hedgerow clearing. The number of mechanized infantry needed to secure a chain clearing operation is greater than the number needed to secure Rome plows. The speed with which hedgerows can be cleared and the size of the areas worked with the chain necessitate the larger number of security forces.

5. (U) CONCLUSIONS: The early success of this type of hedgerow clearing operation has been recognized by the formulation of plans by Company E, 65th Engineer Battalion for a more extensive hedgerow clearing project in the Citadel. The chain clearing operation has produced a valuable side benefit; the tearing up of whole clumps of bamboo by the chain has exposed numerous tunnels and caches. The amounts of enemy munitions and equipment destroyed or evacuated during the trial period are included in Inclosures 3 and 4. The speed and thoroughness of chain clearing operations, coupled with increased safety to

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bulldozer operators, have been demonstrated during this trial period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT L. FAIR
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Chief of Staff

- 5 Incl
1. Sketch of Hedgerow Clearing
 2. Sketch of Area Clearing
 3. Munitions Safely Detonated or Destroyed
 4. Supplies and Structures Destroyed/Evacuated
 5. Photographs (3)


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



Clearing Hedgerows.

Incl 1 to Incl 9

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Detail of Chain Link

Clearing Foliage From Area

Incl 2 to Incl 9

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Munitions Safely Detonated or Destroyed

Type Munition	Number Found/Destroyed	Number Detonated
60mm Mortar	10	0
81mm Mortar	17	0
82mm Mortar	16	5
4.2" Mortar	13	1
105mm HE	38	17
105mm CS	2	1
155mm HE	6	5
8" HE	2	0
57mm RR	1	0
RPG-2, Round	20	0
RPG-2, Booster	4	0
RPG-7, Round	9	0
RPG-7, Booster	1	0
122mm Rocket, Complete	1	0
Hand Grenades	21	21
Chi Com AP Mines	3	1
Chi Com AT Grenades	4	0
Claymore Mines	1	0
Tilt Rod Mines	9	0
25 lb. Mines	2	0
TM-46 Box Mine	1	0
CBU	2	0

Inclosure 3 to Incl 9

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Type	Number Found/Destroyed	Number Detonated
Chi Com Explosive Block	1 (Cu.Ft.)	0
52mm Propellant	5 (lbs.)	0
AK-47 Round	920	0
M79 Round	18	0
Home Made Grenade	3	0
Explosive Booby Trap w/trip wire	4	4
40 lb. Mine	11	1

Inclosure 3 (Cont.)

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Supplies and Structures Destroyed or Evacuated

- 39 Funji Pits
- 2 Bunkers
- 15 Tunnels, 2 with medical supplies and NVA money
- 2 Two-man fighting positions
- 5 Reinforced fighting positions
- 1 .51 cal. MG position
- 3 Non-explosive booby traps

- 4 Sets, web gear
- 1 Officer's belt w/star
- 1 NVA shirt
- 1 Tank radio cable
- 1 55 gal. drum w/bandages

- 1 .50 cal. barrel
- 5 SKS Carbines
- 1 82mm mortar tube

- 1 .30 cal. ammo can w/documents
- 1 .50 cal. ammo can w/3 lbs. medical supplies
- 1 " " " " w/tape recorder, parts missing
- 1 " " " " w/6 pair shower shoes
- 6 " " " " w/Ho Chi Minh sandals
- 1 " " " " w/radio parts
- 1 " " " " w/GI gas mask

200 lbs. white powder, possibly nitrate or lime


Enemy Killed in Operation, Enemy Bodies Discovered

- 12 NVA bodies in graves
- 2 VC killed by 90mm canister round

Inclosure 4 to Incl 9

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Hedgerow Clearing

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Hedgerow Clearing

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AVDCOP

SUBJECT: Ground Surveillance Radar (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) GENERAL. In the process of upgrading the surveillance and target acquisition of US Army units, occasionally the technology involved in the development of materiel will overtake the capabilities of units in the field. Ground Surveillance Radars provide an all weather, 24 hour surveillance capability with the ability to detect targets during periods of reduced visibility. They provide accurate target information data permitting immediate engagement by fire or other appropriate tactical reaction. Three types of ground surveillance radars are presently employed within the 25th Infantry Division.

a. AN/TPS-25. A doppler principle radar, organic to division artillery headquarters battery, with an ability to detect moving personnel at ranges of 10-12 kilometers under favorable terrain condition. It is used to provide coverage of those areas determined to be most lucrative for the detection of enemy main force movements.

b. AN/PPS-5. A doppler principle radar, organic to division maneuver battalions with a maximum range of 5 km to detect moving personnel targets. It is used primarily to provide medium range identification and location of hostile targets during periods of reduced visibility with the secondary mission of providing close in detection of enemy movement around fire support bases, critical bridges and base camps.

c. AN/PPS-4. A doppler principle radar, retained within divisional maneuver battalions, with a 1.5 km personnel detection range. They are sited primarily to provide protection to night defensive positions and small critical installations such as bridges.

