

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD386902	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	unclassified
FROM:	confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO:	Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM:	Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; NOV 1967. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.
AUTHORITY	
AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (10 Jan 68) FOR OT RD-670801 17 January 1968


SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th
Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:



KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

FEB 6 1968

DISTRIBUTION:

- Commanding Generals
 - US Continental Army Command
 - US Army Combat Developments Command
- Commandants
 - US Army Command and General Staff College
 - US Army War College
 - US Army Air Defense School
 - US Army Armor School
 - US Army Artillery and Missile School
 - US Army Aviation School
 - US Army Chemical School
 - US Army Civil Affairs School
 - US Army Engineer School
 - US Army Infantry School
 - US Army Intelligence School
 - US Army Adjutant General School
 - US Army Missile and Munition School
 - US Army Southeastern Signal School

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

AD 386902

**Best
Available
Copy**

CONFIDENTIAL

2

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Defense Affairs
Defense Documentation Center
Project Manager, Naval Inshore Warfare Project Office
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Commanding Generals
US Army Weapons Command
9th Infantry Division

CONFIDENTIAL

3

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-MH

7 November 1967


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDFU TO)

TO: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHCS-MH
APO San Francisco 96375

1. Attached is the second Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the 9th Infantry Division since its arrival in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. The report was prepared in accordance with AR 1-19 and accurately reflects a factual account of the Division's principal operations, activities and administration together with observations and recommendations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


R. H. PHELPS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

1. Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:


ACofS For Force Dev, DA (Thru channels) (1)(2)(3)
CG, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH (Direct) (4)(5)
CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCS-MH (Direct) (6)(7)(8)
CG, II FFORCEV, ATTN: ACofS, G3 (9)(10)
CG, U.S. Army Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga (11)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

5

CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATIONAL
REPORT



LESSONS LEARNED

9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

1 MAY - 31 JULY 1967

RECLASSIFIED AT 8 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 6300.10

*FOR OT RD
670901*

CONFIDENTIAL

7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I

Significant Organization Activities

SECTION II

Commander's Observations and Recommendations

SECTION III

APPENDIXES

	TAB
1 Major Geographical Features Within Division's TAGI	1 *
2 Roster Key Personnel	2 *
3 Captured VC Document	3
4 Command History River Flotilla One	4
5 Photographs Base Camp Locations	5 *
6 Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation HOPBAC XVI	6 **
7 Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation AKRON	7 **
8 AMHRO 4-67	8 *
9 Results of M16 Lubricant Test	9
10 Division Radio and Telephone Switchboard Designators	10 *
11 Sample JGVDS Leaflets	11 *
12 Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation ENTERPRISE	12 **
13 Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation PAIR BEACH II/ CORONADO	13 **
14 Letter of Instructions (Planning Procedures)	14 *

*--Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

**--Withdrawn, Hqs, DA, to be published separately.

9

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65) (WDFU-TO)

THRU: Command Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

SECTION I (C)

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. INTRODUCTION:

a. Command: During the reporting period the 9th Infantry Division continued internal defense assistance and internal development operations in support of the II Field Force, Vietnam, Campaign Plan¹ during 92 days of combat. Division Headquarters remained at Camp Martin Cox (YT 1600) except when control of operations in remote portions of the Division's tactical area of interest dictated displacement of a forward tactical command post. Operational Control of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate)(Light) conducting Operation FAIRFAX in Gia Dinh Province terminated at 100001 May 1967. Headquarters, 1st Brigade returned to Camp Martin Cox from operational control of the 25th Infantry Division and participation in Operation JUNCTION CITY III effective 200340 May 1967. The Division subsequently operated with a full complement of organic tactical resources for the remainder of the reporting period. Upon its return, Headquarters, 1st Brigade initiated internal defense and development operations in Bien Hoa Province (Operation Riley). Headquarters, 2d Brigade terminated Operation PALM BEACH II at 010001 June and initiated Operation CORONADO. Headquarters, 3d Brigade continued area oriented consolidation operations in Long An Province (Operation ENTERPRISE). Operational Control of

¹LOI 7-66, Secret, Headquarters, II Field Force, Vietnam, AVFEC, II Field Force, Vietnam, Campaign Plan for 1966.

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR OT RO
670801

10

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) was assumed by the 9th Infantry Division² at 261300 May 1967 and the regiment (-) was subsequently attached to the 9th Infantry Division³ on 1 June 1967. This report addresses an impartial and factual account of Operations ENTERPRISE, PALM BEACH II, CORONADO, GREAT BEND, RILEY, HOPTAC, PADDINGTON, EMPORIA, AKRON, KITTYHAWK, FAIRFAX and associated command activities and administration.

b. Reporting Officer: Major General George S. Eckhardt (1-31 May)
Major General G.G. O'Conner (1 June-31 July)

c. Location: Long Thanh North (Camp Martin Cox)(YS 164998), RVN.

d. Tactical Area of Interest (Unit Locations and Map References):
Appendix 1.

e. Roster of Key Personnel: Appendix 2.

f. Prepared By: 19th Military History Detachment.

2. Personnel and Administration:

a. General: Significant improvements were noted in the personnel and administrative areas during the reporting period. These improvements were attributed to aggressive implementation of the personnel infusion program and completion of several related actions to improve headquarters management. Maintenance of morale was furthered by an overall increase in recreational facilities, expansion of postal services, utilization of in and out of country rest and recuperation allocations and addition of what is believed to be one of the best post exchange facilities in Vietnam. Discipline, law and order remained excellent as evidenced by an extremely low stockade population and the limited number of inspector general and congressional inquiries. Prompt and expeditious payment of troops with disbursements totalling \$7,246,464.00 during the reporting period resulted in minimal pay complaints.

b. Administration:

(1) Headquarters Management: A Headquarters Administrative Standing Operating Procedure was published during the reporting period to standardize and clarify methods for completing staff actions. Additionally,

²Message, Secret, Headquarters, II Field Force, Vietnam, AVFBC-OP (50619), Subject, Operational Control of Units (U).

³General Order Number 2562, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, dated 1 June 1967.

AVDE-MH

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

procedures were published for movement and internal organization of the headquarters when a forward command post is established. Plans for development of the Division Main Headquarters complex at Camp Martin Cox were approved and construction or modifications to existing facilities was initiated.

(2) Statistics:

(a) Division Strength:

(Comparison as of the end of the previous and current reporting period)

	<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
30 April	1162	1111	14720	16191
31 July (Includes Attachments)	1196	1143	14921	15927

(Strength by Month)

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>			<u>ASSIGNED</u>			<u>PRESENT FOR DUTY</u>		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
MAY	1015	181	14921	1007	123	16633	961	111	15856
JUNE	1015	181	14921	993	130	16533	993	121	16070
JULY	1015	181	14921	1008	135	15927	1039	133	15555

(Gains by Month)

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
MAY	3	17	933	953
JUNE	40	4	387	431
JULY	105	10	335	450

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(b) Casualties:

	KHA				WHA			
	OFF	WO	EM	AGG	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
MAY	1	0	32	33	36	0	480	516
JUNE	4	0	51	55	18	0	348	366
JULY	2	0	41	43	21	0	303	324

	NBD				NBI			
	OFF	WO	EM	AGG	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
MAY	2	1	6	9	4	0	53	57
JUNE	0	0	0	0	2	0	56	58
JULY	2	0	2	4	0	0	43	43

(c) Analysis of Casualties:

	MINES	SMALL ARMS	MORTAR	BOOBY TRAPS	SNIPER	OTHER
S & D	161	246	24	228	32	178
Defense	23	27	60	1	—	11
Convoy	3	—	—	—	—	1
Patrol	8	35	1	46	2	35
Base Area	2	2	31	—	—	10
In Flight	—	13	—	—	8	13
Ambush	—	—	—	1	4	—
Attack	—	2	—	—	—	6
Other	83	46	12	45	8	183

4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

13
AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(Situation)

	KHA	WHA
S & D	127	742
Defense	19	103
Convoy	—	4
Patrol	5	122
Base Area	2	43
In Flight	11	23
Ambush	1	4
Attack	—	8
Other	36	341

(Location of Wound)

	KHA	WHA
Leg	16	505
Arm	4	346
Head	69	185
Chest	37	49
Back	4	52
Stomach	10	24
Other	19	61

c. Personnel Management

(1) One of the more important problems of personnel management confronting the division after arrival in Vietnam, was reduction of the rotational hump which would occur during November - December 1967 and January 1968. Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam policy is that no more than 25% of the command will rotate during a given month after the units first year in Vietnam. Policy guidance further reduces this to 15% after the units second year in Vietnam. Three courses of action were available to effect required reductions in the rotational hump:

(a) Curtail individual tours to spread rotational losses over a 4-5 month period.

(b) Infuse personnel with the replacement stream or other organizations in Vietnam for a replacement of similar grade and MOS.

(c) Because the division had deployed in three major increments, it was possible to infuse some personnel between each major deploying increment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(2) The first course of action was ruled out because of the tremendous amount of man days which would be lost by a massive curtailment.

(3) The second course of action was adopted and implemented to infuse a major portion of selected division personnel with either the replacement stream or with other organizations in Vietnam to accommodate rotational hump objectives.

(4) The third course of action, intra division infusion, was also implemented to further improve reduction of the rotational hump to within USARV objectives.

(5) Implementation of the infusion program was accomplished as follows:

(a) Coordination meetings for exchange of personnel were arranged with other organizations in Vietnam through Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam. One prime factor which was initially overlooked during coordination meetings was the travel distance between organizations affected by personnel transfers. Air transportation was used when possible to reduce time lost in transit. However, last minute cancellations of transportation caused an administrative burden in the departure area i.e., billeting personnel until other transportation could be scheduled.

(b) An infusion team was organized in the Personnel Services Branch, Personnel Services Division of the Adjutant General's Section. This team was composed of one Sergeant (E-7) and five Sergeants (E-5) all of whom had extensive personnel management experience. Personnel management experience is required to remain abreast of each change which may affect the infusion of one individual among the thousands who are programmed for infusion. For example, two individuals in different units who are not scheduled to rotate during the rotational hump of the units between which an infusion is contemplated are tentatively selected for exchange. The two individuals under consideration are compared by grade, MOS and times wounded (if an individual had been wounded twice, he is deleted from consideration for infusion). If all requirements are met the two individuals are programmed for infusion on a future date. The infusion team then commences a machine listing which verifies data until the infusion is to take place. If one of the individuals under consideration for infusion becomes a casualty (second time or evacuated), is promoted or reduced, has his MOS changed or becomes involved in an operation from which he cannot be released, the infusion is nullified. Requirements to resolve administrative matters i.e., organizational equipment to be retained by individuals, and reducing administrative burdens on headquarters involved, dictates that the infusion process be programmed rather than be effected simultaneously with matching of two personnel.

(c) In addition to the inter-division/organization infusion program, an intra-division infusion program was also initiated. This

CONFIDENTIAL

15

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOK-65)

program required that orders be published reassigning over three thousand personnel between units in the division. The same individual requisites were used to program intra-division transfers. An important side effect (morale factor) resulting from intra-division infusion is that it allows personnel who deployed with the division to remain in the division.

d. Discipline, Law and Order

(1) General: During the reporting period as overview of discipline, law and order reveals that the 9th Infantry Division is maintaining an excellent record. The courts-martial rate did not reflect a significant trend but remained low by comparison within USARV. However, the Class I and II offender rate did indicate a need for command attention.

