

AVDCFB-C

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation YELLOWSTONE)

Artillery Regt, 1st Guard Bn, 680th Training Regt, 7th NVA Div, 82d Rear Services Group, and possible elements of the 9th NVA Div. The total strength of these units was estimated between 10,000 and 14,000; however, in late November 1967, the 9th VC Div moved into Northwestern Binh Long Province and other units were dispersed down to battalion-size units throughout War Zone "C". Initially their pattern of activity was to defend supply areas and to fight delay actions, allowing COSVN Ho to move north across the Cambodian Border. Once this was accomplished, enemy forces conducted counter sweep operations and attacks on friendly base camps.

b. War Zone "C" is characterized by extremely heavy jungle vegetation and occasional open areas. The hydrography of the area is restricted to two small streams which had little effect on friendly or enemy movement. The terrain was heavily dotted with trenches and fortifications. The largest concentrations appeared to be in headquarters and cache areas just south of the Cambodian Border.

c. In the first week of the Operation, friendly units met with little enemy resistance. Most of the contact was limited to indirect fire harassment and probing actions. Intelligence indicated that COSVN HQ and its security guard units were located due north of KATUM, probably moving across the border. Other unit dispositions and locations were unknown; however, it was suspected that elements of the NVA 7th Div were dispersed to the south and east of KATUM. There were no signs of a mass exodus of War Zone "C", upon the arrival of US troops.

d. Significant contacts during the operation were generally with company or smaller sized units defending base camps. There were a few instances of enemy units attacking ARVN or FWP during sweeps, but the majority of activity involved contact with VC/NVA units in heavily fortified base camps or forward defensive positions. Enemy tactics were to make the operation as costly as possible while committing a minimum number of troops. He made extensive use of indirect fire, employing 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars, and 122mm rockets. These attacks were generally used for harassing purposes, attempting to inflict casualties and destroy supplies rather than to support ground attacks. However the enemy did on two occasions demonstrate a capability to conduct a multi-battalion attack on friendly FSBs.

e. The enemy employed AT mines on Route 4, but AP mines and booby traps were conspicuous by their absence.

f. Significant enemy losses:

(1) 03 and 09 Dec 67: 4-9 Inf Bn vic XT 299 938 located three caches containing 350 tons of unpolished rice. The rice was later evacuated.

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- (2) 200140-200500 Dec 67. The 4-9 Inf Bn FSB BEAUREGARD (IT 380 855) was attacked by an estimated 1-2 NVA battalions from the 141st NVA Regt. Results: 6 US KIA, 12 US WIA; 40 VC KIA (BC), 33 KIA (POSS), 18 small arms, 9 crew-served weapons, and 1 PRC-10 radio captured.
 - (3) 041030 Jan 68. B Co 2-14 Inf located and destroyed 40 tons of polished rice vic IT 358 858.
 - (4) 171428-171700 Jan 68. 2-14 Inf engaged an estimated 2 VC companies vic IT 348 908. Results: 2 US KIA, 13 US WIA; 13 VC KIA (BC), 1 small arm and 5 heavy weapons captured.
 - (5) 251415-251620 Jan 68. 2-14 Inf engaged an estimated VC company vic IT 248 752. Results: 1 US KIA, 16 US WIA; 20 VC KIA (BC).
 - (6) 051513 Feb 68. A Co 4-9 Inf ambushed a VC squad vic IT 362 870 resulting in 7 VC KIA (BC), 2 pounds of documents, and 1 machine gun.
 - (7) 070015 Feb 68. 1st Brigade CRIP ambushed an estimated VC company, vic IT 186 504. Results: 1 US WIA, 2 PF WIA; 26 VC KIA (BC).
 - (8) 161245-170900 Feb 68. 2-14 Inf engaged one VC battalion vic IT 242 483 entrenched in Tay Ninh City. Results: 4 US KIA, 25 US WIA; 81 VC KIA (BC).
 - (9) 19 Feb. 2-14 Inf engaged an estimated VC company with all organic weapons and supporting fires vic IT 0754. Results: 2 US WIA; 66 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC POW, 81 rounds 107mm rockets, and 114 rounds 82mm mortar.
- g. The heavy jungle in War Zone "C" made movement slow and tiring. Streams were for the most part an insignificant factor in effecting movement. The ground was hard, but the jungle restricted movement of tracked vehicles to the road.
- h. Observation and fields of fire were extremely limited by the dense vegetation. The VC overcame this by making extensive use of observers in trees. In this manner the VC were able to accurately adjust mortar fire on the FSBs.
- i. The overall evaluation of the intelligence information gained from local and attached sources was considered to be C-3 (sometimes reliable, possibly true). In War Zone "C" there was a lack of local agents. Most intelligence was from the combat troops and aerial detection devices. Operational security of Operation YELLOWSTONE was considered fair.

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DATE: 8 Dec 67 - 24 Feb 68

	<u>1-3</u>	<u>2-14</u>	<u>2-34</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Names of Other Units In Operation</u>	<u>TOTAL LOSSES</u>
KIA (BC)	100	287	19	84	Air Force	490
KIA (POSS)	123	159	10	45	2-12 Inf	337
Detainees	3	20	35	4	2-22 Inf (M)	58
					1-5 Inf (M)	
PW's				4	3-17 Cav	4
					1-49 ARVN	
Civil Def			4	7	7-11 Bn Arty	11
					1-27 Bn Arty	
Imm CIV			16	27	2-32 Bn Arty	43
					3-13 Bn Arty	
SA Wpns	29	14	7	20	2-77 Battery	70
Heavy Wpns	9	17	2	6		34
SA Ammo	23,593	7,100	452	120		31,265
HE Ammo	262	937	80	272		1,551
Mines & BT's	30	37	145	24		236
Rice (ton)	11½	39½		475		526
Structures	81	92	19	11		203
Bunkers	500	616	67	129		1,312
Documents (LB)	17	47½	1	5		70½
Tunnels (M)	421	186	10			617
Suspens		4		3		7
Foxholes	248	167	12	38		465
Trench						1,810
Radio's	1	1		3		5

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Commo Wire - 60 lb.	Protective Masks - 4
Scissors - 1 Pr.	Telephones - 1
Diesel Engine - 1	Knives - 3
Foot Bridges - 5	Canteens - 13
Fish - 2 1/2 Tons	
Stoves - 8	
Bayonets - 1	
Sugar - 15 lb.	
Beans - 150 lb.	
Garden Plots - 3	
Medical Supplies - 12 lb.	
Fish Traps - 6	
Cows - 5	
Miscellaneous Foods - 15 lb.	
Salt - 3 tons	
Fertilizer - 400 lb.	
Sandals - 10 pr	
Aiming Stakes - 2	
Sewing Kits - 1	
Water Buffalo - 2	
Miscellaneous items - 5 lbs.	
Loud Speakers - 1 Set	
Hammocks - 1	
Tables - 6	
Bamboo Ladder - 3	
Live Stock Corral - 3	
Lard - 50 lb.	
Cabbage - 50 heads	
Sleds - 2	
Propaganda Leaflets - 12 lb.	
Bicycles - 35	
Cooking Aress - 6	
Web Gear - 17	
Weapon Magazines - 26	
Ponchos - 18	
Clothing - 80 lb.	
Walls - 16	
Cooking Equipment - 50 lbs.	
Tools - 59 lbs.	
Typewriter - 1	
Pigs - 5	
Chickens - 50	

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9. (C) Mission: The 1st Brigade received the mission to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in War Zone "C" and to complete the following engineer projects:

a. Construct USSF/CIDG camp and type II C-123 airfield at Thien Ngon (vic XT 0881).

b. Construct USSF/CIDG camp and rehabilitate airfield to type II C-130 at KATUM (vic XT 3390).

c. Clear, improve and maintain the following roads for military convoy traffic:

(1) Route 4 (XT 284 618 to XT 333 903)

(2) Route 243 (XT 284 618 to XT 335 575)

(3) Route 247 (XT 101 758 to XT 272 772)

10. (C) Concept of the operation: The 1st Brigade conducted combat operations with the 4-9 Inf, 2-14 Inf, and the TF 2-34 Armor constituting the major force. Combat operations were designed to support the engineer effort at KATUM and PREK KLOK, THEIN NGON, and secure logistical convoys to KATUM, and to search out and destroy VC/NVA forces and bases. This operation was conducted in three phases.

a. Phase I. (D-Day to D+10) The 4-9 Inf, 2-14 Inf, 7-11 Artillery and the 588th Engineer battalion were airlifted into the CIDG secured LZ at KATUM, and conducted combat assault vic KATUM with the 4-9 Inf and 2-14 Inf. TF 2-34 Armor secured movement of the heavy engineer equipment to KATUM, artillery to PREK KLOK, and logistical convoys on Route 4 from MUI BA DAN to KATUM, and began improving the KATUM airstrip to receive C-130 aircraft.

b. Phase II (D+10 to D+60) The 1st Brigade conducted methodical search and destroy operations within the TAOR, opened Route 4 for overland resupply to PREK KLOK and KATUM.

c. Phase III (After D+60) YELLOWSTONE forces began phasing down. 2-14 Inf and HHC 1st Brigade returned to TAY NINH BASE CAMP 8 Feb 68 with the remaining elements closing TAY NINH 23 Feb 68.

11. (C) Execution: 1st Brigade received the 25th Infantry Division OPLAN 18-67 (Operation YELLOWSTONE) dated 281900H Nov 67. The 1st Brigade prepared and implemented OPLAN 12-67 (Operation YELLOWSTONE) dated 031200H Dec 67. In executing D-Day of Operation YELLOWSTONE each battalion of the Brigade Task

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Force prepared their OPORD. The 2-14 Inf ~~with~~ the 4-9 Inf conducted a combat assault into LZ's in the vicinity of KATUM securing objectives designed to provide security to the Task Force elements to be quartered at KATUM. The 588th Engr Bn from D-20 to D-1 cleared and opened roads required to support Operation YELLOWSTONE, and on D-Day convoyed to KATUM. On D-Day the 7-11 Artillery Bn was airlifted from TAY NINH to KATUM (FSB CUSTER). TF 2-34 Armor from D-2 to D-1 occupied FSB BLISS (XT 287 642) and FSB HILL (XT 278 680) while on D-Day the TF 2-34 Armor attacked north to establish a FSB at PREX KLOK (XT 288 815).

b. Significant contacts:

(1) 11 Dec 67: 4-9 Inf in an ambush patrol vic XT 275 960 engaged 2 VC with small arms at 0135H. At 0218H this AP received 50 rounds of 60mm mortar resulting in 1 KIA and 8 WIA. The mortar fire lasted 21 minutes. The AP requested a LPT, counter-mortar ship, and a Spooky. Artillery fire was provided from FSB CUSTER (XT 333 903). At 0311H mortar fire began again with 10 rounds of 60mm from vic XT 268 975. At 0316H, 14 rounds of 60mm and 1 RPG were received from vic XT 265 966. Losses: 2 KIA and 22 WIA. VC losses unknown. NOTE: By engaging the 2 VC with unknown results the 4-9 Inf compromised their position but did not relocate.

(2) 120845 Dec 67: While the 1-49 ARVN Inf was combat assaulting to an LZ vic XT 378 858, one of the UH1Hs carrying troops was shot down vic XT 334 915. The LZ was initially cold at 0836H, but as the third lift to 1-49 Inf landed on the LZ at 0901H, they received 60mm mortar fire, indicating the LZ was hot. The mortar was spotted at XT 390 857 and engaged with a gunship and artillery. Mortar contact was broken at 0937H. The LZ remained cold after 0937H.

(3) 121130 Dec. The CO HHC, 1st Brigade C&C ship received small arms fire from vic XT 343 913. Artillery was fired into the area. At 1130H also a CH-47 extracting a UH-1D from XT 342 913 received fire from XT 342 913. At 1304H FAC received fire from XT 342 913 resulting in no hits. At 1425H, B Company 2-14 Inf received small arms fire from XT 342 913, returning fire with artillery and organic weapons. At 1503H B company 2-14 Inf received additional fire from XT 342 913 again returning fire with artillery. At 1514H FAC received BAR fire from XT 342 913 and again artillery fire was delivered into the area. Losses: no friendly; enemy unknown. NOTE: Artillery does not negate the necessity for the infantry to move through an area to clear the area of VC.

(4) 140827 Dec 67: A Company 2-14 Inf received SA and AW fire from vic XT 343 912 from an estimated 2 VC. Contact was broken at 0829H with no casualties. Contact was reestablished at 0844H resulting in 1 KIA and 1 WIA. Contact was broken at 0910H and reestablished at 1035H with A Co receiv-

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ing SA and AW fire and rifle grenades resulting in 2 WIA. Contact broken at 1038H and reestablished at 1056H from a bunker via XT 343 913 with A Co receiving AW fire and RPG from an estimated 20 VC. 90mm fire was delivered point blank on the bunker and an airstrike delivered at XT 343 912. The airstrike resulted in 2 US WIA from A Co and one WIA from C Co who had maneuvered into the area to assist A company. At 1540H A company continued to sweep to XT 338 909 while C Company sweep to XT 342 914 without contact. Friendly losses: 2 KIA, 15 WIA; enemy losses: 2 VC (BC).

(5) 140940 Dec: C Company 4-9 Inf received SA fire and claymore from via XT 245 941 with sporadic fire continuing until 0950H. B Company moved in to block the trails via XT 241 937. Contact was maintained until about 1100H. An airstrike was delivered at 1105H to XT 250 940. B Company moved to the north flank as the contact was reestablished at 115H. Contact at 1120H was via XT 245 944, with this contact broken at 1147H. Friendly losses: 6 KIA, 18 WIA; enemy losses: 7 KIA (BC), 10 KIA (POSS), and 3 RPG - 2 rounds.

(6) 150640 Dec. YATUM Base Camp received 35-40 60mm mortar rounds. At first light when C Company 2-14 Inf examined the perimeter they found that one claymore mine had had the wires cut and one claymore had been turned around.

(7) 161024 Dec: B Company 4-9 Inf received AW fire from an estimated VC platoon via XT 245 942. The VC platoon had 7 AW firing. D Company began moving from XT 241 944 at 1035H to assist B Company. VC contact with B Company was broken at 1059H and reestablished at 1103H as 3 AW began firing from XT 245 942, resulting in 1 US WIA. CSBKA was placed on the VC position at 1118H. Contact was broken at 1145H with B Company moving to XT 245 939. D Company established contact via XT 246 944 at 1214H and breaking off at 1230H without casualties.

(8) 200140 Dec: The 4-9 Inf at FSB BEAUREGARD (XT 380 855) received 95 rounds 82mm and 60mm mortar. At 0230H infiltrators were reported inside the perimeter. The infiltrator set fire to the artillery ammunition resulting in 620 rounds 105mm burning. At 0346H the FSB was surrounded by an estimated 1-2 NVA battalions. At 0405H the land line communications with the FSB were cut. The mortar attack ceased at 0550H then began again at 0705H. Contact was broken at 0735H. Friendly losses: 6 KIA, 12 WIA; enemy losses: 40 KIA (BC), 33 KIA (POSS).

(9) 171428 Jan 68. C company 2-14 Inf established contact via XT 348 903 with an estimated 2 VC companies. The contact began with C Company receiving SA, and AW, from an estimated 3-10 VC. Fire was returned with SA, AW, artillery, and gunships. From this contact, C Company sustained 1 WIA. Contact remained until at 1515H A Company, who was maneuvering into

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the area, received fire at vic XT 248 906, resulting in 1 WIA. Contact remained as C Company reported 2 KIA and 10 WIA at 1535H. At 1705H the VC force was estimated to have a reinforced platoon in the woods with 2 platoons in bunkers. Contact was broken at 1730H with sporadic fire remaining until about 1830H. Friendly losses: 2 KIA, 13 WIA; enemy losses: 13 KIA (BC), 14 KIA (POSS).

(10) 251402 Jan 68. B Company 2-14 Inf received SA fire at XT 248 952 from an estimated reinforced VC squad. The gunships on station supported B Company with fire. At 1430H the PAC ship on station received 2 hits with negligible damage. At 1430H A Company received SA fire at XT 248 953 which resulted in the CO of A Company being wounded. At 1443H A and C Companies consolidated under the command of CO C Company. B Company moved into the area and at 1535H B company was at XT 248 952 and A and C Companies at XT 248 954 with the VC force between the 2-14 Inf elements. Contact remained until 1715H. Friendly losses: 1 KIA, 16 WIA; enemy losses: 20 KIA (BC).

(11) 06 Feb 68. NVA/VC forces employed CS RCA at PREK KLOK. The CS was in burlap bags, tied with rope and wire, and had an explosive charge attached to the outside of the bag. About 6 bags were placed adjacent to the perimeter. Three bags did not detonate. These bags were evacuated to Division. The bags which did detonate were placed downwind from PREK KLOK and were not effective against the camp.

(12) 11 Feb 68. KATUM Base Camp received 32 rounds of 82mm mortar. Some of the rounds contained "gas" which incapacitated 10 individuals. The casualties were reported to be nauseous and have headaches at 1002H. By 1330H all of these casualties had been returned to duty.

(13) 150825 Feb 68: A Company 588th Engr Bn and 1 platoon of A Company 2-22 Inf (M) enroute to THIEN NGON were ambushed by an estimated VC company at XT 089 790. The VC fired AW and RPG resulting in 10 KIA, and 2 APC destroyed. The contact was broken at 0850H with unknown VC losses.

(14) 160115 Feb 68. PHU KOUNG, XT 234 746, began receiving mortar and 122mm rocket fire and ground attack. MACV requested and got 1 APC ARVN troop and 2 ARVN Inf companies to support MACV. Action broke at 0245H as it began at BIEN KHO, XT 231 495. At 0310H the mortar fire began again at PHU KOUNG and BIEN KHO, but the ground attack had ceased. At 0345H, as both contacts continued, PHU KOUNG reported VC had entered the MACV compound. One VC POW, captured by MACV, stated that his unit was from NUI BA DEN and that the unit would continue the attack until after sunrise, then would return to NUI BA DEN. Contact was broken at PHU KOUNG at 0530H but continued at BIEN KHO. At 0545H the VC CP was suspected to be located vic XT 245 485; and the TAY BINH Province Chief requested US forces to sweep the

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area XT 250 493 to XT 250 495 to XT 270 493 to XT 270 470 giving clearance to fire any type ordnance the US forces required. By 1200H 2-14 Inf was sweeping the area vic XT 27 49 and XT 28 50. The combined forces at this time was 4 US companies and ARVN companies. Contact was established at 1245H and continued vic XT 241 48, at 1905h and B and C Companies 2-14 Inf moved to support A Company 2-22 Inf (M). At 1959H three airstrikes were delivered at XT 244 486. Sporadic contact and mortar fire continued to 170425 Feb. At 170806 Feb it was reported that the VC unit had withdrawn at 170300 Feb. Contact was not reestablished. Friendly losses: 4 KIA, 25 WIA; enemy losses: 81 KIA (BC). The VC force was estimated at 1 battalion.

(16) 190800 Feb 68. 2-14 Inf established contact with an estimated VC company firing all organic weapons and supporting fires vic XT 075 534. Sporadic contact was maintained all day. Friendly losses: 3 WIA; enemy losses: 66 KIA (BC), and 2 POW.

12. (C) Results:

a. Personnel:

(1) FRIENDLY	KIA	WIA	NBC	MIA	TOTAL		
4/9	20	154	1		175		
2/14	13	194	18		225		
2/34	15	92	15		122		
1/5							
2/12	4	1	1		6		
HHC	2	10	5		17		
OTHERS	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>12</u>		
	59	458	40		557		
(2) ENEMY	4/9	2/14	1/5	2/12	HHC	OTHERS	
			2/34				
KIA (BC)	100	287	19		7	77	
KIA (POS)	123	159	10		13	32	
(3) KILL RATIO					FRIENDLY/ENEMY		
4/9					1 - 5		
2/14					1 - 11.9		
2/34					1 - 1.2		
1/5					<u>—</u>		
					TOTAL	1 - 6	

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<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>QTY</u>
ACCESSORY OUTFIT, field	1 ea
ALARM SET, AN/GSS9	4 ea
ARMORER VEST, protective	80 ea
BAG, waterproof	105 ea
BAYONET KNIFE, w/scabbard	108 ea
BARBER KIT	2 ea
BELT, pistol	107 ea
BINOCULAR 6X30 MIL RET	1 ea
BLANKET WOOL, bed olive green	61 ea
BOOT, tropical	105 ea
CANTEEN, plastic water 2qt	267 ea
CANTEEN, plastic	6 ea
COMPASS, magnetic lensatic	6 ea
CARRIER, personnel, M113A1	1 ea
COVER, canteen aluminum	111 ea
DRAWERS, men cotton OG-109	40 ea
FORK, field mess	70 ea
GENERATOR SET, 3KW	1 ea
GLASSES, sun protection	10 ea
GLOVES, leather, work type	50 ea
HAMMOCK, jungle	105 ea
HANDKERCHIEF, cotton	60 ea
HEADNET, mosquito	70 ea
HELMET, steel	95 ea
KNIFE, field mess	105 ea
LAUNCHER, grenade	3 ea
LINER, helmet, soldiers	95 ea
LINER, poncho, nylon	122 ea
MACHINE GUN 7.62mm M-60	11 ea
MACHETE, w/o sheath	8 ea
MASK, protective, field M-17	264 ea
MATTRESS, pneumatic	105 ea
PACK, combat field	105 ea
PAN, mess kit C85	105 ea
PISTOL, .45 Cal	14 ea
PONCHO, nylon	119 ea
POUCH, ammunition	221 ea
PLOTTING BOARD, M-16	1 ea
RADIO SET AN/PRC 9	14 ea
RADIO SET AN/PRC 25	3 ea
RADIO SET AN/GRC 106	1 ea
RADIO, TRANSMITTING SET AN/PET-4	9 ea

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RECEIVER, TRANSMITTER RADIO RT524	1 ea
RIFLE 5.6mm M-16E1	44 ea
RIFLE, RECOILLESS 90mm M6F	3 ea
RUCKSACK, nylon w/frame	107 ea
SIGHT UNIT 60mm	2 ea
SOCK, nylon w/olive green 109	200 ea
SHOVEL, entrenching tool	105 ea
SPOON, field mess CRS	70 ea
SUB-MACHINEGUN CAR 15 5.56mm	2 ea
SUSPENDERS, field pack	105 ea
TANK, combat M48A3	4 ea
TABLEWARE, OUTFIT field	1 ea
TENT, shelter half	105 ea
TOWEL, bath, olive green	200 ea
TROUSERS, men's tropical	727 ea
TRUCK, cargo 3/4 ton	1 ea
TRUCK, utility 1/4 ton	1 ea
TYPEWRITER, non-port, non-elect	1 ea
UNDERSHIRT, cotton, olive green 109	250 ea

13. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. PX facilities were not available to the troops in the field on this operation. A mobile PX was considered but deemed not acceptable in that this would automatically result in the discontinuance of sundry pecks. Any desired items not included in these pecks could be purchased by designated unit individuals at Tay Ninh and sent out on resupply. This is preferable to the certain inequities that would occur if a mobile PX was available at the forward base camp.

b. There was considerable difficulty in the rapid distribution of mail in the early and intermediate stages of the operation. This was largely due to the irregular air service. A regularly scheduled cargo plane eliminated this problem.

c. Difficulties were also experienced in getting replacements, returning R&R personnel, etc.: from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh and Katum. Again this was largely due not only to irregular aerial service but also insufficient flights. Getting soldiers back to their units was always slow. The problem would have been at incalculable proportions if it were not for the frequent ground convoys.

d. Supply: All classes of supply were drawn from Tay Ninh LSA who operated a forward support area at Katum. Supply convoys were operated daily and controlled by DISCOM Forward. Water points were operated at Katum, Prek Kloc, and Bau CO by the 588th Engineer Bn. Support Base: Knox, all

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potable water was supplied by a water point operated by the 65th Engineers. Showers points at Katum were operated by Tay Ninh LSA and at Bau CO by 588th Engineers. The greatest problem area of supply was ice, which seemed to be in limited supply at all forward camps.

1) Class I:

A RATIONS	251,439 meals
C RATIONS	183,375 meals
IIRP RATIONS	680 meals
SUNDRY PACKS	1,079 ea.

2) Class II and IV: A total of 345 tons was used in support of the operations.

Class III:

Agas	46,490 gal
Diesel	73,800 gal
Lub oil OE-30	2,370 gal
Lub oil OE-10	1,159 gal
Lub oil OE-50	1,450 gal
Lub oil OE-90	325 gal
Grease AA	85 lb
Solvent	55 gal
Hydraulic fluid (brake)	84 gal
Hydraulic fluid (ramp)	87 gal
Aviation Gas	13,232 gal
JP-4	18,000 gal

(4) Class V:

Ctg, 5.56mm	41.3 tons
Ctg, 7.62mm	82.0 tons
Ctg, Cal .45	2.8 tons
Ctg, Cal .50	139.2 tons
Ctg, 40mm	16.9 tons
Ctg, 81mm	347.0 tons
Ctg, 90mm	808.4 tons
Ctg, 106mm	3.6 tons
Ctg, 60mm	210.0 tons
Ctg, 4.2" Mortar	279.5 tons
Hand Grenades	14.5 tons
Smoke Grenades	15.5 tons
Mine, claymore	5.7 tons
Miscel, (flares, deco, sig)	13.3 tons

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e. Maintenance: Maintenance teams from the battalions were with their respective units. They were able to perform all 2nd echelon vehicular maintenance. The 725th Maintenance Battalion provided some maintenance facilities. No 3rd echelon maintenance was provided in the field. Problem areas for the 2/34 Armor were:

- (1) Procurement of tank engines
- (2) Availability of repair parts for M73 machine gun
- (3) Support maintenance for fire control instruments, artillery and artillery and small arms.

f. Treatment of casualties, evacuation, and hospitalization: Dust-Off support was provided by Cu Chi and Tay Ninh MEDEVAC units. Battalion aid stations treated patients for minor ailments and "D" CO, 25th Medical Clearing Station located at Katum handled all cases beyond the capabilities of the battalion stations.

g. Transportation: Transportation was provided by organic vehicles, CH-47, C-130, C-123, UH1D.

h. Communications: Communications were provided by brigade and battalion sections; this consisted of FM and RTT. UHF was provided by 125th Signal Battalion.

i. Medical Evaluation: Personal health was generally good throughout the operation. One significant problem area, was that of rat control. Control measures included:

- (1) Proper police of area, especially the mess area.
- (2) Use of anti-coagulant poison.
- (3) Use of traps and snares.
- (4) Dapsafane Malaria Prophylaxis was used in addition to the Chloroquine-Primaquin tablets. No malaria was reported during the operation. Common complaints included colds, minor cuts and scratches, and at first, sunburn. Skin irritations were a persistent problems with most resulting from the heat. These were minimized by the daily use of showering facilities.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques. None reported.

15. (C) Commander's Analysis:

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a. All engineer projects assigned to the 1st Brigade were completed (USSF/CIDG camps at KATUM and THEIN NGON and improving the airstrip at KATUM to receive C-130 aircraft and constructing an airstrip at THEIN NGON to receive C-123 aircraft).

b. The roads were secured, cleared, and improved to support the Brigade operations within War Zone "C" and the Brigade located and destroyed many VC/NVA bases and forces. At about D+30 there was a substantial decrease in VC contact as the VC moved into the Saigon area for their TET offensive.

c. From 18 Jan 68 to 15 Feb 68 all contact with the VC was with very small units or scattered individuals. During this time minor mortar attacks were the only VC offensive actions. Major contact was established on 15, 16, and 17 Feb 68 which suggested that some of the units which had moved to the Saigon area had returned. On 19 Feb 68, the 2-14 Inf located a VC company area which was suspected to have conducted the mortar attacks on the TAY NINH Base Camp.

d. Action continued throughout the Operation YELLOWSTONE with sporadic contact almost daily.

e. The use of airmobile assets enabled the Brigade to assault a large portion of its TAOR. Without airmobile assets the Brigade was restricted to the immediate vicinity of its base camps. When restricted to assault entirely by ground movement, the effectiveness was minimal since the VC units began to move around the US installations and effective ground range.

f. Eagle flights were conducted infrequently because of the requirement to support US forces with artillery and the difficulty in moving and securing arty at temporary FSB's based on the dense jungles and lack of CH-47's to accomplish timely movements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Joseph J. Mc...
THOMAS A. STOK
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268

AVDCTB-C

19 MARCH 1968

SUBJECT: COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

COMMANDING GENERAL
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
ATTN: AGOFS G3
APO 96225

1. NAME OF OPERATION: OPERATION YELLOWSTONE.
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 8 DEC 67-18 DEC 67, 27-DEC 67-24 FEB 68.
3. LOCATION: NORTHERN WAR ZONE "0".
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3D BDE 25TH INF DIV.
 5. COMMANDERS:

3D BDE 25TH INF DIV	COL LEONARD DAEMS
2D BN, 12TH INF	LTC RAPHAEL TICE (TO 21 FEB 68)
2D BN, 22ND INF (M)	LTC ANDREW G. NORRIS (TO 21 FEB 68)
	LTC KING J. COFFMAN (FWD TO PRES)
3D BN, 22ND INF	LTC THOMAS U HARROLD (TO 2 FEB 68)
	LTC ROY K. FLINT (2 FEB 68 TO PRESENT)
4TH BN, 9TH INF	LTC JOHN M HENCHAN
TF 1-5 INF (M)	LTC HENRY R. MURPHY JR.
2-14TH INF	LTC ALLEN BRACY
3-11TH CAV	LTC NEAL CREIGHTON
2-77TH ARTY	LTC WILLIAM L ALBRIGHT (TO 5 FEB 68)
	LTC FRFD J MERRITT (5 FEB TO PRESENT)
 5. TASK ORGANIZATION:

2/12 INF (-1 CO & RCN PLT) 3TMS 44TH IPSD 1-PLT-D/65TH ENGR (DS)	BDE CONTROL 1 CO 2/12 INF (OPCON) RCN PLATOON 2/12 (OPCON) 2/77TH ARTY (DS) D/65TH ENGR (DS) A-C-D 3/13TH ARTY (OSR) S1B SPT ELM (SPT) 3D PLT 25TH MP CO DISCOM FWD COMND ELM (SPT) FWD SPT SEC, S&T (SPT) B/ 25TH MED BN (SPT) D/725TH MAINT BN (SPT) SEC QM BRFG PLT (SPT)
2/12 INF (M) 3TMS 44TH IPSD 1PLT D/65TH ENGR (DS)	
3/22 INF (-1 CO) 3 TMS 44TH IPSD 1 PLT D/65TH (DS)	

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7. SUPPORTING FORCES

A. ARTILLERY

1. DURING THE PERIOD OF OPERATION YELLOWSTONE, THE 2/77 ARTY WAS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE 3D BDE AND ATTACHED MANUEVER BATTALIONS. FROM 10 DEC 1967 UNTIL 15 DEC 67, A/6/77 ARTY WAS ATTACHED TO 2/77 ARTY AND IN OS ROLE TO 3D BDE ELEMENTS. FROM 29 DEC 67 UNTIL 31 JAN 68, A/3/73 WAS ATTACHED AND IN A GSR ROLE TO 2/77 ARTY.

2. NORMAL USE OF PREPLANNED AND ON CALL FIRES WERE USED EXTENSIVELY DURING THE OPERATION. DURING SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSIONS BY MANUEVER BATTALIONS, EFFECTIVE USE WAS MADE OF BLOCKING FIRES ALONG ROUTES OF MARCH. ONE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUE, PARTICULARLY DURING THE OCCUPATION OF FSB BURT, WAS THE EMPLOYMENT OF CLOSE-IN H&H'S. THESE WERE FIRED IN GREAT VOLUME AT BURT AND WERE BELIEVED INSTRUMENTAL IN THE SUPPRESSION OF VC MORTAR ATTACKS.