2. (C) PROBLEM. During the early months of 1969, a thorough review was made of 25th Infantry Division ground surveillance equipment and the results which it had been producing. Performance was judged to be below the level expected of the equipment, and a thorough analysis was made of the complete ground surveillance radar system employed by the 25th Infantry Division. The evaluation indicated a need for more radar operator and maintenance training and for improvement in siting and techniques of employment.

3. (C) SOLUTION. Planning the employment of ground surveillance radars is under the general staff supervision of the ACoS, G2. The Division

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AVDCOP

SUBJECT: Ground Surveillance Radar (U)

Artillery Commander is responsible for the operational employment of AN/TPS-25 radar, i.e. selection of site locations which maximize surveillance capability in areas directed by the Commanding General, and for providing long range surveillance capability in areas directed by the Commanding General. The AN/PPS-4 and AN/TPS-5 radars are under autonomous operational and employment control of the maneuver battalion commander. He uses current intelligence indicators to determine the best possible site location to maximize the surveillance capability. To provide greater information accuracy, all AN/TPS-25 and AN/PPS-5 radar locations are surveyed, and towers are provided the AN/PPS-5 to minimize "dead space". The radars are surveyed to an accuracy of 10-digit UTM coordinate, which contributes to fast, accurate artillery engagement. During the past month, a concerted effort was made to enhance the capabilities of ground surveillance radars. An advisory team from USAECOM inspected all radar sites. A mobile training team followed the USAECOM team to all sites, giving advice on siting and maintenance, and giving operators instruction on their radars, located at their unique sites. A radar operator school was established at Cu Chi. Graduates from this school are the nucleus of unit OJT programs. In the time period since training began, three times as many radar sightings have been made as compared to a similar time period immediately before training. The Target Information Center (TIC) monitors ground surveillance radar sightings as reported to G2 Operations in the DROC. After plotting the sightings and analyzing the intelligence situation, the TIC may recommend a combat response in addition to artillery. The TIC may also recommend confirmation of the sighting by other surveillance means.

4. (C) RESULTS. Results for the period 1 May thru 6 June 1969 are tabulated below. Body count is generally a result of artillery reaction; however, Night Hawk UH-1 aircraft have been incorporated into the system with positive results. Physical body count is indicated below; however, the actual number of enemy killed is much higher as indicated by numerous drag marks and blood trails located in the areas fired on.

<u>INCLUSIVE DATES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF SIGHTINGS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TARGETS ENGAGED</u>	<u>BODY COUNT</u>
1 May - 6 June 69	273	211	45

Ground surveillance radars have been notably successful in giving early warning of battalion and multi-battalion attacks on Patrol Bases Diamond and Frontier City and at Fire Support Base Crook.

5. (C) CONCLUSIONS. Reliable radars, manned by competent operators and sited to provide the most effective surveillance, provide the commander with another tool for observing enemy movement within his area of interest. The AN/TPS-25 radar, with a range of about 12 kilometers, has produced the most consistent and reliable results, while the AN/PPS-5 radar gives the battalion commander an effective means of early warning against

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
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AVDCOP

SUBJECT: Ground Surveillance Radars (U)

enemy attack. These radars when properly tied in with other surveillance devices and intelligence confirm enemy intentions and afford the US commander an excellent means for detecting and destroying him.

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AVDCOP

SUBJECT: Sensor Employment (U)

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1. (C) GENERAL. The 25th Infantry Division blocks three major enemy infiltration routes leading to Saigon. In the past the enemy has attempted to take advantage of darkness and other periods of reduced visibility to move his forces, weapons and supplies into positions from which to launch an attack.
2. (C) PROBLEM. Periods of darkness and reduced visibility decreased the ability of our forces to observe enemy movement along suspected infiltration routes. Aerial observation and patrols were limited in range and in their ability to effectively engage enemy forces attempting to gain the advantage of surprise. Similarly, base camps and fire support bases became more vulnerable to enemy standoff and ground attack during these periods of reduced visibility.
3. (C) SOLUTION. In September 1968 the 25th Infantry Division initiated evaluation of various sensors. At first, success was limited, but as techniques improved and response to sensor activations became more rapid, this device proved to be an effective deterrent to enemy movement. The basic type of sensor employed by the 25th Infantry Division is the seismic type which can detect movement of humans within a radius of about forty meters and vehicle movement out to about three hundred meters. Variations of this sensor are the acoustic and the magnetic type which detect noise and metal objects, respectively. The sensors are generally positioned by hand; however, of 462 sensors employed since the beginning of the Division program, fifty have been dropped from helicopters into otherwise inaccessible areas. Sensor activation is read out on receivers named "Portatales" at nearby fire support bases and at a central receiving station on Nui Ba Den. Fire is then brought to bear on the target by artillery and by Night Hawk aircraft.
4. (C) RESULTS. Enemy movement has been greatly curtailed along critical avenues of approach. Early warning has been given to base camps and fire support bases, allowing them to prepare for attempted enemy attacks and to successfully defeat the attacking force. Intelligence has been obtained of intended enemy movement, and freedom of the night has been denied him. Mine laying teams have been detected and either killed or driven off, and mining incidents along critical roads have been dramatically reduced. Accurate evaluation of the effect of sensors on enemy forces has not been possible, as

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AVDCOP


SUBJECT: Sensor Employment (U)

targets are generally sensed and fired upon at night. By daylight, when a visual reconnaissance or on the ground check is possible, drag marks are generally the only evidence which remains to indicate the success of the sensing. However, the table below indicates physical body count during the past several weeks, as well as the scope of the 25th Infantry Division sensor program.