(2) Provost Marshal Activities

(a) Because of the nature of Provost Marshal activities, comparisons of trends can more easily be examined by FY quarter per 1000 personnel. During the 3d Quarter, Division Class I offender rate was .89 as compared with 1.11 during the 4th Quarter. The Division's 4th Quarter Class I offender rate was more than double the USARV average. Larcenies represented the most frequently reported Class I offense i.e., personal loss of money, tape recorders, etc. In most cases the owner was at fault because he did not use means at his disposal to properly secure property that was stolen.

(b) There were 641 Class II offenses committed during the 4th Quarter. This represented a rate of 37.53 compared with USARV rate of 31.04. Class II offenses identified reflect an aggressive enforcement policy on uniform violation, pass and leave violations, regulations governing off limits establishments, etc. Approximately one third of the Class II offenses resulted from citations issued by military police units in Saigon, Bien Hoa, Long Binh and Vung Tau for the aforementioned offenses.

(c) Seventy-nine traffic accidents were investigated by the Division Provost Marshal's Office during the 4th Quarter. Sixty-four involved Division men and vehicles. The most predominant cause of vehicle accidents were failure to maintain control of vehicles, driving too fast for road conditions and improper passing. Traffic accidents resulted in one Vietnamese death and no Division fatalities. Citations for speeding showed a slight increase during the 4th Quarter over the 3d Quarter however, there was a significant decline when compared with the total number of citations issued for total violations.

(d) The number of non-combat lost, stolen and recovered weapons represented an increased awareness of all personnel on the importance of maintaining control of individual weapons.

7
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

16

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

	3d Quarter	4th Quarter
Lost	34 (\$4151.00)	19 (\$3169.00)
Stolen	10 (\$1485.00)	7 (\$644.00)
Recovered	10 (\$1313.00)	7 (\$1300.00)

(e) Approximately seventy-five percent of criminal investigations involved use or possession of marihuana. Marihuana is readily available at relatively low prices (200-300 piasters or \$1.89-\$2.70 per pack of twenty cigarettes). Most cases reveal that personal curiosity prepetrated purchase of marihuana.

(f) In summary, a valid comparison of discipline, law and order in units of the Division is difficult because each unit operates with varying missions, organization, and in a different enviroment. Comparison with USARV average does indicate however, that law enforcement within the Division is highly effective.

(3) Judge Advocate General Activities

(a) During the period 1 May - 31 July 1967, courts-martial were held at a rate which did not reflect any significant disciplinary problem areas. Eleven general courts-martial were held during the period. The major offenses tried by division general courts-martial fell within the following general catagories (most courts included trail for more than one offense):

- Assault with intent to commit sodomy - 1
- Offer of violence against a superior officer - 1
- Self-inflicted wound - 1
- Sodomy - 1
- Conspiracy to commit sodomy - 1
- Assault intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm - 1
- Larceny - 4
- Willful disobedience of a lawful command from a superior officer - 10
- Wrongful possession of marihuana - 4
- Wrongful use of marihuana - 3
- Wrongful transfer of marihuana - 2
- Negligent homicide - 1
- Assault with a dangerous weapon - 7
- Wrongful possession of more than one Army ID card - 1
- Wrongful discharge of weapon - 1
- Hit and Run driving - 1
- Reckless driving - 1
- AWOL to avoid field duty - 2
- AWOL from duty station - 1
- Concealed weapon - 1

CONFIDENTIAL

17
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(b) The prisoner population fluctuated slightly, but remained near 30. This figure is low when compared with other divisions in Vietnam and does not represent a significant trend or problem area.

e. Morale and Miscellaneous

(1) General: Morale within the Division remained excellent. Improvements in postal, recreation, post exchange facilities and utilization of rest and recuperation leaves were among the activities which attributed to the maintenance of a high state of morale in the Division. Other areas such as Red Cross and awards and decorations activities were also expanded during the quarter.

(2) Personal Services: Morale within the Division remained excellent through the reporting period. More important of the intensified efforts to provide more and better facilities for promoting unit morale are shown below:

(a) Rest and Recuperation allocation and utilization:

	ALLOCATION	% OF UTILIZATION	TOTAL
May	1274	113.2	1442
June	1236	104.1	1286
July	1600	99.1	1588

USO SHOWS

Musician's Union	2 May
Johnny True Trio	25 May
Guys and Dolls	13 June
Jack Costanzo	19 July

(b) Swimming pool: Construction on a 50 X 100 foot swimming pool was started at Camp Martin Cox to be operational by the end of August.

(c) Outboard motor boat: Three 16 foot outboard motor boats and water ski equipment were made available for use at the Dong Tam base.

(d) Postal Services: Two mobile postal facilities were established during the reporting period using 2½ ton trucks with shop van bodies. One is operated as a package mailing facility adjacent to the wrapping service at the Camp Martin Cox Main Post Exchange. The other mobile unit is

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

spotted in high troop density areas away from the Camp Martin Cox Post Office. To protect mail during inclement weather, it is delivered to the heliport for further delivery to outlying units by two 3/4 ton ambulances. To facilitate delivery of mail to casualties, liaison NCO have been assigned at surgical hospitals in Long Binh, Saigon and Vung Tau. These liaison NCO report admission and release of all Division casualties to the APO at Camp Martin Cox.

(e) Finance: With ever increasing demands of tactical operations, steps were taken to provide additional financial support to troops in the field. Twice each week a finance service team visits forward troop units. This team resolves pay problems, initiates and stops allotments, makes field payments and funds foreign currency agents. Within five days after each payday, division finance service teams travel as far north as Cam Ranh Bay and as far south as Vung Tau to pay hospitalized division personnel. This procedure reduces the burden on class A agents and releases them to the more pressing requirements of combat. As an additional service to class A agents, finance service teams fly to forward areas to deliver payrolls. Turnbacks are received in a similar manner. One problem area experienced is the number of replacements reporting to the Division without their financial data records folder (FDRF). The junior officer or enlisted man can ill afford a minor deviation in income if his FDRF is lost. To correct this situation these individuals are paid one month's pay in suspended status until the original or a duplicate FDRF can be obtained. In summary, close and continuous financial support was provided, as evidenced by an almost total absence of pay complaints.

(f) Religious Services: During the reporting period there were a total of 621 protestant and 598 catholic services conducted with a total attendance of 41, 880 personnel.

(g) Personal Health and Hygiene:

1 Casualty Evacuation: The principle of evacuating a patient from the field to the battalion aid station to Division Clearing Station to Army or surgical hospital is time honored. In a counterinsurgency environment and with helicopter evacuation, the patient is often evacuated from the field directly to Army or surgical hospital level. This has undoubtedly attributed to saving many lives. Experience has shown however, that in many cases this has been detrimental to both the casualty and the mission. The following points substantiate the fact that intermediate clearing stations should not be over flown.

a Many patients are evacuated from the field without receiving proper medical attention because of the tactical situation and thus, have not been treated for an extended flight (20 or more minutes). Moreover, patients that have been treated by the combat medic and who are in shock, require an airway, or a tourniquet which in turn requires immediate professional medical treatment. When a clearing station is by-passed in this type situation,

10
CONFIDENTIAL

19

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

the risk of having a patient die of wounds is increased with every unnecessary flying minute.

b Unavoidably mixing seriously and slightly wounded on the same aircraft causes the slightly wounded to go to Army or surgical hospital level. This creates the administrative burden of returning slightly wounded to their units and a corresponding unnecessary loss of foxhole strength.

c Clearing Stations (battalion level) have the necessary equipment and professionally trained personnel to provide resuscitative medical care and to stabilize the patient so that further evacuation will not jeopardize loss of life or limb.

d Patients are delivered to the battalion clearing station by vehicle, "slicks", ground vehicle and other medical evacuation helicopters. Hence, maximum utilization of available space on a medevac helicopter returning to Army or surgical hospitals can be made from the clearing station.

2 Four Life Saving Steps: Analysis of casualties after a recent operation indicated that 14% of the deaths were due to loss of blood. Death from loss of blood resulting from wounds of the extremities is in most cases, preventable if everything possible is done to stop the loss of blood. The percentage of aidmen assigned to each unit is more than sufficient to support normal requirements however, unit commanders have been reminded that the possibility of a large number of casualties occurring in a short time frame or loss of the medic himself, cannot be considered a remote possibility. Therefore, training and retraining in the four life saving steps to include self aid is a recurring requirement.

3 Communicable Diseases:

a Hepatitis: Several cases of hepatitis encountered during the reporting period has prompted renewed emphasis on the dangers of drinking domestic soft drinks or cooling drinks with non-potable ice.

b Amebic Dysentery: Failure to use chlorine disinfectant for sterilization of fresh produce was attributed to several cases of amebic dysentery during the reporting period. Units have been reminded that fresh vegetables must be disinfected prior to consumption.

(h) Special Services: To improve procedures of Special Services support of the division, hand receipt accounts have been established in all 9th Division and tenant units. This will serve to insure efficient issue and use of both appropriated and non-appropriated supplies and equipment furnished to supported units by the Division Special Services facility. In other areas, an 11,000 square foot service club was opened at the Dong Tam

11
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

20

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

Base on 18 July. Addition of a professionally trained female director brings to a total of four service club trained directors now supporting the division.

(i) Army Exchange Services: See paragraph 11, Base Development.

(j) Awards and Decorations: The awards and decorations policies for the 9th Infantry Division are firmly established and being adhered to by all units. A continuous rising volume of awards are being processed each month making a more timely and effective awards and decorations program. To keep pace with the ever growing number of recommendations being processed a daily Awards and Decorations Review Board has been established to speed the awarding of decorations to deserving division personnel. To further assist the unit commanders after a large scale action, AG Alert Teams are often sent to areas of action to help in the preparation of the recommendations for awards. The use of Command Letters are the principle means of keeping the commanders abreast of any change or as a reminder system concerning the awards and decorations program of the division. The present Awards and Decorations program is under constant review for possible ways of awarding decorations to deserving assigned division and attached unit personnel by a more expedient means.

UNIT	MH	DSC	SS	LM	DFC	SM	BSM/V	AM	PH	BSM	AM/V	ACM/V	ACM
1st Bde			4		1		1	50	6	4	11	4	3
2d Bde			2		2			14	3	1			
3d Bde			2	1			2	6	17	2		1	1
HHC 9th Div				1			2	11	1	11	3		4
2/39 Inf			4				10	21	184	28	1		2
3/39 Inf			17			1	43	3	446	17		12	4
4/39 Inf			5		3		11	2	93	3	3	13	4
2/47 Inf			4			1	7		190	12		1	1
3/47 Inf	1		9				92	3	226	3		15	
4/47 Inf			9				30	6	272	9		17	2
2/65 Inf			14			2	31	4	347	38		11	3
3/60 Inf	1		15		1	5	80		342	4		25	
5/60 Inf			4			5	18	2	390	19		17	6
Div Arty							1	66	6	7	6	1	
1/11 Arty						1	9	5	17	3	2	2	1
2/4 Arty			7				3	7	28	11		1	
3/34 Arty			2			1	26	10	12	8	1	1	14
1/84 Arty							2	2	6	4		2	19
Sup Comd										2		1	
9th Admin									5	5			5
9th S&T									3	1			2
9th Med												2	8
709 Maint								36	8			2	2

CONFIDENTIAL

12

21

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

UNIT	MH	DSC	SS	LM	DFC	SM	BSM/V	AM	PH	BSM	AM/V	ACM/V	ACM
9th Avn			3		15	1	1	762	23	10	42	5	
15 Engr			2				9		69	10		6	5
3/5 Cav			16		12	5	59	365	237	13	19	54	30
9th Sig									12	3		1	4
9th MP Co							2		1	3		12	1
Others					1		3	2	21	2		2	11

(2) Miscellaneous

1 Red Cross: Support rendered during the reporting period represented a steady increase in almost all areas of assistance with the peak month being July. It is believed that the number of cases handled during July will be the highest for the current calendar year.