3. DURING THE BATTLE OF SUDI CUT (1-2 JAN 68), ARTILLERY PLAYED A HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT ROLE. DIRECT FIRE WAS EMPLOYED UPON ATTACKING VC FORCES IN LARGE VOLUME. DURING THE BATTLE APPROXIMATELY 60 ROUNDS OF BEEHIVE AMMUNITION WERE FIRED AND WERE BELIEVED INSTRUMENTAL IN STOPPING THE VC HUMAN WAVE ASSAULTS. DURING THE ATTACK, INTERDICTION FIRES WERE FIRED ON WITHDRAWING ENEMY FORCES FROM FSB BEAUREGARD (VIC XT381056).

4. POSITIONS OCCUPIED:

BTRY	COORD	DATES OCCUPIED	MEANS OCC
A/2/77	XT 370 630	8-9 DEC 67	CONVOY
A/2/77	XT 395 700	9-15 DEC 67	CH-47
A/2/77	XT 280 779	27-29 DEC 67	CH-47
A/2/77	XT 499 806	29 DEC-127 JAN	CH-47
A/2/77	XT 492 475	27 JAN-24 FEB	CH-47
D/2 77	XT 370 630	8-9 DEC 67	CONVOY
B/2/77	XT 395 700	9-15 DEC 67	CH-47
B/2/77	XT 280 778	27-28 DEC 67	CONVOY
B/2/77	XT333 903	28 DEC-11 JAN	CONVOY
B/2/77	XT 499 806	11-28 JAN 68	CH-47
B/2/77	XT 492 475	31 JAN-10 FEB	CONVOY
B/2/77	FSB SIRON	28-31 JAN 68	CONVOY
C/2/77	XT 370 630	8-9 DEC 67	CONVOY
C/2/77	XT 280 778	27-29 DEC 67	CONVOY
C/2/77	XT 499 806	29 DEC-25 JAN	CONVOY
A/3/73	XT 499 806	30 DEC-28 JAN	CONVOY
A/3/73	FSB BURT	28-31 JAN 68	CONVOY
A/6/77	XT 395 700	10-15 DEC 67	CH-47

5. STATISTICAL DATA:

(A) TOTAL ROUNDS EXPENDED:

2/77	A/3/73	A/6/77
35,662	9,504	1,190

(B) MISSIONS BY TYPES:

(1) H&H	2/77	A/3/73	A/6/77
(2) SPT	721	160	7

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1. USAF

(1) EXTENSIVE USE WAS MADE OF TACTICAL AIR TO INCLUDE PREPLANNED, IMMEDIATE AND COMBAT PROOF MISSIONS WITH NORMAL AIR REQUEST CHANNELS BEING USED FOR ALL MISSIONS FLOWN.

(2) STATISTICAL DATA:

(A) MISSIONS

1.	PREPLANNED MISSIONS REQUESTED:	140
2.	PREPLANNED MISSIONS FLOWN	133
3.	PREPLANNED SORTIES:	315
4.	IMMEDIATE MISSIONS REQUESTED:	100
5.	IMMEDIATE MISSIONS FLOWN:	100
6.	IMMEDIATE SORTIES:	205

(B) RESULTS OF TACTICAL AIR:

1.	VC KILLED BY AIR (BODY COUNT)	14
2.	VC KILLED BY AIR (POSS)	61
3.	MILITARY STRUCTURES DESTROYED	18
4.	MILITARY STRUCTURES DAMAGED	6
5.	BUNKERS DESTROYED	75
6.	BUNKERS DAMAGED	36
7.	BUNKERS UNCOVERED	192
8.	TRENCHES DESTROYED (IN METERS)	245
9.	TRENCHES UNCOVERED (IN METERS)	1200
10.	TUNNEL ENTRANCES EXPOSED	5
11.	TUNNELS COLLAPSED (IN METERS)	30
12.	FOXHOLES DESTROYED	4
13.	SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS	
	A. WHITE SMOKE	7
	B. BLACK SMOKE	1
	C. GRAY SMOKE	4

C. ARMY AVIATION:

(1) THE BRIGADE CONDUCTED NUMEROUS AIRBORNE OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION YELLOWSTONE BY THE 269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION. WORKING WITH THE SAME HELICOPTER COMPANIES IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE AS COORDINATION IS GREATLY SIMPLIFIED. IN ADDITION, QUICK REACTION INSERTIONS AND EXTRACTATIONS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH MINIMUM LOSS OF TIME.

(2) THE BRIGADE AVIATION SECTION FLEW A TOTAL OF 825 HOURS AND 734 SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION. A TOTAL OF 1626 PASSENGERS WERE TRANSPORTED DURING THIS PERIOD.

(3) THE LARGEST SINGLE EVENT DURING OPERATION YELLOWSTONE IN WHICH ARMY AVIATION WAS INVOLVED WAS THE BATTLE OF SOU CUT ON 1-2 JANUARY, 1968. THE SPARTANS FROM THE 15TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION ARRIVED AT 0330 HOURS WITH CLASSY EMERGENCY RESUPPLY. THEY WERE JOINED BY THE LITTLE BEARS OF THE 188TH AHC. SOME OF AMMUNITION HAD BEEN EXHAUSTED AND OTHERS WERE CRITICALLY LOW. WHILE THE BATTLE RAGED AROUND THEM, AND WHILE DRAWING INTENSE HOSTILE FIRE, ON EACH APPROACH, THE SLICKS CONTINUED TO BRING IN AMMUNITION, WITHOUT WHICH FIRE SUPPORT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED.

(4) FIRE SUPPORT AREA BURT WAS LOCATED IN THE NORTHEASTERN PORTION OF WAR ZONE C (XT500805). THE GROUND WAS DRY AND HAD BEEN GRINDING INTO A FINE POWDER, DUE TO THE NUMBER OF UNITS OCCUPYING THE AREA. AIR TRAFFIC WAS HEAVY AND DUST CAUSED BY THE DOWN WASH OF THE ROTORS WAS A CONTINUOUS PROBLEM. THIS PROBLEM WAS PARTIALLY ALLEVIATED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DUST SUPPRESSION

CH-47 RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT AND THE OTHER FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF OH-23'S AND UH-1'S. ONE PAD WOULD NOT SUFFICE DUE TO CONGESTION AND CH-47 ROTOR WASH. THESE PADS WERE COVERED WITH DEBRASOLINE USING A 600 GALLON SPRAYER DAILY. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL WAS ACHIEVED BY UTILIZING PATHFINDERS FROM THE 25TH AVIATION BATTALION. A DIRECT LINE 1 WAS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE PATHFINDERS AND THE ARTILLERY FOC TO COORDINATE CHECKFIRES FOR ARRIVING AND DEPARTING AIRCRAFT. TO AVOID CONSTANT CHECKFIRES, AN AIR CORRIDOR WAS ESTABLISHED THROUGH WHICH ALL AIRCRAFT ARRIVED AND DEPARTED. DEPENDING ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION, THIS CORRIDOR WAS OFTEN CHANGED TO MEET REQUIREMENTS.

(5) GUNSHIP SUPPORT FOR THE BATTLE OF SOUJI CUT WAS PROVIDED BY C-TROOP 3/17 CAVALRY, 187TH AND 188TH AHC'S AND COMPANY B, 25TH AVIATION BATTALION. THESE AIRCRAFT WERE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED TO ASSIST IN BLUNTING THE TWO REGIMENT ATTACK.

B. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

A. INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING THE BRIGADE AO WAS OBTAINED FROM 25TH INF DIV G-2, AND THROUGH LIAISON WITH ADVISORY TEAMS.

B. THE AO EXTENDED FROM WAR ZONE C TO THE VICINITY OF SAIGON. TERRAIN VARIED FROM DENSE DOUBLE CANOPY JUNGLE TO RICE PADDIES AND SWAMPY LOWLAND AREAS.

C. THE FOLLOWING ENEMY INITIATED ACTIONS OCCURRED:

- (1) SNIPER FIRE 41
- (2) MORTAR FIRE 57
- (3) MINES 27
- (4) BOOBY TRAPS 10
- (5) ENGAGEMENTS 60
- (6) FIRE AGAINST AIRCRAFT 14

D. THE FOLLOWING MAJOR INCIDENTS OCCURRED:

- (1) 131445H DECEMBER 67: B/3/22 INF DESTROYED 6000 POTATO WASHER GRENADES AND 9000 BASEBALL GRENADES AT XT182997. THESE GRENADES WERE PROTECTED BY MOSMOLINE AND STORED IN 55 GALLON DRUMS, WHICH WERE BURIED IN THE GROUND.
- (2) 012300H JANUARY 68: FSB (RT BT500905) RECEIVED A GROUND ATTACK FROM AN ESTIMATED VC REGIMENT. THE ATTACK LASTED FROM APPROXIMATELY 2300 TO 0600; DURING WHICH TIME THE 3D BRIGADE KILLED 355 VC APPENDED 500 PWTS, AND CAPTURED 75 AK-47'S, 16 RPG-27'S, 12 RPG-7'S, 11 LMG'S AND 1 PISTOL. US LOSSES WERE 19 KILLED AND 111 WOUNDED.
- (3) 050002H JANUARY 68: B/4/9 INF ENCOUNTERED HEAVY RESISTANCE ON A LANDING ZONE AT XT53093. IN THE INSUING ENGAGEMENT 3D BDE KILLED 65 VC (RC) AND 200 VW (POSS), WHILE LOSING 7 KILLED AND 16 WOUNDED.
- (4) 091430H JANUARY 68 B/3/22 DISCOVERED AN APMS CACHE AT XT182792. THEY EVACUATED AND DESTROYED A TOTAL OF 11,450 RDS OF 7.62 MM AMMUNITION, 14,000 BLASTING CAPS AND 46 CASES OF DEMOLIT-ION.
- (5) 300630H JANUARY 68: THE 3D BRIGADE WAMP CAMP AT CAMP RANIER (XT495673) RECEIVED 8 XT107 MM ROCKETS; 107 . . . ROCKETS WERE RECEIVED AGAIN ON 31 JANUARY. THIS MARKED ONE OF THE FIRST APPEARANCES OF THIS CHINESE COMMUNIST WEAPON IN VIETNAM.

E. MAJOR VC PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES ARE LISTED IN PARA 12

9. MISSION: 3D BDE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION MOVE TO NORTHERN WAR ZONE "C" AND CONDUCTS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO DESTROY VC/NVA FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS, OPENS LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR FRIENDLY FORCES, AND INTERDICTS VC/NVA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

A. MANEUVER: SEE OPORD 40-67 PARA 3.

B. FIRES: MAXIMUM USE WAS MADE OF TAC AIR AND ARTILLERY THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION.

C. REFERENCES:

(1) OPORD 37-67 HQ 3D BDE 25TH INF DIV DTD 3 DEC 67 W/CH 1.

(2) FRAGO 1 TO OPORD 37-67 DTD 11 DEC 67.

(3) FRAGO 2 TO OPORD 37-67 DTD 11 DEC 67.

(4) OPORD 40-67 HQ 3D BDE 25TH INF DIV DTD 26 DEC 67 WITH CHANGES 1 & 2.

(5) FRAGO 1-67 TO OPORD 40-67 DTD 27 DEC 67.

(6) FRAGO 2-67 TO OPORD 40-67 DTD 13 JAN 68.

(7) FRAGO 3-67 TO OPORD 40-67 DTD 19 JAN 68.

11. EXECUTION:

A. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY:

(1) 8 DEC 67:

(A) 3D BDE: CONCLUDED OPERATION DIAMONDHEAD. INITIATED OPERATION YELLOWSTONE. AT 072221 HRS AND 080019 HRS DAU TIENG BASE CAMP RECEIVED ONE RD S/A HARRASSING FIRE. FIRE WAS NOT RETURNED AS SOURCE OF FIRE WAS UNDETERMINED. RESULTS INCLUDED NO US CASUALTIES.

(B) 2-12 INF: REMAINED DAU TIENG AS BDE RRF. PREPARED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

(C) TF 2-22: CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO VIC XT424664. AT 1055 HRS, AN APC HIT A MINE AT XT416853 RESULTING IN NEG US CASUALTIES AND MODERATE DAMAGE TO THE APC.

(D) 3-22 INF: CO A CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS IN THE MICHELIN TO VIC XT509497 AND ESTABLISHED A COMPANY SIZE AMBUSH. BN(-) REMAINED DAU TIENG AS DIVISION RESERVE.

(E) TF ROMEO: DETACHED FROM TF 2-22 EFFECTIVE 080700 HRS. SECURED BRIDGE SITE VIC XT390628. CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB GRANT VIC XT382625.

(F) 3-49 ARVN: ARRIVED DAU TIENG. PREPARED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

(2) 9 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: CONDUCTED CA AND SECURED SOUTHERN PORTION OF FSPB HOOD VIC XT389702. CO C(-) REMAINED DAU TIENG AS BDE RRF.

(B) TF 2-22: CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS IN AO OTTER. CO A & C/2-31 ARMOR CONDUCTED OPERATIONS TO VIC XT419707. CO B, C, & CP CONDUCTED OPERATIONS TO VIC XT410717.

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(C) 7-22 INF: CO A CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS IN THE MICHELIN CLOSING CAU TIENG AT 1300 HRS. BN(-) REMAINED IN DAU TIENG AND PREPARED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

(D) TF ROMEO: CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB GRANT (XT382625). OPCON TO 3-13 ARTY.

(E) 3-49 ARVN: CONDUCTED CA AND SFCURED NORTHERN PORTION OF FSPB HOOD (XT389702).

(3) 10 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: AT 091835 HRS, CO C WAS AIRLIFTED FROM DAU TIENG TO FSPB GRANT (XT382625) FOR SECURITY; WAS RETURNED TO DAU TIENG AT 100930 HRS. BY CH-47. CO C CONDUCTED SWEEP OPERATIONS VIC XT502465 TO VERIFY A REPORT OF 10 ARMED VC IN THE AREA. 1 PLT OF C REMAINS OPCON TF ROMEO. CO C(-) REMAINED AS BDE RRF. BN(-) CONDUCTED CA AT 1300 HRS VIC XT442686.

(B) TF 2-22: CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO FSPB HOOD (XT389702). RELIEVED 2-12 INF AND 3-49 ARVN OF SECURITY MISSIONS.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONDUCTED CA AT 1000 HRS VIC XT442686. CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS VIC XT376718.

(D) TF ROMEO: CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB GRANT (XT382625). REMAINED OPCON 3-13 ARTY.

(E) 3-49 ARVN: AT 091928 HRS ENGAGED UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC WITH S/A VIC XT389702. VC DID NOT RETURN FIRE.

(4) 11 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: AT 102150 HRS DAU TIENG AMBUSH PATROL VIC XT 502465 WAS SPRUNG IN REACTION TO MOVEMENT AROUND LOCATION WITH NEGATIVE US CASUALTIES AND UNKNOWN VC RESULTS. 1 PLATOON CO C REMAINED OPCON TF ROMEO. CO C(-) REMAINED AT DAU TIENG AS BDE REACTION FORCE. BN(-) CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO VIC XT461696.

(B) TF 2-22: CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB HOOD (XT389702). CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS VIC FSPB HOOD.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO VIC XT415720.

(D) TF ROMEO: CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB GRANT (XT382625). REMAINED OPCON 3-13 ARTY.

(E) 3-49 ARVN: CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO VIC XT438688.

(5) 12 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS FROM XT462696, TO XT457679, XT470684, AND XT476693 THEN RETURN. NEGATIVE CONTACT. CO C(-) REMAINED DAU TIENG AS BDE RRF.

(B) TF 2-22: TF(-) CONTINUED TO SECURE FSPB HOOD AND CONDUCT LOCAL S&D OPERATIONS. CO B CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO XT398735 AND RETURN. C/2-34 ARMOR MOVED TO SOU DA AND BECAME OPCON 1ST BDE, 25TH INF DN. AT 1230 HRS THE LEAD TANK OF C/2-34 ARMOR DETONATED A BOOBY TRAP CAUSING 4 KIA AMONG D/65 ENGR TROOPS WITH THEM.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO XT434729. NEGATIVE CONTACT. CO C CONTINUED OPCON 1-5 INF (M).

(D) TF ROMEO: CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB GRANT AND THE BRIDGE SITE TO THE NE.

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(E) 3-49 INF (ARVN): CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS FROM XT440683, XT436671, XT449671, AND XT446690. AND RETURN; NEGATIVE CONTACT.

(6) 13 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED LOCAL S&D OPERATIONS VIC XT 453696 AND CONDUCTED EAGLE FLIGHTS TO XT333775, XT376757, XT375769, AND XT377795. CO C(-) REMAINED DAU TIENG AS BDE RRF. AT 1210 HRS DEC 67 THE D CO AMBUSH PATROL VIC XT467702 OBSERVED 3 VC BIRDS IN NORTH OF THEIR AMBUSH SITE. ARTILLERY FIRE WAS CALLED IN AND RESULTED IN 3 VC KIA (POSS). A SWEEP OF THE AREA IN THE MORNING RESULTED IN TWO BICYCLES WHICH WERE DESTROYED. AT 1600 HRS RECON PLT RECEIVED TWO BURST OF AK-47 FIRE VIC XT374789 W/O CASUALTIES. GUNSHIPS AND ARTILLERY WERE EMPLOYED W/UNKNOWN RESULTS.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): BN(-) CONTINUED TO SECURE FSPB HOOD. COMPANIES B AND C CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO XT383732 AND XT400715 RESPECTIVELY THEN RETURNED TO FSB HOOD. RECON PLT CONTINUED AS TF ROMEO.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO XT418749. CO C REMAINED OPCON 1-5 INF(M). AT 1400 HRS BOTH B AND D COMPANIES RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE SNIPER FIRE VIC XT432727 AND XT428754 RESPECTIVELY. ARTILLERY AND SR FIRES WERE EMPLOYED WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. AT 1445H 6 55 GAL DRUMS WERE LOCATED VIC XT425737. THE DRUMS WERE FOUND TO CONTAIN 15,000 HAND GRENADES OF VARIOUS TYPES WHICH WERE DESTROYED (EXCEPT FOR TYPE SAMPLES WHICH WERE EVACUATED).

(D) TF ROMEO: CONTINUED TO SECURE FSB GRANT.

(E) 3-49 INF (ARVN): CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO VIC XT418679. NEGATIVE CONTACT.

(7) 14 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: CO A CONDUCTED A COMBAT ASSAULT INTO AN LZ VIC XT359798 AT 0945 HRS WITHOUT CONTACT. AT 1008 HRS THE BN(-) WAS ORDERED TO MOVE TO DAU TIENG. THE MOVE WAS COMPLETED AT 1520 HRS. CO C CONTINUED AS DIV RRF AT DAU TIENG. NEGATIVE CONTACT EXCEPT FOR THE FIRST LIFT OF RETURNING TROOPS TO DAU TIENG RECEIVED SR FIRE FROM XT470465 W/O LOSS OR DAMAGE.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO XT384724 (NEG CONTACT). CONTINUED TO SECURE FSPB HOOD. RECON PLT CONTINUED AS TF ROMEO.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO XT436735, AND RETURN TO XT418749. AT 1405 HRS A CO HAD A CLAYMORE MINE DETONATED AGAINST THEM VIC XT420736 CAUSING 2 KIA AND 8 WIA. CO C CONTINUED OPCON 1-5 INF(M).

(D) TF ROMEO: CONTINUED TO SECURE FSB GRANT.

(E) 3-49 INF (ARVN): CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO VIC XT385675. FROM 1310 TO 1345 HRS THE BN ENGAGED AN UNDETERMINED SIZED VC DELAYING FORCE VIC XT390674. THE BN MANEUVERED AGAINST THE ENEMY AND ARTILLERY WAS CALLED AND EMPLOYED WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 1410 HRS AND CONTINUING UNTIL CLOSE OF THE PERIOD THE BN MOVED IN AN AREA (XT35067) WITH A HIGH RATE OF BOOBY TRAPS AND A SMALL POPULATION OF SNAGS. RESULTS INCLUDED 1 KIA AND 7 WIA (ALL ARVN). AT THE CLOSE OF THE PERIOD THE BN WAS LOCATED AT XT385675 AND MOVING TO A LARGER VIC XT385072.

(8) 15 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: REMAINED DAU TIENG AS 25TH DIV RRF. CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS WITH C&D COMPANIES IN THE MICHELIN PLANTATION (XT 5148 TO XT5149). RECON PLT CONDUCTED MOUNTED S&D OPNS THROUGHOUT BEN CUI PLANTATION (XT 5144). AT 1425 HRS. CO C DETONATED A ROAD

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(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUED TO SECURE FSPB HOOD UNTIL RELIEVED BY 3-49 INF (ARVN) AT 1315 HRS. BEGAN MOVEMENT FROM THE FSPB TO DAU TIENG AT THAT TIME. THE BN LAAGERED AT 1730 HRS VIC XT442655. AT APPROXIMATELY 1230 HRS A HAND GRENADE EXPLOSION AT THE FSPB CAUSED 2 DOW AND 5 WRA. AN INVESTIGATION CONTINUES TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED A COMBAT ASSAULT INTO A COLD LZ VIC XT532702 AT 0825 HRS AND CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO XT 370679. CO C CONTINUED OP CON 1-5 INF(M).

(D) TF ROMEO: CONTINUED TO SECURE FSPB GRANT. NEG CONTACT.

(E) 3-49 INF (ARVN): CONDUCTED AN AIRMOBILE MOVE TO FSPB HOOD FROM XT385675, CLOSING AT 1315 HRS AND ASSUMING SECURITY OF THE FSPB AT THAT TIME.

(9) 16 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: REMAINED DAU TIENG AS DIVISION RRF. CO A CONDUCTED A COMBAT ASSAULT INTO A COLD LZ VIC XT455534 AT 1400 HRS AND MOVED TO XT465525 BY THE CLOSE OF THE PERIOD.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): BN(-) MOVED FROM XT442655 TO DAU-TIENG, CLOSING AT 1532 HRS. CO'S A & C CLOSED TAY NINH AT 1605 HRS. RECON PLT CLOSED DAU TIENG AT THE CLOSE OF THE PERIOD.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED AN AIRMOBILE MOVE FROM XT 532702 TO DAU TIENG CLOSING AT 1130 HRS. CO C REMAINED OP CON 1-5 INF(M). NEGATIVE CONTACT

(D) 3-49 INF (ARVN): SECURED FSPB HOOD UNTIL IT CLOSED AT 1320 HRS. THE BN THEN CONDUCTED AN AIRMOBILE MOVEMENT TO DAU TIENG, CLOSING AT 1358 HRS. NEGATIVE CONTACT.

(10) 17 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: CONTINUED BS DIVISION RRF IN DAU TIENG. CO A CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS FROM XT465525 TO XT465500 WHERE THE COMPANY WAS EXTRACTED AND RETURNED TO DAU TIENG, CLOSING AT 1500 HRS. AT 0725 HRS A CO ENGAGED 2 VC VIC XT463525. VC FLED IMMEDIATELY AND CONTACT WAS NOT REGAINED. AT 1350 HRS COMPANIES B AND C WERE EAGLE FLIGHTED INTO AN LZ VIC XT516517 AND CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS W/O CONTACT UNTIL 1627 HRS WHEN EXTRACTED TO DAU TIENG.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): BN(-) REMAINED DAU TIENG AND PREPARED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS. COMPANIES A AND C CONDUCTED CONVOY AND ROUTE SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE TAY NINH-FRENCH FORT-SOUI DA COMPLEX AND CLOSED DAU TIENG AT 1758 HRS. SCOUT PLATOON BECAME ATTACHED 2-77 ARTY FOR SECURITY OF FSPB ALLEN. NEGATIVE CONTACT.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) REMAINED DAU TIENG AND PREPARED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS. CO C REMAINED ATTACHED TO 1-5 INF(M). CO D AND RECON PLT SECURED MOVEMENT OF 2-77 ARTY TO FSPB ALLEN. RETURNING TO DAU TIENG AT 1500 HRS.

(D) 3-49 INF (ARVN): DEPARTED DAU TIENG FOR BAO DON AT 0800 HRS, REVERTING TO PARENT UNIT CONTROL.

(11) 18 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED A COMBAT ASSAULT INTO A COLD LZ VIC XT585419 AT 0721 HRS. CO A(-) CONTINUED AS DAU FNG RRF. ONE PLATOON CO A CONTINUED OP CON 2-77 ARTY FOR SECURITY OF FSPB ALLEN. A BN BASE CAMP WAS ESTABLISHED VIC XT370415 AND INTER-DICTORY OPERATIONS INITIATED IN ASSIGNED AREAS.

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(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED ROAD MOVEMENT FROM DAU TIENG TO XT546393, DEPARTING AT 0605 HRS AND CLOSING AT 1108 HRS. AT 0828 HRS VIC XT527423 A COMMAND DETONATED 8" ARTILLERY ROUND WAS FIRED CAUSING 2 KIA AND 3 WIA TO THE BN SWEEPING TEAM. AT 1035 HRS B CO OBSERVED 10-15 VC VIC XT552396. ARTILLERY WAS EMPLOYED AND B CO PURSUED W/O GAINING CONTACT. NEGATIVE US AND UNKNOWN VC LOSSES. AT 1147 HRS CO C ENGAGED 2 VC VIC XT546393. VC BROKE CONTACT AND FLED SE. UNK VC RESULTS. COMPANY PATROL BASES WERE ESTABLISHED BY CO A (XT527400), CO B (XT562389), AND CO-C (XT546393). THE BN CP LOCATED WITH CO B. FROM 1517 HRS TO 1525 HRS, CO C ENGAGED 3 VC VIC XT548399 WITH S/A, R/W, AND M79 FIRE. VC RETURNED FIRE WITH RIFLE GRENADES AND AK-47'S. RESULTS INCLUDED 1 VC KIA (BO) AND 1 AK-47. THERE WERE NO US LOSSES.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED A COMBAT ASSAULT INTO A COLD LZ VIC XT585419 AT 0907 HRS. A BN BASE CAMP WAS ESTABLISHED XT 587417 AND INTERDICTION OPERATIONS INITIATED.

(D) 30 BDE TERMINATED OPERATION YELLOWSTONE AND INITIATED OPERATION CAMDEN AT 180300 HRS DEC 67.

(*2) 30 BDE TERMINATED OPERATION CAMDEN AND RE-ENTERED OPERATION YELLOWSTONE 270600 HRS DEC 67.

(A) 2-12 INF: REMAINED DAU TIENG BASE CAMP AND PREPARED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): MOVED BY MOTOR MARCH FROM VIC THANH AN TO DAU TIENG CLOSING 270048 DEC 67. CO A WAS RECONNING BY FIRE VIC XT519416 AND FIRED INTO CO A 2-12 INF (OPCON 2-22 INF). RESULTING IN 8 US NDI. AT 270830 DEC 67 DEPARTED DAU TIENG BY MOTOR MARCH ENROUTE TO XT285619. AT 271200 DEC 67 BN CAME UNDER OPCON 1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV.

(C) 3-22 INF: REMAINED DAU TIENG BASE CAMP AND PREPARED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

(13) 28 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) MOVED BY FIXED WING TO KATUM. CAME UNDER OPCON 1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV 271200 DEC 67.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): RETURNED FROM OPCON 1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV 271634 DEC 67.

(C) 3-22 INF: REMAINED DAU TIENG BASE CAMP AND PREPARED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

(D) 2-14 INF: BECAME OPCON 30 BDE 271634 DEC 67.

(14) 29 DEC 67:

(A) 2-22 INF(M): AT 2100 HRS CO B DETECTED UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC VIC XT588358. ENGAGED THEM WITH S/A AND CLAYMORE RESULTING IN 2 VC KIA (BO) AND ONE AK-47 CIA. NO US LOSSES.

(B) 3-22 INF: AIRMOBILE COMBAT ASSAULT TO VIC FSPB BURT (XT500907). NEG CONTACT.

(C) 2-14 INF: (OPCON) CONTINUED TO SECURE BO TUC.

(15) 30 DEC 67:

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUE SECURITY OF FSPB BURT & BDE FWD CP VIC XT500907 & SECURED BRIDGE SITE VIC XT462819 UNTIL EXTRACTION OF BRIDGE. AT 1845 HRS CO A RECEIVED RPG FIRE VIC XT499819 RESULTING IN 2 US WIA. AT 1222 HRS CO B RECEIVED 1 RPG ROUND VIC XT476821 RESULTING IN 1 US WIA.

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(B) 3-22 INF: CONDUCTED SWEEPS & OUTPOSTING OPERATIONS ALONG ROAD FROM FSPB BURT (XT500807) TO BRIDGE SITE (XT462819). AT 1953 HRS CO A ENGAGED 2 VC W/SA & M/9 VIC XT501798 RESULTING IN 1 VC KIA (BC). AT 0620 HRS CP RECEIVED 10 INCOMING 60MM RDS VIC XT500803. NEG CASUALTIES. AT 0950H CO A ENGAGED 2 VC VIC XT501798 RESULTING IN 1 VC KIA (BC). AT 1310H CO A REC'D AK-47 FIRE VIC XT478820 RESULTING IN 1 US KIA & 2 US WIA. AT 1515H PATROL FROM DAU TIENG BASE CAMP SWEEP AREA OF CONTACT. AT 1953H RESULTED IN 1 VC KIA (POSS).

(C) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED OPCON TO 1ST BDE. CO B CONTINUED AS BDE RRF.

(D) 2-14 INF: RELEASED OPCON 1015H AND REVERTED TO 1ST BDE.

(16) 31 DEC 67:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) OPCON TO 1ST BDE. CO B CONTINUED AS BDE RRF.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB BURT & BDE RWD CP. CO B SECURED BRIDGE SITE VIC XT462819 UNTIL 1018H WHEN BRIDGE WAS EXTRACTED. ENROUTE TO FSPB BURT CO B RECEIVED 1 RPG ROUND FROM VIC XT478820 RESULTING IN MODERATE DAMAGE TO 1 APC & 1 US WIA.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONTINUED SWEEPS & OUTPOSTING OPERATIONS ALONG ROAD FROM FSPB BURT (XT500807) TO BRIDGE (XT462819). AT 0600H RECEIVED APPROXIMATELY 10 ROUNDS OF 60MM MORTAR FROM THE SOUTH. ROUNDS LANDED 75 METERS SHORT. NEG CASUALTIES. AT 1305H CO C RECEIVED 3 RPG ROUNDS & AW FIRE VIC XT478820 RESULTING IN 1 US KIA & 2 US WIA. RETURNED FIRE WITH SA. VC LOSSES UNKNOWN.

(17) 1 JAN 68:

(A) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED TO SECURE FSPB BURT & CONDUCTED SECURITY PATROLLING.

(B) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED OPCON 1ST BDE. CO B CONTINUED AS BDE RRF.

(C) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUED TO SECURE FSPB BURT & CONDUCTED SECURITY PATROLLING. DELAYED ENTRY: 310314Z DEC 67 CO C ENGAGED 1 VC VIC XT496806 RESULTING IN 1 VC KIA (BC) & CAPTURED 1 AK-47. DELAYED ENTRY: 311035Z DEC 67 CO B FOUND 1 22 CAL PISTOL VIC XT 500790. DELAYED ENTRY: 311518Z DEC 67 CO A FOUND 1 BIKE & 1 VC KIA (BO) VIC XT502793.

(D) 1-5 INF(M): CONDUCTED SECURITY PATROLLING VIC XT520522 & MAINTAINED DEFENSIVE POSTURE. 311820H 1 1/2 TON TRAILER HIT MINE RESULTING IN MODERATE DAMAGE TO TRAILER. NEG CASUALTIES.