<u>INCLUSIVE DATES</u>	<u>TOTAL SENSORS EMPLOYED</u>	<u>NUMBER OF ACTIVATIONS</u>	<u>NUMBER FIRED UPON</u>	<u>BODY COUNT</u>
9-15 May	145	178	102	27
16-22 May	180	333	226	89
23-28 May	191	250	234	43
29 May-4 June	191	232	176	39

5. (C) CONCLUSIONS. The sensor is a valuable tool for the commander in combat. Enemy movement can be detected and interdicted swiftly with no danger to friendly troops. Selected targets can be seeded with sensors, and the readout can be used for intelligence. In the past sensors have been used in a relatively fixed location once placed; however the 25th Infantry Division is testing the concept of making sensors available on a limited basis to isolated patrol base commanders for use as early warning devices, and initial results are favorable. Use of the sensor by commanders is limited only by ingenuity and initiative.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


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AVLCOP

SUBJECT: Countermine Warfare (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) GENERAL. The 25th Infantry Division TAOI is subject to heavy enemy mining. During the period 1 January-30 April 1969 there were over 28 road mining incidents per week in this area. The magnitude of the problem had previously been recognized and efforts to counter mining activity had centered on improvement in detection methods and equipment. Considerable effort, to include specialized individual training and improvement of mine detection equipment, has been expended to increase the percentage of mines found versus those detonated by friendly vehicles or personnel. These measures produced some degree of success, but enemy employment of non-metallic mines increased the possibility that a mine would be missed by the mine sweep team. Employment of mine rollers proved to be only marginally successful, as many mines do not detonate under the first vehicle passing over them.

2. (C) PROBLEM. The problem facing the 25th Infantry Division thus became one of minimizing enemy road mining activity. Using the Univac 1005 computer assigned to the Division AG section, statistics on enemy road mining were compiled and analyzed. The analysis revealed that over fifty percent of road mining activity in the Division TAOI was concentrated in four sectors of road having a total length of about four and one-half kilometers. Three of the four sectors of road were on LOC's leading to 25th Infantry Division fire support bases, and the remaining sector was at a major intersection on the Division MSR. Two of the roads leading to fire support bases support virtually no civilian traffic, while that portion of the MSR being mined experienced very little civilian activity.

3. (C) SOLUTION. Once the problem areas had been isolated, tactics were developed to counter the enemy's mine laying activities. Sensor fields were emplaced in the critical areas, and ambush patrol activity was increased. Artillery VT fire was put on alert to respond to both the sensors and to the patrols. Night Hawk aircraft equipped with IR lights, night observation devices, and miniguns fly throughout the Division TAOI nightly, and the crews of these UH-1 aircraft are placed on the alert for any sign of enemy activity in the four most heavily mined areas. Any

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AVDCOP

SUBJECT: Countermine Warfare (U)

enemy appearing in any of these key locations is immediately engaged with all available firepower.

4. (C) RESULTS. The intensified countermine program has been in effect for one month. Results for this limited period indicate that the effort expended has been worthwhile. The sector of MSR which has previously experienced an average of ten mining incidents per month had only three incidents during May 1969. The three sectors of LOC which have previously experienced an average of fifteen, twenty and eleven mining incidents per month respectively, had only one, eight and three mining incidents during May 1969. Personnel and equipment losses showed a corresponding decrease. See Inclosure 1.

5. (C) CONCLUSION. The program outlined above is felt to be a good beginning for effective prevention of mine casualties and damage. The number of mines detonated can be reduced by improved mine sweep techniques and equipment, but all incidents can be eliminated only by denying the enemy the ability to place his mines. The success of our sensor program combined with ambush patrols and rapid artillery reaction indicates that this is a feasible goal. The tactics employed have definitely discouraged enemy mine planting teams in their attempt to harass our forces.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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MINE DATA

INFORMATION DERIVED FROM COMPUTER PROGRAM 513A

HEAVIEST MINING EXPERIENCED ON ROADS
BORDERING CITADEL.

MINING ALSO DROPPED OFF DURING PRE-TET
PERIOD

ROADS MOST HEAVILY MINED ARE ROUTES 6A,
7A, 239, AND 26, 249 AND 14

METALLIC MINES ARE FOUND ALMOST EXCLU-
SIVELY ADJACENT TO NVA BASE AREAS

VC EMPLOY NON-METALLIC MINES WITH
IMPROVISED DETONATORS

EXPERIENCE FACTORS

	<u>FOUND</u>	<u>DETONATED</u>
MAR 1969	64	69
APR 1969	53	71
MAY 1969	42	38

VEHICLES DAMAGED BY MINES

MAR 1969	67
APR 1969	70
MAY 1969	31*

* After initiation of countermine measures being
taken in selected areas.