	CASES HANDLED	LOANS/GRANTS (AMOUNT)	EMERGENCY LEAVE
May	1074	20 (\$2600.00)	73
June	1425	24 (\$2930.00)	113
July	1633	18 (\$1740.00)	128
Total	<u>4132</u>	<u>62 (\$7270.00)</u>	<u>314</u>

2 Circuit Rider: A "circuit rider" service which has been in operation since shortly after the Division's arrival in country, continued to prove beneficial. The service consists of representatives from AG, Finance, SJA, IG and Red Cross who move to outlying units on a weekly schedule to provide a administrative assistance as required. Commanders in the field make individuals with legal, financial or related problems available when the circuit rider service arrives. This eliminates an unnecessary amount of time lost to transport and billet individuals in need of assistance at the Division base camp.

3. (C) Intelligence

a. General:

(1) Primary enemy objectives during the reporting period have been to discourage the Vietnamese people's support of the GVN and Free World Force programs, and to harass, and if possible destroy GVN and US Forces. The VC/NVA have generally avoided contact with US Forces, except for isolated instances when they have attempted to take full advantage of surprise to engage friendly forces. These engagements have generally lasted only a short period of time and terminate when the VC have either successfully accomplished their mission or have been able to withdraw from the battlefield. The VC have

¹³
CONFIDENTIAL

22

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

conducted numerous night raids against small ARVN installations and have attacked the Revolutionary Development cadre teams in every province within the Division TAOI. The VC have continued to intimidate the population, using either threats or armed force in order to obtain the cooperation of the Vietnamese people.

(2) VC units appear to have moved away from the more populated areas and in some instances to the outer extremities of the 9th Infantry Division TAOI. This movement is believed to be the result of the incessant probing and sweeping of US Forces. Thus the VC's ability to wage a conventional type war appears to have deteriorated although they still possess the ability to mobilize into larger combat units on short notice. In their present fragmented and clandestine organization, VC units are extremely difficult to locate, identify, and destroy. This is especially true in the Delta.

(3) The VC Main Force units have been concentrated primarily in LONG THANH and PHUOC TUY Provinces. They have generally avoided US Force operations, except to conduct an occasional vehicle ambush or a night attack (usually by fire only). They appear to have improved in armament, discipline, and training during the latter part of this period; often this has been done by having an entire battalion move into War Zone D or eastern Cambodia for a period of several weeks for training and for resupply.

(4) Guerrillas and self-defense forces have been active in the Nhon Trach District and throughout the delta. There have been no recognizable distinction between friendly contacts with guerrillas and those with self-defense forces. Both are similar in lack of uniformity in dress, equipment, and armament, and appear to have the same mission of harassing and taking advantage of any opportunity to destroy small friendly forces. During daylight, most contacts are characterized by short skirmishes of low intensity, usually initiated by sniper fire from treelines or heavily vegetated stream banks. Booby traps appear to be placed in front of advancing friendly troops, and may be later retrieved once our forces clear the area. The amount of mining of roads in the delta has increased during the reporting period, and occasionally even main highways like Route 4 are cratered during the night. Several bridges have been destroyed, and the Ben Luc Bridge is constantly threatened. (App 3, A Captured VC Plan to Attack the Bridge Located at BEN LUC). During the hours of darkness there have been several mortar attacks on US installations at Dong Tam, Tan An, and Ben Luc. There has also been complementary firing of anti-tank weapons, automatic weapons, and small arms in some instances. Several small ARVN installations and RD areas have been attacked by indirect and direct fires, and if a weakness in the defensive perimeter has become apparent, they have initiated an assault and in a few instances penetrated the installation.

(5) The irregulars are excellent at blending in with the terrain and the indigenous population, and they use both to maximum advantage. They move very quickly, often hiding their weapons in the nipa

14
CONFIDENTIAL

23

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

palms or in the muddy water to make their escape easier, once they have lost the advantage of surprise. They realize that friendly forces will have difficulty proving their involvement unless they are caught with weapons. They may either hide in nipa palms or other vegetation, under the water using bamboo or reeds for breathing apparatus, or they may run to the nearest inhabited area to blend with the local population. They are considered able to move faster and with more stealth over the paddied country than the average better equipped and heavier US soldier. They take maximum advantage of the night to evade friendly forces, regroup, resupply, and coordinate their activities. They thoroughly plan and rehearse any planned contact with friendly forces to the extent that they know in advance where they will hide their weapons and what routes of escape they will use. They will not initiate a contact unless they consider the situation favorable to them.

(6) Weapons used by irregulars have included a variety of European, American, and Chicom models to include the 7.62 Chicom carbine, US M1 rifle, US M1 and M2 carbine, German Mauser, 1917 Mauser, 1917 Remington, US BAR, Thompson SMG, US Enfield, US Springfield, US Winchester, a variety of pistols, and various Chicom, US, and homemade grenades and booby traps. Lately, there have been some AK-47 Chicom weapons captured from irregular forces in the Nhon Trach and Nha Be Districts, and in Long An Province.

(7) Many irregulars may tire of the constant running and evading, but those who do usually either become ralliers or take leave to recuperate as innocent civilians before again taking arms. Morale varies from being low, for the irregular with strong family ties, or a distaste to bear arms, to excellent for the fanatical Communist. Many irregulars are believed to be "opportunists" who carry arms to exploit the Vietnamese populace, and who may occasionally attempt a low order operation to personally benefit from the capture of supplies or weapons from friendly elements. This type of guerrilla has little staying power, and his support vacillates between occasional participation in irregular actions to that of being a "drifter" in the Vietnamese society. Other dedicated irregulars appear convinced of foreign meddling in Vietnamese affairs, and provide leadership and direction to the irregular organization.

b. Enemy Strength

(1) In the Division TAOI:

Combat personnel	10,900
Logistical support personnel	1,350
Guerrillas	3,930
Self-Defense Forces	8,840
Infrastructure	<u>3,130</u>
Total	28,150

15

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

24

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

NOTE: In addition there were large numbers of Vietnamese who were conscripted either willingly or unwillingly to serve as laborers, porters, and/or informants for the VC, for varying periods and at various times.

(2) By Province/Area:

	<u>Binh Tuy</u>	<u>Long Khanh</u>	<u>Bien Hoa</u>	<u>Rung Sat</u>	<u>Long An</u>	<u>Dinh Tuong</u>
Combat	400	4,900	255	1,000	1,440	1,940
Logistical		1,352				
Spt/Admin						
Guerrillas	95	55	600		1,420	1,780
Self-Defense						
Secret S-Defense	780	55	795		2,210	5,000
Political	195	575			1,230	1,130

Enemy Combat and Combat Support Units:

UNIT DESIGNATION	TYPE OF UNIT	SUBORDINATE TO: (VC DESIGNATION)	LOCATION (GVN DESIGNATION)	STRENGTH
HQS, 5th VC Div	VC Main Force	COSVN	Long Khanh Prov	500
274th Regt	VC Main Force	5th VC Div	Long Khanh-Phuoc Tuy Prov	2000
275th Regt	VC Main Force	5th VC Div	Long Khanh Prov	2000
24th Arty Gp	VC/NVA Main Force	5th VC Div	Long Khanh-Phuoc Tuy Prov	400
Doan 84 (Gp 84)	Rear Service	COSVN	Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, Phuoc Tuy Prov	1352
Doan 10 (T-10)	VC Main Force	COSVN	Rung Sat Special Zone	1000
D445 Bn*	Provincial Bn	Ba Bien Prov	Phuoc Tuy Prov	500
C240 Co**	District Cp	Long Thanh Dist, Ba Bien Prov**	Long Thanh Dist, Bien Hoa Prov	120
C245 Co	Unknown	Unknown	Nhon Trach Dist Bien Hoa Prov	100
C207 Plt	Unknown	Long Thanh Dist Labor Committee, Ba Bien Prov	Long Thanh Dist Bien Hoa Prov	35
4th Bn***	VC Main Force	Thu Duc Dist, Military Region IV	Long Thanh Dist Bien Hoa Prov	150
506th Bn	Provincial Bn	Long An Prov	Duc Hoa Dist Hau Nghia Prov	330
2nd Bn	Provincial Bn	Long An Prov	Can Duoc-Tan Tru Districts, Long An Prov.	250

16

CONFIDENTIAL

3-

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

C75 RR Co	Prov Cmbt Spt Co	Long An Prov	Unlocated	100
C2 Co	Prov Inf Co	Long An Prov	Unlocated	100
U/I Sapper Co	Prov Cmbt Spt Co	Long An Prov	Unlocated	100
C312 Co	Dist Inf Co	Ben Thu Dist	Ben Luc-Thu Thua District, Long An Prov	120
C313 Co	Dist Inf Co	Chau Thanh Dist	Binh Phuoc Dist	120
C314 Co	Dist Inf Co	Long An Prov	Long An Prov	120
C315 Co	Dist Inf Co	Tan Tru Dist	Tan Tru Dist	70
C316 Co	Dist Inf Co	Long An Prov	Long An Prov	80
C334 Sapper Co	Region Cmbt Spt Co	Can Duoc Dist	Can Duoc Dist	70
5th Bn****	VC Main Force	Long An Prov	Long An Prov	175+
6th Bn*****	VC Main Force	Military Region II	Tan Tru Dist	200+
261st Bn	Region Force	Nha Be Dist, Mil Region IV	Long An Prov	550
263d Bn	Region Force	Binh Tan Dist, Mil Region IV	Dinh Tuong Prov	550
514th Bn	Provincial Bn	Mil Region II	Dinh Tuong Prov	350
C212 Sapper Co	Prov Cmbt Spt Co	My Tho Prov	Dinh Tuong Prov	90
C207th Co	Prov Inf Co	My Tho Prov	Dinh Tuong Prov	80
Cai Lay Co	Dist Inf Co	Cai Lay Dist	Khiem Ich Dist	80
Cai Be Co	Dist Inf Co	My Tho Prov	Dinh Tuong Prov	80
Cho Gao Co	Dist Inf Co	Cai Be Dist	Kien Binh Dist	80
Chau Thanh Co	Dist Inf Co	My Tho Prov	Dinh Tuong Prov	80
		Cho Gao Dist	Cho Gao Dist	80
		My Tho Prov	Dinh Tuong Prov	80
		Chau Thanh Dist	Long Dinh Dist	80
		My Tho Prov	Dinh Tuong Prov	

* D445 Bn could be used to reinforce district units within Bien Hoa and Long Thanh Provinces as well as in Phuoc Tuy Province.

** Exact subordination of this unit unknown.

*** 4th Battalion frequently crosses into Bien Hoa Province to avoid ops by allied/US Forces in its own area.

**** 5th Bn operates in Nha Be District, Military Region IV, but is based in Thanh Duoc District, Long An Province to avoid allied/US ops in Nha Be District, Gia Dinh Province.