(18) 2 JANUARY 68:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED OPCON 1ST BDE. CO B REMAINED BDE RRF

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB BURT & CONDUCTED SECURITY PATROLLING. AT 2235 HRS CO A CP ENGAGED 1 VC BETWEEN LP POSITION AND PERIMETER. BN CAME UNDER INTENSE GROUND ATTACK FROM EST VC REGT. ATTACK CONTINUED UNTIL 0515H 2 JAN 68. SUSTAINED 5 US KIA AND 41 US WIA.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB BURT & CONDUCTED SECURITY PATROLLING. AT 1844 HRS AP VIC XT503807 ENGAGED 1 VC SQUAD RESULTING IN 2 US KIA & 1 US WIA. AT 2235H BN CAME UNDER INTENSE GROUND ATTACK FROM EST VC REGT. ATTACK CONTINUED UNTIL 0515 2 JAN 68 SUSTAINING 17 US KIA AND 93 US WIA. OPCON 1ST BDE 021745H.

(D) 1-5 INF(M): CONDUCTED SECURITY PATROLLING VIC XT520522 & MAINTAINED DEFENSIVE POSTURE. RELEASED OPCON TO BDE 020000Z JAN 68

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(E) 4-9 INF: OPCON 30 BDE 020700 JAN 68.

(19) 3 JAN 68:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED OPCON 1ST BDE. CO B REMAINED BDE RRF.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB BURT & CONDUCTED LOCAL SECURITY PATROLLING.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONTINUED OPCON 1ST BDE.

(D) 4-9 INF: CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB BURT & CONDUCTED LOCAL SECURITY PATROLLING.

(20) 4 JAN 68:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED OPCON 1ST BDE. CO B REMAINED BDE RRF.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSPB BURT & CONDUCTED LOCAL S&D OPERATIONS.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED OPCON 1ST BDE. CO D REMAINED ATTACHED 1-5 INF(M).

(D) 4-9 INF: CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSB BURT & CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS.

(21) 5 JAN 68:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED OPCON 1ST BDE. CO B RELIEVED OF BDE RRF AND MOVED BY FIXED WING TO JOIN PARENT UNIT.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSB BURT (XT500807). CONDUCTED LOCAL S&D OPERATIONS. NEG CONTACT.

(C) 3-22 INF: RELIEVED FROM OPCON 1ST BDE AND RETURNED TO DAU TIENG BASE CAMP (XT492473) TO ACT AS BDE RRF.

(D) 4-9 INF: AT 0902 HRS CO B CONDUCTED COMBAT AIR ASSAULT INTO HOT LZ. 2 HELICOPTERS WERE SHOT DOWN. RESULTS 1 US KIA. AT APPROXIMATELY 1610 HRS 1ST PLT CO B WAS SURROUNDED BY UNK NUMBER OF VC VIC XT533902. AIR STRIKES HAVE BEEN CALLED IN IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT THE PLATOON. REINFORCEMENT NOT FEASIBLE DUE TO LIMITED SPACE IN LZ. CONTACT STILL IN PROGRESS AT END OF REPORTING PERIOD.

(22) 6 JAN 68:

(A) 2-12 INF: 2-12 INF: OPCON 1ST BDE.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUED TO SECURE FSB BURT (XT500807) AND CONDUCTED LOCAL S&D OPERATIONS.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED AS BDE RRF. CONDUCTED LOCAL S&D OPERATIONS. A&B CO CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS IN MIBHELIN PLANTATION. CO C ACTED AS BDE RRF AND PREPARED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS. CO D CONTINUED OPCON 1-5 INF(M).

(D) 4-9 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSB BURT. RECON PLT SECURED NUI BA DEN ROCKET CRUSHER. AT 0729H CO D FOUND 1 DEAD VC (BC). COORDINATES UNK. AT 0845H VIC XT503800 CO D FOUND 1 DEAD VC (BC). AT 1320H CO D RECEIVED 2 RPG 11 ROUNDS VIC XT501790. NEG CASUALTIES.

(23) 7 JAN 68:

(A) 2-12 INF: REMAINED OPCON 1ST BDE.

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(B) 2-22 INF(M): AT 0428H VIC XT498809 RECON PLT REC 1 GRENADE. FIRE RETURNED WITH M79'S. NEG US CAS. UNK VC RESULTS. AT 0428H VIC XT498809 CO B DETECTED MOVEMENT IN TREES. ENGAGED WITH M16'S. VC CASUALTIES UNK. AT 0930H VIC XT530820 CO B FOUND 3 PARTIALLY COMPLETED BUNKERS WITH OVERHEAD COVER AND 1 TABLE. ALL DESTROYED IN PLACE. AT 1620H VIC XT546853 CO B FOUND PLATOON SIZE BASE CAMP.

(C) 3-22 INF: AT 0720H CO A&B MOVED BY CH-47 TO FSB BURT (XT500807). CO C REMAINED AT PAU TIENG AS RDE RPF. CO D CONTINUED OPCON 1-5 INF(M).

(D) 4-9 INF: BN(-) RECON PLATOON CONTINUED TO SECURE NUI BA DEN AND ROCK CRUSHER. AT 0155H VIC XT502801 CO D RECEIVED 3 GRENADES. RETURNED FIRE WITH GRENADES. NEG US CASUALTIES. VC CASUALTIES UNKNOWN. AT 0150H CO D RECEIVED UNK NUMBER HAND GRENADES. RETURNED FIRE WITH GRENADES. SWEEP REVEALED 1 TRAPT WITH BLOOD ON IT. AT 0606H COORDINATES UNK CO D FOUND 1 VC KIA(PO) AT 1430H CO C VIC XT503701 FOUND 2 BICYCLES AND DESTROYED THEM.

(24) 8 JAN 68:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED OPCON 1ST RPF. RECON PLT CONTINUED AS RDE RPF.

(B) 2-22 INF(M) CONDUCTED S&O OPERATIONS VIC XT5485 & XT5289. AT 0915H VIC XT549845 CO B FOUND SEVERAL BUTTERFLY TRAPS AND DESTROYED THEM IN PLACE. AT 1410H CO B RECEIVED SA FIRE. RETURNED FIRE WITH LFT WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 0220H CO RECEIVED APPROX 50 RDS 82MM MORTAR FIRE. FIRE RETURNED WITH 81 MM MORTARS & ARTY RESULTING IN UNK VC LOSSES AND 3 US WIA. AT 1745H VIC XT53483 CO C RECEIVED SA & AW FIRE. FIRE RETURNED WITH SA & AW WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 1410H VIC XT54483 CO C FOUND 1000 LBS POLISHED RICE & 250 LBS UNPOLISHED RICE.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED S&O OPERATIONS VIC FSB BURT (XT500807). CO C REMAINED RDE RPF. CO B CONTINUED OPCON 1-5 INF(M). AT 0215H VIC XT498803 RECEIVED 1 MORTAR ROUND. NEG CAS. FRONT

(D) 4-9 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED LOCAL S&O OPERATIONS VIC FSB BURT AT 2321H VIC XT501803 CO D DETECTED MOVEMENT TO THE FRONT. ENGAGED MOVEMENT WITH GRENADES WITH UNK RES. AT 2312H VIC XT502802 CO D RECEIVED 1 GRENADE. NEG CAS. AT 1008H VIC XT514871 CO D RECEIVED SA FIRE. FIRE NOT RETURNED. NEG CAS. RECON PLT CONTINUED TO SECURE NUI BA DEN ROCK CRUSHER.

(E) 9-5 INF(M): BECAME OPCON 3D RPF 1100H.

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(75) 9 JAN 68:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) OPCON 1ST INF BDE. RECON PLT CONTINUED AS BDE RRF.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUED S&D OPERATIONS VIC XT505895. AT 2108H VIC XT525803 CO A LP DETECTED 1 VC WITH RPG LAUNCHER. ENGAGED WITH M-16 AND 81MM MORTAR WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 0720H VIC XT525892 CO A RECEIVED 10 MORTAR ROUNDS TAKING NO CASUALTIES. CO B SWEEP THE AREA WITH NEG RESULTS. AT 1019H VIC XT501901 CO A FOUND 1 RPG-2 LAUNCHER, 1 BAG RICE, BUNNER AND ASSORTED CLOTHING. AT 1103H VIC XT501901 CO A FOUND 75 60MM MORTAR ROUNDS, 1 AK-47. AT 1312H VIC XT515907 CO A REC HEAVY SA & AW FIRE. ENGAGED WITH LFT 4 US WIA DUSTED OFF. AT 1355H VIC XT511906 CO A RECEIVED SA AND AW AND RPG FIRE FROM EST 30 VC. ENGAGED WITH SA & ARTY RESULTING IN 10 VC KIA (BC).

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED TO SECURE FSB BURT (XT500805) & CONDUCT LOCAL S&D OPERATIONS. CO C & D OPCON 1-5 INF(M). AT 1430H VIC XT482792 CO B FOUND 3 82MM MORTAR ROUNDS, 136 60MM MORTAR RDS, 38 CASES OF DEMOLITIONS, 22 CASES C-4, 4 CASES OF 7.62 MM ROUNDS AND 7 CASES OF AK-47 RDS.

(D) 4-9 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED TO SECURE FSB BURT (XT500805) & CONDUCT S&D OPERATIONS. RECON CONTINUED TO SECURE WUI BA DEN ROCK CRUSHER. AT 0839H VIC XT503783 CO C FOUND 14 BUNKERS WITH OVERHEAD COVER. AT 0830H VIC XT498790 CO D FOUND 1 1/2 TON TRAILER. AT 1015H VIC XT522787 CO C CALLED IN AIRSTRIKE ON VC BASE CAMP. AT 1455H CO A FOUND VC BASE CAMP WITH 3 BUNKERS, 3 ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITIONS AND SPIDER HOLFS.

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(E) 3-11 CAV: BECAME OPCON 1210H FOR S & O OPERATIONS. AT 1218H VIC XT523924 TRP M REC SA FIRE RESULTING IN 3 US WIA. AT 1540H VIC XT522920 TRP M DESTROYED 15 VC BICYCLES.

(26) 10 JAN 68:

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) REMAINED OPCON TO 1ST ADF. RECON PLT CONTINUED AS ADF PRF.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED S&O OPERATIONS VIC XT525803. AT 0825H VIC XT513003 CO A APC RAN OVER MINES. AFTER PASSING, MINE EXPLODED RESULTING IN 7 US WIA. AT 0937H CO A FOUND SMALL BUNKER & TRENCH SYSTEMS. AT 1046H CO A FOUND 1 OFAN VC & DOCUMENTS (EVAC).

(C) 3-22 INF CONTINUED TO SECURE FSA BURT & CONDUCT S&O OPERATIONS. CO CAD CONTINUED OPCON TO 1-5M. AT 1653H VIC XT 500807 CO A SUFFERED 3 US & 2 ARVN CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM FIRE CAUSED BY EXPLOSION.

(D) 4-9 INF: CONTINUED TO SECURE FSA BURT & CONDUCT S&O OPERATIONS. RECON PLT CONTINUED TO SECURE NUI DA PEN ROCK CRUSHER. AT 1922H COORDINATES UNK CO AND DESTROYED 2 BUNKERS. AT 1250H CP REC 16 60 MM MORTAR RDS. NFO CAS.

(E) 3-11 CAV: CONTINUED TO CONDUCT S&O OPERATIONS VIC XT 490910. AT 1630H VIC XT513900 TRP L DEST 2 MILITARY STRUCTURES AND CATTLE PEN. AT 1605H VIC XT513900 TRP L REC 4-5 RPO RDS. RETURNED FIRE WITH AW WITH UNK RESULT.

(F) 1-5 INF(M) CONDUCTED CORDON & SEARCH OPERATIONS VIC XT 520497. AT 1145H VIC XT510420 CO C SUSTAINED 3 WIA FROM BOMBY TRAPPED GRENADE. AT 1411H VIC XT 520497 CO C SEARCHED HOSPITAL & STORE WITH NFO RESULTS.

(27) 11 JAN 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONTINUED S&O OPERATIONS VIC XT5301. AT 1118H CO B FOUND 2300 LBS POLISHED RICE, 2 RIFLES (GERMAN) & 11 BIKES. VIC XT531015. THIS BELIEVED TO BE A RESUPPLY DEPOT. AT 1220H CO A FOUND 9 HAND GRENADES, 2 US PROTECTIVE MASKS, 2 60MM RDS AND 15 MILITARY STRUCTURES. VIC XT531015. AT 1302H CO B VIC XT535910 DESTROYED 5 BUNKERS 61X81 W/ OHC AND 14 BUNKERS 121X141 W/ OHC & 3 RPO RDS, 30 STICKS DYNAMITE, 3700 LBS POL RICE, 2 CASES 7.62 AMMO, 6 GAS MASKS. AT 1400H CO B HAD 1 NRI FROM FALLING TREE VIC XT530910. AT 1400H CO A HAD VIC XT535001 FOUND 0 FRESH GRAVES W/ VC KIA(PC) & 2 BIKES. AT 1650H CO A FOUND VIC XT535010, 0 BIKES, 4000 LBS BAGGED RICE, 1 CASE 7.62 AMMO, 1 CASE TNT, 3 CASES RIFLE GRENADES & 3 RPO RDS.

(B) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED OPCON 1ST ADF. RECON PLT REMAINED AS ADF CRIP.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONTINUED S&O OPERATIONS VIC XT500805 AT FSA BURT & CONDUCTED LIMITED S&O TO VIC XT5075. CO DAC REMAINED OPCON TO TF 1-5 (M)

(D) 4-9 INF: CONTINUED SECURITY OF FSA BURT (XT500805) & CONDUCTED LIMITED S&O TO VIC XT5082. AT 2150H CO C SPRING AMPUSH VIC XT503705 IN REACTION TO MOVEMENT WITH UNK RESULTS.

(E) 3-11 CAV: CONTINUED SCREENING OPERATIONS TO THE WEST ALONG CAMP 001/N BORDER FROM VIC XT5080 TO VIC XT5102. AT 0951H TRP M FOUND GRAVEL MINES VIC XT515425. AT 1112H TRP M ENGAGED 2 VC VIC XT517605 WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 1120H TRP M ENGAGED 2 VC VIC XT 472018 WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 1200 TRP M RECD UNK NO RPO RDS FROM VIC XT472416 RESULTING IN 2 US WIA & 1 US KIA.

(F) 1-5 INF (M): CONTINUED DAYLIGHT PATROL OPERATIONS IN MICHELIN PLANTATION. AT 0932H CO D 3/22 DESTROYED 1 B2MM RD VIC XT 512493. AT 1043H CO D 3/22 ENGAGED 1 VC WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS VIC XT 512475. A SWEEP FOUND 1 SHORT WAVE RADIO, 2 CLIPS AK47 AMMO, 1 MAP WITH POSNS PLOTTED, 1 BIKI, AND MISC DOCUMENTS.

(28) 12 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONTINUED OPCON 1ST HIX. RECON PLT REMAINED PREPARED REAR REACTION FORCE. AT 1550H CRIP VIC XT 503447 CRIP REC SA & AW FIRE. RETURNED FIRE WITH SA. NEG US CAS. VC CAS UNK. AT 1755H VIC XT 500777 1 FM OF CRIP WAS GORED & DURING RESCUE ATTEMPT WAS SHOT IN THE THIGH (FRIENDLY).

(B) 2-22 INF (M): CONTINUED TO S&D TO VIC XT 5287. AT 0300H CO C RECEIVED 5 RPG RDS VIC XT 510891 RESULTING IN 3 US KIA. AT 0735H CO C SWEEP AREA FROM WHICH RECEIVED RPG RDS FROM VIC XT 519801 RESULTING IN 1 VC KIA (RC), 1 RPG-2, 2 RPG RDS. AT 1117H CO A FOUND BASE CAMP VIC XT 481798 CONTAINING 10 20 RUNKERS, 1 COOKING HOODIES, AND 100M TRENCH SYSTEM. AT 1515H CO A FOUND BASE CAMP VIC XT 4874 CONTAINING 40 RUNKERS & 5000 LBS OF POLISHED RICE.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS TO VIC XT 4779 & XT 4780. AT 1145H CO A FOUND BASE CAMP VIC XT 47810 CONTAINING 100 RUNKERS, AND MISC BLOOD SOAKED BLACK TAJAVAS. AT 1320H CO B FOUND BASE CAMP VIC XT 481798 CONTAINING 10 RUNKERS, 10 MILITARY STRUCTURES ASSORTED COOKING UTENSILS, MISC MEDICAL SUPPLIES, 2 BICYCLES & MISC DOCUMENTS. AT 1350H CO B MADE CONTACT WITH EST 2 VC SNIPERS VIC XT 478798. CONTACT BROKEN 1300H. NEG US CAS, VC CAS UNK.

(D) 4-9 INF: CONDUCTED S&D OPER V IC XT 5170 & XT 5177. AT 0920H CO B FOUND 7 SHALLOW GRAVES VIC XT 501780. RESULTS 7 VC KIA (RC). AT 1254H CO A MADE CONTACT WITH VC PLATOON VIC XT 508776 RESULTING IN 3 VC KIA (RC) AND 1 US WHA. RECON PLT CONT'D TO SEARCH NUI BA DEN ROCK CRUSHED.

(E) 3-11 ACR: CONTINUED TO SWEEP TO THE EAST TO VIC 5202. AT 0915H TRP M RECEIVED 2 RPG RDS VIC XT 52023 RESULTING IN 2 US KIA & 1 US WHA. AT 1415H TRP M FOUND BASE CAMP WITH BIKES PARTS & MISC CHINESE MEDICINE VIC XT 52023. AT 1552H TRP 1 DETONATED MINE VIC XT 520001 RDS IN NEG CAS AND HEAVY DAMAGE TO VEHICLE AT 1707H TRP L RECEIVED 1 HOI CHAMH VIC XT 545002.

(F) 1-5 INF (M): CONTINUED ON CO SITE OPER IN THE MICHELIN PLANTATION VIC XT 518518. CO C AND D 3-22 INF REMAINED OPCON. AT 0755H VIC XT 34418 CO A RECEIVED 5 RPG-2 RDS, AW AND SA FIRE. RETURNED FIRE WITH SA AW, 40MM AND M-79 RESULTING IN 1 US WHA, 1 TANK AND 2 APC'S MINOR DAMAGE & UNK VC CASUALTIES. AT 1320H CO C 1-5 AND CO D 3-22 CORDED AND SEARCHED AP 6 CHAMH XT 518518 WITH NEG FINDINGS. AT 1520H VIC XT 522518 CO C RECEIVED 5 RDS 40MM MORTAR FIRE. RET'D FIRE WITH MORTARS & LFT RESULTING IN 1 US WHA & UNK VC CASUALTIES. AT 1759H VIC XT 512494 CO C DEST 1 TILT ROAD MINE.

(29) 13 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF CONTINUED OPCON 1ST HIX. RECON PLT CONT AS BDE CRIP

(B) 2-22 INF (M) CONTINUED S&D OPERATIONS VIC XT 5280 WITH NEG CONTACT.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONTINUED S&D OPERATIONS VIC XT 4778 WITH NEG CONTACT. CO C&D CONTINUED OPCON TO 1-5 INF (M)

(D) 3-11 ACR: CONTINUED TO SWEEP IN CAMBODIAN BORDER VIC XT 5889. AT 1220H TRP L APC DETONATED MINE VIC XT 5855. RDS IN 1 US WHA AND MXPATF DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.

(E) 1-5 INF (M) CONTINUED S&D OPER IN MICHELIN PLANTATION VIC XT 512445 & XT 510495 WITH NEG CONTACT

(F) 4-9 INF: CONTINUED S&D OPER VIC XT 5177 WITH NEG CONTACT

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(30) 14 JAN 68

(A) 2-22 INF: CONTINUED S&D OPERATIONS VIC XT467E. AT 2228H VIC XT543808 CO C L^T DETECTED MOVEMENT AND ENGAGED WITH CLAYMORES WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 2254H CO C OBSERVED 3-5 VC WITH SURVILLANCE SCOPES 75 METERS FROM PERIMETER & ENGAGED WITH AW WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 2314H CO B FOUND 4 BICYCLES (FVAD)

(B) 2-12 INF: CONTINUED OPCON 1ST BDE. RECON PLT CONT'D AS BDE CRIP

(C) 3-22 INF: CONTINUED S&D OPER VIC XT4680 WITH NEG RES. CO D & E REMAINED OPCON TO 1-5(M).

(D) 4-9 INF: CONTINUED S&D OPER VIC XT5380 WITH NEG CONTACT. RECON PLT CONTINUED TO SECURE NUI BA DEN ROCK CRUSHER.

(E) 1-5 INF(M) AT 1406H VIC XT545487 CO C RECEIVED SPORADIC AW FIRE. RET FIRE W/ ARTY W/ UNK RESULTS.

(F) 3-11 CAV: RELEASED OPCON 1825H.

(31) 15 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: CONTINUED OPCON 1ST BDE. RECON PLT CONT'D AS BDE CRIP

(B) 2-22 INF (M) CONTINUED S&D OPERATIONS VIC XT5374. AT 1100H VIC XT523773 CO A CAPTURED 1 VC WITH RPG-2 AND 1 RPG RD. EARLIER AT 1150H CO C FOUND 1 DEAD VC WITH AK47. AT 1424H VIC XT528772 CO A FOUND 4 VC KIA & CAPTURED 1 VC 1 MED BAG, 3 AK47'S & 1 BAG OF DOCUMENTS. AT 1725H VIC XT528772 CO A FOUND 20 60MM MORTAR RDS.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONTINUED S&D OPERATIONS VIC XT4077. AT 1210H CO D ENGAGED 1 SNIPER WITH SA WITH UNK RES. AT 1240H VIC XT488787 CO B RECEIVED FIRE FROM CLAYMORE. RET FIRE WITH SA WITH UNK RES. AT 1320H VIC XT488787 CO B REC FIRE FROM VC FORCE OF UNK SIZE. RET FIRE WITH SA AW ARTY. LFT & AID STRIKE RFS IN 4 US KHA & 24 US WHA. UNK VC CASUALTIES. AT 1535H CO D DETONATED ROBBY TRAP RES IN 6 US WHA. CO CMO CONT'D OPCON TO 1-5(M).

(D) 4-9 INF: CONTINUED S&D OPER VIC XT5378. RECON PLT CONT'D TO SECURE NUI BA DEN ROCK CRUSHER. AT 0844H VIC XT508794 CO-C FOUND 52 T MAN BUNKERS WITH COMMO WIRE. AT 0850H VIC XT519795 CO C FOUND 3 50 CAL GUN POSITIONS & 4 1 MAN FIRING POSITIONS.

(E) 1-5 INF(M): CONTINUED S&D OPERATIONS VIC XT5554, XT5449, & XT5550. WITH CO CMO, 3-22 INF OPCON. AT 0840H VIC XT554537 CO C RECEIVED 4 60MM MORTAR RDS AND AW FIRE. FIRE RET WITH ARTY RES IN 1 US KHA & UNK VC CAS. AT 1040H VIC XT519520 LFT RECEIVED FIRE FROM AW. NEG CASL AT 1150H VIC XT547547 LFT RECEIVED AW FIRE. RETURNED FIRE WITH ARTY. RESULTING IN 1 US WHA. VC CAS UNK. AT 1248H VIC XT557551 C&C SHIP ENGAGED 2 VC WITH ARTY WITH UNK RESULTS.

(31) 16 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: RETURNED OPCON TO BDE 1600H JAN 68. RE-POSITIONED & IMPROVED FORTIFICATIONS WITHIN FSR BMT.

(B) 2-22 INF (M): CONDUCTED S&D OPERATIONS VIC XT40755, XT525774, XT498755, & XT517757. AT 1148H CO A FOUND VIC XT530774 25 BIKES WITH SPARE PARTS & TIRES, 4 RPG-7 RDS, 11 RPG-2 RDS, 150 60MM RDS. AT 1205 H CO C FOUND VIC XT525774 70 60MM RDS, 150 60MM RDS, 4000 CAL 30 RDS, 2000 CAL 32 RDS, 50 M70 RDS, 7 RCX-T TELEPHONES, 1 TA-1 & 1 TA-3-12 TELEPHONES, 2 POF-10 BATTERIES, 1 US M1 CARTRIDGE, 3 CASES PULL CHORDS FOR TRIPMINES, 1 ELECTRIC PLASTING CAPS, 142 RPG-2 RDS.

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(C) 1-5 INF(M): CONDUCTED S&O OPERS & ONG AXIS FROM XT521537 TO XT521546, RETURNING TO BASE CAMP ON AXIS FROM XT521537 TO XT503490.

(D) 3-22 INF: CONDUCTED DAYLIGHT AMBUSH PATROLS VIC XT491798 XT506796, XT510810, & XT499817.

(E) 4-9 INF: RELEASED OPCON 30 RDE EFF 1600ZLH JAN 68

(32) 17 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: CONDUCTED PLT SIZE SWEEP TO VIC XT5070. AT 0915H CO C VIC XT506798 FOUND 1 DEAD C (PC) ALSO DESTROY 3 MORTAR POSITIONS, 20 BUNKS, 50 82MM FUSES.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED S&O OPERS VIC XT5274 & 5374. AT 1015H GUNSHIPS SUPPORTING BN ENGAGED 5 VC VIC XT529740 RES IN 1 VC KIA (PC). 1315H CO A VIC XT520762 FOUND 20 BUNKS. AT 1435H CO C VIC XT518734 REPORTED AW FIRE, 1 RPG RD RESULTING IN 6 US WHA. 1435H CO B VIC XT523742 REPORTED 1 RPG RD RES IN 1 US WHA.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONDUCTED DAYLIGHT AMBUSH PATROLS TO VIC XT 4080, XT5081, XT5070, XT5080. CO CAN CONTINUED OPCON 1-5 INF(M).

(D) 1-5 INF(M): CO C EST BLOCK VIC XT5317. CO CAN 3-22 CONDUCTED AIRMOBILE COMBAT ASSAULT VIC XT550605, XT544403, XT560406. AT 0829H TROOPS SECURED DOWNED AIRCRAFT REPORTED AW FIRE FROM VIC XT 573500. THIS OCCURRED AFTER, AT 0820H A LIFT SHIP WAS DOWNED BY AW FIRE FROM VIC XT560503 CAUSING 1 US WHA. AIRSTRIKE CALLED WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 1020H CO C MADE CONTACT WITH 3 VC RES IN 3 VC KIA (PC), 1 RPG-2 & 1 AK47, SUSTAINING 11 US WHA. 1215H 3-22 INF CO D VIC XT567605 APPROXIMATELY 1 VC (SUSPECT) WOUNDED.

(33) 18 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: COND S&O OPER TO VIC XT524810. AT 0045H CO A DEST 3 FOXHOLS W/OHC VIC XT515820. AT 1320H CO A SUFFERED 1 NRI FROM LEG CRAMPS VIC XT517820 (DUSTED OFF). AT 1720H CO A FOUND 1 VC KIA (PC) IN GRAVE VIC XT500810.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED S&O OPER TO VIC XT52763. XT525740 0719H A SWEEP THE AREA OF CONTACT REVEALED 1 VC KIA (PC) & AK 47. AT 0905H CO B LOCATED AND DEST 30 BUNKS, 100 MTRS TRENCH VIC XT518741. AT 1025H CO A FOUND 3 VC IN GRAVES (PC) VIC XT 521737. AT 1025H CO B REPORTED AW FIRE FROM UNK NO VC VIC XT513736. AT 1053H CO C DESTROY 6 AA POSITIONS, 4 BUNKS, 20 1-MAN FOXHOLS W/ OHC VIC XT538739. AT 1105H CO C DESTROY 1 OX CARTS VIC XT530737.

(D) 3-22 INF: BN(-) COND S&O OPER TO VIC XT475755. CO C CONTINUED OPCON 1-5 INF(M). CO D ADELIFTED TO FSB BURT & RET TO PAS-FNT UNIT OPCON. CO G ADELIFTED TO DAU TIENO BECAUSE OPCON 1-5 INF (M). AT 1235H CO A DESTROY 12 BUNKS & 2100 MTRS OF TRENCH VIC XT 478702. AT 1300H CO A ENGAGED 1 VC VIC XT478702 W/UNK RES. AT 1335H CO A, IN AREA OF AIRSTRIKE, VIC XT476703 SUSTAINED 1 US WHA FROM BUTTERFLY BOMB (3 DUSTED OFF) & 1 82MM RD WAS DESTROYED.

(E) 1-5 INF(M): CONDUCTED AIRMOBILE CA TO VIC XT5318, XT 4610, & XT5450.

(34) 10 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: CONDUCTED S&O OPERS TO VIC XT5181 & XT5182.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED S&O OPERS TO VIC XT4073 & XT4074. AT 1053H VIC XT 485755 CO C DESTROY 4 BUNKS, 100 POSITIONS, & 1 MORTAR POSITION. AT 1053H VIC XT485755 CO C DESTROY 1 AA POSNS.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED S&O OPERS TO VIC XT4073 XT4992. OPERS B & C CONTINUED OPCON 1-5 INF(M). AT 1435H VIC XT486826 CO A CAME INTO CONTACT WITH 1 VC RES IN 1 VC KIA POSN. AT 1521H VIC XT 401924 CO C DESTROY 10 BUNKS.

(D) 1-5 INF(M): CONDUCTED S&O OPERATIONS TO VIC XT 5148 & XT 5045. AT 1720 ELEMENT ESCORTING CONVOY AT MINE VIC VTL 631 CO

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(35) 20 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: CONTINUED S&O OPERS TO VIC XT5178

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONT'D TO S&O VIC XT5071, XT4873, & XT5073. AT 1445H VIC XT487725 CO B CAME INTO CONTACT WITH UNK BITE VC FORCE. CONTACT WAS BROKEN AT 1518H. RES IN 1 US KIA, 5 US WIA & 2 APC'S DAMAGED. ALL ORGANIC WEAPONS EMPLOYED AGAINST VC & ARTY AND TAC AIR VC RESULTS 2 VC KIA (BC)

(C) 3-22 INF BN(-) CONT'D TO S&O IN VIC XT4782. CO'S B & C REMAINED OPCON TO 1-5 INF (M).

(D) 1-5 INF(M): CONDUCTED S&O OPERS TO VIC XT5184R6 & XT504453. AT 0733H 3-22 INF CO C AP 46 RETURNING TO BASE CAMP SIGHTED 1 VC WITH 100 LB BAG OF RICE, VC DROPPED RICE AND FLED. RES IN 1 100 LB BAG OF RICE CAPTURED. AT 1515H CO C APPREHENDED 1 21 YR OLD MALE OBTAINED VIC XT472463.

(36) 21 JAN 68

(A) 2-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED S&O OPERS VIC XT4664. CO C CONTINUED OPCON 3-22 INF. AT 1241H VIC XT4727 CO C DETONATED MINE RESULTING IN 5 US WIA (NO D/O) AND MODERATE DAMAGE TO APC'S. AT 0925H VIC XT477709 CO B DEST'D 1 OX CART & 2 L-SHAPED POSITIONS AT 1016H VIC XT484735 CO C DEST'D 5 BNKS, 1 MIL STRUCTURE & EVAC 1000 LBS OF RICE. AT 1241H VIC XT47808 CO A DETECTED MOVEMENT & ENGAGED WITH GRENADE WITH UNK RES. AT 0419H VIC XT488800 CO C 2-12 DEST'D 8 BUNKERS & 1 FOXHOLE

(B) 2-12: BN(-) CONDUCTED S&O OPERATIONS VIC XT5380. CO C CONTINUED OPCON TO 3-22 INF. RECON PLT REMAINED RE CRIP. AT 0925H VIC XT524801 CO B DEST'D 3 BNKS. AT 1512 CO A VIC XT515804 FOUND 17 BNKS & 2 ENTRENCHING TOOLS.