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AVDCIN

20 June 1969

SUBJECT: Target Acquisition (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) GENERAL. The 25th Infantry Division has available numerous and diverse sources of intelligence as well as a varied combat response capability. Fleeting targets require immediate recognition of their existence and dissemination of this information to enable rapid engagement and destruction. Though the nature of the target determines the most appropriate means of response, priorities may dictate the use of a less suitable reaction.
2. (C) PROBLEM. The problem of target acquisition is threefold: (1) to better integrate incoming, all-source information, (2) to have quicker confirmation of suspected targets, and (3) to rapidly disseminate target data to appropriate action agency.
3. (C) SOLUTION. A Target Information Center (TIC) has been established as a central agency for efficient conversion of all-source information into targets for combat response. The TIC's key task is to recognize the initial clue to a possible target and to direct additional collection efforts to expand this initial limited knowledge into a specific target. Timely dissemination of the resulting target information is an important consideration.
 - a. The TIC is composed of a G2 Element and a Fire Support Element. Two officers and two enlisted men each from the G2 Section and the Division Artillery are assigned to the TIC. This strength provides a manning level of one officer and one enlisted man for each element during two twelve-hour shifts (Inclosure 1). The G2 has staff responsibility for the TIC. Direct supervision is exercised through the G2 Air in coordination with the Assistant Fire Support Coordinator. Two organizational factors are considered to be critical to the success of the TIC: (1) it is located in the Division Tactical Operations Center (DIOC), and (2) the TIC is not a separate operational element; the targets it develops are recommended to the G3, Division Artillery and the Brigades for their action. These two features are essential to preserve established organizational and operational lines.

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SUBJECT: Target Acquisition (U)

20 June 1969

b. "Hard" target information e.g. base camps, bunkers, and foot bridges, is obtained from interpretation of aerial photography and from visual reconnaissance; Army aviators and Air Force pilots are debriefed, as well as artillery observers, G2 Air observers, Forward Air Controllers, and Airborne Personnel Detector (People Sniffer) mission crew members. Data also is obtained from the following sensors: Infrared (IR) or "Red Haze" (TAB A), Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR)(TAB B), Duffel Bag seismic and acoustic devices (TAB C), Airborne Personnel Detector (TAB D), and Ground Surveillance Radars (AN/TPS-25, AN/PPS-5 and AN/PPS-4)(TAB E). Other sources of information are intelligence reports, interrogation reports from prisoners and ralliers, agent reports, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, and enemy contacts.

c. The basic working tools of the TIC are a 1:50,000 map of the DIVISION TAOI on which the indicators of recent activity are maintained for the previous seven days, together with an acetate overlay of hard target locations and trail activity. The latter data is maintained on a permanent basis. Symbols are shown in Inclosure 2. The indicators of recent activity are color-coded by day of the week using 1800 - 1800 hours time frames in order to maintain continuity of night sensors. For rapid selection of active targets, it is only necessary to superimpose the hard targets overlay on the map and, by visual inspection, determine the hard targets in close proximity to the activity indicators. Cause plotting and extracting coordinates from the hard target plots compounds inaccuracy, a hard target library is maintained with targets filed by 10,000 meter grid square. The six or eight digit coordinate is then used to verify the precise location for accurate combat response. Records are kept on all targets developed, by source, to include the results obtained from the response (Inclosure 3).

4. (C) The Target Information Center has been operating since April. Results gained have been gratifying. Results for May, by sensors are given in the appropriate TAB. During the first two weeks of June, sensor target acquisition and appropriate combat response, coordinated by the TIC, has been credited with 30 enemy KIA (BC), 6 enemy KIA (POSS), 4 secondary explosions and the discovery of 1000 pounds of rice.

5. (C) CONCLUSION. The Target Information Center, as tailored by the 25th Infantry Division, has been successful in making the sensor program, in conjunction with all other intelligence sources, an effective means of target acquisition. Success of the TIC and the associated sensor programs, in both the paddy and jungle areas of the "Tropic Lightning" TAOR indicates these concepts may have wide applicability in areas of similar terrain.

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AVDCIN
SUBJECT: Target Acquisition (U)

20 June 1969

Mountainous areas, with their unique problems, may require some drastic modification of the sensor programs described herein, but the concept of a central agency integrating all-source information, quickly confirming suspected targets, and disseminating target data to operational elements should be valid in any terrain, under all "hot" war conditions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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as

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CO, Co A, 5th SFG, ATTN: Int O, APO 96240
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TAB A

1. (C) RED HAZE: The Red Haze program, employing airborne infrared sensor equipment, provides the 25th Infantry Division with a valuable, day or night, surveillance capability. Present aircraft assets allow surveillance of 800 to 1000 square kilometers in a 24 hour period. This is considered adequate coverage of the Division's TAOR.