***** 6th Bn operates in Binh Tan Dist, Military Region IV, but is based in Ben Luc District, Long An Province to avoid allied/US ops in Binh Chanh-Tan Binh Districts, Gia Dinh Province.

CONFIDENTIAL
17

216

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

d. Enemy Losses.

(1) Major engagements

(a) Ap Bac, during Operation Palm Beach, occurred on 2-3 May 1967 when elements of the 2d Brigade engaged the 514th LF Bn. VC KIA were 195 (BC) and numerous weapons were captured.

(b) Nha Be, during Operation CORONADO, occurred 19-21 June 1967 when initially A Company and then C Company, 4/47 Inf, 2d Brigade engaged a large VC force, later reinforced by 3/47 and 3/39 Battalions. VC KIA were 256 (BC), and 50 weapons were captured.

(c) Operation AKRON was a search and destroy operation against elements of the VC 274 Regt conducted between 9 and 29 June in SE Bien Hoa Province and NE Phouc Tuy Provinces. VC KIA for this operation were 94.

(d) Operation PADDINGTON was search and destroy operation that occurred during 10-16 July, and was targeted against the 274th Regiment of the 5th VC Division. The VC were largely successful in evading friendly forces, but suffered 45 KIA.

(e) A battle near the Dong Nai River occurred as part of Operation EMPORIA on 21-24 July 1967, when the 1/11 Cav Sqdn was ambushed by elements of the D800 Dong Nai Bn. VC KIA were 96.

(f) Operation CORONADO II resulted in an engagement between the VC and elements of the 2d Brigade and two ARVN Ranger Battalions on 27-31 July 1967 in Dinh Tuong Province. VC losses to US Forces were 96 KIA, while another 216 VC KIA were attributed to ARVN.

(2) Recapitulation of enemy losses (captured/destroyed)

	May	June	July	Total
VC KIA	533	590	636	1759
VC PW	38	25	117	180
Detainees	675	782	1182	2639
Small Arms	81/2	109/1	131/0	321/3
Crew Served Weapons	8/5	11/0	20/0	39/5
Ammunition (rounds)	0/9389	14056/946	30/3000	14086/13335
Grain (tons)	7/28.28	15.45/32.49	2.65/7.81	25.10/68.58
Sampans	0/48	0/65	0/53	0/166

d. VC attacks against ARVN/RF/PF and RD cadre.

18
CONFIDENTIAL

27

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(1) General. The number and frequency of attacks, acts of terrorism, assassinations, and sabotage directed against ARVN, Popular Force, and Revolutionary Development activities and installations increased noticeably during the last month of the reporting period. This may be explained as VC attempts to take advantage of the monsoon rains which inhibited ground and air mobility.

(2) Recapitulation.

	May	June	July	Total
Attacks (incl harassing fires)	30	20	64	114
Terrorism and Assassinations	3	6	12	21
Hamlet Entry and Propaganda	4	3	4	11
Sabotage	2	3	11	16

e. Significant Intelligence Sources.

(1) During the reporting period, the Division employed Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs), Sigma Teams, Recondo Teams, Red Haze, SLAR, Aerial Photography, Visual Reconnaissance, and the Chemical People Detector with varying degrees of effectiveness. Operations at the end of the reporting period were far more productive than at the beginning of the period. Better liaison was being conducted with ARVN and the Vietnamese government, police, and para-military officials at province and district levels at the end of the reporting period. The 9th MI Detachment conducted continuous operations in support of the Division intelligence collection program.

(2) The OB Section, 9th MI Detachment, maintained information on the composition, disposition, strength, tactics, training, logistics, equipment, personalities, and code names/numbers of enemy units within the 9th Infantry Division TAOI. In addition, the OB Section assisted in writing Intelligence Estimates for the RVN provinces of Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, and Bien Hoa, as well as estimates for operations PORTSEA, CHAPMAN, AKRON, and CONCORDIA. During this period, the OB Section was involved in planning and requesting specialized intelligence support from higher headquarters, writing of EEI to be answered by subordinate units, and the debriefing of Special Forces Reconnaissance Patrols. The most recent function was evaluating Field Information Reports produced by the 9th MI Detachment, the 149th and 135th INTC Groups, OSA Reports, and Agent Reports produced by other sources.

(3) Interrogation Section, 9th MI Detachment assets were deployed at brigade level as a standard practice. Interrogation teams were also deployed at battalion level in Long An Province to provide continuous

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

support for battalions involved in the pacification effort in the area. An interrogation team was deployed at the Dong Tam base to provide support for the base security element. Two mobile interrogation teams were located at division headquarters to provide additional support for any element of the division which may require their services. 14th MI Detachment (ARVN) personnel were integrated into interrogation teams at all levels and provided support to the Division G2.

(4) The CI Section, 9th MI Detachment maintained 11 confidential informants and sub-informants in areas where 9th Infantry Division units were located. These informants were primarily targeted against the VC infrastructure, but were also able to provide valuable information concerning the location of VC units, and guerrilla activity. The CI Section is developing a comprehensive infrastructure file which will cover all areas where the 9th Infantry Division is conducting operations. Information on the personalities in this file is obtained through liaison with allied intelligence agencies, interrogation reports, and confidential informants. Units planning to conduct operations in a given area have access to these files. Special agents from the CI Section have accompanied units on cordon-and-search missions. On cordon-and-search missions, CI agents have in their possession the infrastructure files for that area and are able to assist intelligence officers in identifying detainees and suspects.

(5) The 9th Division Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Detachment performed quite successfully during the reporting period, completing 43 patrol missions in which there were 18 contacts with the enemy. LRRPs were used in the Delta region with moderate success because of the nature of the terrain and dense population. However, they were able to obtain much useful information on the terrain and enemy situation in Base Area 302 and 303. This permitted a more productive allocation of resources when tactical operations were conducted in these areas.

(6) With the activation of the Mobile Riverine Force, the need for waterway intelligence was significantly increased. In addition to depths, widths, bank conditions and obstructions of waterways, horizontal and vertical underbridge clearance was also needed. The effort to obtain the desired data included the investigation of all US, ARVN and MPW sources. One method used to gain this intelligence was to communicate with sector advisors in an attempt to utilize the RF/PF's located at bridges, to collect tidal and clearance data at their particular location. To date very little information has been obtained from this effort; however, it is anticipated that this channel will provide the needed data in the future.

f. Intelligence Highlights during the Reporting Period.

(1) During the months of May, June, and July 1967, both the 274th and the 275th VC Regts were involved in several contacts with both ARVN

20
CONFIDENTIAL

29

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

and FWNAF units. On 5 May 1967, the 2d Bn, 275th VC Regt, reinforced by at least one heavy machine gun company of the 24th Arty Gp, 5th VC Div, attacked Ham Tan Compound (YS 9882) inflicting moderate casualties on the defenders. Between 28 April and 5 May the 1st and 3d Bns of the 275th VC Regt were involved in countersweep operations in the Rung La area (vacinity YT 7810) with elements of the 18th ARVN Div.

(2) On 21 May 1967, the 2d Bn, 274th VC Regt ambushed a platoon of the 11 ACR on Hwy 1 in the vicinity of YS 447825.

(3) On 28 June 1967, the 3d Bn, 275th VC Regt was contacted by elements of the 18th ARVN Div in the vicinity of YT 3332. This contact lasted approximately 2 days and forced the VC to withdraw across the Dong Nai River into War Zone "D". The 2d Bn, 275th VC Regt was also involved in this operation, but to a lesser degree.

(4) On 10 July 1967, elements of the 9th US Inf Div, the 1st Australian Task Force, 11th ACR, and ARVN elements launched Operation PADDINGTON against elements of the 274th VC Regt located in the vicinity of YS 6580. The VC moved with their women and children at night and were able to avoid major contact with allied forces. During PADDINGTON a new 40mm Chicom rocket launcher, Model 56, and a North Vietnamese factory produced claymore mine were recovered. This was the first encounter with a NVA factory claymore in IIICTZ. During the operation, a NVA 2d Lt, assigned to the 50th Training Group of the 5th VC Div rallied and reported that the 5th VC Div had received approximately 105 replacements from the 325B NVA Division.

(5) On 16 July 1967, vicinity YS 434820 2d Bn, 43d Regt, 18th ARVN engaged an estimated VC Bn, no unit identification was established. On 20 July 1967, elements of the 2d Bn, 274th VC Regt attacked ARVN outposts at YS 463779 and YS 453838.

(6) On 21 July 1967, at 0845 hrs, vicinity YT 628440, the 662 RF Co was attacked by an estimated VC Bn; an armored car platoon moving south on Hwy 20 to reinforce the RF Co was ambushed at YT 650462. One POW taken stated he was a member of the D800 Dong Nai Bn. Approximately 55 minutes later, between YT 435328 to YT 432314 on Hwy 20, L/3/11th ACR was ambushed by an estimated reinforced VC Bn. K/3/11th ACR came under heavy fire when reinforcing L troop; the 2d and 3d Bns, 275th VC Regt with elements of the D800 Duong Nai Bn were identified in the action.

(7) Elsewhere in the 9th Div TAOI, the VC continued to harass GVN outposts, attack RD cadre, and attempt to counter GVN pacification plans.

(8) In Long An Province, VC forces dispersed to avoid contact with US forces, but on 19 June 1967, 2d Bde, 9th US Inf Div operating

21
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

30

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

from its mobile afloat base, contacted elements of the 5th VC Bn, Nha Be Dist (AKA 306th Bn) in Can Giouc Dist. The VC lost heavily in this contact.

(9) On the night of 23-24 July 1967, Dong Tam Base received some 32 rounds of 82mm mortar fire; it is believed that the heavy weapons squad of the 514th VC Bn was responsible. The rounds were all anti-personnel, being point detonating and effectively spraying the area with fine pellets. There were no US KIA's.

(10) On 29 and 30 July 1967, US and VNM units made contact with elements of the 263d VC Bn. On 31 July 1967, the Deputy Bn Commander of the 263d VC Bn was captured.

g. Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and possible courses of action.

(1) In VC Ba Bien Province, the 5th VC Division is expected to step up its "monsoon offensive", taking advantage of the hoped for curtailment of friendly aircraft operations due to weather. Probable targets include those government outposts around the periphery of their May Tao Mountain base of operations, convoys along Hwys 1, 2, 15, and 20, the VC Zu Vo Dat "rice bowl", and the Revolutionary Development projects near Xuan Loc. Local force guerrillas will continue to harass local government officials, outposts and Revolutionary Development teams.

(2) In the RSSZ, Group 10 elements will continue to harass the shipping channels to Saigon.

(3) In Long An Province, the entry of new battalions for the "monsoon offensive" has, as yet, failed to materialize. Such an offensive can be expected if friendly forces fail to continue the pressure which has so effectively fragmented the VC forces in the area. Harassment will continue in the form of mining incidents, bridge damage and attacks by fire on friendly outposts, Revolutionary Development cadre and Chieu Hoi centers.

(4) In VC My Tho Province, the "monsoon offensive" is expected to take the form of a buildup of several main force and provincial battalions, assisted by local guerrillas, to attack district towns as well as the Dong Tam Base.