(C) 3-22 INF: CONDUCTED S&O OPERS VIC XT4781 WITH CO C 2-12. CO B & C CONT'D OPCON TF 1-5 INF(M). AT 2113H CO A LP VIC 407808 ENGAGED 4-5 VC WITH CLAYMORE WITH UNK RES. AT 2142H VIC XT407808 CO A ENGAGED MOVEMENT WITH GRENADE WITH UNK RES. AT 0015H VIC XT488809 CO C 2-12 DEST'D 8 BNKS & 1 FOXHOLE.

(D) TF 1-5 INF(M): CONDUCTED S&O OPERS VIC XT5348, XT5446 & XT5245.

(37) 22 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED S&O OPERS VIC XT5070 & XT5091. CO C CONT'D OPCON 3-22 INF. RECON PLT CONT'D AS RE CRIP. AT 0916H VIC XT50905 CO D DESTROYED 15 FOXHOLES. AT 0945H VIC XT507804 CO D FOUND 6 BNKS. AT 1310H VIC XT502700 CO D FOUND 1 VC KIA (RC) & 2 APC RDS.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED S&O OPERS VIC XT5377 & XT5275. AT 0308H VIC XT405730 CO A LP HEARD EXPLOSIONS OUTSIDE PERIMETER & ENGAGED WITH COMINT'G MORTAR FIRE WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 1330H VIC XT524776 CO B FOUND 1 VC KIA (RC). AT 1355H VIC XT5277 CO C FOUND 2 VC KIA (RC) AT 1410H VIC XT537774 CO A FOUND 3 VC KIA (RC) & 6 ROLLS OF COMMO WIRE, 3 CHICOM TELEPHONES, 200 RDS AK47 AMMO, 7 BNKS, 3 SFTS WEB GEAR, AND 10 120 MM RDS. AT 1315H VIC XT477777 CO B APC DETONATED MINE RES IN 3 US WIA (EVAC) AND 1 APC DAMAGED.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED SEARCH OPERATIONS VIC XT4881, XT4880, & XT4879 WITH CO C 2-12 INF OPCON. CO B&C CONTINUED OPCON 1-5 INF(M). AT 0813H VIC XT499709 CO C DESTROYED 4.2 MORTAR ROUNDS (2). AT 1010H VIC XT403748 CO D DEST'D 1 60MM MORTAR RD. AT 1330 H VIC XT493703 CO D DEST'D 1 154MM RD.

(D) TF 1-5 (M): CONDUCTED OPCON & SEARCH OPERATIONS VIC XT464449 & XT450450 WITH CO C & B 3-22 INF OPCON. AT 0525H VIC XT450450 CO C APPREHENDED 2 MALES AND 1 FEMALE WITH 2 JACKS, 1 CARTRIDGE, & BICYCLES. AT 0022H VIC XT450459 CO C DESTROYED 1 TUN-

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(42) 27 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED RECON IN FORCE TO VIC XT5097 XT5150. RECON CONT'D AS BDE CRIP. RECON 3-22 (OPCON) CONT'D AS SECURITY FOR DAU TIENG-TAY NINH CONVOY.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED RECON IN FORCE TO VIC XT515796, XT437820, & XT502787. AT 0907 HRS VIC XT501800 CO B ENGAGED ↑ VC WITH SA & GRENADES WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 0945 HRS VIC XT515796 CO A REC'D SA FIRE. RET FIRE WITH SA RES IN 1 VC KIA(BC) & 1 AK47 CAPTURED. AT 1205H VIC XT405820 CO A ENGAGED 1 VC RES IN 1 KIA (RC) & 1 AK47 CAPTURED. AT 1255H VIC XT503802 CO B APC RECEIVED AW FIRE & RPG RDS FROM UNK NUMBER OF VC. RET FIRE WITH AW WITH UNK RES. AT 1357H VIC XT405820 CO A RECEIVED AW & RPG FIRE FROM UNK NUMBER VC. RET FIRE WITH AW & SA RES IN 1 US WIA (EVAC) & 1 VC KIA (DC) AND 1 AK47 CAPTURED.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED OPERATIONS UNDER OPCON 2D BDE RECON CONT'D OPCON 2-12 INF FOR SECURITY OF DAU TIENG-TAY NINH CONVOY.

(43) 28 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED RIF TO VIC XT5316. RECON PLT CONT'D AS BDE CRIP. RECON PLT 3-22 INF(OPCON) CONT'D AS SEC FOR DAU TIENG - TAY NINH CONVOY. AT 0810H VIC XT510477 CO D DEST'D 10 ↑ MAN FOXHOLES. AT 0915H VON CAC BRIP VIC XT537474 REC'D HIT FROM GROUND FIRE SUSTAINING MINOR DAMAGE ENGAGED WITH ARTY WITH UNK RES.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CLOSED DOWN FSB BURT AT 1320H AND CONDUCTED RIF TO VIC XT497734. AT 1340H VIC XT505705 CO C REC'D ↑ 60MM MORTAR RD RES IN NEG CASUALTIES.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) OPCON 2 D BDE. RECON OPCON 2-12 INF.

(44) 29 JAN 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M)BN(-) (DAU TIENG) CONDUCTED RIF FROM VIC XT405736 TO VIC XT482702. AT 0240H VIC XT405736 CO A DETECTED MOVEMENT & ENGAGED WITH M-70 W/ UNK RESULTS.

(B) 2-12 INF: BN(-) (DAU TIENG) CONDUCTED AIRMOBILE ASSAULT TO VIC XT499577 LZ GOLD & RIF TO VIC XT510556. RECON CONT'D AS BDE CRIP. RECON 3-22 INF(OPCON) CONT'D TO SECURE DAU TIENG - TAY NINH CONVOY. AT 0920H VIC XT460464 GUNSHIP SUPPORTING BN SANK ↑ SAMPAN.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) OPCON 2D BDE.

(E) TF 1-5 INF(M): (XT385626) BECAME OPCON 0500H. SECURE FSB VIC XT384626 & PREPARED TO LINK UP WITH 2-22 INF(M). AT 0925H VIC XT364600 CO C APPREHENDED 2 DETAINEES.

(45) 30 JAN 68

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED DEFENSIVE PATROLLING VIC XT515454 & XT502503. RECON CONT'D AS BDE CRIP. RECON 3-22 INF CONT'D AS SECURITY FOR DAU TIENG - TAY NINH CONVOY.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): (XT160406) PROVIDED SECURITY FOR FISH WORK PARTY AT BRIDGE SITE VIC XT48702 & CONDUCTED DEFENSIVE PATROLS VIC XT473717 & XT482702. AT 0945H VIC XT485700 CO B DEST'D 10 BUNK & 10 FEET 14 TRENCH. AT 1130H VIC XT498608 CO B FOUND 30-40 BUNKERS & CAPTURED 21 RPG RDS, 1 MAP & UNK AMOUNT OF DOCUMENTS. AT 1430H VIC XT460406 RTDY A 3-13 ARTY GUN CARRIER DETONATED MINE RES IN 6 US WIA (EVAC). AT 1534H VIC XT460606 CO B APC DETONATED MINE RES IN 3 US WIA (EVAC) AND HEAVY DAMAGE TO APC.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) OPCON 2D BDE. RECON PLT OPCON 2-12 INF.

(D) TF 1-5(M): (XT371630) PROVIDED LOGISTICAL CONVOY SECURITY BETWEEN TAY NINH & LOC NINH & CONDUCTED DEFENSIVE PATROLLING VIC XT391618, XT390628, & XT385635. AT 0005H VIC XT373610 CO D

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(47) 1 FEB 68

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) AIRLIFTED TO CU CHI & BECAME OPCON TO 2D BDE TOTSH. RECON CONT'D AS BDE CRIP.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CLOS'D DAU TIENG BASE CAMP 2200H AND OCCUPIED POSITIONS TO REINFORCE BDE PERIMETER.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) OPCON 2D BDE. RECON RELIEVED OPCON 2-17 INF AND BECAME OPCON 2-22 INF(M)

(D) 3F 15'(M): RELEASED FROM OPCON 1925H.

(48) 2 FEB 68

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) OPCON 2D BDE. RECON PLT CONTINUED AS BDE CRIP.

(B) 2-22 INF(M) CONDUCTED RIF VIC XT5148 & PROVIDED SFC FOR DAU TIENG - TAY NINH CONVOY. AT 0852H VIC XT5143 RECON PLT FOUND CULVERT SITE BLOWN. USED AVLB FOR CROSSING. AT 1230H VIC XT4946 SWEEP TEAM DEST'D 1 81MM RD & 2 FLARFS. AT XT517496 CO A DEST'D 6 SPIDER HOLES. AT 1600H VIC XT501488, CO B DFTONATED 1 MINE RES IN 1 US KIA.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) CONT OPCON 2D BDE. RECON CONT OPCON 2-22 INF(M).

(49) 3 FEB 68

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) OPCON 2D BDE. RECON PLT CONT CRIP BDE.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED RIF VIC XT5148 & XT5249. AT 1131H VIC XT533481 CO B HAD 1 NBI (EVAC) FROM ACCIDENTAL LODGE-MENT OF EM1'S FOOT BETWEEN APC AND TREE. AT 1205H VIC XT516416 CO B FOUND MORTAR POSITION & DEST'D 1 82MM MORTAR RD. AT 1248H CO A DESTROYED 2 FOXHOLERS. AT 1302H VIC XT523476 & XT523478 CO A DEST'D 1 BUNKER IN EACH LOCATION. AT 1513H VIC XT566503 CMC SHIP SUMPURTING THE RN REC SA FIRE. REW FIRE W/ ARTY RESULTING IN 1 US WIA (NOT EVAC) AND UNK VC LOSSES. AT 1639H VIC XT537485 CO A DEST 1 75MM ROUND.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) OPCON 2D BDE. RECON PLT CONT AS CRIP.

(50) 4 FEB 68

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) OPCON 2D BDE.

(B) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED RIF TO VIC XT5646, XT5747, & XT5650. AT 1029H VIC XT560495 CO B APC DFTONATED AT MINE RESULT-ING IN 2 US WIA (EVAC) AND 1 APC DESTROYED. AT 1120H VIC XT562501 CO B DEST'D 1 BNK. AT 1130H VIC XT568507 CO B REC AW FIRE AT XT 522484 CO A DEST'D AA POSITION. AT 1435H VIC XT522484 CO A DEST'D 1 BNK. AT 1500H VIC XT550475 CO A DEST'D 1 BNK. AT 1520H VIC XT550475 CO A DEST'D 1 BNK.

(C) 3-22 INF: BN(-) OPCON 2D BDE.

(51) 5 FEB 68

(A) 2-12 INF: BN(-) CONT'D OPCON 2D BDE. RECON PLT CONT'D AS BDE CRIP.

(B) 2-22 INF: BN(-) CONDUCTED RIF TO VIC XT5148, XT5550, & XT5148 AND CORDON & SEARCHED AT 13 RIB VIC XT5146. AT 2105H VIC XT515513 CO A LP ENGAGED 3 VC WITH SA & AW. VC RET FIRE WITH SA RES IN 1 US WIA AND UNK VC CAS. AT 2230H VIC XT5148 CO A REC'D SA FIRE AND 1 APC-2 RD. RET FIRE WITH AW W/ UNK RES. AND 1 US KIA (NOT EVAC). AT 0736H VIC XT5148 CO A FOUND 7 VC KIA (RC) AND CAPTURED 2 ROR-LAUNCHERS, 2 APC-11 RDS, 1 ROYALDE LAUNCHER, 2 MALLETS. AT 1135H CO'S A21 FST CORDON APPROX AT 13 RIB (XT 56449) : SEARCHED THE VILLAGE WITH NEG RES. AT 1405H VIC XT 564495 CO B REC'D SA FIRE. FIRE RET WITH SA & AW. AT 1405H VIC XT 564495 CO B REC'D SA FIRE. FIRE RET WITH SA & AW.

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(52) 6 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED RIF TO VIC XT5150, XT5010, XT5217, XT5217, & XT5218. AT 1107H VIC XT520501 CO A DESTROYED 1 81MM MORTAR ROUND. AT 1202H VIC XT538489 CO B DESTROYED 1 BUNKER.

(53) 7 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): BN CONDUCTED CORDON & SEARCH VIC XT462410 & RIF TO VIC XT4611. AT 2315H VIC XT501155 BFCOM PLT RECEIVED SA FIRE. FIRE RETURNED WITH 1 RTY & 81MM MORTAR WITH INK RESULTS. AT 0105H VIC XT483444 CO C APC RECEIVED RPG FIRE RESULTING IN 2 US WIA. AT 1025H VIC XT452450 CO B RECEIVED COMMAND DETONATED MINE RESULTING IN 1 US WIA (EVAC) & APC LIGHTLY DAMAGED. AT 1330H VIC XT462410 CO B APPREHENDED 17 DETAINEES. AT 1513H VIC XT471439 CO A DESTROYED 1 105MM ROUND.

(54) 8 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED RIF TO VIC XT4712 & XT4716. ALSO SECURED DAU TIENG - TAY NINH COMPOY. AT 0925H VIC XT38128 AVLB DETONATED A MINE RESULTING IN ALLR DAMAGED. AT 0959H VIC XT496416 CO A CAPTURED 900 LBS RICE. AT 1033H VIC XT407115 CO A CAPTURED 600 LBS SALT. AT 1106H VIC XT407115 CO A CAPTURED 600 LBS RICE. AT 1336H VIC XT489425 CO C DESTROYED 1 SAMPAN. AT 1125H VIC XT488422 CO A FOUND 1 VC KIA. AT 1145H VIC XT402424 CO C CAPTURED 1 5 GAL CAN FISH, 1 5 GAL CAN PICKLES & 200 LBS RICE. AT 1159H VIC XT403410 CO A DESTROYED 0 BUNKERS, 1 FOXHOLE, & 1 WELL. AT 1250H VIC XT403406 CO A DESTROYED 20 FOXHOLES. AT SAME TIME VIC XT405425 CO C DESTROYED 2 FISHNETS. AT 1315H VIC YT38128 CO B DETONATED FUZE (MINE DID NOT DETONATE) RESULTING IN 1 US WIA (NOT EVAC). AT 1315H VIC XT403407 CO A DESTROYED 50 FOXHOLES, 1 KITCHEN & CAPTURED 200 LBS RICE. AT 1313 VIC XT403407 CO A CAPTURED 7 RPG-2 ROS, 7 AK47 MAGAZINES, & UNK SA ROS. AT 1420H VIC XT500418 CO C DESTROYED 5 BICYCLES, 1 BUNKER, 10 OXCARTS.

(55) 9 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED RIF TO VIC XT4116 & XT4118. AT 0811H VIC XT434410 BFCOM PLT DESTROYED 1 PRESSURE TYPE MINE. AT 1505H VIC XT437140 CO B APC DETONATED A MINE RESULTING IN 1 US WIA (EVAC) & 1 APC MODERATELY DAMAGED.

(56) 10 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED RIF TO VIC XT5145. AT 0928H VIC XT500452 CO C FOUND NUMEROUS FOXHOLES. AT 1500H CO A BECAME OPCON 2-14 INF, AND CO A 2-14 INF BECAME OPCON 2-22 INF(M).

(57) 11 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): BN(-) CONDUCTED CORDON & SEARCH VIC XT5044. CO A 2-14 (OPCON) WAS BDF RRF. AT 1114H VIC XT507112 CO B FN-GAGED 3 VC WITH SA & 81MM MORTAR WITH INK RESULTS. AT 2122H VIC XT505443 AN OH-23 IN SUPPORT OF THE BN RECEIVED AW FIRE TAKING 2 HITS, RESULTING IN OH-23 LIGHTLY DAMAGED. FIRE

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(58) 12 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): BN(-) CONDUCTED CORDON & SEARCH VIC XT 504472 WITH CO A 2-14 INF OPCON. CO A CONTINUED OPCON 2-14 INF. AT 0702H VIC XT524480 BN LAAGER SITE RECEIVED APPROX 20 RDS 82MM MORTAR FIRE. FIRE RETURNED WITH ARTY RESULTING IN 1 US WIA (EVAC) AND UNK VC LOSSES. AT 1528H VIC XT524478 CO C ENGAGED 3 VC WITH SA & 3 AP MINES. AT 0728 VIC XT525478 CO C ENGAGED 3 VC WITH SA & 81MM MORTAR FIRE WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 1551H VIC XT514489 CO D DESTROYED 1 BUNKER. AT 1621H VIC XT510489 CO C DETONATED 1 BOOBY TRAP RESULTING IN 2 US WIA (EVAC). ALSO DESTROYED 3 BOOBY TRAPS AND 1 105MM RD.

(59) 13 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): BN(-) CONDUCTED PIF IN AO SAMSON AO DELILAH WITH CO A 2-14 INF OPCON. CO A 2-22 INF REMAINS OPCON 2-12 INF. RECON CONTINUED TO SECURE DAU TIENG-TAY NINH CONVOY. AT 1850H VIC XT515481 BN LAAGER RECEIVED APPROX 20 RDS 82MM MORTAR FIRE. FIRE RETURNED WITH ARTY WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 0855H VIC XT413342 RECON PLT RECEIVED COMMAND DETONATED MINE AND SA & RPG FIRE.

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RETURNED WITH ARTY WITH SA & AW ALSO AND TAC AIR RESULTING IN 0 US WIA (EVAC) & 2 APO'S DAMAGED, AND 1 VC KIA (AC), & 1 APO-2, 7 RPG-7, 1 RIFLE, 3 AK-7'S, CAPTURED. AT 1100H VIC XT415045 CO C RECEIVED 1 RPG ROUND. FIRE RETURNED WITH AW & SA RESULTING IN 1 US WIA (EVAC) & UNK VC LOSSES.

(60) 14 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED SWEEPS ALONG DAU TIENG-TAY NINH MSR FROM BASE CAMP TO VIC XT4142 WITH CO A 2-16 INF OPCON. CO A CONTINUED OPCON 2-16 INF. AT 1315H VIC XT462410 CO C CAPTURED 100 RDS OF .50 CAL AMMO. AT 1345H VIC XT462410 CO C CAPTURED 150 RDS OF .50 CAL AMMO.

(61) 15 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED SWEEPS OF DAU TIENG-TAY NINH MSR TO VIC XT415113 & XT430458 & RIF TO VIC XT47111 & XT4646 WITH CO A 2-16 INF OPCON. CO A CONTINUED OPCON 2-16 INF. AT 1050H VIC XT502450 CO C RECEIVED SA FIRE. FIRE RETURNED WITH SA WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 1355H VIC XT4555 CO B APPREHENDED 1 DETAINEE.

(62) 16 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CO A CONDUCTED COMB & SEARCH OF VILLAGE VIC XT4515. CO C CONDUCTED RIF TO VIC XT4346. CO A CONTINUED OPCON 2-16 INF. CO A 2-16 CONTINUED OPCON 2-22 INF(M) AND PROVIDED RDE RIF. AT 0750H VIC XT41443 RECON PLT RECEIVED SA FIRE. NO CASUALTIES. AT 1035H VIC XT450450 CO B APPREHENDED 5 DETAINEES ALSO CAPTURED 5 LBS MEDICAL SUPPLIES, 1 SET OF FATIGUES & RECEIVED 1 RETURNEE. AT 1138H VIC XT41443 CO C ENGAGED 1 VC WITH SA & ARTY WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 1155H VIC XT40437 RECON PLT DESTROYED 1 MINE AND 1 PRESSURE TYPE MINE. AT 1215H VIC XT4041 RECON PLT RECEIVED SA FIRE. FIRE RETURNED WITH SA & AW WITH UNK RESULTS. AT 1215H VIC XT 300437 ENGINEER COANE DETONATED MINE RESULTING IN 1 COANE MODERATELY DAMAGED. AT 1525H VIC XT41419 RECON PLT DESTROYED 1 PRESSURE TYPE MINE.

(63) 17 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF (M): CONDUCTED RIF TO VIC XT430449 TO XT400439 AND SECURED DAU TIENG-TAY NINH CONVOY. SECURED CULVERT AT CP C. SECURED BRIDGE OVER SAIGON RIVER IN MSR AND REINFORCED DISTRICT. CO A 2-16 INF DEPARTED CAMP AT 1500H TO TAY NINH. AT 1145H VIC XT420468 SCOUT PLT DESTROYED 3 AT MINE.

(64) 18 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED ROAD CONVOY SECURITY AND ESCORT FROM TAY NINH TO DAU TIENG.

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(64) 19 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED RIF ALONG THE ROAD FROM DAU TIENG TO VIC XT752442. AND SECURED DAU TIENG-TAY NINH CONVOY. AT 0935H VIC XT370242 SCOUT PLT DETONATED A BOoby TRAP RESULTING IN 3 US KIA. AT 1135H VIC XT374448 BN DEST 1 AT MINE.

(65) 20 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED CONVOY SECURITY AND ESCORT FROM TAY NINH TO DAU TIENG.

(66) 21 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): A COMPANY OPCON 1ST BDE, R&C COIS CONDUCTED RIF MISSIONS IN MICHLIN PLANTATION. 9 CO CONDUCTED RIF OUT TO VIC XT533463 TO XT515445 THEN TO BASE CAMP. RCTON CONTINUED AS RDE RIF, SECURITY OF PROVINCE & DISTRICT.

(67) 22 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED ROAD SECURITY AND CONVOY ESCORT BETWEEN DAU TIENG AND TAY NINH. AT 0952H VIC XT352442 A SCOUT PLT APC DETONATED AN AT MINE RESULTING IN 3 US KIA (EMAC) AND 1 APC DESTROYED.

(68) 23 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED RIF VIC XT713031.

(69) 24 FEB 68

(A) 2-22 INF(M): CONDUCTED RIF AND CONVOY SECURITY ON MSR FROM TAY NINH TO DAU TIENG.

(B) GENERAL: 3D RDE TERMINATED OPERATION YELLOWSTONE AT 2100H.

12. RESULTS:

A. US LOSSES:

(1) PERSONNEL: 37 KIA, 358 WIA, 4 DOW, 6 MBI

B. ENEMY LOSSES

(1) PERSONNEL: 1087 KIA (90) 337 KIA (POSS) 21 PW, 2 CHIEU HOI.

(2) EQUIPMENT CAPTURED AND EVACUATED

WEAPONS

- 119 AK-47
- 9 M40
- 3 M70
- 5 M16
- 11 SIG
- 2 C/L 50 MG
- 2 12.7MM MG
- 3 M50
- 31 RPG-2
- 16 RPG-7
- 1 57MM RR
- 3 60MM MORTAR

AMMUNITION:

- 23830 RDS SMALL ARMS
- 100 RDS 82MM MORTAR
- 170 RDS 60MM MORTAR
- 111 RPG-2 BOOSTERS
- 14 RDS 120MM ROCKET
- 13 RDS 57MM RR
- 30 RDS 75MM RR
- 30 RDS RPG-2
- 05 RDS RPG-7
- 12 RDS 106-7 BOOSTERS
- 75 RDS 12.7MM MG

COMMUNICATIONS:

- 0 CHICOM FIELD PHONES
- 1 CHICOM FM RADIO
- 1 CHICOM TRANSMITTER
- 1 CHICOM SW RECEIVER
- 1 TR-2E
- 1 TA-312
- 1 TA-1

FOOD:

24 TONS RICE

MISCELLANEOUS:

25 BICYCLES
68 DOCUMENTS

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(3) ENEMY EQUIPMENT DESTROYED

WEAPONS:

2 RPG-7

2 AK-47

1 RPG-2

2 AK-50

FOOD:

1200 LBS SOYBEANS

300 LBS PEANUTS

500 LBS GRAIN

12 TON RICE

MISCELLANEOUS

123 BICYCLES

1 6 H.P. GENERATOR

AMMUNITION:

19,300 RDS SMALL ARMS

15,500 GRENADES

11,000 BLASTING CAPS

8,800 50 CAL RDS

315 RPG-2 RDS

355 60MM MORTAR RDS

120 57MM RR RDS

70 82MM MORTAR RDS

51 MINES

0 BOoby TRAPS

45 RPG-7 RDS

66 DEMOLITION

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13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

A. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION: DURING THE OPERATIONS THE BRIGADE S-1 SECTION OPERATED FROM DAU TIENG WITH REPORTS BEING FORWARDED TO AND FROM THE FORWARD LOCATION.

B. SUPPLY: OPER YELLOWSTONE WAS SUPPORTED FROM DAU TIENG. ALL SUPPLIES WERE DELIVERED BY HELICOPTER WITH NO DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED.

C. MAINTENANCE: MAINTENANCE & SUPPORT SERVICES WERE ADE-
QUATE THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION.

D. STATUS OF EACH SUPPLY: ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLY WERE ADE-
QUATE THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION.

E. PATIENT CARE AND EVACUATION: HELICOPTERS CONTINUED TO BE THE PRIMARY MEANS OF EVACUATION OF WOUNDED PERSONNEL. CO B 25TH MEDICAL BATTALION OPERATED OUT OF DAU TIENG.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: NONE.

15. RECOMMENDATIONS: NONE.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Charles W. Clark
CHARLES W. CLARK
CAPTAIN, INFANTRY
ADJUTANT

DISTRIBUTION:
5-CO, 25TH INF DIV
25-CO, 18TH MIL HIST DET
1-S1
1-S2
3-S3
1-S4
1-S5
2-2/12 INF
2-2/22 INF(M)
2-3/22 INF
2-2/77 ARTY

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION, 12TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96268

AVD:TB-F-30

15 March 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/RC5/33/32)

TO: Commanding Officer
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
APO San Francisco 96268

1. Name or Identity and/or Type of Operation: Operation Yellowstone.
2. Date of Operations: 7 December - 16 December 1967
28 December 1967 - 31 January 1968
3. Location: Southern Portion AO HOOD, Eagle Flights into AO OTTER (X13677), Michelin Rubber Plantation, Latou, FSB BURT.
4. Control or Command Headquarters: 3d Bde, 25th Infantry Division
1st Bde, 25th Infantry Division
5. Reporting Officer: LTC R. D. TICE.
6. Task Organization: Co A 2/12
Co B 2/12
Co C 2/12
Co D 2/12
BSC, 2/12
7. Supporting Forces: 7th Air Force
2/77th Artillery
269th Aviation
8. Intelligence:
 - a. Intelligence concerning the Battalion TAOR for Operation Yellowstone was obtained from the 3d Bde, 25th Infantry Division and from the 1st Bde, 25th Infantry Division.
 - b. Information received indicated that vic (X1279936) was site of large rice cache for enemy forces operating throughout the area.
 - c. Intelligence information was sent to 2/12th from 3d Bde, that Dan Tieng may be subjected to enemy attack and was consequently airlifted back as security force.
 - d. Operations in AO OTTER produced several enemy bunkers with overhead cover, but no significant offensive actions by enemy forces.
 - e. On 8 January at (X1340884) contact made with squad size element. Web gear captured from one of the two enemy NVA's identified him as NVA regular.
 - f. On 12 January located 8 graves (X1345287), bodies of 8 males recovered dressed in light green uniforms. Enemy unit unknown.
 - g. On 20 January Bn (-) found base camp approximately one week old, with stakes tied to trees (probably trail markers) (X1509799), and nearby were 25 foxholes probably used as staging area.
 - h. On 22 January a reconnaissance patrol from Camp Butler at (X1509770) found VC sandals, scissors, medical gauze, and approximately one pound propaganda leaflets.
9. Other VC encounters were as follows:
 - (1) Sniper fire 6
 - (2) Mortar fire 6
 - (3) Booby traps 2
 - (4) Engagements 9
 - (5) Mining 2
 - (6) Fire against aircraft 3

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J. Enemy Communications:

- (1) In the base camps located, communications wire was found throughout indicating use of land line communications.
- (2) On 20 January while searching a base camp at (XT503797) found one radio battery case indicating enemy was using radio communications.

K. Enemy Operations:

- (1) Throughout the operation at Katun, PSB BURT and in the Michelin Rubber Plantation enemy units made no attempts at offensive operations. Enemy forces encountered used basic guerrilla tactics.
- (2) On 19 December 1967 2/12th airlifted back to Dau Tieng due to possible enemy offensive action. Base camp received 45 rounds enemy mortar fire, scattered small arms fire, but no major offensive action.

L. Weather and Terrain:

- (1) Weather throughout the operational period was dry and hot, and had no adverse effects on operational capability. Terrain trafficability was adequate for armor employment.

9. Mission: During Operation Yellowstone 2/12th was called on to perform missions in several different areas.

a. On first mission, 9 December 1967, commencing H-Hour, D+1 2/12th Inf (-) conducts combat assault into IE 1, secures southern portion of PSB HO79 (aka Bao). In D+2 effects link-up with TF 2/22 and conducts offensive operations in assigned AO to locate and destroy VC/NVA Forces and installations until D+7. On D+8 2/12th (-) conducts automobile move to PSB XE70 and continues to contact and destroy VC/NVA Forces until D+15. From D+15 to D+60 2/12th conducts detailed Reconnaissance in Force Operations in assigned AO.

b. On 2nd mission, 28 December 1967, commencing 0700H, 2/12th Inf (-) conducts airlift by fixed wing aircraft to Katun, becomes OPGON to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. Conducts combat assault in vic (XT2893) and secures rice cache for extraction. Conducts patrols in assigned AO to locate and destroy VC/NVA Forces and installations until 2 Jan 68. On 2 Jan 68 returns to OPGON to 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and conducts missions to be announced.

c. On 3rd mission, 26 January 1968, 2/12th to airlift to Dau Tieng to reinforce and/or counterattack the following areas and employ two (2) companies in the Michelin on Reconnaissance in Force Operations, also provide security for vehicle convoy between Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh:

(1) Reinforce:

- (a) District Headquarters
- (b) 369th RF Company
- (c) Bon Do Out-post
- (d) CRIP and Nguyen Van Than Out-post
- (e) Cau Cat Out-post
- (f) Cau Dau Out-post
- (g) Bridge
- (h) Cau Sinh Out-post
- (i) Bon Cut
- (j) Local ambush patrols

(2) Counterattack:

- (a) TROIC
- (b) SWORD
- (c) GOLD
- (d) OMAHA-1
- (e) OMAHA-2
- (f) OMAHA-3
- (g) JUNG

10. Concept of Operations: On the first mission of Operation Yellowstone was to be executed in three phases:

a. Phase I: D+1 2/12 Inf (-) conducts combat assault and secures southern portion of PSB HOOD. Effects link-up with TF 2/22 and begins offensive operations in assigned AO to the south and southwest.

b. Phase II: D+8 2/12 (-) conducts automobile move to PSB HENO and conducts offensive operations to the west and northwest in sector.

c. Phase III: D+15 to D+60 2/12 (-) conducts detailed Reconnaissance in Force Operations to locate and destroy VC/NVA Forces and installations in assigned AO.

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The second mission of Operation Yellowstone was to be executed in four phases:

- a. Phase I: 0700-1000H 28 Dec 2/12 Inf (-) conducts airlift by fixed wing to Katun, becomes OPCON to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div.
- b. Phase II: 1000-1430H 28 Dec 2/12 Inf (-) conducts combat assault to vic (XT2393) and secures rice cache for extraction.
- c. Phase III: 28 Dec 67 - 2 Jan 68 2/12 Inf (-) establishes battalion patrol base and conducts offensive operations in assigned AO.
- d. Phase IV: 2/12 Inf returns OPCON to 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and conducts missions TRM.