2. (C) There are three sources of sensor information available to the Division:

a. The OV-10 Mohawk aircraft, mounting the AN/AAS-14 sensor, has a visual display in the cockpit of the area being sensed. This display exists for only four seconds before a new area is displayed. Under ideal conditions of an easily plottable area, in good weather, and the system working well, inflight reports of fires can be made. Experience has shown that ideal conditions exist so seldom, that inflight reports are rare.

b. All information received by the airborne sensor can be simultaneously transmitted to a Ground Sensor Terminal (GST) AN/TAQ-1. The GST records information on film imagery and displays the information in the same manner as the aircraft. The imagery from the GST is processed and interpreted in facilities immediately adjacent to the GST.

c. In the event that a data link can not be obtained between the aircraft and the GST, the imagery in the aircraft is downloaded at the Division airfield. Processing and interpretation is accomplished as with data link imagery. Normally, information from data linked imagery is the most valid and the most rapidly disseminated.

3. (C) During the dry season, numerous grass, brush and forest fires exist in the Division TAOR. The majority of these fires can be read out of the imagery due to their distinctive signature. These returns are not reported. Likewise, returns from villages and hamlets are not reported in either season. "Sanitized" reports are immediately disseminated by the G2 Air to the Target Information Center and to interested brigades without further evaluation. The TIC begins analysis of the returns and when a correlation is made between a return and other intelligence, this information is disseminated to units with a recommendation as to appropriate combat response. The TIC may also recommend further confirmation through the use of Night Hawk, Ground Surveillance Radar or other means.

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4. (C) Red Haze missions are planned and requested by 0900 hours daily. The following are considerations in selecting areas:

- a. Request by brigades.
- b. Areas searched by Airborne Personnel Detector Missions in order to obtain confirmation of activity.
- c. Areas recommended by the TIC suspected of being occupied by the enemy.
- d. Areas over which no visual or photo reconnaissance has been made during the previous 24 hours.
- e. Areas of dense foliage where little or no intelligence exists as a result of visual or photo reconnaissance.

5. (C) Typically, a Red Haze mission of four to six target areas requires three hours to be flown. Imagery from the GST is processed after mission completion. It is processed in thirty minutes to an hour and then interpreted. Therefore, the time between completion of the first target area and dissemination of the information may be five hours. To reduce this time, unprocessed imagery of high priority target areas is removed from the GST as areas are completed by the aircraft. Processing and interpretation follows resulting in a delay time of only two hours.

6. (C) Recently, in conjunction with II FFORCEV, the 25th Infantry Division coordinated a hunter-killer team consisting of an OV-10 Mohawk and a "Shadow" aircraft. The Red Haze aircraft, operating over a known enemy base camp area which has been cleared for free fire, acquires a target with its sensor and drops a flare rigged to burn on the ground. The Mohawk turns 180 degrees, acquires the flare and the original target, and drops a second flare. The "Shadow" then engages the area between the flares. Though two operations of this nature have been tried with no positive results reported, the hunter-killer team seems ideally suited to operating in War Zone areas and these operations will continue depending upon "Shadow" availability.

7. (C) In its role of target acquisition, the Red Haze program has been credited with 8 enemy KIA (BC), 40 bunkers destroyed and numerous fighting positions uncovered, during the month of May.

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TAB B

1. (C) Side Looking Airborne Radar: SIAR is capable of providing the Division with day or night surveillance of the entire TAOR in all but heavy storm conditions. The imagery produced in the OV-1B Mohawk aircraft cockpit and Ground Sensor Terminals gives SIAR a capability of detecting moving targets and reporting them within four (4) minutes of being sensed.
2. (C) Locations of targets are given as 6-digit UTM coordinates. In areas where streams, rivers and roads are discernable on the imagery, 6-digit coordinates are considered accurate. However, in areas where the approximately 1:500,000 scale imagery is difficult to plot, the interpreted location is accurate to no less than plus or minus two hundred meters.
3. (C) SIAR missions are planned and requested by 0900 hours daily. SIAR is capable of covering the 25th Infantry Division's area of operation in two missions with flight lines sixty kilometers in length. Two SIAR missions are selected to give complete coverage of areas of high interest or expected enemy activity.
4. (C) SIAR is primarily used for area surveillance. SIAR has been most successful in confirming night activity on roads, trails and waterways which are suspected of being infiltration routes. Visual reconnaissance reported a trail and canal network from the Cambodian border, east to the Song Vam Co Dong, generally along the XT00 east - west grid line. Almost nightly, in April, scattered SIAR returns indicated this route was active. Also in April, visual and photo reconnaissance of the Trapezoid (XT5540) indicated north - south foot and oxcart trails were heavily used and terminating at the Mushroom (XT6033). SIAR returns confirmed activity. Ground operations and artillery were employed to close this enemy route.
5. (C) SIAR acquired targets, due to movement and readout delay, are marginal artillery targets. After SIAR acquisition, a target must be hunted. This is best accomplished by an aircraft which can locate the target and destroy it. In February, coordination was made with a "Spooky" aircraft and the locations of SIAR acquired targets were inflighted to "Spooky". During a seven night period, "Spooky" reported engaging three trucks and five lambrettas.
6. (C) Recently, helicopters mounting a xenon searchlight and a .50 cal machinegun flew "trail" to SIAR aircraft. The large area in which SIAR acquires targets proved to be too large for the helicopters to travel across, from target to target. The concept has been changed in order to increase the efficient use of limited air assets. SIAR inflight reports are now made to the TIC. TIC determines the location and disseminates the information to the brigade which has the nearest Night Hawk patrol in the air or on strip alert. To date, this operation has had no results.