(5) Throughout the 9th Division TAOI VC forces are targeted through September on the disruption of GVN presidential elections. They plan to attack election propaganda teams and all other personnel working for the election, confiscate ballot boxes, assassinate candidates and attack election sites. Tax collection activities, propaganda programs and terrorism are expected to increase. However, the VC are concerned with the grow-

CONFIDENTIAL
22

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

ing disenchantment of the people and have cautioned all their forces to avoid inflicting casualties on the civilian population.

4. Operations

a. General.

(1) To provide a basis for discussion of the complexity of 9th Infantry Division tactical operations, the general paragraph addresses the Mission, Task Organization, Operational Control (OPCON) of Organizations, and the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF); all of which affected tactical operations during the reporting period.

(2) Mission: The 9th Infantry Division continued operations in support of missions and tasks, specified and implied, by the II Field Force, Vietnam Campaign Plan. These operations consisted primarily of internal defense and development operations in Bien Hoa, Long An, Dinh Tuong, Gia Dinh (terminated 100001 May 1967), and Long Khanh Province (initiated 261300 May 1967). In addition, strike operations were conducted in the RUNG SAT Special Zone and Phuoc Tuy Province.

(3) Task Organization: Task organization of the 9th Infantry Division remained relatively constant for the reporting period. Major changes are addressed in paragraph 4b, Tactical Operations.

1st Bde

2-39 Inf
4-39 Inf
2-47 (M) Inf
3-5 Cav
1-11 Arty (DS)
Plat, C/5-2 Arty (AWSP)
TF Forsyth (OPCON)

2d Bde

3-47 Inf
4-47 Inf
3-34 Arty (-)
D/15 Engr
CTF 117 (Spt)

3d Bde

3-39 Inf
2-60 Inf

TF FUNSTON

TF 3-60 (OPCON)
A/3-34 Arty (DS)
Plat (-), C/5-2 Arty (AWSP)(SP)

DIV ARTY

A/7-8 Arty (GS)
1-84 Arty (-)(GS)
Sec, C/5-2 Arty (AWSP)

Div Trp

9 Avn
15 Engr (-)
9 MP Co (-)
9 Sig (-)
9 MI Det (-)
39 Cml Det
18 PI Det
19 PI Det

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

32

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

TF 5-60
2-4 Arty (-)(DS)
2 Sec, C/5-2
C/15 Engr (Spt)

199th Bde (Sep)(Lt)
(011110 Mar-100001 May)

11th ACR (Eff 261300 May)

1-11 Cav
3-11 Cav
A/7-9 Arty (DS)
B/2-35 Arty (DS)
B/56 Engr (-)

(4) Operational Control and or attachment of Organizations:

(a) During period 182200 April - 191155 May 1967, Headquarters, 1st Brigade was under operational control (OPCON) of Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division for Operation JUNCTION CITY III/DIAMOND HEAD.

(b) The 199th Bde (Sep)(Lt) was OPCON to Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division 010001 March - 100001 May 1967 for Operation FAIRFAX.

(c) Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division assumed OPCON of 11th ACR and Operation KITTYHAWK on 261300 May 1967. Attachment of the 11th ACR was effected on 1 June.

(5) Mobile Riverine Force (MRF)

(a) During the reporting period a significant innovation in the conduct of strike operations in the Mekong Delta occurred when Headquarters 2d Brigade and River Assault Flotilla One (US Navy) commenced operations as the MRF. River Assault Flotilla One provides mobility, combat support, and limited combat service support to MRF operations. The mission of the MRF is to conduct offensive operations in the Mekong River Delta area and in the Rung Sat Special Zone. In the accomplishment of this mission, the MRF surpasses any other combined strike force presently operating in Vietnam. New solutions to old problems have sometimes been required by the MRF environment: among these are communications, intelligence collection, and fire control. The outstanding combat record of the MRF clearly shows that these problems have been met and solved. (App 4, Command History for June - July 1967, Commander, River Assault Flotilla One and App 10, Operational Report Lessons Learned, Operation PALM BEACH/CORONADO)

1 Mobility is the by-word of the MRF at all levels from the platoon to the brigade. For example, the MRF was alerted on 25 July to relocate from Can Giouc District, Long An Province to Cai Lay District, Dinh Tuong Province. Planning began immediately, even while combat elements were conducting search and destroy operations ashore. The MRF commenced movement at 270200H July. In just over eleven and one-half hours the move of 3900 personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

with supporting artillery had been completed and the area of operations had displaced eighty-five nautical miles. By way of comparison, to move the same number of personnel a similar distance in the same time period would require the constant services of 23 CH-7 aircraft. Movement of supplies and supporting artillery would require even more aircraft resources. Although a riverine move of this type is remarkable, even greater mobility is obtained at smaller unit levels when both air and riverine techniques are employed. Blocking forces inserted by airmobile means effectively complement riverine assaults so that the total effect is greater than the sum of its parts.

2 Combat support and limited combat service support as provided by River Assault Flotilla One have contributed significantly to successful combat operations in a riverine environment. As discussed in a previous ORLL published by this headquarters, a riverine artillery base had already been developed to render optimum support prior to commencing full scale operations by the MRF. Naval fire support in the forms of 20mm and 40mm guns and of 81mm direct fire mortars represent important increases in the firepower available to the ground commander. Moreover, rapid transport of forces within an area of conflict enhances the ground commander's ability to effectively maneuver against the enemy. Repeatedly, MRF elements have encircled Viet Cong forces and systematically destroyed them.

3 Communications problems which have been encountered fall into two categories: equipment shortages due to increased requirements, and system incompatibilities due to changed environmental conditions. Shortages due to overextended communication equipment authorizations are particularly prevalent with TA-312/U (telephones), RC-292 (antennas), and VRC524 (vehicular mounted FM radios). Mutual interference caused by requirements to operate several radio sets and associated antennas from one ship has created a series of technical problems which are presently under study by Electronics Command.

4 Intelligence collection requirements for MRF operations are greater than for comparable sized conventional forces for two reasons:

(a) The MRF, due to its great mobility, must keep abreast of events in a larger area. The intelligence staff at brigade level cannot physically keep track of the data base required for accurate estimates within an area of interest such as the MRF area. Initial studies into the feasibility of employing automatic data processing equipment support this conclusion. A fundamental change in concept has been made: A mobile Intelligence Team (MIT) nominally consisting of representatives from 2d Brigade S2, 9th Division MI Detachment (IPW), 9th Military Police Company, 2d CA Company, 19th PSYOP Company, and other, specialized intelligence units were organized and equipped to move in advance of the MRF. Thus, when the MRF is alerted to increased enemy activity in an area by existing intelligence collection agencies such as ARVN forces, United States Advisory teams, etc., the MIT moves to the area, establishes vital liaison and begins target development.

CONFIDENTIAL

34

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

In this manner, the latest available intelligence on any operational area is disseminated on a timely basis. To further assist both intelligence collection and population control, initial inquiries have been made to obtain 12 National Policemen on permanent assignment to the MRF.

(b) The MRF requires intelligence not normally needed for other operations. Navigational data, in particular, have been either inaccurate or non-existent. A riverine survey team assigned to Command Task Force (CTF) 117 has made significant contributions to the operational effectiveness of the MRF. Based upon data collected during initial transit of a river or stream at high tide, the survey team gives an immediate indication of navigability at low tide. The on-scene (Navy) commander can then plan for patrols and for support of ground troops with confidence; without this on-the-spot data, the (Navy) commander would have to rely upon outside sources of information. It is significant to note that CTF 117 riverine assault craft have regularly transited streams described by outside sources as navigable only to "small sampans".

5 Proper fire control is the mark of a professional, highly competent fighting force. Initial fire support coordination policy has been tested in combat and necessary modifications made. Because of the fluid riverine environment, target identification becomes increasingly important; direct communication between the supporting and the supported elements has proven invaluable. Further, because of the wealth and diversity of supporting fires available to the ground commander, the rifle company forward observer must fulfill the dual functions of observer and of fire support coordinator for the company commander. Assistance in this mission is gained from airborne fire support coordinators and from airborne command and control helicopters. Through either one or a combination of these methods, supporting fire from 20mm and 40mm guns, 81mm direct fire mortars, 105mm and 155mm artillery, helicopter gunships, and tactical airstrikes as well as those fires from organic infantry weapons have been brought to bear upon the enemy.

(b) Summary: The MRF has exceeded planned objectives in almost every field. During the reporting period, the VC/US kill ratio stood at 7.51:1. This kill ratio was greater than the II FFORCEV average during the reporting period. As refinements are incorporated, current operational capabilities of the MRF will show increased efficiency and effectiveness. The MRF concept has been proven sound on the field of battle.

b. Tactical Operations

(1) General: Eleven major operations were conducted by the 9th Infantry Division during May-July 1967. The primary objective of these operations in the Division's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI), was directed at internal defense and development with associated strike operations when intelligence warranted. In the main, internal defense and development operations are

CONFIDENTIAL

26

35

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

still in the offensive phase. Transition into the defensive phase had however, been broached in the Long An and Bien Hoa Province where advisory assistance to train ARVN units was initiated at the close of the reporting period.

(2) Operation ENTERPRISE (13 February - Present)

(a) Background: At the time this operation began, Long An Province was essentially virgin territory in that control of the province had fluctuated between VC and GVN control since 1961. By early spring 1967, the VC were estimated to control over seventy-five percent of the population (345,000) and over ninety percent of the recognized hamlets and villages. At that time the VC had a well organized intelligence system and a complex logistical base system, especially in the Plain of Reeds area. The two major VC units operating in Long An Province were the 506th Provincial Mobile Battalion and the 2d Independent Battalion. Consequently, the objective of Operation ENTERPRISE during the offensive phase of consolidation operations was to fix and destroy these two units.

(b) Operation ENTERPRISE was initiated 130830 February 1967 by the 9th Infantry Division when 3-39 Inf relieved 2-14 Inf, 25th Inf Div at Rach Kien in Long An Province. Strength of division elements in the province were subsequently increased to brigade size with movement of 2-60 Inf into Tan Tru (XS 655621), TF 5-60 into Binh Phouc (XS 610650) and Headquarters, 3d Brigade into Tan An (XS 5486). During early stages of the offensive phase, a Division Forward Command Post was established at Ben Luc (XS 6276). (App 5, Photographs).

(c) The first major engagement of Operation ENTERPRISE occurred on 9 April near Doi Ma Creek during the previous reporting period (see Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Activation through Deployment). Identification of enemy elements engaged revealed that a reinforced company of the 506th VC Battalion, 315 Local Force VC Company and local Guerrillas had been soundly defeated. Enemy losses in this engagement were 247 VC KIA (BC) and 1 PW.