The third mission of Operation Yellowstone was to be executed in three phases:

- a. Phase I: 27 January 1968 two companies to conduct Eagle Flights into Michelin Rubber Plantation to destroy VC/NVA Forces and installations.
- b. Phase II: 2/12th will hunt/attack and/or reinforce Camp Rainier and friendly units within their sphere of responsibility.
- c. Phase III: 2/12th will provide security for vehicle convoy between Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh.
- d. In all phases of above three mentioned missions maximum use of TAC air and artillery throughout the operations.

e. References:

- (1) OPRD 33-67, HHC, 2/12th Inf, 25th Inf Div, dtd 06 Dec 67.
- (2) FRAGORD 1 to OPRD 33-67, dtd 15 Dec 67.
- (3) FRAGORD 2 to OPRD 33-67, dtd 16 Dec 67.
- (4) FRAGORD 3 to OPRD 33-67, dtd 27 Dec 67.
- (5) FRAGORD 4 to OPRD 33-67, dtd 26 Jan 68.
- (6) FRAGORD 5 to OPRD 33-67, dtd 27 Jan 68.
- (7) FRAGORD 6 to OPRD 33-67, dtd 28 Jan 68.
- (8) FRAGORD 7 to OPRD 33-67, dtd 29 Jan 68.
- (9) FRAGORD 8 to OPRD 33-67, dtd 30 Jan 68.

11. Executions:

07-08 Dec 67

2/12th Inf prepared for future operation. Co C (-) continued mission as Bde Ready Reaction Force.

09 Dec 67

2/12th (-) began operations with combat assault at 0935H. It was completed by 1100H landing at (XT397704). Bn (-) proceeded to secure southern portion of the LZ (FSB 8000) while 3/49th ARVN secured northern portion. Co C (-) was airlifted at 1825H to FSB GRANT (XT380620) for additional security purposes. Co D found 2 bouncing Betty mines on LZ and destroyed.

10-12 Dec 67

2/12th (-) continued Reconnaissance in Force operation in AO OTTER, on 12 Dec Recon at 0950H located and destroyed 7 bunkers with overhead cover at (XT472591). The bunkers were 10' x 15' x 5'. Inside were a table, chairs, cot and two entrenching tools. Lager site for the Bn is (XT464498).

13 Dec 67

2/12th (-) conducted Eagle Flights into 4 areas of AO OTTER, (XT39771), (XT39772), (XT39773) and (XT39774). At 1625H Recon saw sniper fire from (XT39775). Lager for the night (XT39776).

14 Dec 67

2/12th an Eagle Flight lifted to (XT3279). They then returned to Dau Tieng because of Intelligence Report. Last element arrived 1525H. Bn went on Red Alert at 1800H for possible attack. Base camp came under mortar attack at 2130H until 2330H. Approximately 45 mortar rounds fell in Bn area. 2/12th suffered 3 MIA's.

15 Dec 67

Recon went on night patrol in Bon Cui Rubber departing 0905H. They closed base camp at 1430H. Co's C & D departed base camp 0700H to establish two ambushes in Michelin. Co D established their ambush at (XT512483) and C at (XT510496). As C Co prepared to leave the ambush site they hit two booby traps wounding 2 at (XT510496). Co's C & D closed camp at 1535H. One platoon from C Co remains at FSB GRANT, OPCON to Task Force Recon.

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16 Dec 67

Co A combat assaulted to (XT455530) then started moving to night ambush site. At 1540H at (XT455522) they found 10 bunkers. At 1600H at (XT463522) located 3 bunkers 10' x 20' x 8'. All bunkers were destroyed. At 1720H at (XT464520) they located 2 bicycles along the river, also one submachine gun and one sniper. Co A's ambush site for the night established at (XT455523). Bn (-) remained at Camp Binh with mission of Bde Reaction Force. The platoon from Co C returned to Dem Tien from FSB GRANT 0930H. Recon ambush patrol at 1845H was in contact at (XT509461) on all sides. Artillery, gunships and firing from checkpoint was used to get patrol back to base camp at 2000H. Checkpoint at Post #1 at 2330H received incoming grenade with negative casualties.

17 - 27 Dec 67

2/12th participated in Operation Condon.

28 Dec 67

2/12th resumed Operation Yellowstone. They were airlifted by fixed wing to Katun (XT333097). Last lift completed at 1100H. Bn came under OPGCN to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. From Katun they will combat assault to (XT292925) and will remain in force from Lager site until 2 Jan 68. Co B and Recon Platoon are in Dem Tien as 3d Bde, Ready Reaction Force.

29 Dec 67

2/12th Inf (-) located 3 caches of rice in their immediate area in AO MITCH. B (-) Lager site for the night was (XT279934).

30 Dec 67

2/12th Inf (-) continues OPGCN to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. Bn is currently running Recon in Force operations from their Lager site at (XT279934) in AO MITCH.

31 Dec 67

Began extraction preparations for large rice cache. Approximately 7 tons were extracted on the 30th of Dec and another 30 tons today.

1 - 4 Jan 68

Continues OPGCN to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div, extracting rice and conducting recon in force operations.

5 Jan 68

Bn (-) relocated to FSB LATCH (XT333098). Replaced 3/22 at FSB and assumed FSB security requirements. Bravo Co airmobile from Dem Tien to Katun, last element departed Dem Tien 1235H.

6 - 7 Jan 68

Bn (-) remains OPGCN to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div providing security for forward resupply base at Katun.

8 Jan 68

A-2-12 while providing security for Base Flow operations, made contact with squad also enemy element at coord (XT340884). Contact was broken at 1005H with following results: two enemy KIA. Web gear taken from one enemy KIA proved he was member of NVA Force. At 1600H sniper fire was received at coord (XT349886) resulting in one US KIA, two US MIA and one US MH. Enemy losses unknown. Bravo Co at 1100H found four graves at (XT346786) with 4 male bodies uncovered.

9 Jan 68

Sniper fire at coord (XT341884) on Delta Company resulted in one US KIA. At 1825H continuing sniper fire inflicted two US MH and one US KIA. Enemy casualties unknown.

10 Jan 68

Combat assault conducted at coord (XT274864) sweeping to coord (XT267895) then to PE at coord (XT275885). Mission completed at 1530H Alpha had one MH.

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11 Jan 68

2/12th continues security mission of Katun. At 1815H received 10 rounds 82mm and 15 rounds 60mm mortar fire. Negative Flame casualties. Alpha departed Katun 0745H sweeping east to (XTJ99901), north to (XTJ99920), west to (XTJ-6920) then southeast back to Katun. Bravo provided security for Axo Flow Operations working the perimeter.

12 Jan 68

Charlie Company at coord (XTJ45397) located 8 graves, bodies of 4 males were uncovered dressed with light green uniforms.

11 - 14 Jan 68

On 13 Jan conducted local room in force missions. On 14 Jan a combat assault was conducted by Co's A, P, and C into (XT299972) and a room in force operation began. Gunships covering the assault received fire via (XT299978). They returned fire and an airstrike was called in. Co C received small arms fire (XT298979) from approximately 3 WC. Returned fire and swept the area. Co B located minefield and 10 VC bodies in shallow graves. Three companies continued sweep to JE vic (XT292958) where they were extracted back to Katun.

15 Jan 68

Secure Route 246 with Co's A, B & D to Bo Tac where they were met by the 2/14th Inf. 2/12th located and destroyed 3 anti-tank mines while clearing the road. Returned to Katun 1730H.

16 Jan 68

Co (-) moved by C-47 from Katun to FSB BURT. Relieved the 4/9th Inf. Came under control of 3d Bde, 25th Inf. There was US MIA.

17 - 18 Jan 68

Conducted local patrolling on the 17th of Jan and improved positions around the perimeter. On the 18th continued perimeter sweep 100 meters from FSB BURT. Alpha at (XT515830) found three freshly dug foxholes 4' x 3' x 5', two had overhead cover. At 1315H dust-off required for crew US MIA, paralyzed legs due to cramps. At 1615H a stay behind force from Alpha discovered grave with male dressed in black pajamas.

19 Jan 68

Conducted local sweep in force operations via FSB BURT. Delta Company at 0749H found 1 VC body (XT504807). Returned to perimeter 1700H.

20 Jan 68

Conducted local room in force via FSB BURT (5080) sweeping southeast to (XT515784) southwest to (XT513782), then northeast to (XT509797). Returned to BURT 1600H. Alpha at (XT507796) 0817H found stakes tied to trees. Stakes were probably used as trail markers. Also Alpha discovered 4 bunkers 3' x 4' x 5' with overhead cover. Estimated they were three days old. Destroyed them. At 0850H via (XT509799) found 8 huts, 17 bunkers, two with overhead cover. All bunkers and huts destroyed by fire. At 0940H via (XT511791) found six foot bunker with overhead cover which was approximately one week old. At 1020H via (XT517777) found 7 freshly dug unused graves, 4 foxholes 3' x 4' x 4', 2 incomplete, 6 freshly dug bunkers without overhead cover approximately 1 week old. At 1225H via (XT511792) located 1 foxhole and hut with tunnel 8' long. At 1410H via (XT507797) found probable staging area with approximately 30 foxholes having overhead cover. Alpha also discovered 1 radio battery case, rucksack, bandages and approximately 100 pounds of rice. Located 6 graves at same location with 6 males. At 1530H found 1 bicycle and extracted. Delta Company at 0755H via (XT515784) found VC bridge 3' wide tied with vines. Also found 1 AK47 with magazine at (XT504800). All elements closed BURT 1600H.

21 Jan 68

Conducted local room in force via BURT, (XT5480) sweeping east to (XT524801), north to (XT524809), then southwest to (XT514806). Alpha at 1510H via (XT515805) found 17 bunkers with overhead cover 3' x 4' x 4', constructed of one set of legs with one foot of dirt on top. Also found some bloody rag and two VC entrenching tools. Closed FSB BURT 1620H. Bravo was trailing element of B (-). At 1045H via (XT524801) found 3 bunkers with overhead cover and 3 foxholes. Bunkers were partially destroyed and very old. Found 1 bandolier M/47 ammo.

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22 Jan 63

Continued sweeps near FSB WURT perimeter. Bravo Company at 0815H vic (XT505905) found 15 one man foxholes with no overhead cover. They were approximately two weeks old, destroyed same. At 1600H vic (XT507804) found 4 VC bunkers about 3 weeks old. Returned to perimeter 1600H. Delta Company at 0815H vic (XT505905) found 35 one man foxholes with no overhead cover about two weeks old, destroyed same. At 0953H vic (XT512805) found small base camp having 15 bunkers with overhead cover 3' x 4' x 4', destroyed same. At 1255H vic (XT503798) found 1 VC box approximately three weeks old, 2 RFG-2 rounds with charges, and 1 CMLON grenade. Delta returned to WURT 1600H with captured ordnance.

23 - 24 Jan 63

2/12th Inf (-) continued security mission of FSB WURT. Conducted cloverleaf type operations near Hill 495 (XT504833).

25 Jan 63

All companies 2/12th participated in local sweeps near WURT. Bravo at 1500H near (XT503905) found 2 RFG-2 rounds with boosters.

26 Jan 63

FSB WURT at 0800H received 25 82mm mortar rounds. This action resulted in 4 US KIA and 29 US MIA. Extraction operations from FSB WURT began at 0850H. An closed Camp Rainier at 1157H.

27 - 31 Jan 63

En (-) conducted Reconnaissance in Force operations in and around the Michelin Rubber Plantation. They cloverleafed each day and would return near Jaeger site and set up ambush sites. During this time the 2/12th (-) had negative contact, negative findings. 31 Jan 63 was the last day of Operation Yellowstone for the 2/12th.

12. Results:

- a. US Losses:
 - (1) Personnel: 5 KIA, 47 MIA.
- b. Enemy Losses:
 - (1) Personnel: 35 VC killed (BC), 1 VC killed (poss).
 - (2) Enemy Equipment Captured and Evacuated:

Individual weapons	Food	Medical supplies
bandolier w/AK47 ammo	129,040 pounds rice	1 pair scissors
2 RFG-7 rounds w/boosters		1 box bandages
2 RFG-2 rounds w/boosters		
1 AK47 magazine		
20 rounds AK47		

Fortifications (destroyed)

- 1 12' trench
- 1 8' tunnel
- 53 1 man foxholes w/overhead cover
- 8 small huts
- 176 bunkers

Miscellaneous

- 4 pair sandals
- 4 entrenching tools
- 1 rank sock
- 2 bicycles
- 1 table
- 4 chairs

Ordinance destroyed

- 3 anti-tank mines
- 2 bounding Jotty mines

13. Administrative Matters: None.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: The use of chain saws were quite effective in clearing Jaeger sites and cutting timber for bunkers.

15. Commanders Analysis: None.

16. Recommendations: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION

1 cy - 2/22

1 cy - 3/22

25 cys - J3 Bde

James H. Haddock
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
CPT, Infantry
Adjutant

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10. (C) INTELLIGENCE: Intelligence received during Operation YELLOWSTONE proved to be timely and generally accurate. During much of the operation, the BN CP was located close to the Bde CP, facilitating quick exchange of intelligence information. The BN interpreters proved a great asset in initial interrogation of PWs and initial readout of captured documents.

Greater use could have been made of SLUR, RED HAZE, and PEOPLE SNIFFER missions to aid in detecting the buildup and movement of enemy forces.

11. (C) MISSION:

(1) 2d Bn (Mech), 22d Inf moved to Northern War Zone "C" to conduct offensive operations to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, open land lines of communication for friendly forces and interdict VC/NVA trails and routes.

(2) From 1-24 February, 3-22 Inf (M) provided Base Camp Security for Camp Rainier, cleared Hwy 239 and 26 between Tay Ninh and Dien Bien Phu daily, then secured the convey and conducted Reconnaissance in Force in areas adjacent to Camp Rainier.

11. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: On 27 Dec 67, 3-22 Inf (M) moved from Camp Rainier to Prek Klok, Katur and Bo Tue, arriving and establishing, in conjunction with 3-22 Inf, Fire Support Base BURT on 31 Dec 67. Until 27 Jan 68, in conjunction with Fire Support Base security, 3-22 Inf (M) conducted operations north to the Cambodian border and to the south a distance of about 10 km. On 28 Jan 68, 3-22 Inf (M) departed FSB BURT enroute to Camp Rainier, arriving at about 2230 hours, 31 Jan 68. From 1-24 Feb 68, 3-22 Inf (M) conducted Reconnaissance in Force from Camp Rainier while, at the same time, providing Base Camp Defense.

12. (C) CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY:

a. General:

(1) 27 Dec 67: At 0048, all elements of the 3-22 Inf (M) had closed into Camp Rainier. At 0034, 3-22 Inf (M) began to move enroute to Prek Klok, XT275786, to initiate Operation YELLOWSTONE. At 1540, 3-22 Inf (M) became OPCON to 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. At 1540, 3-22 Inf (M) had closed into Prek Klok, where they laagered for the night.

(2) 28 Dec 67: At 1100, 3-22 Inf (M) departed Prek Klok, XT275786, enroute to Bo Tue, via XT304853. At about 1700, 3-22 Inf (M) had closed into Bo Tue and laagered there for the night. The entire move was made without incident. At 1940, Co B, at XT383650, reported movement on a 190 degree azimuth and placed it under fire.

(3) 29 Dec 67: At 0700, via XT363050, a sweep was made by Co B, resulting in a find of one M-47 and 2 VC KIA (BC). Approximately 0600, 3-22 Inf (M) departed for Bo Tue enroute to FSB BURT. At 0634, Co C reported finding and destroying 3 bunkers at vic XT394853. At 0849, Co C located and destroyed six AT mines about 25 meters apart at XT401845. At 0940, via XT421839, two more AT mines were found about 50 meters apart, and destroyed. At 0957, Co C located and destroyed another AT mine, via XT410839. At 1155, Co C, via XT42819, located and destroyed another AT mine. At 1558, Co C located 9 AT mines 25-50 meters apart via XT466019. Some of them had been recently planted and were pressure-release stick type. At 1830, via XT499010, an APC from Co C hit an AT mine, resulting in moderate damage to the APC, but no casualties. At 1853, Co A had an APC hit by an RPG via XT44817. At the same time, the CP Op and Co A received increasing small arms and automatic weapons fire from both sides of the road. At 1900, the contact was broken. Results of the contact were 3 US KIA, 4 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA, and 1 APC with minor damage. At 1955, Co A and the CP Op closed into FSB BURT, XT490004. Co B and C/3-13 Arty laagered for the night at a separate location from the FSB.

(4) 30 Dec 67: At 0622, about 10 rounds of 60mm mortars landed outside the southern portion of the FSB BURT perimeter. There were no casualties. At 1155, Co C linked up with 3-22 at XT462020. At 1223, an APC from Co B, via XT478020, was hit by an RPG, causing moderate damage and 1 US KIA. At 1445, Co B and 3-22 closed into FSB BURT. 3-22 continued to secure FSB BURT. At 2100, FSB BURT received approximately 30 60mm rounds, resulting in one US KIA, and damage to 10 Claymore mines.

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(5) 31 Dec 67: At 0300, Co C had movement to their front and took it under fire. A sweep at first light revealed 1 VC KIA (DC), and one M-47 rifle. At 1005, Co A found an old rusty .22 cal pistol, vic XT500790. At 1025, Co A, vic XT500709, found and destroyed five L-shaped bunkers. At 1202, Co C vic XT502700, located and destroyed a mortar site with two fuse wells and fresh soil, indicating they were recently used. At 1237, Co B found and destroyed 6 foxholes, vic XT509706. At 1500, Co C, vic XT502793, found a bicycle and one dead VC, approximately 24 hrs old. The VC was apparently killed by a mortar. At 1921, FSPB DURT received 20-30 60mm mortar rounds, with no casualties.

(6) 1 Jan 68: At 0925, vic XT496795, Co C located and destroyed a rice bin, 5'x20'. At 0945, vic XT491609, Co A found an old M-16 rifle with magazine and ammo, which had jammed and was discarded. At 1220, all elements had closed into the perimeter of the FSPB. 2-22 Inf (H) and 3-22 Inf continued to secure FSPB DURT. From 2010 to about 2335, the 1Ps on Cos A, B, and C were receiving sporadic rifle grenade and RPG fire. At 2335, the 2-22 received 100-150 rounds of 60mm mortar from an azimuth of 1000 mils. At 2341, the entire perimeter began receiving small arms, machinegun, RPG, recoilless rifle, and rifle grenade fire.

(7) 2 Jan 68: At 0007, Co C, at the southern end of the perimeter, was in heavy contact. By this time, Co C had five casualties and had lost one M113 APC by RPG fire. Three M113 APCs, with crews, were sent from the Dn Recon Platoon to reinforce Co C. At 0031, several 60mm mortars were fired into the perimeter. At 0047, Co B had a track hit with an RPG, and requested reinforcements. Elements of the Recon Platoon were dispatched to the Co B area. By 0120, Co B was in need of a total resupply of 60mm mortar ammo. At 0125, Co A, on the West side on the perimeter, reported heavy RPG and automatic weapons fire. By 0120, the Dn Recon Platoon requested a basic resupply of M-79, cal .50, and M-60 machinegun ammo. At 0131, a Duster, which had moved to reinforce Co C, was hit and destroyed by VC fire. At 0145, Co A's western sector of the perimeter was quiet. The northern sector, secured by Co B, was still receiving moderate amounts of enemy fire. Co C, on the southern side of the perimeter, was receiving heavy amounts of 60mm mortars. They were fired from 400 meters south of the Co C area, vic XT500790. The AF reported that at that time they had sustained 3 US KIA's, and that large numbers of VC were still moving down the trail towards FSPB DURT. By 0245, 2-77 Arty was adjusting its guns in order to fire direct Bechives in support of Co C. At 0247, a request was received for immediate reinforcement for Co C 3-22 Inf which was on the east side of the 2-22 Inf perimeter. Two M113 APCs with crews were immediately deployed to fulfill this request. At about 0250, ammo resupply was being received at DURT, and casualties were being evacuated. By this time, all cal .50 and M-60 machinegun ammo available from the CP Co had been given to Co C. The Co C commander requested that Tactical Air, to include Napalm, be employed to within 150 meters of his sector of the perimeter. By 0310, massive air strikes were being employed as requested. By 0545, the battalion had 5 M113 APCs immobile due to hostile fire. At this time, Co C was still receiving 60mm mortar fire in their area. Resupply and evacuation aircraft received heavy ground fire from .51 cal and other Chinese machineguns. The fire was being received from about 300 - 400 meters out of the perimeter from the South and Southwest. Contact ended about 0640, and initial close-in sweeps of the area began. At 0641, Co C elements linked up with their Blue 1 ambush patrol. The remainder of this period was spent sweeping the contact area, resupplying and applying maintenance to vehicles and weapons. 2-22 Inf (H) continued to secure FSPB DURT, sweep the area of battl, restock ammo, and maintain vehicles and weapons. Through the evening of 2 Jan, all companies reported no contact and observation of VC outside of their sectors.

(8) 3 Jan 68: At 0315, the southern portion of FSPB DURT received 20-30 60mm mortar rounds, resulting in 1 US KIA from Co C. At 1212, vic XT492457, Co C found 1 female body. At 1400, General Westmoreland visited the battalion. At 1437, Co A located, vic XT467407, a basic bunker in one bunker, 6'x4'x4', with 2 1/2' of overhead cover, 600 lbs of rice, a nose hole, 12'x20', 2 bunkers, 6'x4'x4', and 50 meters of trench line. It was destroyed. During the morning, numerous bodies and enemy weapons were found, results of the previous day's battle.

(9) 3 Jan 68: At 0907, Co C, at XT494796, located an area

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(9) 3 Jan 68: At 0907, Co C, at XT494796, located an area

(17) 12 Jan 60: LP's reported movement during the hours of darkness. At 0320, the western side of the perimeter received 5 RPG rounds. Fire was returned and the RPGs ceased. At 0712, Co C conducted a sweep to the front of their perimeter and located 1 VC KIL (DC), 1 RPG rocket launcher, and three RPG rounds. At 0730, Cos A and C departed for RIF. At 1036, via XT522072, Co A found an animal trap. It was destroyed. At 1106, Co A, via XT522072, located a base camp. It contained 26 bunkers, 4 huts and a trench system. At 1453, via XT544074, Cos A and C found a base camp containing 40 bunkers, 17 200 lb bags of rice. The area was evacuated and the bunkers were destroyed.

(18) 13 Jan 60: LP's reported sporadic movement during the hours of darkness. Cos A and E searched the areas to the east and south-east during the day and by 1530, all elements had closed the laager via XT541200. From 2300 to 2355, all LP's reported movement in their areas.

(19) 14 Jan 60: At 0011, Co E departed for RIF. At 1020, Cos A, C, and the CP Co departed, following Co B. At 1110, Co B, via XT 503700, found 4 bicycles. At 1112, Co C, at XT517003, located and destroyed two butterfly bombs. At 1113, Co D, at XT503702, located 4 bicycles. By 1315, all elements had closed the laager, via XT505760.

(19) 15 Jan 60: At 1133, Co A, at XT532770, was sweeping to the east to encounter VC who had been spotted by a recon helicopter. At 1143, Co C, at XT532773, located 1 VC who had been KIL with a .50 cal. Also found was 1 M-47 rifle. At 1305, Co D, at XT505764, located 8 bunkers and 2 antiaircraft positions which were destroyed. At 1315, Co B 3-22 Inf, was in contact at XT500700. Co B 3-22 became OPCON to 3-22 at 1320 and proceeded to the contact area. At 1405, Co A was sweeping into a base camp area at XT520772. Co C was moving in on the left of Co A. Co A immediately made contact and pushed into the base camp. Results were 6 VC KIL (DC), 1 POM, 3 M-47 rifles, 1 RPG launcher, a medical bag and a bag of documents, to include a diary and pictures. There were no friendly casualties. By 1605, Cos A and C had closed the En laager at XT506760. Co B, which was OPCON to 3-22, sustained 3 US MIA's. Co B closed into the En laager and reverted back to En at 1953.

(20) 16 Jan 60: By 0925, all Cos had departed for RIF. At 1035, at XT529775, Co A located a base camp containing 50 bunkers. At 1040, Co A located a Chieng claymore mine rigged for detonation and 3 1/2 lb blocks of TNT. At 1045, Co C, at XT523773, located a tunnel containing 70 60mm mortar rounds, 150 60mm mortar rounds, 50 CBM fuse caps, 25 60mm fuses, 0000 .51 cal rounds, 165 RPG-11 rounds, 4000 rounds .32 cal ammo, 2000 rounds of .30 cal ammo, 50 M-79 rounds, 2 box type telephones, 101 57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 1 M-1 telephone, 1 US M-1 carbine, 2 M16-10 radios, 1 M-3/12 telephone, 3 casts of pull cords for grenades, and 14 electrical blasting caps. At 1200, at XT520776, Co A located 25 bicycles. At 1430, at XT527766, Co A located an underground storage area. By 1623, all companies had closed the En laager, XT505760.

(21) 17 Jan 60: At 1027, Co E linked up with a platoon from 3-27 Air Cav at XT523740. The Cav platoon had become OPCON to the 3-22 Inf (H). At 1056, Co C moved to XT530746 to set up a temporary laager and send out probing patrols. At 1137, at XT523713, an air observer located a base camp which was in very good condition, with 300-500 metres of trench lines, 4 huts, several machinegun positions and many vehicles. The personnel were spotted wearing khaki uniforms. At 1213, Co A and the CP Co arrived at the new laager site at XT524742. At 1326, Co A located 3-4 bunkers and a trench system with fresh diggings. All was destroyed. At 1415, Co C, at XT530730, made contact with 3-5 VC. They received M-47 small arms fire and 1 RPG round. Results of the contact were 1 VC KIL (DC) and 6 US MIA's. At 1435, the CP Co received one RPG round resulting in 1 US MIA. 4 airstrikes were called in during the day. At 1630, C/3-17 returned to parent control. At 2159, at XT527737, an En laager Co observed several VC about 50 metres from their position and took them under fire. En laager received fire with M-47's. There were no friendly casualties.

(22) 18 Jan 60: At 0000, a platoon from C/3-17 Cav became OPCON to the battalion. At 0049, Co C, at XT503742, located a small base camp with 7 bunkers which were destroyed. At 1020, Co A, at XT524737, located 3 graves with VC bodies 3-5 days old. Three body count were obtained.

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At 1721, Co L, at XT517730, received 1-2 mortar rounds of sniper fire. There were no casualties. At 1653, from XT79737 to XT517739, Co C located and destroyed 7 excavations, 10 bunkers, 6 .51 cal machinegun positions, and 20 foxholes. At 1224, Co L, at XT507769, located and destroyed the excavations. At 1250, Co B and the Co G departed for a new night laager at XT497762. At 1600, the 2nd Rifle platoon returned to its parent unit control.

(23) 19 Jan 60: At 0630, Co A, B, and C departed for RIF. At 0746, a platoon from 3-17 Cav located at XT497750 and became OOD: to 2-22 Inf (II). At 1000, the 2nd platoon, at XT490742, received a rocket from one of their Gunships resulting in 5 US MILs. At 1650, Co C, at XT455755, located and destroyed 4 rectangular type antiaircraft positions. At 1255, Co L, at XT507777, located and destroyed 4 bunkers, one machinegun position, and several mortar fox holes. The site appeared to be 5-7 days old. At 1315, Co L, at XT452730, checked out an area of a previous air strike and found 150 meters of trench line and 6 bunkers which were destroyed. At 1330, the platoon of C/3-17 Cav was lifted out and control was returned to the parent unit.

(24) 20 Jan 60: At 1015, Co B located an 81mm mortar dug at XT507755. It was destroyed. At 1115, Co L, at XT497730, found an excavated. It was extracted. At 1315, Co C and the Co G moved to a new laager at XT497732. At 1316, at XT511727, Co C located and destroyed 6 bunkers, a trench system and an M1 sewing machine. At 1445, at XT45725, Co L received 1 round of 81mm fire. At 1503, they received another 81mm round. Fire was returned and contact broken at 1515. There were 5 US MIL, 1 US M1, and 3 VC ML (LC). There was slight damage to an M13 LC.

(25) 21 Jan 60: At 0952, Co L, at XT404735, located and destroyed 1 hut and 5 bunkers. Also found was 1000 lbs of rice which was evacuated. At 1333, Co C, at XT474727, hit a pressure typewriter causing heavy damage to the VC and 5 US MILs. By 1555, all Cos were in the En laager at XT497732.

(26) 22 Jan 60: At 0305, about 10 60mm mortars landed 400 meters east of the Battalion perimeter. They were fired from an azimuth of 175 degrees from 1300 meters. There was no damage nor were there any casualties. At 1150, Co L, at XT527776, located 5 lbs of documents, 1000 M-47 rations, and 6 bicycles. The documents were extracted and all other equipment was destroyed. At 1212, at XT525775, Co L located 2 graves about 1 week old from which 2 body counts were claimed, and 800 lbs of rice in a steel container. It was destroyed. At 1355, Co L captured 3 VC in a bunker and killed all three. In the area, they also located 7 bunkers, 6 rolls of camm wire, 3 ChiCom phones, web gear, 2 ChiCom grenades, and 14 120mm mortar rounds in a cave. At 1519, Co E, at XT515772, had an APC hit a stick mine resulting in 3 US MILs and the total destruction of the APC. At 1531, Co C, at XT532769, located 12 60mm grenade rounds and a "Walkie-Talkie" type radio.

(27) 23 Jan 60: At 0715, 2-22 Inf (II) departed their night laager at XT501762 enroute to FST LURT, closing at 1040.

(28) 24 Jan 60: 2-22 Inf (II) remained at FST LURT. At 1545, 10 rounds of 60mm mortar landed 100 meters outside the eastern perimeter. There were no casualties.

(29) 25 Jan 60: At 1000 FST LURT received 10-15 rounds of 60mm mortar. They were fired from an azimuth of 120 degrees and landed 100-200 meters outside the perimeter. At 1411, Co C, at XT500730, spotted 1 VC preparing to fire an RPG at an LC. He was taken under fire and he fled. A sweep resulted in the capture of a back pack containing 3 RPG rounds. There were no casualties among the friendly forces.

(30) 26 Jan 60: At 0750, the FST received 10-15 rounds of 60mm mortar in the center sector. They came from an azimuth of 130 degrees. The En suffered 1 US MIL who DOW. At 1415, the Battalion received 50 rounds of 60mm mortar, rifle grenades, and 20mm small arms fire. The En returned fire with automatic weapons fire, mortars and arty. Contact was broken at 1425. The En had 1 MIL and enemy casualties were unknown. 2-12 Inf and 3rd Lt Co Bq completed extraction from FST LURT at 1400.

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(31) 20 Jan 60: At 0907, Co D, at the southeast portion of the perimeter, sighted VC with an RPG. Grenades and all arms were employed and automatic weapons fire was received from the contact area. Contact was broken at 0910. There were no friendly casualties. At 0947, Co A, at XT496019, engaged and killed 1 VC. Sniper fire was still coming in so a defensive perimeter was set up and fire was returned. The above VC was armed with an M-47. He possessed normal web gear but his height was approximately 6 feet. Co A remained in the above position and killed 2 more VC. There were no friendly casualties. At 1257, at XT503002, Co E received sniper fire and RPG rounds. Fire was returned with organic weapons. At 1300, Co D moved out to sweep the area of contact and received the more RPG rounds which resulted in 2 US KIA. By 1600 all elements had returned to FSB LAUT.