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TAB C

1. (C) Duffel Bag: Camouflaged seismic, acoustic and magnetic sensor devices are successfully employed in the 25th Infantry Division TAOR to detect activity along enemy routes of infiltration and lines of communication. Planning and employment of Duffel Bag sensor devices and associated monitor stations is under the general staff supervision of the ACofS, G2. The Duffel Bag program provides for the efficient integration of unattended sensors into the Division's surveillance and intelligence collection plan. Emplaced by aircraft and ground troops, the sensor system provides nearly instantaneous information of movement in all kinds of weather, during darkness, and in difficult terrain. The sensors are employed offensively to monitor known enemy routes of communications, defensively to detect enemy movement near friendly installations; and for intelligence by determining the nature, direction and size of the enemy force moving past the sensors.

2. (C) Use of sensors for offensive, defensive or intelligence missions may be directed by the Commanding General, requested by a subordinate commander, or recommended by a staff section. Investigation of an area for suitability of sensor employment is conducted as follows:
 - a. The G2 Plans Officer provides order of battle data and conducts preliminary map study of the general area under consideration. Other targeting inputs from the Division Target Information Center e.g. SLAR, Red Haze, and People Sniffer, are considered in the investigative process.

 - b. The G2 Air photographs the proposed area and the photographs are analyzed in detail by the Imagery Interpretation Section to determine the optimum individual sensor locations on the ground. The recommended locations (8-digit coordinates) are marked on the photos. These grids provide excellent guidance to the team that will emplace the sensors. Photos are also furnished to Brigade S2s for information and planning.

 - c. A G2 representative coordinates with all appropriate elements of the Division Staff and the appropriate Brigade before finalizing the sensor emplacement plan.

3. (C) The final plan is submitted to G3 Plans who publishes an operations order directing the brigade to conduct a sensor emplacement operation within a specified time period. The tasking directive includes the number of sensor devices allocated and specific sites for installation. G2 representatives provide technical assistance during emplacement.

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4. (C) In the offensive role, Duffel Bag sensors transmit to relay stations located on dominant terrain features and are interpreted at a central station. The data on activations is immediately communicated to artillery units for engagement. These communications are monitored in the Target Information Center in order to fulfill the sensor's intelligence role. Activations are plotted by the TIC and forwarded to interested ground units and airborne patrols such as Night Hawk or "Shadow".

5. (C) The imaginative use of diverse aerial and ground assets has made the Duffel Bag program an outstanding success. Cited below are examples of recent results obtained:

a. On 1 Apr 69, six sensor devices were employed vicinity Convoy Check Point 36 (XT3472) to reduce enemy mining activity. During the 30 day period prior to Duffel Bag employment at CP 36, Division elements recorded 11 mining incidents. During the month of April, only three undetected mining incidents occurred at CP 36. The Duffel Bag Program clearly discourages enemy mine laying operations.

b. During the night of 14 - 15 Apr 69, heavy Duffel Bag activations in the Tay Ninh Rocket Belt (XT1154) resulted in artillery engagement of an estimated enemy company. Enemy KIA and equipment/installations destroyed are as follows:

KIA: 5 NVA (BC) KBA

DESTROYED: 20 rocket firing sites

22 rocket aiming stakes

12 bunkers

c. On 26 Apr 69, Division elements conducting a ground sweep vicinity XT1460 located 19 graves. Credit of 19 enemy KIA (BC) was recorded for Duffel Bag operations. Heavy sensor activations had been detected in the area the preceding night, resulting in expenditure of 26 rounds of artillery and cessation of movement and activity.

d. In two remote areas of southwestern War Zone C, sensor activations were engaged by artillery on 17 and 29 May resulting in 7 KIA (BC), and 3 KIA (BC), respectively.

e. Duffel Bag activations engaged by artillery or exploited by ground operations have been credited with the following results since 1 Feb 69:

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266 KIA (BC)

51 AK47 rifles

4 Fws

1 .45 cal pistol

150 rds small arms

1.5 pounds of documents

2 rds 105mm

8 tunnels uncovered

3 HG

44 bunkers destroyed

4 107mm rkts

20 rocket sites

9 rds 57mm

33 tons of rice

19 bangalore torpedoes

3 grave sites discovered

8 RPG launchers, 27 RPG rounds, 18 RPG boosters

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TAB D

1. (C) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD): The Airborne Personnel Detector is a device used to determine the presence of personnel and provide the immediate readout of this information. There are two types of personnel detectors available for use in the 25th Infantry Division: The Detection, Concealed Personnel Detector, Aircraft Mounted, XM3 (Airborne Personnel Detector) and the XM-2 Personnel Detector (Manpack). The XM3-APD ("Sniffer") consists of two identical, but independent, detecting modes, and provides two independent readouts for "combination readings". The XM-2 Manpack is aircraft mounted only when an APD is not available.