(d) Operation ENTERPRISE was temporarily extended north to the Plain of Reeds area on 8 May. This operation was called NIRVANA II and was directed against VC Base Area 371 in the Plain of Reeds. Base Area 371 was reported to contain as many as 68 separate logistical installations. Reports also indicated the presence of the 506th Local Force Battalion and the C312 VC Company. Elements of the 3d Brigade and one company from 4-50 Inf (ARVN) continued Operation NIRVANA II until 14 May with no significant contact. However, destruction of enemy installations undoubtedly had a far reaching effect upon their use by the enemy for logistical purposes. Final significant results were 14 VC KIA (BC), 1 Hoi Chanh, and 111 booby traps, 107 bunkers, 6 sampans, and 68 rounds of 60-mm mortar ammunition destroyed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

36

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(e) In summary, each battalion generally continued area-oriented consolidation operations in the district in which it was based during the reporting period. When intelligence indicated the presence of an enemy concentration, battalions were massed to meet the threat. Often major size tactical elements were deployed from the ENTERPRISE area to support operations outside Long An Province. As evidenced by noted absence of any sizeable concentration of enemy (platoon size or larger) in Long An Province, the offensive phase of Operation ENTERPRISE has almost been completed. The 506th Provincial Mobile and 2d Independent Battalions can neither mass nor move through the province in any sizeable strength. Significant VC losses since 13 February have been 1140 VC KIA (BC), 42 PW, 30 Hoi Chanh and 146 SA, 6-60mm mortars, 1 M79, 146.6 tons of rice, 4 rolls of 16-mm films, 92 lbs documents, (App 3, Captured VC Plan to Attack Ben Luc Bridge), \$6800VN and miscellaneous items captured. Destroyed were: 252 structures, 4132 bunkers, 90 sampans, 10,080 rounds SA, 169 mines, 277 grenades, 654 booby traps, 9.7 tons of rice, 1 booby trap factory and other miscellaneous items. (App 9, Combat Operations After Action Report-Operation ENTERPRISE).

(3) Operation PALM BEACH (28 January - 31 May)

(a) General: Operation PALM BEACH was conducted in two phases. Phase I (28 Jan - 10 Mar) was conducted by Headquarters, 3d Brigade. During phase I primary emphasis was placed on development of Dong Tam base and security of dredging equipment (See Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Activation through Deployment). On 10 March, Headquarters, 2d Brigade relieved Headquarters, 3d Brigade and initiated Phase II. During Phase II, Headquarters, 2d Brigade continued base development, dredge security, consolidation operations in the My Tho area and outfitting for Mobile Riverine Force Operations.

(b) On 2 May, in response to intelligence of the presence of the 514 Local Force VC Battalion in the Ap Bac Secret Zone (XS 3055), Headquarters, 2d Brigade conducted a classic search and destroy operation. Elements of the 3-47 and 3-60 Inf moved northwest of Dong Tam by tactical road march and deployed companies abreast along Highway 4. The two battalion force then moved north and became heavily engaged near the approximate center (A/3-47 Inf) of the linear formation. While A/3-47 Inf fixed the enemy force, flank units were moved to complete an encirclement. In late afternoon three companies (A/3-47, A/3-60 and C/5-60 (M) Inf) made a ground assault which subsequently developed into a night attack on the enemy position. The Viet Cong, as evidenced by loss of 195 VC KIA (BC), were taken by complete surprise. (App 6, Combat Operations After Action Report-HOPTAC XVI). Total losses for Operation PALM BEACH I and II were 570 VC KIA (BC), 45 PW, 6 Hoi Chanh and 57 SA, 10 crew served weapons, 1 B&O rocket launcher, 10.15 tons of rice, .5 tons of salt, 10.5 lbs of documents and other miscellaneous documents captured. (App 12, Operational Report-Lessons Learned-Operation PALM BEACH II/CORONADO).

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Operation CORONADO (1 June-Continuing)

(a) General: Headquarters, 2d Brigade conducted limited riverine training during Operation PALM BEACH II by conducting small scale, short duration riverine assaults along the Song My Tho (river) adjacent to Dong Tam. These operations served as a break-in vehicle for full scale operations with the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). Upon initiation of operations with the MRF, the mission of Headquarters, 2d Brigade was to conduct operations in designated provinces and the RUNG SAT Special Zone in cooperation with other US Army, US Navy and RVN units to extend GVN influence by capturing/destroying VC personnel, installations, equipment and infrastructure where found.

(b) Full scale operations of the MRF commenced with the initiation of CORONADO I on 1 June. CORONADO I began with riverine assaults commencing at 190635 June vicinity Rach Nui (Canal)(XS 8466). At 1150 the same morning A/4-47 Inf became heavily engaged with elements of the 5th Nha Be (VC) Battalion. A/4-47 Inf had little or no cover at the outset of the battle and the enemy was fighting from prepared positions. Losses during this action were: US, 21 KHA and 53 WHA, VC losses were 256 KIA (BC). During the remainder of Operation CORONADO I, Headquarters 2d Brigade in coordination and cooperation with 2d and 3d Battalions, 46th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) conducted eight brigade size operations in Long An and Go Cong Provinces. These operations resulted in 243 VC KIA (BC), 109 PW and 58 Hoi Chanh.

(c) CORONADO II was initiated 270600 July in western Dinh Tuong Province. Headquarters, 2d Brigade, augmented by 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 3-39 Inf and TF 5-60 Inf (9th Infantry Division) and in coordination with elements of 7th Infantry Division (ARVN), VNMC Brigade (-) and 44th Ranger Battalion, reacted to intelligence of five VC Battalions located in Dinh Tuong Province. A running battle ensued with heaviest contact being made by 3d and 4th Battalions, VCMC Brigade (-). During this operation the Vietnamese Marines inflicted 108 VC KIA (BC) and 6 PW while suffering 44 KHA and 115 WHA. Losses inflicted by US Forces totaled 70 VC KIA (BC), 6 PW and 1 Hoi Chanh while suffering 8 KHA and 30 WHA.

(d) The 9th Infantry Division TAOI includes the RUNG SAT Special Zone (RSSZ). After conducting extensive operations during the previous reporting period (Operation CHAPMAN) and a portion of the current period, operations in the RSSZ were temporarily suspended at 121200 May 1967. While Division elements were conducting Operation CHAPMAN and after operations were temporarily suspended, other FVMAF continued to conduct limited operations throughout other portions of the zone. At 010700 June 1967 Operation GREAT BEND was initiated. When intelligence sources indicate the presence of the enemy in the zone, Operation GREAT BEND is reinitiated with forces primarily from the MRF. These forces generally vary from company to battalion size, operating in the RSSZ for two-three day intervals. Although no major encounters with the enemy have evolved from these operations, destruction and capture of enemy fortifications and materials during operations conducted has undoubtedly had a devastating

CONFIDENTIAL

38

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

effect on enemy operations in the RSSZ. (App 12, Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Operation PALM BEACH II/CORONADO)

(e) In summary, Operation CORONADO and the MRF concept has proved highly effective in defeating enemy forces hiding, training and attempting to live in a riverine environment. Continued strike operations employing riverine and airmobile assaults with associated fire power will, in the final analysis, serve to destroy the enemy in a geographical sanctuary which has supported enemy operations and existence in the Mekong Delta area for many years. (App 12, Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Operation PALM BEACH II/CORONADO).

(5) Operation FAIRFAX: The 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Lt) was conducting Operation FAIRFAX in Gia Dinh Province (Capital Military District) when Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division assumed operational control on 010001 March 1967. The 199th Inf Bde continued operations in the Gia Dinh Province and periodically supported Operation ENTERPRISE by deploying battalion size elements into Long An Province. Total VC losses to the 199th Infantry Brigade while under operational control of the 9th Infantry Division and while conducting Operation FAIRFAX and participating in Operation ENTERPRISE during period 010001 March-100001 May, were 274 VC KIA (BC) and 22 PW. Upon termination of OPCON to 9th Infantry Division, the 199th Inf Bde continued Operation FAIRFAX.

(6) Operation AKRON (9-29 June) was conducted by Headquarters, 1st Brigade and 3-11 Cav south of Camp Martin to clear Base Area 303 (Hat Dich) of VC Forces and installations. A major objective of the operation was to clear three trails and helicopter landing zones between Highway 15 and Highway 2 to facilitate future operations. An engineer task force composed of A and B/15 Engineer Battalion and A/86 Engineer Battalion with 26 bulldozers and 17 Rome Plows succeeded in clearing 45.7 km of trails and 1615 acres of jungle. One major engagement during the operation occurred 190115 June when 1st Bn, 274th VC Regiment attacked the 3-11 Cav command post. The VC employed automatic weapons, 75mm recoilless rifles and mortars but were unable to breach the perimeter. VC losses were 65 KIA (BC). US losses were 9 KHA and 32 WHA. Total VC losses for the operation were 94 VC KIA (BC), 4 PW, 2 Hoi Chanh and 10,935 rounds SA, 45 mines, 9 tons of rice, 12 sampans, 98 structures, 15 tunnels, 1370 bunkers and two regimental size base camps destroyed. Sixty-two small arms and seven crew served weapons were captured. (App 7, Combat Operations After Action Report-Operation AKRON).

(7) Operation PADDINGTON (10-16 July). This was a strike operation conducted in Phuoc Tuy Province to destroy elements of the 5th VC Division. This operation was controlled by a 9th Infantry Division Forward Command Post located with Headquarters, 1st Australian Task Force vicinity Nui Dat (YS 4367). Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-), 2d and 3d Battalion, VNMC Brigade, 2-43 ARVN, 2d Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) and 7th RAR participated. One major engagement involving 3d Bn VNMC and one battalion of the 274th VC Regiment at 121030 July resulted in 40 VC KIA (BC).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

A major accomplishment of Operation PADDINGTON was the successful employment of a Tri-FWMAF in a previously inaccessible area to significantly disrupt installations and activities of the 5th VC Division. Total enemy losses were 92 VC KIA (BC) and 13 SA, 400 AP mines, 10 AT mines, 1000 hand grenades, 25 RPF rounds and 2600 SA rounds captured. In addition, 350 bunkers, 1500 meters of trench, 56 huts and 9800 pounds of rice and grain were destroyed. (App 13, Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation PADDINGTON).

(8) Operation HOPTAC (010001 June - Present). This is an internal defense and development operation in the Dinh Tuong Province which includes security of the Dong Tam base (XS 4143). Task Force Funston (a provisional Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment) is allocated forces for defense of the Dong Tam Base, security of dredging and construction operations (see paragraph 11, Base Development) and for limited consolidation operations. During the reporting period two mortar attacks against Dong Tam base occurred. Artillery, gunships and AC-47 aircraft supported in both attacks with unknown results. Significant losses during Operation HOPTAC have been: VC 87 KIA (BC), 3 PW and one pound of documents captured and 41 structures, 311 bunkers, 112 booby traps, three grenades, five mines, 20 tons of rice, 13 sampans, one lumber yard and one tunnel destroyed. US losses were: 4 KHA, 59 WHA and one APC and one 3/4 ton truck destroyed, seven 3/4 ton trucks, three 1/2 ton trucks, two 2 1/2 ton trucks, one Medical Unit, self-contained transportable, one air conditioner, two AN/GRC 46 radios and six trucks damaged.

(9) Operation RILEY (030001 July - Present). This is an internal defense and development operation in Bien Hoa Province and includes defense of Camp Martin Cox. When not engaged in strike operations, Headquarters, 1st Brigade assumes operational control of all elements engaged in Operation RILEY including Task Force Forsyth (a provisional Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment located at Camp Martin Cox). In the absence of Headquarters, 1st Brigade, TF Forsyth is allocated sufficient forces to secure Camp Martin Cox and to conduct limited consolidation operations in the Area of Operations for Operation RILEY. In addition to providing assistance to local RF/PF outpost positions in the form of construction materials and technical assistance during Operation RILEY, a training program for the 2-48 Inf (ARVN) was initiated on 31 July 1967. Significant losses during the reporting period have been US: 2 KHA and 14 WHA. VC losses have been 1 KIA (BC), 19 detainees, and two sewing machines, a small amount of documents, one carbine magazine and one typewriter captured and 23 huts, 36 bunkers, five mines, four M-79 rounds, 23 sampans, 744 rounds of small arms ammunition, two spider holes, five CBU, 10 booby traps and one claymore mine destroyed.