(32) 20 Jan 60: At 0210, the Bn received approximately 15 rounds of 60mm mortar from an azimuth of 350 degrees at 600 meters. The attack resulted in 4 US KIA. At 0200, the Bn began movement to a new laager via XT490735. At 0900, trail elements who had not departed the FSB received 15-20 rounds of 60mm mortar inside the perimeter. Air observers indicated the mortars were fired from XT500021. An immediate airstrike was placed into the above location. There were 3 US KIA resulting from the attack. At 1150, the Bn trail elements again received 10-15 rounds of 60mm mortar. The attack resulted in 1 US KIA. At 1300, the last element of the Bn departed FSB LAUT and it was officially closed out. At 1603, an attached self-propelled 155 howitzer hit a mine at XT497745. The artillery piece sustained moderate damage. At 1710, all elements had closed a new laager at XT490735.

(33) 29 Jan 60: 2-22 Inf (M) departed the laager at 0754. Co A led. Movement was slow due to vegetation and trees. At 1336, all elements closed a new laager via XT421701.

(34) 30 Jan 60: At 0747, Co C had arrived at the bridge site at XT460702 to secure engineers while they installed the bridge. At 0830, at XT459705, Co D located and destroyed 2 bunkers. At 0952, at XT430602, Co D located a small base camp with 60 meters of trench line and 6 bunkers. At 1030, word was received from 3d Lde that the New Years Tot Troop was cancelled, effective at 0945. At 1115, at XT490690, Co D located a base camp with 30-40 bunkers which showed signs of recent use. Found within the base camp were cooking utensils, 20 rounds of M16-11, 1 M16-VII, a number of M-47 rounds, some clothing, 3 lbs of documents, and a map. At 1315, the bridge had been completed and Co A began crossing. At 1427, a 155 howitzer from 3-13 Arty hit a mine at the entrance to the new laager at XT460695, resulting in 1 US KIA, and moderate damage to the track. At 1536, Co E, at XT460695, had an M16 hit a mine resulting in 3 US KIA and a total loss of the M16. At 1651, all elements had crossed the bridge and were in the new laager at XT460696. At 1743, the bridge had been extracted.

(35) 31 Jan 60: At 0703, Co A found a Chicom mine at XT460694. It was blown in place. At 0734, two more mines were found by Co E. They were believed to be pressure detonated M16 mines. They were blown in place at XT459693. At 0803, Co A found a mine and blew it in place. At 0850, the Bn laager received, at XT460696, incoming 60 mm mortars from the east. There were approximately 20 rounds, resulting in negative casualties. Co A, at XT453670, at 0857, found a Chicom mine which they blew in place. Co A was last element for securing a bridge crossing and reported that they were fired on by RPG rounds at XT453670. The enemy also set off a claymore mine. Damages were repaired and there were no casualties. At 0939, Co A found a mine at XT453674. It was blown in place. At 1005, at XT453673, Co A found 3 mines (Chicom) which were blown in place. At 1007, at XT453672, Co A found 1 Chicom mine. It was blown in place. At 1020, Co A, at XT453671, found a Chicom mine. It too, was blown in place. At 1040, the Bn received incoming mortars from the east. Approximately 15 rounds landed outside the perimeter. There were no casualties. Co A, at XT453676, at 1157, received M-47 sniper fire. There were no casualties. Word was received from 3d Lde to real march to Camp Rainier instead of going to a laager. Co A, at XT47637, found 2 Chicom mines which were blown in place. The last element closed Camp Rainier at 2132.

(36) 1 Feb 60: 2-22 Inf (M) performed convoy security to Toy Ninh from Camp Rainier, base camp defense and patrolled adjacent areas. At 1335, the Bn received from 3d Lde a possible mission to 466 Lia. At 1725,

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(37) 2 Feb 60: At about 0657, Cos A, B, and the 4.2" mortar platoon moved to the Michelin Rubber Plantation, via XT513409. Plans were to block VC infiltration from the south. At approximately 0659, Co C was alerted to move into the town of Lou Tieng. Large crowds of villagers were gathering and there were reports VC in the town. At 1223, Co C found an Chm mortar and 3 unknown type flares at bunker 22. At 1435, Co A detained one person and extracted him back to Camp Rainier. At 1530, Co A found a spider hole at XT517456. The hole was destroyed. At 1555, Co B, at XT510450, had a man step on an AT mine. The mine was 5-10 meters off the road. The man was KIA.

(38) 3 Feb 60: Cos A, B, and the 4.2" mortar platoon continued to operate in the vicinity of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. At 1134, Co B, at XT520447, found a dud Chm mortar round. It was blown in place. At 1183, at XT520472, Co B had a man injured when he caught his ankle between a track and a tree. He was evacuated by CH-23 aircraft. At 1155, at XT516476, Co B found a mortar site. In the mortar site were found 6 empty fuse caps and 1 live 60mm round. The round and fuse caps were blown in place. At 1240, at XT532400, Co A found 8 fresh punji pits. They were destroyed. At 1345, Co A found a bunker at XT523476. The bunker consisted of bags of dirt. It was destroyed. At 1430, Co A found a 75mm M1 round in a case. The round was destroyed at XT524470.

(39) 4 Feb 60: Cos A, B, and the 4.2" mortar platoon continued to operate via the Michelin Rubber Plantation. At 0910, Co A found 2 antiaircraft positions at XT540436 and XT545494. Both positions were destroyed. At 1020, at XT560496, a D Co track hit a mine. The track was totally destroyed. A dustoff was completed at 1046. At XT562501, at 1115, Co B found 1 bunker which was destroyed. At 1140, at XT564503, a man from Co B stopped on a mine. A dustoff was requested at 1141 for 3 cases. At 1155, the dustoff was completed. At 1200, Co B reported that the AT mine that was stopped on was set off by a smaller, more sensitive pressure type mine or booby trap. The crater, 30 meters off the road, was 3'x4'. At 1204, at XT567506, Co B found 3 AT percussion type mines. They were destroyed. At 1419, at XT551456, Co A found and destroyed 2 bunkers. At 1420, at XT490424, Co A found and destroyed a bunker. At 1505, at XT554475, Co A found and destroyed another bunker. At 1503, at XT533453, both Cos A and B closed into a new laager. At 2145, Co A's Red 2 LP, at XT546400, made contact with an unknown number of VC. The LP had one MIA. At 2234, at XT546400, Co A moved to reinforce their LP. As they were pulling into position, they received RUC rounds, resulting in 6 MIA and 1 KIA. At 2336, Co A, at XT456400, found 1 VC pack, 2 RUC rounds, and 1 VC body.

(40) 5 Feb 60: At 0734, at XT546400, Co A found 2 JCO launchers, 1 US M-79, 2 wallets with ID cards, NVL money, and numerous blood trails leading towards the village. At 0821, at XT546400, Co A found 1 propol and and cup and 1 cleaning rod for an M70 VII. At 1200, at XT566404, Cos A and B worked off the village. The III team also arrived and C male individuals were interrogated. The National Police were called to question villagers without ID cards. At 1405, Co A found 2 NVL flags which they confiscated. At 1447, both elements had departed for their new laager at XT535400.

(41) 6 Feb 60: At 1100, at XT546504, Co A found an Chm mortar and which was destroyed. At 1200, at XT530400, Co B found and destroyed 1 bunker. At 1530, all elements had closed Camp Rainier.

(42) 7 Feb 60: At 0113, Co C, at XT400462 (District Hq) received sniper fire and mortar rounds. There were 2 US MIA but no dustoff was required. At 0930, Cos A and B moved to XT464450 to seal and search a village. Co B's 16 platoon had taken up security for the Dau Tieng-Tay Ninh convoy. At 1030, at XT452450, Co B's 16 platoon struck a mine resulting in 1 US MIA and moderate damage to the JCO. At 1425, at XT463350, Co C turned over to the IV's a total of 17 detainees who were picked up during the search of the village. At 1503, Co C, at XT461439, found and destroyed a dud 105mm round. At approximately 1600, Cos A and C closed into their night laager via XT474455.

(43) 8 Feb 60: 2-24 Inf (I) continued to Recon in Force in areas adjacent to Camp Rainier with elements covering base camp defenses. The Recon Platoon continued to secure the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy. At 0930, at XT474435, Co C at the stream found 2 rafts made of logs and the tracks showed signs of recent activity.

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from 6' off the ground. At 1110, Co C, at XT492424, located and destroyed 1 ampm. At 1130, Co A, at XT492422, found 1 VC wearing black pajamas in a grave. He appeared to have been dead about one week. At 1145, Co C, at XT492424, found 3 5 gallon cans of fish, 1 5 gallon can of pickles, 2 100 lb bags of polished rice, and a small amount of peanuts. At 1155, Co C, at XT493410, located 4 bunkers, an I-shaped foxhole, about 50 one-man foxholes, 2 100 lb bags of polished rice, recent fires and pits that were still hot, a trench line, and a five foot section of a Bangalore Torpedo. At 1217, Co C, at XT493426, located 2 bunkers that had been recently used. Also located was a garden and two wells. At 1415, Co C, at XT500410, located 2 bicycles, 1 bunker, a concrete tunnel, 50 lbs of rice and one oxcart. Co C lagored at XT493440.

(44) 9 Feb 68: 2-22 Inf (M) continued to Recon in Force and Seal and Search villages in areas adjacent to Camp Rainier. In addition, it continued the missions of the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy. The base camp Co. was still operated by the 2-22 Inf (M). At 1040, Co C, at XT453471, checked out a trail and found a poncho with blood on it which appeared to be about 5 days old. A VC shirt, still wet with perspiration, was also found. A further search resulted in no further findings. At 1505, at XT437499, one of Co L's APCs hit an AT mine. The explosion resulted in 1 US KIA and moderate damage to the APC. At 1640, 31 Ldc reported that an OH-23 aircraft was down at XT404430. The M platoon of Co A was dispatched to secure it. At 1737, the downed aircraft was air-borne again and the security elements returned to rejoin Co A. At 1800, Cos A and B were closed at Camp Rainier.

(45) 10 Feb 68: At 0920, the 2d platoon of Co C found, at XT500452, 10 foxholes and destroyed them. At 1445, Co A departed for Tay Ninh to become OCON to the 1st Ldc, 25th Inf Div. At 1500, Co A, 2-14 Inf arrived at Camp Rainier to become OCON to 2-22 Inf (M).

(46) 11 Feb 68: At 1105, at XT413442, the Recon Platoon, reported that a trailer being pulled by a mess truck hit a mine. The trailer was a total loss. At 1114, at XT507442, Co D spotted 3 VC and took them under fire with negative results. Cos I and C closed into their new night laager at 1535 at XT522470.

(47) 12 Feb 68: At 0900, at XT415440, a Recon APC was hit with a command detonated mine, resulting in a total loss to the APC, with 2 attached engineers KIA. At 0910, at XT415445, the Recon Platoon, while conducting security for the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy, came under attack. Two Recon trucks were hit by RPG rounds, resulting in 9 US KIA. At 0945, Co C moved out from Camp Rainier to reinforce the Recon Platoon, via XT415445. At 1005, Co C had an APC hit a mine at XT410435, which resulted in 2 US KIA. At 1112, Co C made contact at XT415445, resulting in 4 VC KIA (DC). Co C also captured 1 RPG round and two RPG rocket launchers and 1 M-47. Co C had 1 US KIA. Wounds were caused by an M-79 fired at a foxhole. At 1415, at XT415445, Co C reported finding 4 VC KIA (DC), 1 RPG-VII, 2 M-47s and 1 Chicom rifle with a rifle grenade launcher attached. At 1531, Co D closed into its laager at XT498501. At 1624, Co C and the Recon platoon closed Camp Rainier.

(48) 14 Feb 68: Co C and the Recon Platoon continued to secure the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy. At 0900, the Recon Platoon found a mine at the east end of Den Qui village at XT452450. The mine was brought to Camp Rainier for interpretation. At 1145, at XT452450, the M platoon reported a barricade of logs and trees had been removed by engineers and the road was clear. Co D and the Recon Platoon closed Camp Rainier at approximately 1839. Co C lagored at XT455445, at approximately 1900.

(49) 15 Feb 68: At 1334, at XT453445, Co L picked up one detainee, a male, 60 years old with no ID card, who was turned over to the MI. At approximately 1400, 2-22 Inf (M) received word that their A Co, which was OCON to the 2-14 Inf, had made contact north of Tay Ninh. Co A reported 4 US KIA and 3 KIA. No further information was available. Co C and the Recon Platoon closed Camp Rainier at approximately 1535. Co D lagored at 1649, at XT463459.

(50) 16 Feb 68: At 0530, Co D reported that their seal of Den Qui 3 village was complete, and that the search would begin at 0600. At 0930, the Recon Platoon, as security for the Dau Tieng - Tay Ninh convoy, found, at XT420425, four VC hand grenades on the ground. They were

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blown in place. At 1000, Co E, at Don Qui village 3, found 5 lbs of medical supplies, penicillin, hypodermic needles, 1 set of jungle fatigues, and took 7 detainees and a Hoi Chanh and all the equipment to the Don Tien bridge for turnover to the NPs. At 1215, the Recon platoon, at XT408440, found an AT mine. It was blown in place. At 1216, the Recon platoon, at XT408440, reported that a crane in the convey had hit a mine, which resulted in minor damage to the crane and no casualties. The Recon platoon also reported receiving sniper fire. Fire was returned. There were no casualties. Due to the amount of road blocks on Route 239, the convey to Tay Ninh was unable to proceed. Recon platoon laggered at XT408440, Co D at XT471469, and Co C at XT403438, all at approximately 1750.

(51) 17 Feb 68: At 0610, at XT387423, Co E found 6 1-man fighting positions and destroyed them. At 1143, the Recon platoon found two mines at XT377466. The mines were blown in place. Cos D and C and the Recon platoon closed Camp Rainier at 1747. Co A 2-14 went back to parent control in the 1st Ldo.

(52) 18 Feb 68: At 0943, at XT369425, the Recon platoon reported that a booby trap on the road exploded, resulting in 3 US WIA. At 1135, the Recon platoon found a mine which was blown in place. Cos D and C and the Recon platoon closed Camp Rainier at 1715.

(53) 19 Feb 68: At 0652, at XT506480, Co C's 1st platoon spotted 1 VC and opened fire, resulting in 1 VC KIA (DC), the capture of 1 pineapple-type grenade, drafting paper, and paper plates. At 0915, at XT525477, Co E found and destroyed 1 bunker. At 0920, at XT525479, Co C found 3 bunkers and destroyed them. At 0938, Co C, at XT516486, found a dud 81mm mortar which was blown in place. At 1000, at XT517486, Co C found and destroyed a bunker. At 1053, at XT545485, Co E found a cave containing 8 cases of 60mm mortar rounds, 2 cases of RPG rounds, one mine, and 3 boxes of M-47 ammo. At 1126, at XT515495, Co C found 3 booby traps. They were destroyed. At 1136, at XT537457, Co E found 1 VC hut and an oxcart. They were destroyed. At 1525, at XT511488, Co C found and destroyed a mine. At 1605, Cos D and C closed Camp Rainier.

(54) 20 Feb 68: 2-22 Inf (M) continued to Recon in Force in the vicinity of the Don Qui and Michelin Rubber Plantations. Co A remained OPCON to the 2-14 Inf of the 1st Ldo. The 1st Recon platoon continued to secure engineers and the Don Tien - Tay Ninh convey. At 0658, Co C departed Camp Rainier. At 0716, Co E departed Camp Rainier. Both companies assisted in securing sweep teams on Route 239 and 26 and Recon in Force in the adjacent areas. At 0817, the Recon platoon located and destroyed a US hand grenade on the east side of Don Qui village 3, via XT453449. At 0900, Co C, at XT375424, found beer cans buried in the road. At 1635, Camp Rainier received 20 82mm mortar rounds. There were no casualties. Counter mortar fire was immediately employed. By 1730, all units had closed Camp Rainier.

(55) 21 Feb 68: At 0907, Co C found a mortar site via XT518496. The mortar site was destroyed. At 0925, at XT531470, Co C found a mortar site and destroyed it. At 1111, Co C, at XT531470, found and destroyed an L-shaped bunker. At approximately 1530, all elements closed into Camp Rainier. At 2345, via Durrer #22, there were incoming mortar rounds resulting in 1 US WIA. LTC King J Coffman, Inf, 066295, assumed command of the battalion, replacing LTC Aubrey G Morris, Inf, 071848.

(56) 22 Feb 68: At 0950, at XT352442, Recon had a track hit a mine, resulting in 3 US WIA and total loss to the APC. At 1225, Co C, at XT450450, fired on 2 VC. One of them dropped an M-47 and 2 magazines. At 1349, at XT450450, Co C reported that a female worker in the rubber plantation had said that "one of the VC shot at was wounded." Co C was unable to locate the VC. At 1540, the Recon platoon and the Tay Ninh convey closed Camp Rainier. At 1645, Co D closed their lagger at XT500458. At 1725, Co C closed Camp Rainier.

(57) 23 Feb 68: At 1101, a call came from 3rd Ldo that Camp Rainier was receiving incoming mortar rounds. At 1211, NHC/2-22, reported one minor casualty due to the attack. At 1555, Co C moved to a new lagger at XT486454. At 1700, the Recon platoon and Co C closed Camp Rainier with the convey. At 1750, Camp Rainier (Co D 2-22 Inf (M)) had a 107mm rocket hit their mess hall, resulting in 8 US WIA. The mess hall suffered minor damage.

- (29) Commo wires: 6 rolls
- (30) Commo telephones: 3
- (31) Walkie-talkie radios: 1
- (32) Rice: 11,000 lbs
- (33) Documentar: 18 lbs
- (34) Maps: 1
- (35) NVA money: unknown amount
- (36) Oxcart: 1

e. Enemy Equipment Destroyed:

- (1) M-47 ammo: 5050 rounds
- (2) Small arms ammo: 2 cases, 1 box
- (3) Light mg ammo: 1000 rounds
- (4) .51 cal ammo: 8000 rounds
- (5) RPG-7 rounds: 33
- (6) VQ-2 rounds: 292
- (7) 120mm mortar rounds: 70
- (8) 81mm mortar rounds: 4
- (9) 60mm mortar rounds: 232
- (10) 82mm fuses: 50
- (11) 60mm fuses: 25
- (12) Propellant charge, RPG-2, 7: 10
- (13) Bangalore Torpedos: 1 (5' section)
- (14) 75mm RR rounds: 7 (with case)
- (15) 57mm RR rounds: 101
- (16) 155mm rounds: 1
- (17) Booby traps: 3
- (18) Butterfly bombs: 4
- (19) Chica claymores: 2
- (20) 500 lb bombs: 2
- (21) AT mines: 49
- (22) Mine bomb: 1
- (23) Grenades: 71
- (24) Rifle grenades: 45
- (25) .30 cal ammo: 4000 rounds
- (26) .32 cal ammo: 2000 rounds
- (27) M-79 rounds: 50
- (28) Blasting caps, electric: 14
- (29) Pullcords for grenades: 3 cases
- (30) Electrical wire: 2 miles
- (31) Commo wire: 400 meters
- (32) Bunkers: 251
- (33) Foxholes: 97
- (34) Spider holes: 11
- (35) Panji pits: 8
- (36) Trench: 675 meters
- (37) Tunnel: 2 (30 ft)
- (38) Huts: 21
- (39) .51 cal positions: 17
- (40) Wells: 3
- (41) Oxcarts: 6
- (42) Surpan: 1
- (43) Raft: 2
- (44) Rice: 800 lbs
- (45) 5 gal cans: 3 - fish, 1 - pickles
- (46) Cooking utensils
- (47) Insect trap: 1
- (48) Canteens: 60
- (49) Entrenching tools: 50
- (50) Web gear: 100 sets
- (51) Road blocks: 5
- (52) Clothing: 10 lbs
- (53) Assorted fish and clothing
- (54) Dicyclos w/assorted spare parts: 31
- (55) Sawing machine: 1 (old)

14. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Personnel: The influx of new personnel has improved in recent weeks, and throughout Operation YLLONSTONE, no major personnel problems existed.

b. Routine Reports: No difficulty.

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e. Supply: There were no problems encountered in support of operational units during this period. Supply for the month of January was effected from a forward support base at Xitun, and also Dau Tieng, with timely and efficient coordination. After the Battle of Suoi Cat, some delay was experienced in receipt of 40mm ammunition to replenish the Battalion basic load.

d. Maintenance: Limited availability of major assemblies such as power packs, transmitters and transfer cases continue to present a major problem in the maintenance of M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers.

e. Treatment of Casualties: (Evacuation and Hospitalization)

(1) Evacuation of personnel was accomplished in a highly efficient manner and no problems existed in this area.

(2) Identification of deceased personnel, although greatly improved, is still posing some problems, which can be eliminated by positive action taken in the areas:

(a) Responsible personnel at the site of evacuation insure that all personnel evacuated are properly tagged.

(b) Responsible personnel at Field Hospitals receiving evacuated personnel, should not relay information to inquiring agencies pertaining to the identity of evacuees until positive identification is determined in the manner outlined in existing regulations.

(c) Continued constant emphasis that each individual soldier possess and properly wear and carry identification tags and cards, in addition to marking of boots, belts and headgear as required by current regulations.

(3) Some difficulty was experienced in location of personnel by the parent unit after evacuation from the field. Hospitals are not notifying units when patients are received, thereby causing units to contact various field hospitals by telephone to determine the location of patients.

f. Communications: Communication throughout Operation YELLOWSTONE was excellent due to outstanding support from the Division Signal Maintenance Section.

15. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None.


16. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

Operations in War Zone C during this period were characterized by light contact with the exception of the Suoi Cat Battle. The VC/NVA personnel contacted during this period also seemed to be green and untrained as evidenced by several weapons captured that had never been fired and were relatively new. Also noted were random groups of VC/NVA personnel who were wandering about seemingly disorganized and with a complete disregard for the use of cover and concealment. It is felt that all key personnel had displaced to the south and that the remaining stragglers were either replacements or rear-area type caretaker personnel.

Also noteworthy was a complete absence of newly emplaced mines or booby traps in the area of operations. All mines located were several months old and many had become uncovered by erosion.

Operations around the Dau Tieng base camp and adjacent to the MSR from Dau Tieng to Tay Ninh were characterized by an increase in harassment of the convoy route and in an intensified mine and booby trap effort in this area. It is felt that this harassment was coordinated to complement the Tet Offensive effort to confuse and disorganize mobile units to the road net, to weaken our forces by attrition at little cost to himself, and to restrict the deployment of personnel and equipment from Dau Tieng to support operations in the south. The best counteraction to the enemy's design is to continue and increase, if possible, the tempo of offensive sweep operations in order to break out of regular patterns of dependence upon road networks.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


MALCOLM G. WITT
Capt. in, Infantry
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BATTALION, 22D INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96268

AVICTE-N-3

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Operation Yellowstone II)(U).

THRU: Commanding Officer
3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
ATTN: S-3
APO San Francisco 96268

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G-3
APO San Francisco 96225

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation Yellowstone II, a 25th Infantry Division offensive operation conducted in its Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI).

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 29 December 1967 to 25 January 1968.

3. (U) LOCATION: PEB BURT (XT498804), Katun (XT333900), and Michelin Plantation.

4. (U) COMPY/ND HEADQUARTERS: 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

5. (U) COMBATANTS:

3D Battalion, 22D Infantry
Company A, 3-22 Infantry
Company B, 3-22 Infantry
Company C, 3-22 Infantry
Company D, 3-22 Infantry

LTC Thomas U. Harrold
Cpt Herbert C. Chancey
Cpt Robert L. Humphill
Cpt Elliot Fishburne
Cpt William A. Curtis
(29 Dec 67 to 17 Jan 68)
Cpt William J. Monahan
(18 Jan 68 to 25 Jan 68)
2Lt Steven A. Wilder
1Lt Philip J. Halliday

Reconnaissance Platoon
Heavy Weapons Platoon

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

Company A, 3-22 Infantry
Company B, 3-22 Infantry (19 Jan thru 22 Jan OPCON 1/5 in (I))
Company C, 3-22 Infantry (On 31 Dec OPCON 1/5 in (M))
Company D, 3-22 Infantry (2 Jan thru 17 Jan OPCON 1/5 in (II))
Reconnaissance Platoon, 3-22 Infantry
Heavy Weapons Platoon, 3-22 Infantry

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery:

Artillery support for 3-22 Infantry during Operation Yellowstone II was provided by 2-77 Artillery. At various times during the operation the following batteries provided direct support for the battalions

- (a) C Battery 2-77 Artillery (105mm)
- (b) A Battery 2-77 Artillery (105mm)
- (c) B Battery 2-77 Artillery (105mm)
- (d) L-27 Artillery (155mm)
- (e) Additional fire support was provided by the Battalion

Heavy Weapons Platoon in general support, while all weapons platoons provided direct support at company level. All supporting artillery fires were extremely responsive and accurate.

b. United States Air Force: Extensive effective use was made of Tactical Air to include preplanned and immediate missions. All 3-22 Infantry requests for air support went through 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, this was accomplished by forwarding all requests to the Brigade Liaison Officer.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Operation Yellowstone II began on 29 Dec 67 with a combat assault of 3-22 Infantry (-) into a cold LZ. The LZ was prepared by artillery and gunships prior to the combat assault. The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion provided 3 lifts of 20 ships to conduct the combat assault.

(2) Daily resupply and extraction sorties were flown by CH-47 helicopters. A severe rotor wash problem existed because of the powder condition of the soil at the FSB. This problem was partially solved by the use of Para Prime on two helipads at the FSB.

(3) On the morning of 2 Jan 68, during the Battle of Soul Out Army Aviation played a major role. At 0930 an emergency resupply of Class V was resupplied to 3-22 Infantry (-) by 145th Aviation. In addition 25th Aviation, 187th and 183th Combat Aviation Battalions provided direct support with gunships and emergency resupply.

(4) During Operation Yellowstone II, 3d Brigade Aviation Section provided CH-23's for the 3-22 Infantry on immediate and preplanned requests. Maximum extensive use was made of these resources for Reconnaissance/Command Control of the maneuver elements.

6. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence concerning the battalion TMOB for Operation Yellowstone II was obtained from 25th Division G-2, 3d Brigade S-2, 25th MI Detachment, VR sightings, and post operations.

b. On the night of 1 January-2 January 1968, during the New Years trace, FSB BURT (XT5080) was attacked by elements of the 271st and 272d VC Regiments. Interrogation of POWs after the battle revealed that on approximately 25 December these two Regiments moved from or through the Cambodian Salient to staging areas within several hours walking distance of FSB BURT. On the night prior to the attack, movement was engaged outside the perimeter and the following morning two bodies were discovered with documents indicating they belonged to the 271st (one body was possibly identified as the Company Commander of C.16 Mortar Company, 271st Regiment). This was the first indication that this unit was in the area. The next night the 271st supported by at least two Battalions of the 272d attacked FSB BURT. It appeared that the battle plan included four battalions attacking with two battalions in reserve. Documents found on one body indicated that he was the Commander of the 2d Battalion, 271st Regiment, although positive identification was impossible. A Noi Chanh who rallied on 12 January 1968, stated he was a member of the 271st. His company had been held in reserve and at 020000 hours they began withdrawing into Cambodia. His unit later moved out of Cambodia to vicinity XT5191 where they were hit by a 3/52 strike. They then moved back into Cambodia (XT5691).

c. During the remaining period of Operation Yellowstone II, 3-22 Infantry experienced light enemy contact. Intelligence reports during the later stages of Operation Yellowstone II indicated that the VC were planning to conduct major offensive operations during the TET holiday period. It was assumed from these intelligence reports that the light contact we were experiencing was the result of the VC troop buildup in various staging areas.

d. Significant Incidents:

(1) 291945 Dec - At XT501796, A16 sprung their ambush on two (2) VC resulting in one (1) VC KIA (BC), 3 AK-47 magazines w/ammo, 1 old bayonet, 1 pistol bolt, 1 plastic rope, 1 pair pliers and 1 bicycle.

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- (2) 300620 Dec - Falcon forward received 10 60mm mortar rounds outside of perimeter.
- (3) 302305 Dec - At XT474820, D Co had contact with unknown number of VC. The VC used RPG and S/A fire resulting in one (1) US KIA, 2 US WIA. VC casualties unknown.
- (4) 311305 Dec - At XT505816, A 26 engaged one (1) VC with S/A with negative results.
- (5) 312000 Dec - D Co perimeter received 10 rounds of six-rod RPG and 60mm mortar fire resulting in one (1) US WIA.
- (6) 312130 Dec - At XT500805, A 16 sprung their ambush resulting in two (2) VC KIA (DC), 1 POW, 1 9mm pistol, 1 pair of field glasses, assorted documents and 1 US compass. A 16 received one (1) RPG resulting in three (3) US WIA. Also found was 1 M-16 with blood on it.
- (7) 011850 Jan - A 36 LP received RPG and S/A fire at XT502805.
- (8) 011855 Jan - Falcon perimeter received sporadic 60mm and S/A fire.
- (9) 012130 Jan - Sporadic firing continued resulting in 2 US KIA and 2 US WIA.
- (10) 020130 Jan - FSB BURT came under heavy attacks of RPGs, 60mm mortars, M16 and S/A followed by ground attack in Falcon A and Falcon C area of perimeter. Ground attack lasted until 0500 and contact was broken at 0630 hours.
- (11) 020600 Jan - Falcon made a sweep in front of their perimeter resulting in 171 VC KIA (DC) and 5 POWs. Documents from dead VC indicate the VC were from 271st and 272d VC Regiments which had joined to form a single reinforced regiment.
- (12) 071225 Jan - Falcon received 32 rounds of 60mm mortar resulting in 2 US WIA.
- (13) 071400 Jan - Falcon received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar with negative casualties.
- (14) 091915 Jan - Falcon received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar resulting in 2 US WIA.
- (15) 101215 Jan - Falcon received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar with negative casualties.
- (16) 111050 Jan - Falcon received 8-10 rounds of 60mm mortar with negative casualties.
- (17) 121355 Jan - At XT478798, B Co received approximately 25 rounds of incoming M-16. Returned fire and swept area finding one (1) bunker with OHD and expended M-16 casings, VC web gear, and protective mask.
- (18) 121430 Jan - At XT474796, B Co left flank started receiving M-16 sniper fire. Sporadic firing continued until 1500 hours with negative casualties.
- (19) 151232 Jan - Lead element of B Co received RPG and claymore fire from an estimated VC squad.
- (20) 151250 Jan - B Co shot 1 VC out of a tree, 1 VC KIA (DC), no weapons.
- (21) 151615 Jan - B Co EM tripped a booby trap resulting in 3 US WIA.
- (22) 151700 Jan - Calling airstrikes in support of B Co, also using artillery and gunships. Results of enemy action 1 US KIA and 26 US WIA.

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(23) 181331 Jan - A Co had a US butterfly bomb explode resulting in 4 US KIA.

(24) 240950 Jan - At XT512184, A Co had 1 US KIA as a result of a booby trapped grenade.

(25) 251335 Jan - At XT513466, B Co reported receiving 4-8 incoming AK-47 rounds with negative casualties. Returned fire with unknown results.

9. (C) MISSION: 3-22 Infantry (-) on 29 December 1968, combat assaulted into FSB BURT to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, open land lines of communications for friendly forces, and to interdict VC NVA lines of communication from Michelin Plantation to northern War Zone C.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Maneuver:

(1) Phase I: (290856 Dec 67-300645 Dec 67) 3-22 Infantry (-) combat assaults into FSB BURT (XT498804), secures the area for subsequent airmobile introduction of 2-77 Artillery (-), assists in the security of FSB BURT. (See Inclosures I and II)

(2) Phase II: (300645 Dec 67-311800 Dec 67) 3-22 Infantry provides daylight close in security for the FSB and conducts night ambush patrolling around the FSB. (See Inclosure II)

(3) Phase III: (311800 Jan 68-021600 Jan 68) Proposed New Years Truce period, 3-22 Infantry participating in increased local security measures, patrol and ambush plans. (See Inclosure II)

(4) Phase IV: (021600 Jan 68-050800 Jan 68) 3-22 Infantry (-) conducts airlift to Katun (XT333900) and conducts reconnaissance in force operations in that area.