2. (C) In order to facilitate rapid communication of detector sensings, a simplified readout system was developed using an alpha code to denote "combination readings":

- Alpha - 80 to 100 ua readings on both scales
- Bravo - 60 to 80 ua readings on both modes
- Charlie - 80 to 100 ua readings on ammonia mode
- Delta - 60 to 80 ua readings on ammonia mode

The background is established to read between 30 and 40 ua for each area searched and an increase in the reading indicates presence of personnel in the area. Experience has shown that Alpha and Charlie readings are the most reliable indicators of personnel presence.

3. (C) The utilization and effectiveness of the APD is influenced by many variables. Experience has shown the following to be the major variables which can be controlled through careful planning and briefing:

a. Flight Pattern of the Sniff Aircraft. The exhaust of the aircraft will affect the APD. Therefore, it is important that the flight pattern be such that the aircraft is always moving upwind (see Inclosure 4). Flying a flight pattern perpendicular to the direction of the wind from downwind to upwind will minimize the influence of the exhaust. For maximum area coverage, the distance between legs of the flight pattern should not exceed 300 meters.

b. Altitude of the Sniff Aircraft. During some periods of the day and because of the minimum amounts of effluents given off by the human body, effluents do not rise into the atmosphere. It is important, therefore, to fly as low as possible above tree tops or the ground level to get the best response. The altitude should be as constant as possible in an area as variation may materially affect the readings. Best results are obtained when flying at an altitude less than 50 feet above tree tops, brush or grass.

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
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- c. Temperature gradient between the ground and the atmosphere is of great importance. The best temperature gradient for flat, open terrain is an inversion where effluents remain close to the ground. Inversions normally occur between sunrise and 1000 hours. The best temperature gradient for wooded areas and jungle is a lapse condition where the effluents are lifted through the canopy. This condition usually exists from approximately 1000 hours until the earth and air reach equal temperatures (neutral gradient) at approximately 1400 hours (see Inclosure 5).
- d. Wind speeds above 10 knots rapidly dissipate the effluent. Therefore, winds of less than 10 knots are desirable and actually improve downwind detection capabilities.
- e. It is obvious that wind direction affects locating the source of the effluent and, by patterning the search in an upwind direction, the sources can be pinpointed. As each pass of the "Sniffer" comes closer to the effluent the readings will increase until "Sniffer" is upwind of the reading when a sharp decrease will be evident.
- f. The rains of the wet season improve the performance of the APD by eliminating residual effluents (lasting up to 24 hours in the dry season without wind). However, the personnel detector can not be employed during rain due to flight safety regulations and characteristics of the machine.
- g. It is important that an area to be sniffed be free of effluents produced by smoke, explosive fumes and aircraft exhaust. These tend to mask human effluents.
- h. The APD is not a quantitative device. No correlation between level of readings and number of personnel detected can be made due to variables involved. Readings will increase, in theory, with an increase in stay time of personnel, but, readings will also be detected for a number of hours after personnel have departed, and vegetation tends to prolong this residual effect.
4. (C) APD missions should be integrated into the overall tactical plan of the brigades. Commanders should indicate general areas of interest. The "Sniffer" operator and the Chemical Officer at each Brigade should assist planning personnel in developing a search pattern to maximize the usefulness of the APD.
5. (C) It is recommended that the aircraft team used on a "Sniffer" mission consist of a "slick" carrying the APD, and two gunships for protection. An LOH is desirable and is employed for visual reconnaissance of areas of significant readings. A navigator/plotter in one of the gunships controls the "Sniffer" search pattern, plots actual flight lines and annotates the plot with readings. He is in communication with the "Sniffer" operator at all times.

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6. (C) If the APD has an oscillograph recorder, the operator can mark significant events (entrance and exit from area, turns) on the tape. This allows for accurate post-mission analysis for intelligence and planning.
7. (C) When in doubt as to whether readings are a residual or an actual scent, Riot Control Agent CS should be dispensed to drive the enemy out of hiding. The area of CS employment should be closely observed for movement. CS should be carried on all APD missions and used as often as the situation allows.
8. (C) The Target Information Center has made extensive use of information from APD as a valid indication of enemy occupation of bunker complexes and other "hard targets". During the period 15 - 30 May 69, twelve areas were engaged by artillery or airstrikes resulting in 12 enemy KIA (BC), 5 secondary explosions, 27 bunkers and 8 tunnels destroyed. The 25th Infantry Division has recently embarked on a plan where all Eagle Flights and Aerorifle operations will be accompanied by "Sniffer" as a means of finding lucrative insertion areas. The program is too new to be assessed at this time.