(10) Operation KITTYHAWK continued during the reporting period with 11 ACR (-) conducting internal defense and development operations in the Long Khanh Province. Emphasis during the operation has been on providing security of routes between Long Giao (YS 4397) and Long Binh (YT 0612) and Gia Ray (YT 6312). On 27 June, 1-11 ACR moved to reinforce 52d Ranger Bn (ARVN) which were in heavy contact with elements of 3d Bn 275th VC Regiment vicinity YT 3332.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

Subsequently the 9th Infantry Division provided 2-39 Inf, 4-39 Inf, A/3-5 Cav and supporting artillery to OPCON 11 ACR. Significant results of the battle were 49 VC KIA (BC) and a substantial amount of equipment captured. (see Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 11th ACR).

(11) Operation EMPORIA (21 July - Present). The 11 ACR (-) initiated major jungle clearing operations along Highway 20 from its junction with Highway 1 to the II CTZ Boundary, a distance of 90 kilometers. At 210935, L/3-11 Cav engaged a battalion of the 275th VC Regiment reinforced by elements of the DONG NAI Battalion. The VC employed 57-mm recoilless rifles, RPG rockets, automatic weapons and assorted small arms. Enemy losses were 96 KIA (BC), 1 PW and 25 small arms and six crew served weapons captured. US losses were 14 KHA and 47 WHA, (See Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 11th ACR).

c. Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

(1) The 9th Division PSYOP Campaign has increased its effectiveness and volume of support to the division. This increase in both volume and effectiveness can be attributed to the application of the experience gained by Division Psyoperators during the preceding months and to refined procedures for effecting coordination between brigade, division and supporting PSYOP Companies. These experiences were exchanged during weekly PSYOP meetings in which plans were also formulated for upcoming operations. The most noticeable achievement in Division PSYOP to date occurred on 31 July. On 310910 July 1967, a request for a rapid reaction leaflet from the 2d Brigade was phoned to division. At 0920 hours this request was phoned the 246th PSYOP Company in Bien Hoa. The leaflet was given top priority by the 246th PSYOP Company and put ahead of all other requests. The presses were stopped and the leaflet was processed for immediate printing. By 1200 hours 50,000 copies of the leaflet were printed and on their way to the Bien Hoa Air Base to be put on a PSYOP aircraft. By 1400 hours the leaflet was dropped in Dinh Tuong Province. In just a matter of five hours the leaflet was processed, printed and air dropped, reducing the normal reaction time for a leaflet of this type by 19 hours. Although this is just one example, it does reflect the higher degree of coordination now being applied between brigade, division and the supporting PSYOP Companies. Commanders within the division have also increased their awareness of the importance of PSYOP before, during, and after tactical operations. Emphasis was placed on the production of rapid reaction PSYOP (App 11, Sample PSYOP Leaflets) to exploit Chieu Hoi gains and tactical operations.

(2) PSYOP activities during the reporting period are as follows:

May: 12,599,000 leaflets air dropped
157,646 hand and ground disseminated.
50 hours and 15 minutes aerial and ground loudspeaker
broadcasts.
35 Films.

CONFIDENTIAL

4
AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

CONFIDENTIAL

June: 14,410,000 Leaflets air dropped.
16,000 Hand and ground disseminated.
23 hours and 25 minutes aerial and ground loudspeaker
broadcasts.
29 Films.

July: 12,297,500 Leaflets air dropped.
15,920 Hand and ground disseminated.
26 Hours aerial and ground loudspeaker broadcasts.
51 Films.

Leaflets, JUSPAO Newsletters, posters and miscellaneous publications were hand and ground disseminated during MED/DENTCAPS, County Fairs and audio-visual presentations. This method of PSYOP dissemination is continually stressed as it employs "Face to Face" persuasion. Films continued to be received enthusiastically by the target audience. Films shown consisted of comedies, westerns, public health and sanitation and VN psychological appeals.

(3) The effectiveness of the 9th Division PSYOP Campaign is more apparent through the number of Hoi Chanh rallying in the division TAOI, not necessarily to the Division. During the reporting period 19 Hoi Chanh rallied to the 9th Infantry Division. This represents a decrease of 12 between this and the previous reporting period. However, the number of ralliers in the Division TAOI has remained on par or surpassed last years figures for the same period of time. When 2d Brigade began conducting operations in Dinh Tuong in February, ralliers increased. When the Mobile Riverine Force operations were shifted to another province, the rate declined. Another example is Long An Province. Division Forces first began operations there in February and the rate increased, reaching its peak in March. After that the rate fell but has remained relatively high. A slight decrease in the rate is expected after initial operations as the soft marks turn themselves in first. Hard core VC are more difficult to convince, but extended pressure over the months causes many of them to rally. Increases in Hoi Chanh are partly attributable to the intensive PSYOP program being carried out by the 3d Brigade in support of battalion operations. In other areas, results of the PSYOP campaign are not so readily apparent, however, new ideas are being formulated to intensify the campaign in these in these low yield areas. Realizing the value of immediate exploitation of Hoi Chanh, maneuver units have steadily increased PSYOP effort in this area. Exploitation of ralliers will continue to receive maximum emphasis in an effort to induce prospective Hoi Chanh to rally. A concentrated effort will also be established to induce NVA ralliers. A Chieu Hoi questionnaire has been prepared for distribution to insure a more accurate method of evaluation of the PSYOP effort.

(4) PSYOP field teams are currently attached to the 2d and 3d Brigades from the 19th and 246th PSYOP Companies. These teams provide PSYOP

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

support in the form of ground loudspeaker broadcasts and audio-visual presentations. PSYOP field teams consist of one officer and one EM cadre provided to tactical units on a direct support mission basis to provide maneuver units with a PSYOP advisory and operational unit. The loudspeaker field team, equipped with the AN/UH5 public address set, is capable of operating in a vehicle or ground role and broadcasting up to 3000 meters. Complementing the efforts of the loudspeaker field team is an audio-visual field team which is restricted to a vehicle role. Their primary piece of equipment is a PSYOP jeepster that can be used to show movies and record and broadcast loudspeaker appeals on the spot. The PSYOP field teams act as propaganda advisors to ground unit commanders in addition to their operational missions that include:

(a) Supporting tactical operations with propaganda against civilian non-combatants and hostile forces.

(b) Exploiting psychological opportunities and vulnerabilities that are determined during tactical operations.

(c) Providing a quick reaction person-to-person contact with non-combatants and hostile forces encountered.

(d) Providing a limited PSYOP intelligence capability to the supported unit.

PSYOP field teams provide the Division with an increased capability to win the hearts and minds of the people and control non-combatants which is essential in this type of war in order to accomplish the tactical mission. The audio-visual field team has proven particularly effective in hand disseminating printed media, i.e., leaflets, JUSPAO Newsletters and miscellaneous publications during audio-visual presentations.

(5) There are not enough field teams available to adequately support the division. Plans are underway to upgrade the PSYOP supporting companies to battalion size which will provide the additional field teams.

(6) Future PSYOP will be phased into all aspects of Division tactical operations. It will also be emphasized more during MED/DENTCAPS in the "Face to Face" role. The addition of 30 portable megaphones and a multilith 85 printing press will significantly increase the Division's capability of providing rapid reaction PSYOP during tactical operations.

(7) Recapitulation of Psychological Operations Activities by Province:

CONFIDENTIAL

43

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

<u>Province</u>	<u>Leaflets</u> <u>Air - Dropped</u>	<u>Misc Pub &</u> <u>leaflets hand</u> <u>Disseminated</u>	<u>Aerial &</u> <u>L/S Broadcasts</u>	<u>Films</u>
Phuoc Tuy	2,766,000			
Long Khanh	5,442,000	10,000	11:20	12
Bien Hoa	1,540,000	15,349	3:30	
Long An	13,099,500	56,217	59:15	93
Dinh Tuong	12,281,000	8,000	10:55	10
Others	4,178,000	100,000	14:40	

d. An objective appraisal of the progress of internal defense and development operations in the Division's tactical area or responsibility (TAOR) indicates that the offensive phase of consolidation is almost concluded. Area-oriented consolidation operations in districts where the Division is deployed in strength have for example, rendered base camp areas almost totally safe. Strike operations have either fragmented organized enemy resistance into small groups or driven it out to the TAOR. Small groups of enemy resistance present no significant difficulty and strike operations can be quickly mounted against large enemy forces that attempt to enter or transit the TAOR. The remaining problem, which is infinitely more complex, is destruction of enemy infrastructure. Destruction of the infrastructure is undoubtedly taking care of itself to a degree. For example, the enemy cannot produce victories which are vital to projecting the Viet Cong cause without freedom of movement within the TAOR. Moreover, the infrastructure is constantly being expose to extensive psychological operations which have in the past, produced tangible results within organized enemy units. This leads to the conjecture that the infrastructure may be losing its effectiveness mor than is readily apparent on the surface. It is toward this end—destruction of the enemy infrastructure, that future operations will continue to be directed.

5. Logistical

a. Supply and Service

(1) General. As experience is gained supply and services for the Division improved. The Division continues to rely mainly upon organic support for all operations but when needed the support from the 1st Logistical Command has been excellent. The most significant change in logistical operations was establishment of support for the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). The MRF is supported as outlined in Admin Order 4-67, dated 15 May 67, with Change 1, dated 31 May 67 (App 8)

(2) Class I. Class I support remained excellent. During the reporting period two ice plants, one at Camp Martin Cox and one at Dong Tam, became operational. Additionally, an ice cream plant was constructed and became operational at Dong Tam Base. An ice cream plant for Camp Martin Cox is under construction and is programmed to be completed in August 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

44

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(3) Class II and IV. No major problem exists with Class II & IV. Although, there continues to be shortages in certain areas, these shortages have not hindered the Division mission.

(4) Class III and IIIA. Limited capabilities within the division to provide helicopter refueling points have caused some problems. When operations have required more points than can be supported by Division assets, the 1st Logistical Command has provided 5000 gallon tankers for limited periods as refueling points. This action was particularly helpful during Operation PADDINGTON which required a total of forty-two refueling points during the initial phases of the operation. The completion of two bolted steel tanks at Dong Tam base has increased the storage capacity for JP-4 to over 200,000 gallons. Four bolted steel tanks for storage of Class III at Camp Martin Cox are under construction. During the period the POL Section issued 1,123,326 gallons of MOGAS, 1,264,588 gallons of diesel, 1,834,200 gallons of JP-4 and 88,400 gallons of AVGAS.

(5) Class V. No significant problem areas have been encountered in this area.

b. Maintenance

(1) There have been no significant maintenance problems during the reporting period with exception of maintenance support of the Mobile Riverine Force.

(2) The 709th Maintenance had the following job orders during the quarter:

	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>
Aircraft	323	343
Tracked Vehicles	170	151
Wheeled Vehicles	506	436
Artillery & Mortars	47	43
Generators	414	424
Heavy Construction Equip	55	45
Signal Equip	4732	4738
Office Machines	189	312

c. The 9th Medical Battalion treated 17,811 patients. Of this number 288 resulted from hostile action and the remainder were non-battle injuries and diseases. Additionally, 1,639 MEDCAP and 314 DENTCAP patients were treated.

d. Graves Registration Section of the 9th S & T Battalion processed 115 divisional remains and 225 divisional/non-divisional personal effects during the period.