(5) Phase V: (050800 Jan 68-070700 Jan 68) 3-22 Infantry (-) conducts airlift back to Dau Tieng Base Camp and conducts reconnaissance in force operations in the Michelin Plantation. (See Inclosure III)

(6) Phase VI: (070700 Jan 68-230815 Jan 68) 3-22 Infantry (-) is airlifted back to FSB BURT (XT498804) and conduct local reconnaissance in force operations in that area and provides security for FSB BURT. (See Inclosure IV)

(7) Phase VII: (230815 Jan 68-252100 Jan 68) 3-22 Infantry (-) is airlifted back to Dau Tieng Base Camp, regains control of 3-22 Infantry units in Dau Tieng Base Camp and conducts local reconnaissance in force operations in the Michelin Plantation. (See Incl V; See Incl VI, refer paragraph 11, item (26); See Incl VII, refer paragraph 11, item (27))

b. Fire: Artillery support from FSB BURT, 1-27 Artillery and 2-77 Artillery (-) vicinity XT498804.

c. References: 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division OPORD 14-67, dated 26 Dec 67 and 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry OPORD 18-67, dated 27 Dec 67, FMAG ORDERS 1 thru 3 to OPORD 14-67, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and FMAG ORDERS 1 thru 5 to OPORD 18-67, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

Chronological Summary:

a. 29 Dec - At 0835 hours 3-22 Infantry (-) was airlifted to LZ BURT (XT498804). At 1100 hours, Company B, conducting a sweep of the area, found six (6) anti-tank mines (8x10) which were destroyed. At 1610 hours Company B found one (1) anti-tank mine (8x10) while conducting perimeter sweep. At 1715 hours Company B had one (1) EM dusted off with machine wound. At 1945 hours A 16 AP sprung ambush (XT502798) resulting in one (1) VC KIA (80).

b. 30 Dec - At 0620 hours 3-22 Infantry (-) received ten (10) 60mm mortar rounds that landed outside of perimeter. At 1305 hours Company D had contact with unknown size VC force (XT478820) who used RPGs and S/A resulting in one (1) US KIA and two (2) US WIA and unknown VC casualties. Companies A, B, and D provided road security for FSB BURT from XT499804 to XT478820 where they were carried up with 2-22 Infantry (M). At 1200 hours Company A found nine (9) anti-tank mines (XT499819) (8x8) which were destroyed. At 1607 hours all elements of 3-22 Infantry (-) closed FSB BURT. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

c. 31 Dec - At 0715 hours 3-22 Infantry (-) began reconnaissance in force in the area around FSB BURT. At 1157 hours Company D (XT494806) found three (3) Chicom grenades, two (2) 105mm rounds, 24 trip flares; all were destroyed. At 1305 hours A 26 (XT505816) engaged one (1) VC with S/L; negative results. At 1310 hours B 26 (XT491810) found five (5) markers 20x20cm with 2" OMC, two (2) 12x15cm with 2" OMC, one (1) 12x12cm with 2" OMC, one (1) 12x10cm with no OMC. All had connecting tunnels. Also found were three (3) pounds of documents, four (4) OD uniforms, spices and liquor (all was destroyed except uniforms and documents). All 3-22 Infantry (-) elements closed FSB BURT by 1645 hours. At 2000 hours Delta perimeter received 10 rounds of mixed RPG and 60mm mortar fire resulting in one (1) US WIA. At 2100 hours A 16 LP XT506808 received one (1) RVU resulting in three (3) minor US WIA. At 2130 hours A 16 (XT506808) had movement to their front and blew three (3) claymores resulting in two VC KIA, and 1 VC POW, one (1) 9mm pistol, one (1) pair field glasses, assorted documents, and one (1) US compass. Negative further contact as of 2400 hours.

d. 01 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remains at FSB BURT and conducts reconnaissance in force operations in that area. At 1015 hours A 16 (sweep element) found one (1) M-16 with blood on it (XT500805). At 1855 hours A 36 overto to LP location made contact with unknown VC force (XT502805) receiving S/A and RPG-2 fire with negative results. FSB BURT began receiving sporadic RPG and 60mm mortar fire. As of 2400 hours Company A reported two (2) US KIA and one (1) US WIA, and FSB BURT came under heavy ground attack at this time, mainly from the northwest and southeast.

e. 02 Jan - The VC used RPGs, heavy and light machine guns, and 60mm mortars. The initial ground assault lasted until 0100 hours. At 0110 hours the VC regrouped and continued to attack with companies A and C taking the main force of the attack. The VC penetrated the southeastern perimeter being defended by Company C at 0230 hours 105mm direct fire and air support repulsed the attacking VC at the perimeter. The VC regrouped at approximately 0330 hours and the heavy ground attack continued. Friendly forces continued receiving support from 105mm and 155mm direct fire and air support. At 0500 hours the VC began their initial retreat. By 0630 hours contact was completely broken with the exception of sporadic sniper fire. At 0800 hours 3-22 Infantry (-) made a sweep 80 meters in front of their perimeter, counting 171 VC KIA (BC), 5 VC POW accredited to 3-22 Infantry (-). 3-22 Infantry (-) captured 14 AK-47s, 6 RPG-2 launchers, 4 RPG-7 launchers, 51 RPG-2 and RPG-7 rounds, 12 US pistol bolts, 7 US ponchos, 12 canteens with covers, 20 VC soft caps, 12 machine gun drums of ammo, 30 AK-47 magazines with ammo, US weapons destroyed or unaccounted for were 7 M-79s, 1 M-60 machine gun, and 15 M-16s. At 1600 hours 3-22 Infantry (-) began airlift to Katun (XT333900). At 1650 airlift to Katun was completed. At 1610 hours 3-22 Infantry (-) became OPOIN to 1st Brigade 25th Infantry Division. Negative further contact as of 2400 hours.

f. 03 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remains at Katun (XT333900) and conducts reconnaissance in force in that area. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

g. 04 Jan - At 1530 hours Company D (XT342882) found and destroyed eight (8) tons of polished rice. At 1845 hours Company A at Katun (XT333900) received one (1) grenade, negative casualties. At 2140 hours Company A received automatic weapons fire, negative casualties.

h. 05 Jan - At 0800 hours 3-22 Infantry (-) began airlift back to Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT497872). At 1026 hours the airlift was complete. At 2130 hours bunker # 46 spotted eight (8) individuals, engaged with M-79, negative results. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

i. 06 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remains at Dau Trong Base Camp (XT497472). At 0600 hours Companies B and C departed for mission in the Michelin Plantation. At 0625 hours Company C reported that the bridge at XT512474 had been blown. At 0900 hours Company A detained seven (7) Vietnamese with a truck. One had a map of the Michelin, one woman had 7,600 piasters (XT507493). At 0930 hours Company B (XT516477) destroyed two (2) Ox carts. At 1000 hours Company A detained one (1) Vietnamese with Cambodian money in his possession. Companies A and B closed Dau Trong Base Camp by 1530 hours. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

j. 07 Jan - At 0720 hours 3-22 Infantry (-) began airlift back to FSB BURT (XT498804). At 0915 hours the airlift was complete. At 1225 hours FSB BURT received approximately 32 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in two (2) US KIA. At 1400 hours FSB BURT received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire with negative further contact as of 2400 hours.

k. 08 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT and conducted local reconnaissance in force operations. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

l. 09 Jan - At 1430 hours Company B (XT482792) found three (3) 82mm mortar rounds, 156 60mm mortar rounds, forty-one (41) cases TNT (80 blocks per case), twenty-five (25) cases C4, eleven (11) cases 7.62mm rounds (110 rounds per case), and three (3) cases of blasting caps (1400 caps). At 1915 hours FSB BURT received ten (10) 60mm mortar rounds resulting in two (2) US KIA from 3-22 Infantry (-). Negative further contact as of 2400 hours.

m. 10 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT (XT500805) with negative contact as of 2400 hours.

n. 11 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) at FSB BURT (XT500805) received approximately 16-20 incoming 60mm mortars between 0735 and 1135 hours. Negative casualties. At 1600 hours Battalion (-) established a laager position at coordinates (XT500805). Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

o. 12 Jan - At 0751 hours, Company A departed FSB BURT on a sweep mission. At 1135 hours, Company A found an old VC base camp (XT475-810) containing 150 foxholes (4x3) with 2' OHC, one (1) AK-47 magazine, one (1) VC canteen, 40 AK-47 ammo boxes, 50 meters of cromo wire, one (1) wall, five (5) documents, old clothes with blood stains. Company A returned to FSB BURT. At 0751 hours, Company B departed on sweep mission. At 1335 hours Company B (XT478796) received approximately 25 rounds of M-16 sniper fire resulting in negative casualties. Found one (1) bunker with expended M-16 casings (4x3) with 2' OHC, contained one (1) shot VC web gear complete. At 1430 hours Company B (XT474796) received M-16 sniper fire resulting in negative casualties. Company B returned to FSB BURT. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

p. 13 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT (XT500805) with negative contact as of 2400 hours.

q. 14 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT (XT500805) with negative contact as of 2400 hours.

r. 15 Jan - At 1000 hours Company D found a VC base camp (XT488-787) containing five (5) bunkers (6x6) with 2' OHC, eight foxholes (7x9), one (1) kitchen (1x3x4), 1000 rounds of AK-47 ammo, eight bicycle frames, 5,325 pounds of rice, two (2) walls, one (1) table, cooking equipment, sleeping area for eight (8), one (1) gas mask and documents. At 1200 hours Company D (XT488787) began receiving AK-47, RPG-2 fire and claymore fire. At 1250 hours Company B shot one (1) VC out of a tree. At 1310 hours Company D began receiving RPG-2 fire again (XT488787). Company D remained pinned down and at 1530 hours Company D 3-22 Infantry (M) arrived at XT-488787 as reinforcements. At 1615 hours Company D 3-22 Infantry (-) triggered a booby trap resulting in three (3) US KIA. Company D 3-22 Infantry suffered a total of 4 KIA, 26 MIA, and lost one (1) M-16 rifle.

s. 16 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSB BURT and conducted local reconnaissance in force operations in that area. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

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t. 17 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSD BURT and conducted local reconnaissance in force operations in that area. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

u. 18 Jan - At 1240 hours Company A at XT488787 found twelve (12) bunkers (excav.) with 2' OHC, two (2) trenches, 100 meters long running north and south. At 1331 hours Company A (XT488787) hit a booby trapped butterfly bomb resulting in 4 US MIA. At 1340 hours Company A (XT488787) found and destroyed two (2) 60mm mortar rounds booby trapped. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

v. 19 Jan 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSD BURT and conducted local reconnaissance in force operations. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

w. 20 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) remained at FSD BURT (XT500805) with negative contact as of 2400 hours.

x. 21 Jan - At 0800 hours Company B, 3-22 Infantry (-) and Company C, 2-12 Infantry (OPCON to 3-22 Infantry) departed FSD BURT for reconnaissance operations. Companies C and D at 0855 hours found seven (7) bunkers 3x6 with 1' OHC and 100 meters of trench line (XT489009). At 0920 hours Companies C and D found two (2) bunkers 2x6 with 1' OHC (XT486009).

y. 22 Jan - Company B, 3-22 Infantry (-) at 0800 hours began reconnaissance in force operations from FSD BURT, with negative contact as of 2400 hours.

z. 23 Jan - 3-22 Infantry (-) was airlifted by CH-47 from FSD BURT (XT500805) and returned to Dau Tieng Base Camp to conduct operations in the Michelin Plantation. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

aa. 24 Jan - At 0700 hours Recon element departed Dau Tieng Base Camp as security for Tay Ninh convoy. At 0815 hours Companies A and D departed Dau Tieng Base Camp to conduct civil operations at Ap 6 Bis and Xo Dinh Phouc. At 0938 hours Companies A and D were at Ap 6 Bis. At 0950 hours Company A suffered one (1) MIA as a result of a booby trap. At 1115 hours Company A and D departed Ap 6 Bis enroute to Xo Dinh Phouc. At 1145 hours Company A (XT526485) found two (2) old spider holes 2x2x4 containing two (2) ChiCom mortar round boxes. At 1503 hours Recon element with convoy closed Dau Tieng Base Camp. At 1545 hours Company D closed Xo Dinh Phouc. At 1635 hours Company D detained one (1) VC suspect (X534432) who had two (2) 60mm mortar rounds, one (1) M-79 round, and three (3) M-1 magazines. Companies A and D closed Dau Tieng Base Camp by 1800 hours. Negative contact as of 2400 hours.

bb. 25 Jan - At 0700 hours Recon element departed Dau Tieng Base Camp as security for Tay Ninh convoy. At 0815 hours Companies B and D departed Dau Tieng Base Camp for local reconnaissance in force operations in the Michelin Plantation. At 1335 hours Company D (XT543466) received 4-8 rounds of AK-47 fire, negative casualties. At 1455 hours Recon element with convoy closed Dau Tieng Base Camp. At 1610 hours Companies B and D closed Dau Tieng Base Camp. Negative further contact as of 2400 hours.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. US Losses: Personnel: 22 KIA, 98 MIA, 2 MIA (NH).

b. Enemy Losses:

(1) Personnel: 175 KIA, 6 NH, 9 Detainees.

(2) Enemy Equipment Captured and Events:

WEAPONS

1 9mm Pistol
1 M-16
14 AK-47
6 Light Machine Guns
4 RPG-2 Launchers

OFFICE SUPPLIES

3 lbs Boonies

MISCELLANEOUS

4 AK-47 Magazines

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1 RPO-7 Launcher

CLOTHING

13 Pistol Belts
4 OD Uniforms
7 (US) Ponchos
12 (US) Canteens
1 VC Canteen
20 VC Soft Caps
1 VC Web Gear
2 VC Protective Masks

1 Mal Magazine
1 Raynet
1 Pr Flare
1 US Compass
2 pr Field Glasses

(3) Heavy Equipment Captured and Destroyed

STRUCTURES

184 bunkers
300 Meter Trench
3 Spider Holes
8 Nootches

ORDNANCE

16 AT Mines
6 Chicken Granades
4 105mm Rounds
54 RPO Rounds
12 MD Drums of Ammo
30 AK-47 Magazines w/amm
1 81mm Mortar Round
3 62mm Mortar Rounds
3 155mm Rounds
163 60mm Mortar Rounds
31 Cases TNT
25 Cases CL
13,650 AK-47 Rounds
3 Cases Blasting Caps
24 Trip Flares

TRANSPORTATION

1 Bicycle
8 Bicycle Frames
2 Ox Carts

MISCELLANEOUS

1 Plastic Rope
50 Meters Conno Wire

13. (c) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Personnel: During the operation the Detachment S-1 Section operated from Ban Tieng with reports being forwarded from the forward location.

(1) Maintenance of Unit Strength: Average daily strength for the twenty eight (28) day period (29 December 1967-25 January 1968) was:

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>REAR AREA</u>	<u>FORWARD AREA</u>
HEAD	200	111
Co A	34	100
Co B	33	103
Co C	42	103
Co D	46	109
<u>DETACHMENT TOTAL</u>	<u>325</u>	<u>526</u>

(2) Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(a) Throughout the duration of this operation the Detachment "Regulars Club" was able to provide an adequate supply of cold refreshments. This was accomplished by serial resupply whenever the situation permitted. There were very few occasions during the period that free beer and soda could not be supplied from the rear area.

(b) Incoming mail was transported daily from Ban Tieng Base Camp to the forward area by air, during resupply. Outgoing mail was transported daily from the forward area during extraction.

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(c) Catholic and protestant religious services were conducted in the forward area by 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Chelains.

b. Supply: The logistical support for this operation was two-fold. Class II and IV came from Dau Tieng, Class I and III came from Katum, with all resupply conducted by Helicopter CH-47.

The principle "Supporting Agencies" for the source of resupply and services are as follows:

- (1) Battalion 3-4, Dau Tieng
- (2) Support Battalion (Prov) Dau Tieng and Battalion 3-4 (PWO), Katum.
 - (a) Company A, 25th S & T Battalion
 - (b) Company B, 725th Maintenance Battalion
 - (c) 125th Signal Company
- (3) 220th Service and Supply Battalion, Tay Ninh
- (4) Company C, 500th Engineer Battalion, Dau Tieng
- (5) Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion, Dau Tieng

c. Maintenance: Maintenance and Maintenance Support Services proved adequate throughout the operation.

d. Status of Each Class of Supply:

(1) Class I	QUANTITY
Combat Rations	23,595
NA Rations	18,345
Sundry Packs	120
Ice	12,000 lbs

(2) Class II	
Trousers, Jungle	150
Shirt, Jungle	150
Poncho Liners	200
Helmet, Steel	15
Liner, Helmet Steel	15
Air Mattress	70
Poncho	75
Boots, Protective, Jungle	60
Towels	150
Socks	150 PZ
Rest Tablets	1,500 bars
Paper Plates	20,000
Knives, Forks & Spoons	80,000
Cups Paper	20,000
Batteries DA-30	170
Batteries DA-306	254
Batteries DA-200	12
Batteries DA-1100/U	30
Batteries DA-12	40
Batteries DA-30	40
Insect Repellent	1,000 bottles
Foot Powder	4 Cases
Clothing Patches	10 Cases
Sand Bags	50,000

(3) Class III	
Oil GP Lbs	10 cases
LM, Lub oil, 4 oz tube	8 cases
Diesel	2,663 gal
Mogas	2,217 gal
Oil	220 gal

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(4) Class V

7.62mm	26,500
5.56mm	61,940
50 Cal.	3,700
40mm	3,750
81 mm	45
81mm HE	1,512
90mm C	10
4.2 HE	3,453
Frag Grenade	1,765
Smoke	525
LAW M-72	73
Claymores	73
Trip Flares	144
Total Vehicle Mileage	37,605

e. Combat Losses:

Pistol Cal. 45	1
Rifle 5.56mm	7
Carabines	1
Plotting Board	1
Receiver, AN/TTC-9	1
Transmitter, 1/TTT-4	1
Wrist Watch M.	2
Alarm Set Anti-Intrusion	1
Binoculars 6x30	2
Launcher Grenade M-79	1
Rayonet M	10
Radio Set AN/TTC-25	2
Mask Protective M7	20
Surgical Instrument Set	2

f. Communications:

(1) The proximity of the Battalion to Dau Tieng Base Camp did not permit the use of direct radio communications without the use of a retrans station, located at Hui Da Don.

(2) Landline communications were established to FSB 1731T and were highly effective, however, there were occasional breaks caused by APCs crossing the lines. This problem was solved by either burying the cable or rerouting the lines around problem areas.

(3) In general communications were excellent. Terrain occasionally interfered with radio transmission however long antennas nearly always eliminated the problem.

(a) Maximum personnel utilized by Battalion Commo Section at any one time during all phases:

- 1 1 Communications Officer
- 2 4 Wiremen
- 3 3 Radio Operators
- 4 3 Radio Chiefs
- 5 3 Radio Mechanics
- 6 5 Switchboard Operators
- 1 1 Generator Operator

(b) Equipment used during all phases of operations:

- 1 3 292 Antennas
- 2 6 TA312 Telephones

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- 3 Miles wire WD-177
- 4 AC radio equipment
- 5 1 1/4 ton vehicle
- 6 1 Switchboard SD22
- 7 2 T-1 Telephones
- 8 1 10KW Generator
- 2 2 Lighting Sets

g. Medical:

(1) The medical operation continued its three phase concept which consists of primary care by line medic at company level, referral to senior medic with demand group, and finally evacuation to Dau Tieng for more extensive care.

(2) In addition an underground aid station staffed by two medical specialists and Battalion Surgeon was established at FSB D&G, after the Battalion returned to that location on 7 January 1968.

(3) No medical problems were encountered during this operation.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUE: None

15. (C) COMMENTS ANALYSIS:

a. Comments: None

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) The well built bunker, using a deep foothole with heavy overhead cover contributed to the ability of the positions to withstand mortar rounds, RPG hits and S/A fire.

(2) L's proved to be a valuable asset in the detection of VC movement and activity. Likewise the AP could be utilized as a RECON element along with the ability to engage small enemy forces, thus disrupting much of the VC's plans and activities.


(3) The use of Pona Prime helped to reduce the dust problem on LZ's. It proved of great value in landing, unloading and boarding of helicopters.

(4) Employing the 105mm (Canister) in conjunction with the "Clock system" thus, allowing the battery free traverse movement and being able to fully cover the perimeter was of great help. This allowed personnel time to construct defensive positions who otherwise would have been used to man the perimeter.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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as



DENNIS T. BROWN
CPT, INF
Adjutant

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Phase I

Reference, Map, R7N, 1:50,000, Series L7021, Sheets 6231 I, IV,
6232 II, III




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Phase I, II, III

Reference, Map, NW, 1:50,000, Series L701h, Sheets 6231 I, IV,
6232 II, III



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INCL II


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Table 5

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Phase V

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6232 II, III



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
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
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Phase VII

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
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Incl 5

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Phase VII

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6232 II, III

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
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to
Incl 6

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Phase VII

Reference Map, RVN, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6231 I, II, IV,
6232 II, III

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3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry
APO 96216

AVOC-3C

20 Mar 68

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: See Distribution

1. NAME OF OPERATION: Operation YELLOWSTONE
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 7 December 1967 thru 24 February 1968
3. LOCATION: War Zone "C"
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (-)
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Christopher B. Sinclair, LTC, Commanding
6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

A Trp, MAJ Nathan M. Pulliam, Commanding, 7 December 1967 thru 16 December 1967.

B Trp, MAJ Wayne T. Shehorn, Commanding

C Trp, MAJ Gary E. Luok Commanding, 16 December 1967 thru 24 February 1968

D Trp, CPT Russell W. Hengel, Commanding

7. SUPPORTING FORCES: None
8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to Operation. War Zone "C" is a historical enemy stronghold, it was known to have extensive base camps and large caches of ammunition, weapons and food. Recent intelligence strongly indicated that COSVN headquarters, the combat elements in direct support of COSVN and at least one VC division were located in War Zone "C".

b. Terrain and Weather.

(1) General: The area of operation was bounded by the Cambodian border on the north, route TL22 on the west, the east/west grid XT63 on the south and the Saigon river on the east. The AO encompassed the entirety of War Zone "C".

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(2) Terrain: The area is flat to gently rolling with two prominent features: Nui Ba Den and the hill mass Nui The La and Nui Ong. The terrain slopes from north to south, creating north/south patterns of movement, parallel to the stream flow. Aerial observation is very good in the open southern third of the area and poor in the crescent of jungle along the Cambodian border. Ground observation is poor due to dense vegetation. Fields of fire in most areas are restricted by the vegetation.

(3) Weather: The weather during operation YELLOWSTONE was typical of the dry season. The average temperature was 88 degrees and there was only one day of rain. In the morning hours, fog reduced the visibility, conditions improved at approximately 0930 and continued to improve throughout the day.

c. Intelligence During the Operation.

The area of operation contained important enemy base areas for logistical and command operations as well as a protected and concealed comco liaison and supply corridor between War Zone "C" and Cambodia. Enemy units identified in the AO were 271st VC Regiment, 272d VC Regiment and 141st VC Regiment. The 1st Guard Battalion was also identified. During operation YELLOWSTONE numerous bunker complexes were discovered which could have supported the above units.

9. MISSION: Conduct operations in assigned areas in War Zone "C" with two air cavalry troops and one ground cavalry troop to find and fix the enemy; be prepared to secure route 4 from Tay Ninh to Latus; secure Fire Support Base Soui Da from enemy attack; secure downed aircraft and dropped loads anywhere in the area of operations.

10. Concept of Operation:

Maneuver - Operation will be conducted in two phases:

Phase I: Movement to Soui Da

Phase II: 3-17th Cav will conduct recon in force with two air cavalry troops in assigned zones. Trp D provides base camp security. Squadron will be prepared to assist 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div in assigned AO to find and fix known enemy units. Maximum effort in initial phases. Limited night recon will be conducted.

11. EXECUTION:

a. Movement. On 7 December 1967 the squadron (minus C Trp) moved by organic ground and air vehicles from Di An to FSE Soui Da (IT340583). The Squadron Field Trains remained in Di An while the Combat Trains moved forward and co-located with the Squadron Command Post at FSE Soui Da. The move was completed by 071800H December 1967.

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b. 8 December 1967 thru 16 December 1967

Operations during this period were characterized by a day and night program of armed visual reconnaissance with frequent insertions of the aerorifle platoons. D Trp conducted reconnaissance in force operations within AO Soui Da and convoy escort between Tay Ninh and Soui Da. As enemy mortar attacks increased in the vicinity of the FSB at Katun the squadron was tasked to perform night counter-mortar security for the FSB. This mission was hampered by the lack of a secure landing area at or near the FSB. The squadron was forced to conduct the mission based out of FSB Soui Da which increased the reaction time by 15 minutes and reduced station time to 1 hour. Armed reconnaissance missions produced a constantly growing picture of the enemy situation. It soon became evident that the initial intelligence estimate was correct. Sightings of previously unlocated base camps were reported daily. As each sub-area was searched in detail, large bunker complexes were located along every large stream in the jungle area. Enemy lines of communication interlacing the fortified base camps were found and plotted, while many of the base camps were vacant and showed no signs of recent use. A large percentage proved to be occupied and the aeroscouts were drawing automatic weapons fire on every mission. During these initial stages of the operation the squadron was averaging one aircraft hit per day. Upon locating an occupied base area all available fires were brought to bear on the target. Aeroweapons immediately engaged the target followed by IAC air and artillery adjusted by the aeroscouts. As a composite picture of the enemy location became clear, B-52 strikes were programmed on the larger concentrations. The squadron was soon requesting a B-52 strike a day with devastating results on the enemy. At 0445 hours on 14 December 1967, following nightly probes and harassing fire, FSB Soui Da was attacked with small arms and RPG rockets. This resulted in 2 US KIA, two aircraft damaged and one destroyed. Fire was returned immediately and a sweep at first light revealed 1 VC KIA, 2 RPG rockets and 1 RPG rocket launcher captured. Operations continued as normal with no reduction in combat effectiveness as a result of the attack. On 15 December 1967 while suppressing a mortar attack on the FSB at Katun, a B Trp UH1C was downed by enemy fire. The aircraft crashed in the jungle and 60 to 100 ft from the FSB. An OH6A of B Trp attempted to pickup the crew but was unable to make a safe approach to the area. A second OH6A with a lighter fuel and ammunition load succeeded in reaching the downed gunships. While extracting two crewmembers, the OH6A was also downed by enemy fire. The surviving crewmembers formed a perimeter of defense and with the support of aeroweapons ships were able to hold off the enemy until a friendly ground force reached them and extracted them. US losses were 2 KIA. The following morning, B Trp aeroscouts and aeroweapons escorted elements of the 2d Bn, 14th Inf into the area to secure the aircraft for extraction. The scouts, preceding the infantry, counted 50 VC bodies. On 16 December 1967, C Trp, which had been OPCON to the 199th LIB, reverted to squadron control and A Trp was released to the OPCON of the 199th LIB. This change-over was conducted while continuing to accomplish both assigned missions.

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c. 17 December 1967. C Trp aerorifles were inserted at XT577375, to perform a Bomb Damage Assessment following a B-52 Strike. During the reconnaissance, enemy contact was made resulting in 1 NVA POW, 3 INA RMA, 2 AK 47 and two 9mm pistols captured. Assorted medical supplies and web gear were also evacuated. Interrogation of the POW revealed that he was a member of a previously unidentified battalion which had just entered South Vietnam and had not yet been committed. Based on this and other intelligence the 25th Inf Div initiated operation CAMDEN with one Brigade.

d. 18 December 1967 thru 1 January 1968. The squadron continued its primary mission of armed visual reconnaissance; however, several major modifications were made in both the mission assignment and the squadron's mode of operation. It was realized that portions of the initial mission were detrimental to the overall effectiveness of the squadron; for example, in order to secure downed aircraft and dropped loads, it is necessary to provide continuous aerial coverage and, in most cases, insert an aerorifle platoon for ground security. To accomplish the mission the squadron is required to divert at least one air cavalry troop from their primary mission of reconnaissance, thus greatly reducing the effectiveness of the squadron in its primary role. In some cases, when dropped loads were in isolated areas, an air cavalry troop would be diverted for a day at a time. When this was fully realized, the 25th Inf Div released the squadron from that portion of the original mission statement. At that time it was also realized that the areas of operation assigned the squadron were too restrictive and that the squadron's capabilities were not being taken advantage of. It was decided that, rather than assign areas of operation, the squadron should have a free reign throughout the division TACR. This was accomplished by placing a liaison team with each brigade command post to coordinate activities within the brigade's area of responsibility. This close coordination allowed a more rapid dissemination of information and the brigades were able to react directly to information collected by the aeroscouts. Within a short time, joint operations with aeroscouts and aerorifles elements leading the infantry units into previously located enemy areas and with aersweepers supporting became common place. As the units became accustomed to working together and the ground elements gained confidence in the credibility of the intelligence furnished by the aeroscouts and the accuracy of the fires of the aersweepers, a smooth and efficient team came into existence. This greatly increased morale as well as the efficiency of both elements. The air cavalry elements became more enthused as they saw tangible results being produced from the reconnaissance they had performed. For the ground elements, prior knowledge of what to expect and pinpoint location of the enemy led to a number of successes. Large caches were located and either destroyed or evacuated. The enemy will not be capable of restocking the rice, weapons and ammunition lost in these sweeps for a considerable length of time.

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e. 1 January 1968 thru 6 January 1968. At 2400 hrs 1 January 1968, the enemy broke the New Years truce by a multi-regimental attack on FSB Burt, IT499800. Aeroweapons teams were immediately dispatched to help relieve the beleaguered infantry and artillery. As the ammunition supply of the defenders grew short, it was decided that an aerial re-supply and reinforcement must be attempted. To accomplish this, the 25th Inf Div pooled the lift assets of the 25th Avn Bde, D Trp of 3/4 Cav and B & C Trps of the 3/17th Cav under the command of the C Trp Commander. The provisional airlift company moved to the FSB at Ketum to await further missions. An aerial re-supply of FSB Burt was accomplished and the provisional company was released to the parent unit upon arrival of elements of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion. B & C Trp continued saturation reconnaissance of the area surrounding FSB Burt. Movement was detected along two main routes of withdrawal and fire was brought to bear on the retreating enemy. The scouts and weapons continued to engage the enemy until darkness afforded him a means of escape. At the end of the day the squadron had accounted for 26 VC KIA (BC). Since most of the engagement was in dense jungle it is reasonable to assume that the actual number was many times the body count. At 022058 Jan 68 the enemy began a mortar attack on FSB Soui Da, a total of 11 rounds fell with no friendly losses. At dawn 3 Jan 68, the aeroscouts picked up the trail of the retreating VC and continued the actions of the preceding day. The northern escape route was traced to a regimental base camp complex in a dense jungle, via IT556910, IT561910, IT555905 and IT561905. Apparently the VC had thought this area safe from detection and had planned to regroup and re-supply there. Numerous air strikes were directed into the base camps throughout the day. The artillery provided continuous fires between air strikes and throughout the night. Resuming operations at first light on 4 Jan 68, a definite pattern of movement north towards Cambodia was detected. Automatic weapons fire directed at the aeroscouts continued to be heavy as in the past three days. Here again the pattern was definitely shifting north. On the 5th of January, groups of VC were detected moving north on the trails carrying wounded. A group of 11 VC were caught in the open at IT542902 and killed by aeroweapons elements. One of the 11 was a messenger carrying a pouch of documents. A platoon from the 4th Bn, 9th Inf was inserted to recover the pouch but came under heavy automatic weapon fire. The aeroweapons covered the extraction of the platoon. It was certain by this time that the remnants of the attacking force were fleeing north and into Cambodia. Aeroweapons ships at high altitude were able to detect 3 battalion sized base camps and numerous smaller camps inside Cambodia in the "Fish Hook" area. One of these camps overlapped the border and a B-52 strike was placed at IT539907. A ground insertion at IT533902 was attempted to follow up the strike but the enemy had not been weakened enough to allow the exploitation to be successful. The aerorifles were pinned down by automatic weapons fire from bunkers surrounding the landing zone. The lift returned and under the cover of the aeroweapons platoon fires successfully extracted the aerorifles. The coordination of fires and team work enabled the aerorifles to be extracted with minimum friendly losses. One UH1H was destroyed by ground fire, however the crew suffered only minor injuries.