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TARGET INFORMATION CENTER
Map Symbols


Seven-day Plot Symbols:

- △ - People Sniffer
- × - Red Haze
- - SLAR
- ⊗ - Radar Sighting
- ⊕ - Contacts
- ⊙ - Aircraft Receiving Fire - Crew Served Weapon
- ⊖ - Aircraft Receiving Fire - Small Arms
- ∟ - Duffle Bag Activations
- - SPAR

Hard Target Symbols

- - Trails
- - Bunkers
- ⊔ - Foxhole
- ⊔ - Trench
- ⊙ - Tunnel Entrance
- ⊙ - Structure
- ⊙ - AA Position
- ⊙ - Rocket Position
- NUM - Numerous
- ⊔ - Base Camp
- * - Trail Concentration
- ⊔ - Hospital
- ⊔ - Commo Liaison Station
- WG - Underground
- ⊙ - Position
- ⊙ - Storage
- ⊙ - Ammo Cache
- ⊙ - Foot Bridge
- ⊙ - Highway Bridge
- ⊙ - Off Loading Point
- ⊙ - Possible
- ⊙ - Camouflaged
- ⊙ - Graves


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SEARCH PATTERN



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
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WEATHER CONDITIONS



OPEN
Scent hold near ground;
little dissipation
BEST

WOODS - JUNGLE
Scent held below tree tops
POOR



OPEN
Scent Dissipates quickly
POOR

WOODS - JUNGLE
Scent rises above trees, but
trees slow dissipation
BEST



OPEN
If little wind, scent
dissipates slowly
FAIR

WOODS - JUNGLE
Little scent rises above trees
POOR

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TAB E

1. (C) Ground Surveillance Radars. Ground Surveillance Radars provide all weather, 24 hour surveillance capability with the ability to detect targets during periods of reduced visibility. They provide accurate target information data permitting immediate engagement by fire or other appropriate tactical reaction. Three types of ground surveillance radars are presently employed within the 25th Infantry Division.

a. AN/TPS-25. A doppler principle radar, organic to Division Artillery Headquarters Battery, with an ability to detect moving personnel at ranges of 10-12 kilometers under favorable terrain condition. It is used to provide coverage of those areas determined to be most lucrative for the detection of enemy main force movements.

b. AN/PPS-5. A doppler principle radar, organic to division maneuver battalions with a maximum range of 5 kilometers to detect moving personnel targets. It is used primarily to provide medium range identification and location of hostile targets during periods of reduced visibility with the secondary mission of providing close in detection of enemy movement around fire support bases, critical bridges and base camps.

c. AN/PPS-4. A doppler principle radar, retained within divisional maneuver battalions, with a 1.5 kilometer detection range. They are sited primarily to provide protection to light defensive positions and small critical installations such as bridges.

2. (C) Planning the employment of ground surveillance radars is under the general staff supervision of the ACoS, G2. The Division Artillery Commander is responsible for the operational employment of AN/TPS-25 radar, i.e. selection of site locations which maximize surveillance capability in areas directed by the Commanding General, and for providing long range surveillance capability in areas directed by the Commanding General. The AN/PPS-4 and AN/PPS-5 radars are under autonomous operational and employment control of the maneuver battalion commander. He uses current intelligence indicators to determine the best possible site location to maximize the surveillance capability. To provide greater information accuracy, all AN/TPS-25 and AN/PPS-5 radar locations are surveyed, and towers are provided the AN/PPS-5 to minimize "dead space". The radars are surveyed to an accuracy of 10-digit UTM coordinate, which contributes to fast, accurate artillery engagement. During the past month, a concerted effort was made to enhance the capabilities of ground surveillance radars. An advisory team for USAECOM inspected all radar sites. A mobile training team followed the USAECOM team to all sites, giving advice on siting and maintenance, and giving operators instruction on their radars, located at their unique sites. A radar operator school was established

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at Gu Chi. Graduates from this school are the nucleus of the unit OJT programs. In the time period since training began, three times as many radar sightings have been made as compared to a similar time period immediately before training.

3. (C) The Target Information Center (TIC) monitors ground surveillance radar sightings as reported to G2 Operations in the DTOC. After plotting the sightings and analyzing the intelligence situation, the TIC may recommend a combat response in addition to artillery. The TIC may also recommend confirmation of the sighting by other surveillance means.

4. (C) Results for the period 1 May thru 6 June 1969 are tabulated below. Body count is generally a result of artillery reaction; however, Night Hawk UH-1 aircraft have been incorporated into the system with positive results. Physical body count is indicated below; however, the actual number of enemy killed is much higher as indicated by numerous drag marks and blood trails located in the areas fired on.

<u>INCLUSIVE DATES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF SIGHTINGS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TARGETS ENGAGED</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA (BC)</u>
1 May - 6 Jun 69	273	211	45

Ground surveillance radars have been notably successful in giving early warning of battalion and multi-battalion attacks on Patrol Bases Diamond and Frontier City and at Fire Support Base Crook.

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