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f. 7 January 1968. The squadron was ordered to close out FSB Soui Da and establish a new base at Tay Ninh. While the distance to move was short, the move was to be conducted without a break in mission or a reduction in combat effectiveness. The squadron combat trains moved in two phases. The second element maintained full operational capabilities while the first displaced. The entire operation went smoothly and the support of the combat elements continued..

g. 8 January 1968 thru 30 January 1968. The squadron continued to operate in the manner described in para d. With the release from the mission of securing FSB Soui Da, more of the combat power of the squadron became available. D Trp was able to conduct more extensive operations and began to conduct troop sized reconnaissance in force daily. C Trp, in coordination with the 3d Bde, inserted the aerorifle platoon on a daily basis. The aerorifles would be inserted in blocking positions for the 2d Bn, 22d Mech. After the units converged the aerorifles would act as a point element leading the ground force into known enemy bases under the direction of the aeroscouts. On 24 January D Trp was released to the operational control of the 1st Bde and OPCOM was further delegated to the 1st Bn, 5th Mech.

h. 31 January 1968 thru 24 February 1968. The squadron was diverted from operation YELLOWSTONE to operation SARATOGA.

12. RESULTS:

a. Friendly:

	KBI	WBI
Officers	0	3
Warrant Officers	1	8
Enlisted Men	5	40

b. Enemy:

- (1) VC/NVA (EC) - 209
- (2) VC/NVA KIA (POSS) - 192
- (3) Detainees - 36
- (4) Military Structures Destroyed - 464
- (5) Military Structures Damaged - 88
- (6) Sumpans Destroyed - 61
- (7) Sumpans Damaged - 13
- (8) Rice Destroyed - 4,887 lbs
- (9) Individual Weapons Captured - 15
- (10) Crew Served Weapons Captured - 5

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(11) MLs:

- 1 Chicom Claymore captured
- 5 Chicom Claymores destroyed
- 2 Enemy 2 1/2 Ton Trucks destroyed
- 2 VC elephants destroyed

13. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I. Daily average strength supplied from ration breakdown was 500 persons. No problems were encountered.

(2) Class II. Critical TOE shortages of communication equipment have not been solved. Antennas for radio AN/ARC-102 are still short (10ea), also 4 ea AN/WVC - 24 radios and 4 ea AU/PFC - 41 radios. The three items mentioned above are essential for extending communication capabilities of squadron aircraft and would increase the mission capability considerably.

(3) Class III. Support was outstanding throughout the operational area.

(4) Class IV. Support of the squadron at FSB Soui Da was outstanding.

(5) Class V. The following is the daily average expenditure and should be used as a planning figure in the future.

WEAPON	DENSITY	DAILY AVERAGE
M79 Grenade Launcher	215	49
M5 40mm Grenade Launcher	12	387
2.75 Rocket Systems	38	217
7.62 All Types	112	26,230
Smoke Grenades	-	50
Mortar Blun	3	19

b. Maintenance:

Initially the troop and squadron maintenance platoons were located with the squadron combat trains at FSB Soui Da. It was decided early in the operation that this was an unsatisfactory location. At least 50% of the aircraft maintenance must be performed at night. Utilization of the aircraft maintenance lighting sets in a forward combat base is impossible due to light discipline. It was decided that the maintenance platoons should be based in a more secure area. On 10 December 1967 the platoons moved to and established a maintenance facility at Toy Ninh.

c. Treatment of Casualties:

During operation YELLOWSTONE all serious casualties were evacuated directly to the nearest suitable hospital. The success of this method is borne out by the fact this squadron has not had one casualty die of wounds subsequent to evacuation.

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14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

The need for an organic aircraft mounted night-lighting device was realized during the operation. The Squadron's ability to perform its mission at night is limited at this time. The addition of an infrared device would increase the squadron's ability to interdict enemy movement and to provide close fire support during the hours of darkness. The squadron obtained a Xenon searchlight to accomplish this; however, the necessary controls are not available in country.

15. COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS:

a. ITEM: Initial General Reconnaissance

DISCUSSION: The enemy's means of travel in the jungle is by trails. Since all troop movements and re-supply take place on these trails, it is impossible to camouflage them completely.

OBSERVATION: When operating in an area for the first time a general high recon should be made of the area to determine the trail pattern, direction of trails and trail terminal points. This initial survey, when properly analyzed, will provide an excellent base of information on which plans for detailed reconnaissance can be formulated.

b. ITEM: Arowespons Supporting Ground Units

DISCUSSION: Many times, ground commanders were guilty of faulty marking of friendly positions or giving confusing directions on the locations of enemy positions.

OBSERVATION: Due to faulty marking of friendly locations and confusing directions as to the location of the enemy, suppressive fire has been placed dangerously close to friendly ground units. Ground commanders at all levels should be thoroughly familiar with the proper procedures of marking friendly locations. It is equally important to stress the need for clear concise instructions as to the location of enemy elements.

c. ITEM: Use of Mirrors

DISCUSSION: Several operations have been conducted supporting small units. In almost every instance it has been necessary for the ground unit to positively identify its location.

OBSERVATION: Although smoke is an excellent means of marking the position it reveals the location to the enemy on the ground as well as the friendly aircraft. A few flashes from a signal mirror have proven equally effective, without revealing the friendly positions. Panel markers have also been used effectively.

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d. ITEM: Aeroscouts Conducting Trail Reconnaissance

DISCUSSION: Aeroscouts have conducted extensive trail reconnaissance during operation YELLOWSTONE.

OBSERVATION: It has been found that using slow air speed allows the enemy ample time to find concealment and, at a rapid speed, it is impossible to detect enemy personnel on the trail. By flying at 60 knots and criss-crossing the trail, the scouts are able to detect enemy personnel and are relatively safe from ground fire.

e. ITEM: Aeroscouts Screening for Ground Units

DISCUSSION: After contact has been made by a ground unit, the enemy increases his efforts to shoot down scout aircraft.

OBSERVATION: Once contact has been made, scouts should move to the flanks of the friendly unit and work to contain the enemy or canalize him by using artillery and air assets.

f. ITEM: Baby Sitting

DISCUSSION: Air to ground communication with aeroscouts is very poor due to their constant use of "Map of the Earth" flying techniques.

OBSERVATION: This problem has been solved by towing an aeroweapons ship with the aeroscout, extending his communications range as well as providing the scout with heavy weapons protection. This method, called "Baby Sitting" by the aeroweapons, has increased the efficiency of the aeroscouts by assuring them immediate support if downed by ground fire.

WILLIAM W. BRANDON Jr
LTC, Armor
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268

AVOCTB-C

9 JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT: COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
ATTN: ACOFS, G3
APO 96225

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: BATTLE OF BUOI CUT - OPERATION YELLOWSTONE, CONDUCTED BY 3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 012230 JAN 68 TO 020500 JAN 68.
3. (U) LOCATION: FSB BURT (XT 500 805).
4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION.
5. (U) COMMANDERS:

3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV	- COL LEONARD R DAEMS, JR
2D BN, 22 INF (M)	- LTC AWBREY G NORRIS
3D BN, 22 INF	- LTC THOMAS HAROLD
2D BN, 77TH ARTY	- LTC WILLIAM L ALBRIGHT
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

2-22 INF (M)	BDE CONTROL
3 TMS 44TH IPSO	2/77TH ARTY (OS)
1 PLT D/65 ENGR (OS)	D/65TH ENGR (OS)
2-77 ARTY	A, C, & D BTRY, 3/13 ARTY (OSR)
BTRY A&C	3D PLT, 25TH MP (SPT)
3-22 INF (-1 CO)	DISCOM FWD COMD (SPT)
3TMS 44TH IPSO	FWD SPT SEC S&T (SPT)
1 PLT D/65 ENGR	B/25 MED BN (SPT)
	D/725 MAINT BN (SPT)
	SEC QM GRAC PLT (SPT)
7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:
 - A. ARTILLERY:
 - (1) PREPLANNED AND ON CALL DIRECT AND INDIRECT ARTILLERY FIRES WERE USED DURING THE OPERATION TO COVER ENEMY ROUTES OF ADVANCE AND WITHDRAWAL. ARTILLERY WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE AND WAS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY. THE USE OF DIRECT FIRE ARTILLERY, 105MM HE AND BEEHIVE AND 155MM HE, PROVED TO BE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN HOLDING ENEMY ASSAULTS AT THE FSB PERIMETER. ARTILLERY FIRE WAS INITIALLY USED DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THE ATTACK PRIMARILY IN A COUNTER-MORTAR ROLE. PREPLANNED COUNTER-MORTAR TARGETS WERE ATTACKED BY ALL FIRING BATTERIES LOCATED AT FSB BURT AND FSB BEAUREGARD. AS THE ATTACK PROGRESSED AND LISTENING POSTS AND AMBUSH PATROLS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER REPORTED CONTACT WITH ENEMY FORCES, CALLS FOR INDIRECT FIRE WERE RECEIVED AND DELIVERED BY THE ARTILLERY. AS IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT A FULL SCALE ENEMY ATTACK WAS IN PROGRESS, NUMEROUS CALLS FOR FIRE WERE RECEIVED. ADJUST FIRE AND PREPLANNED DEFENSIVE CONCENTRATIONS WERE FIRED. AT ONE POINT, THE BATTERY FIRE DIRECTION CENTER OF BATTERY C,

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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2D BN, 77TH ARTY REPORTED HANDLING 8 MISSIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY. PERHAPS THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF ARTILLERY WAS MADE IN A DIRECT FIRE ROLE. AS THE PERIMETER REPORTED HEAVY CONTACT, THE ARTILLERY MEN LEVELED THEIR TUBES AND, AFTER COORDINATION WITH INFANTRY ELEMENTS, BEGAN DELIVERING HE DIRECT FIRE INTO LOCATIONS JUST FORWARD OF THE PERIMETER. A LARGE VOLUME OF DIRECT FIRE WAS DELIVERED AROUND THE ENTIRE PERIMETER DURING THE BATTLE. HIGHLY INSTRUMENTAL IN STOPPING ENEMY FORCES ATTEMPTING TO BREACH THE PERIMETER WAS THE USE OF THE APERS (BEEHIVE) ROUND. THIS FIRE WAS DELIVERED TO THE NORTH-EAST, SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST PORTIONS OF THE PERIMETER. PARTICULAR VOLUME WAS CONCENTRATED TO THE SOUTHEAST AND SOUTH DOWN THE ROAD WHERE LARGE MASSES OF ENEMY FORCES WERE ATTEMPTING TO PENETRATE. DURING THE MIDDLE AND LATTER STAGES OF THE ATTACK, EFFECTIVE USE WAS MADE OF BLOCKING FIRES TO THE WEST BY BATTERIES FROM FSB BEAUL REGARD. THESE FIRES SERVED A TWO-FOLD PURPOSE IN PREVENTING NOT REINFORCEMENTS BUT WITHDRAWL IN THAT DIRECTION. AS THE ENEMY BEGAN WITHDRAWING TO THE SOUTH, FIRES WERE PLACED ALONG AND JUST OFF THE ROAD IN AN INTERDICTION ROLE.

(2) POSITION OCCUPIED: FSB BURT (XT 500 805).

(3) STATISTICAL DATA:

(A) ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED:

		A/2/77	A/2/77	A/3/73	O/3/73	O/3/73
1.	HE	936	1000	413	171	218
2.	BH	13	45	-	-	-
3.	PD	824	900	98	171	218
4.	MTSQ	112	50	-	-	-
5.	VT	-	50	315	-	-

(B)

1.	HE	630	325	-	-	-
2.	BH	10	50	-	-	-
3.	PD	200	885	-	-	-
4.	GB	-	-	574	-	-
5.	WB	-	-	100	-	-

B. USAF:

(1) EXTENSIVE USE WAS MADE OF TACTICAL AIR IMMEDIATE STRIKE MISSIONS, WITH THE NORMAL AIR REQUEST CHANNELS BEING USED FOR ALL MISSIONS FLOWN. AIR STRIKES WERE EMPLOYED IN ASSEMBLY AREAS AND ON HEAVY ENEMY ATTACKING TROOP CONCENTRATIONS TO WITHIN 150 METERS OF THE FSB PERIMETER, UTILIZING ALL ORDNANCE. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT NARALM AND CBU'S WERE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN BREAKING THE ATTACK FORMATIONS OF THE MASSES ENEMY. SPOOKY WAS UTILIZED TO PROVIDE ILLUMINATION FOR THE AIR STRIKES, AND FIRE SUPPORT DURING LULLS BETWEEN AIR STRIKES. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT TAO AIR PROVIDED THE OVERWHELMING FIRE SUPERIORITY THAT EVENTUALLY BROKE THE ENEMY ATTACK.

(2) STATISTICAL DATA:

(A) MISSIONS:

1. IMMEDIATE MISSIONS REQUESTED: 32
2. IMMEDIATE MISSIONS FLOWN: 32

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(B) RESULTS OF TACTICAL WAR: IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE PRECISE DAMAGE DONE TO THE ENEMY BY AIR STRIKES DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE BATTLE WAS FOUGHT IN DARKNESS AND EXTENSIVE USE OF ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS MADE EXACT DETERMINATION OF THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF RECOVERED ENEMY BODIES DIFFICULT. THOUGH THE ENEMY ATTACK WAS HALTED BY GROUND FORCES AT THE PERIMETER, TAC AIR APPEARS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR BREAKING THE ATTACK. THOUGH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHEN FIRE PARITY WAS ATTAINED - SUPERIORITY WAS GAINED BY USE OF TAC AIR.

C. ARMY AVIATION:

(1) EXTENSIVE USE WAS MADE OF ARMY GUNSHIPS. PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT OF TAC AIR, GUNSHIPS PROVIDED CLOSE-IN DIRECT-FIRE SUPPORT TO THE PERIMETER. SUBSEQUENT TO TAC AIR INITIATION, ARMY AIR WAS UTILIZED TO PROVIDE INTERDICTIONARY FIRES ON ESCAPE ROUTES, AND DIRECT FIRES ON SUSPECTED ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS MOVING TOWARD THE FSB FROM THE NORTH. AN ARMY AIR FLARESHIP WAS USED TO GREAT ADVANTAGE DURING PERIODS WHEN SPOOKY WAS NOT AVAILABLE. ADDITIONALLY, GUNSHIPS WERE UTILIZED TO ESCORT RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT; THEIR SUPPRESSIVE FIRES WERE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AS THE FSB WAS RINGED WITH ENEMY ANTIAIRCRAFT AUTOMATIC WEAPONS.

(2) EMERGENCY AMMUNITION RESUPPLY BEGAN AT 020330 JAN 68 UTILIZING 5 SPARTANS (189TH AHC), FROM BIEN HOA WITH AMMUNITION FOR 2/22 INF AND 3/22 INF.

(3) FIVE SPARTANS (189TH AHC), BLACK WIDOW (188TH AHC) AND LITTLE BEAR (A/25TH AVN) RESUPPLIED THE ARTILLERY OUT OF KATUM.

(4) FOLLOWING ARMY AVIATION UNITS PARTICIPATED IN THE BATTLE:

(A) UH-1D: 189 AHC (SPARTANS), 188TH AHC (BLACK WIDOWS) AND A/25TH AVN (LITTLE BEAR).

(B) GENERAL SUPPORT: C/3/17 AIR CAVALRY, 188TH AHC (BLACK WIDOWS), 187TH AHC (RAT PACK), 189TH AHC (SPARTANS), 25TH AVN (LITTLE BEARS) AND FLAESHIP (WILDCAT).

(C) AMMUNITION WAS RESUPPLIED AS FOLLOWS:

	FROM DAU TIENG	FROM KATUM
M-79	3374	1008
4.2	250	360
81MM	350	360
.50 CAL	18000	40000
5.56	89600	65000
7.62	30400	13400

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

A. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUOI CUT AREA FOR OPERATION YELLOWSTONE (CONTINUED) WAS OBTAINED FROM 25TH DIVISION G-2 SOURCES, II FIELD FORCE PERINTREP, VISUAL RECONN SAUCE MISSIONS AND LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS.

(1) NORTHEASTERN WAR ZONE "D" WAS BEING USED BY VC MAIN FORCE UNITS AS A SAFE HAVEN DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF FRIENDLY LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA SINCE THE BATTLE OF SOVI TRE IN MARCH 1967.

(2) ROUTES 244 AND 246 WERE BEING USED AS MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES IN NORTHEASTERN WAR ZONE "C" AND INTO CENTRAL BINH LONG PROVINCE.

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(3) UNITS LOCATED IN THE AREA OF SUOI CUT WERE BELIEVED TO BE TWO BATTALIONS OF THE 141ST NVA REGIMENT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD BATTALION UNLOCATED IN THE AREA. CONTACT WITH THESE ELEMENTS BY THE 1ST BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY US DIVISION ON 16 AND 20 DECEMBER IN THE VICINITY OF KATUM AND BO TUC CONFIRMED THE PRESENCE OF THIS UNIT. IN ADDITION, ELEMENTS OF THE 271ST VC REGIMENT WERE ALSO BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF XT3976.

B. ENEMY ACTIVITY:

(1) DURING THE MONTH OF DECEMBER ENEMY ACTIVITY TOOK THE FORM OF COUNTER SWEEP ACTIVITIES AGAINST ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST BRIGADE, 25TH US INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE VICINITY OF KATUM AND BO TUC. IN ADDITION, FRIENDLY BASE CAMPS IN THAT AREA RECEIVED MORTAR ATTACKS ALMOST NIGHTLY.

(2) THE CEASATION OF FRIENDLY M AND I FIRING DURING THE NEW YEAR'S TRUCE BROUGHT ABOUT INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF SUOI CUT AND FROM THIS ACTIVITY EVOLVED THE HEAVY MORTAR AND GROUND ATTACK ON FSB BURT (XT 500 807). IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE ENEMY PLANNED TO USE THE CEASE FIRE TO MOVE HIS TROOPS SAFELY TO WITHIN STRIKING RANGE OF THE FSB.

(3) READOUTS OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND INTERROGATION OF PW'S INDICATE THAT THE ENTIRE 271ST VC REGIMENT (VD THE 5TH AND 6TH BATTALIONS, 272D VC REGIMENT WERE EMPLOYED IN THIS ATTACK.

(4) THE ATTACK OF FSB BURT TOOK THE FORM OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE HARASSING MORTAR FIRE INTO THE FSB DURING EARLY EVENING HOURS. AS THE EVENING PROGRESSED, AMBUSH PATROLS BEGAN OBSERVING INCREASING MOVEMENT AT VARIOUS POINTS COMPLETELY ENCIRCLING THE PERIMETER OF THE FSB. AT APPROXIMATELY 2100-2200 HOURS, AMBUSH PATROLS BEGAN RECEIVING "PROBING ATTACKS" WHICH DEVELOPED INTO HEAVY CONTACT BY SMALL ENEMY ELEMENTS. AT APPROXIMATELY 2230 HOURS MORTAR ROUNDS (BOTH 60MM AND 82MM) AND RPG ROUNDS BEGAN "RAINFALLING" INTO THE FSB FROM A NUMBER OF ENEMY MORTAR SITES AND RPG POSITIONS AROUND THE PERIFERY. THE MORTAR ATTACK WAS FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY A GROUND ATTACK OF SMALL ARMS, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, GRENADES AND RIFLE GRENADES COMPLETELY ENCOMPASSING THE BASE. THE BRUNT OF THE ATTACK WAS PLACED FIRST IN THE SOUTHEAST SECTOR WHILE A SECONDARY ATTACK WAS DIRECTED AT THE NORTHWEST AND NORTHEAST SECTORS. THE ATTACK FROM THE SOUTHEAST SHIFTED TO THE SOUTH AND THEN BACK TO THE SOUTHEAST. THE ATTACKS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT, TERMINATING AT APPROXIMATELY 020500H. AT THIS TIME THE ENEMY BEGAN WITHDRAWING TO THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST AND TO THE NORTHEAST.

9. (C) MISSION: 3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION MOVES TO NORTHERN WAR ZONE "C" AND CONDUCTS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO DESTROY VC/NVA FORCES & INSTALLATIONS; OPENS LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR FRIENDLY FORCES AND INTERDICTS VC/NVA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION DEFENDED FSB BURT WITH ONE INFANTRY AND ONE MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION. POSITIONS WERE DUG-IN AND LISTENING POSTS WERE ESTABLISHED BY EACH LINE PLATOON. AMBUSH PATROLS AND LISTENING POSTS WERE ESTABLISHED BY EACH LINE COMPANY. TWO BATTERIES OF 105MM AND ONE BATTERY OF 155MM HOWITZERS SUPPORTED THE DEFENSE UTILIZING INDIRECT FIRES AND FULLY INTEGRATING DIRECT FIRES. (REFERENCES: OPORD 40-67, HQ, 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV, WITH CHANGES 1 AND 2 DATED 26 DEC 67; FRAGC 1-67 TO OPORD 40-67, DATED 27 DEC 67.)

11. (C) EXECUTION (CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY)

A. 011845H JAN 68: AN AMBUSH PATROL MADE CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZED VC FORCE 200 METERS EAST OF THE PERIMETER.

B. 012010H JAN 68: MOVEMENT NOTED AROUND THE PERIMETER WITH EIGHT ENEMY PROBING OR PATROLLING ACTIONS DIRECTED TOWARD THE PERIMETER. LIMITED MORTAR ATTACKS DIRECTED TOWARD THE FSB.

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C. 012230H JAN 68: FSB BURT (XT 500 805) CAME UNDER HEAVY MORTAR ATTACK FOLLOWED BY RPG, SA AND AW FIRE MOSTLY FROM THE SOUTHEAST AND NORTHWEST ALTHOUGH ALL SECTORS OF THE PERIMETER WERE SUBJECTED TO ALL TYPES OF FIRE. A LIGHT FIRE TEAM, FAC AND TAC AIR, IN ADDITION TO SPOOKY AND ARTY WERE CALLED FOR AND EMPLOYED AS THEY BECAME AVAILABLE. ALL OF THE SIX AMBUSH PATROLS BECAME ENGAGED TO VARYING DEGREES.

D. 012400H JAN 68: MORTAR AND RPG FIRES SLACKENED AND GROUND ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED AGAINST THE PERIMETER FROM ALL DIRECTIONS WITH SECONDARY ATTACKS COMING FROM THE NORTHWEST AND NORTHEAST. THE MAIN VC EFFORT CAME FROM THE SOUTHWEST AND SHIFTED TO THE SOUTHEAST.

E. 020100H JAN 68: VC ELEMENTS HAD SUCCEEDED IN REACHING BUNKER LINE POSITIONS IN THE SOUTH (C/2-22 INF(M)) AND SOUTHEAST (C/3-22 INF). BEEHIVE ARTILLERY ROUNDS WERE EMPLOYED ALONG WITH DIRECT FIRE ARTILLERY AND GUN AND FLARE SHIPS. LOCAL BATTALION RESERVES WERE COMMITTED TO SECURE THE PERIMETER. AN ADDITIONAL RESERVE OF TWO PROVISIONAL INFANTRY SQUADS WAS RECONSTITUTED FROM HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS OF THE 2-22 INF AND COMMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE 3-22 INF IN THE SOUTHEAST.

F. 020145H JAN 68: VC FIRE AND CONTACT SLACKENED.

G. 020200H JAN 68: VC FIRES INCREASED AND ALL AREAS WERE ENGAGED. WEIGHT OF ATTACK WAS TO THE SOUTH (C/2-22 INF(M)) AND SOUTHEAST (C/3-22 INF). ONCE AGAIN, BEEHIVE AND DIRECT FIRE ARTILLERY WAS EMPLOYED ALONG WITH GROUND AND FLARE SHIPS. THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST PORTIONS OF THE PERIMETER WERE UNDER PRESSURE OF THE HEAVIEST ATTACK.

H. 020248H JAN 68: TAC AIR IS EMPLOYED IN THE SOUTH, ALLOWING ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY TO BE PLACED IN OTHER AREAS OF THE PERIMETER. ARMY AIR SUPPORT CONTINUES.

I. 020311H JAN 68: FIRE AND CONTACT SLACKENS AND CEASES EXCEPT IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST WHERE TAC AIR IS BEING EMPLOYED.

J. 020327H JAN 68: ALL VC EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED AT THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST PORTIONS OF THE PERIMETER WITH ONLY SPORADIC FIRES DIRECTED TO OTHER PORTIONS OF THE FSB. ARTILLERY DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE, BEEHIVE, GUN AND FLARE SHIPS AND TACTICAL AIR CONTINUES TO BE EMPLOYED.

K. 020500H JAN 68: VC BEGIN WITHDRAWAL TO SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST AND TO THE NORTHEAST. LEAVING DELAYING FORCES TO SCREEN THEIR MOVEMENT. ALL AVAILABLE FIRES CONTINUED TO INTERDICT WITHDRAWAL ROUTES.

12. (C) RESULTS:

A. US LOSSES:

(1) PERSONNEL: 23 KIA, 146 WIA.

(2) EQUIPMENT: 3 APC'S, 1 40MM GUN (SP) DESTROYED. 2 APC'S MODERATE DAMAGE, 1 CAL .45 PISTOL, 3 .50 CAL MACHINE GUNS, 9 M-60 MACHINE GUNS, 14 M-16 REFLES, 3 M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS, 1 STARLIGHT SCOPE, 1 SIGHT 81MM MORTAR.

B. VC LOSSES:

(1) PERSONNEL: 379 KIA, 8 POW (WIA).

(2) ENEMY EQUIPMENT CAPTURED AND EVACUATED: 75 AK-47 RIFLES, 11 CHICOM LMG'S, 1 CAL .45 PISTOL, 12 RPG-7 LAUNCHERS, 16 RPG-2 LAUNCHERS, 2 TR-T TELEPHONES AND 5 LBS DOCUMENTS.

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(3) ENEMY EQUIPMENT DESTROYED:

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>	<u>CLOTHING</u>
50 CH100M GRENADES	2 MILES ELECTRICAL WIRE	100 SETS WEB GEAR
180 RPG ROCKETS	72 CANTEENS	12 PISTOL BELTS
2 RDS 75MM RECEISSL	56 ENTRENCHING TOOLS	7 PONCHOS
4000 RDS AK-47 AMMO		
1000 LMG AMMO		
10 PROPELLANT CHARGES RPG 2 AND 7		
30 AK-47 MAGAZINES		

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

A. PERSONNEL: DURING THE ENGAGEMENT, THE BRIGADE S-7 SECTION OPERATED FROM CAMP RAINIER WITH REPORTS BEING FORWARDED FROM FORWARD LOCATIONS.

B. SUPPLY: NOTIFICATION TO BE PREPARED TO EFFECT EMERGENCY RESUPPLY OF CLASS V FROM KATUM TO FSB BURT WAS RECEIVED BY THE BRIGADE S-4 AT APPROXIMATELY 020130H AT KATUM. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT ALL AIRCRAFT WOULD BE CONTROLLED ON THE BRIGADE ADMIN AND LOGISTICS FREQUENCY. UNITS BEING RESUPPLIED WERE 2/22 INF(M), 3/22 INF AND 2/77 ARTY. AIRCRAFT WERE CONTROLLED BY THE BRIGADE S-4 FOR RESUPPLY OF 2/22 INF AND 3/22 INF. AIRCRAFT UTILIZED BY 2/77 ARTY WERE CONTROLLED BY S-4, 2/77 ARTY SHARING THE SAME FREQUENCY.

C. MEDICAL: MEDICAL EVACUATION OF WOUNDED PERSONNEL FROM FSB BURT WAS ACCOMPLISHED INITIALLY BY RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY DUSTOFF CREWS STATIONED IN DAU TIENG AND TAY NINH WITH BACK-UP COVERAGE PROVIDING SECONDARY EVACUATION BY SHIPS FROM CU CHI AND LONG BINH. THE PRIMARY ROUTES OF EVACUATION WERE: (1) D COMPANY, 25TH MEDICAL BATTALION LOCATED IN KATUM, (2) R COMPANY, 25TH MEDICAL BATTALION IN DAU TIENG, AND (3) THE 45TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL LOCATED IN TAY NINH. SECONDARY EVACUATION WAS ACCOMPLISHED TO THE 12TH EVACUATION HOSPITAL, CU CHI, THE 24TH AND 93D EVACUATION HOSPITALS IN LONG BINH, AS WELL AS EMERGENCY CASES TO THE 45TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: NONE.

15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: NVA FORCES ENCOUNTERED DURING THIS ENGAGEMENT APPEARED TO BE WELL DISCIPLINED AND WERE VERY WELL EQUIPPED, INCLUDING NEW WEAPONS. THE SUCCESS OF THE DEFENSE IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER, SUPERIOR INFANTRY FIREPOWER, DEVASTATING ARTILLERY FIRE, RECHIVE, DIRECT & INDIRECT FIRES, AND DECISIVE, OVERWHELMING TACTICAL AIR POWER. THE GROUND DEFENSES WERE DELIBERATE AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTING AND WHILE STILL BEING FULLY DEVELOPED WERE ADEQUATE TO MEET THE THREAT POSED THE NIGHT OF 1-2 JANUARY 1968.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. THE INTEGRATION OF DIRECT ARTILLERY FIRES IN THE DEFENSE OF A FSB IS A PRIMARY CONSIDERATION. PLANNING OF PERIMETER INSTALLATIONS MUST INCLUDE OVERHEAD AND REAR PROTECTION TO PERMIT ITS UNINHIBITED EMPLOYMENT.

B. AMBUSH PATROLS ARE VITAL TO PROVIDING INFORMATION AS TO ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION. AP'S SHOULD BE CONSTITUTED IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO PROTECT THEMSELVES, BUT NOT SO LARGE AS TO BE UNABLE TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION WHILE CONTINUOUSLY MONITORING ENEMY MOVEMENTS.

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C. TAC AIR CAN BE USED VERY EFFECTIVELY AT NIGHT. A VISIBLE REFERENCE POINT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY IN VECTORING TAC AIR ONTO PRECISE TARGET AREAS.

D. SPOOKY ILLUMINATION IS NECESSARY FOR TAC AIR; HOWEVER, SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT PRIOR TO EMPLOYING TAC AIR AS IT ILLUMINATES DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE ENEMY. ONCE THE TAC AIR STARTS, THE ENEMY'S ADVANTAGE PROVIDED BY THE ILLUMINATION IS NEGATED BY THE FIRES FROM THE AIRCRAFT.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Donald K. Weise
DONALD K. WEISE
CAPTAIN, INFANTRY
ADJUTANT

INCLOSURES:

- ~~1. OPORD 40-67 WITH CHANGES, & 2 Withdrawn, Hqs, DA~~
2. SKETCH OF FSB BURT AND ENEMY ATTACKS
- ~~3. AFTER ACTION REPORT, 2-22 INF (M) (INCL 4)~~
- ~~4. AFTER ACTION REPORT, 3-23 INF (Incl 5)~~

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