CONFIDENTIAL

36

45
AVDE-MH

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

e. During the reporting period, a test was made of various lubricants which would prevent or lower the number of malfunctions of the M16E1 rifle (App 9, Evaluation of Effectiveness of Lubricant Used with M16E1 Rifle).

f. Logistical Support for Operations.

(1) Operation ENTERPRISE: Support of Operation ENTERPRISE continues as previously reported. There has been only one significant change. The Division has established a policy of conducting night convoys to the Forward Support Element at Tan An supporting the 3rd Brigade. Presently the 9th Supply and Transport Battalion is conducting two night convoys per week averaging 15 trucks per convoy. The benefits of this action are twofold. One, the movement of US convoys at night restrict the Viet Cong in their movement. Second, the road (Highway 4) is free from large US convoys during the daytime allowing more freedom of movement for Vietnamese civilian traffic. Also, it is planned to have the 1st Logistical Command conduct four (4) night convoys per week which will further restrict VC movement at night and allow more freedom of movement for civilians during the daytime.

(2) Operation PADDINGTON: Due to the extensive area covered by the operation and the large number of units employed, it was necessary to establish two logistical support bases. One base was established at the Blackhorse Base Camp and coordinated by the S4, 1st Brigade, 9th Inf Division. The second base was established at Xuyen Moc and operated by the Forward Supply Element, 9th S & T Bn normally supporting the 1st Brigade. The logistical base at Blackhorse was resupplied by the 29th General Support Group through the Forward Logistical Base located at the base camp. The base at Xuyen Moc was resupplied by unit delivery from the 53rd General Support Group located in Vung Tau. It should be noted that an operation involving other FVMAF; where a US infantry division is designated as the controlling headquarters, detailed planning and coordination between the maneuver elements and the support units must be effected. Each area of supply, maintenance and medical support must be pinpointed. When needed, outside assistance from the logistical command must be called for well in advance and programed into the overall support plan.

(3) Operation EMPORIA I: An operation to clear Highway 20 conducted by the 11th ACR was not supported by the logistical element of the 9th Division. Coordination was effected by the 11th ACR thru the 9th Division with the 29th General Support Group. Unit distribution was made of Class I, III and V and limited II and IV by convoy daily. Limited air resupply was also used.

(4) Operation CORONADO I and II: Operations conducted by the 2d Brigade (Mobile Riverine Force), 9th Infantry Division is unique in that resupply except for fresh fruits and vegetables, and some repair parts is accomplished by LST. (App 9, Admin and Logistical Support for Operation CORONADO)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

46

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(5) Logistical support of operations in close proximity to Camp Martin Cox continue to be supported from the Division's primary base camp as previously reported.

6. Fire Support

a. General: Fire support during the reporting period consisted of employment of artillery, close air support, B-52 airstrikes, chemical, naval monitors and helicopter gunship support. Fire Support coordination for the most part, was conducted at battalion and brigade level with the Division Fire Support Coordination Center monitoring fire support plans and offering guidance and assistance as required.

b. Fire Support Coordination

(1) Most requests for fire support are routed directly to the element which will provide support rather than through the fire support coordinator. The nature of the combat environment in which the Division is conducting internal defense and development operations dictates use of this system. In some cases this system did not give the fire support coordination center complete knowledge of the fire support being provided and consequently, did not always permit employment of the quickest and most economical means of fire support.

(2) The first operation requiring close centralized control of fire support by the Division Fire Support Element was Operation PADDINGTON. During this operation the Division Fire Support Element operated from the Division Forward Command Post to control the fires of all the various fire support means. Even though no serious problem areas were encountered, several areas in fire support coordination required refinement.

(a) Prompt and accurate reporting of artillery locations and proposed moves are extremely important to the fire support coordinator. In this regard it is imperative that aggressiveness and a sense of urgency be demonstrated to establish communication between the fire support element and the artillery control headquarters. Both FM and VHF should be used. Communications are essential to insure adequate fire support of maneuver elements and mutual support of fire support/patrol bases (FS/PB) during multi-battalion strike operations. Fire plans and progress reports implementing the fire plan must be reported to the fire support element promptly.

(b) Post operation fire support upon termination of Operation PADDINGTON included preparation of a target list for employment of non-toxic chemicals, artillery and airstrikes based on an analysis of intelligence acquired during the operation by the 1st Australian Task Force. The method for attacking a target was as follows: After a target was identified either from intelligence or by the Man Pack Personnel Detector, a CS drop would be made. Approximately 30 minutes later an airstrike would be called in on target and this would be followed by artillery harassing and interdiction fires. Actual

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

47
AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

results of the program are unknown; however, it is feasible that harassment of enemy units in the area justified the program. Follow-on artillery, air and chemical fires should be considered in order to prolong the effects of any strike operation. The major problem is scheduling follow-on fires was the availability of airstrikes. Since these were harassing and interdictionary targets the priority for airstrikes was low. In most cases a more urgent request than harassing and interdictionary had to be used to fill requirements for airstrikes.

c. Artillery Support

(1) General: During the reporting period, 9th Infantry Division Artillery units provided artillery support for Operations ENTERPRISE, PALM BEACH II, CORONADO, GREAT BEND, RILEY, HOPTAC, PADDINGTON, and AKRON. A total of 27,500 missions were fired and 180,691 rounds of ammunition were expended in support of operations. The type of operations conducted with the Division's tactical area of interest placed greater emphasis on employing artillery batteries on independent missions with centralized planning and decentralized control.

(2) The 2-4 Arty is employed in the Delta Area. Because of restricted mobility and scarcity of firing positions, the battalion's batteries were positioned throughout the area of operations and provided the majority of artillery support from battery base camp locations.

(a) 2-4 Artillery provided artillery support for Operations ENTERPRISE, CORONADO and HOPTAC. During an operation in support of Operation ENTERPRISE, two batteries were airlifted into position to support rapid movement of heliborne troops. This was a successful operation with one battery emplaced in time to fire a landing zone preparation for the second FS/PB. Other operations required displacement of artillery to provide adequate support.

(b) Armored Personnel Carriers proved to be effective prime movers for 105mm Howitzers in the Delta area. No modification is necessary but steps must be taken to prevent short turns that might damage the trails.

(3) 1-11 Artillery supported the 1st Brigade. The battalion had to be prepared to displace by land or by air at anytime. During the reporting period, 1-11 Artillery participated in Operations JUNCTION CITY, AKRON, PADDINGTON and RILEY.

(a) During all operations except JUNCTION CITY, the battalion was given additional batteries for operational control. This created problems in communications and control, but proper coordination reduced these problems.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(b) During various operations it was learned that improper employment of white phosphorus as a marking round could cause friendly casualties. The height of burst (HOB) must be at least 200 meters. If less than a 200 meter HOB is employed it should be cleared as a lethal round to preclude injury to friendly elements. When firing illumination, the impact point of the shell casing must be considered to avoid injury to friendly troops by falling debris.

(c) When firing landing zone preparations the artillery must know what the infantry scheme of maneuver is after the insertion so that fires can be shifted during the insertion to support the operation.

(d) Because of the limited communications equipment available to US advisors to ARVN, it is necessary to provide an artillery liaison officer to ARVN forces when these forces are supported by US Artillery.

(4) 3-34 Artillery is the Division's mobile riverine artillery battalion. Currently only two batteries are barge-mounted and the third is located at Dong Tam base camp to provide artillery support for local security, base camp patrols and counter mortar fires. The 3-34 Artillery participated in Operations HOPTAC, RILEY and CORONADO. In addition to riverine operations the battery located at Dong Tam displaced by road and air to support operations.

(a) Since the riverine force is capable of displacing into different sectors of responsibility, it is important that a common code be coordinated with US Advisors for clearance and control purposes.

(b) The major waterways within the operational area must be plotted on the firing charts to facilitate fire coordination with naval elements.

(c) During a mortar attack against the Dong Tam base, the artillery had difficulties firing countermortar targets because friendly patrols were in close proximity to the countermortar targets. The Artillery LNO should offer advice when patrol plans are being developed to permit maximum support by artillery.

(5) 1-84 Artillery is the Division's general support artillery battalion. To best support and reinforce DS artillery, the batteries were positioned throughout the Division's TAOL. This made centralized control difficult. Therefore, the batteries generally operated independently and received support from battalion headquarters located at Camp Martin Cox. The 1-84 Artillery was able to provide adequate artillery support during all major operations of the Division.

(a) Several operations made it necessary to split a battery to adequately provide fire support. This required additional fire direction center (FDC) personnel to provide 24 hour operations. Since the

47

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

batteries are not centrally located or operating under battalion control, battalion FDC personnel have been distributed to various batteries to augment their 24 hour capability.

(b) Airlift procedures have been developed by the battalion for airlifting the 155mm Howitzer by CH-54 and CH-47. The 1-84 Artillery successfully completed airlifts with both types of helicopters without incident. It was learned that goggles must be worn by all personnel in the lift zone because of winds and blowing debris generated by helicopters.

(6) In conclusion, artillery resources allocated to the Division are sufficient to adequately provide required support. Three problem areas which receive constant attention by Division Artillery to insure continuous support are: Keeping artillery air observers constantly appraised of the boundary of areas of operations, organizing artillery pieces in fire support/patrol bases in such a manner as not to restrict available fire support and maintenance of constant temperatures in panoramic telescopes by keeping them in boxes heated with lightbulbs to prevent fogging.

d. Close air support: The majority of immediate air requests during the reporting period were routed through Division to DASC. It was found that the best way for a unit to get an immediate airstrike was to relay the request directly to DASC if the unit had the capability to do so. Response by the Air Force to immediate air requests is normally excellent. The average time between request and the time the aircraft was on target was 30 minutes. Units have been reminded to program use of cluster bomb units which is normally the ordnance carried by aircraft conducting close air support. Cluster bomb units must be expended, otherwise the aircraft will be diverted to another target. In summary, the division received its fair share of close air support based on priorities and operations conducted during the reporting period.

e. B-52 Airstrikes: Eleven B-52 airstrikes were flown during the reporting period. There were no casualties nor evidence of casualties from any of the strikes. There was however, evidence of intensive ground damage. It was found that a subsurface burst was unsatisfactory for use in heavily canopied areas because it left nothing more than a large crater. The surface burst facilitated ground exploitation because it cleared a large area of jungle.

f. Chemical Fire Support: The role of the Division Chemical Section in supporting ground operations during the reporting period was normally to remain airborne above ground units and deliver non-toxic chemical support on call. This type of support was provided for all ground operations. In conjunction with ground observation by units, the manpack personnel detector was successfully employed to locate target of opportunity. On several occasions, enemy escaping from the area of a CS drop were observed and engaged by ground elements and supporting gunships. However, no specific results of enemy casualties were recorded.

CONFIDENTIAL

41

CONFIDENTIAL

50

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

g. Helicopter Gunship Support: Helicopter gunship support is normally the most responsive means of immediate fire support available to the ground commander. Gunships are particularly useful in filling the gap between friendly units and artillery support. The most significant problem area in employment of gunships is identifying the target area to the gunships. In the heat of battle, communications channels become flooded with traffic on troop movements and employment of other means of fire support which leaves only minimum time for coordination with gunships. This problem is under constant refinement and has not significantly hindered successful employment of helicopter gunship support of ground tactical units. In other areas of support, the gunship has proven invaluable when employed in the countermortar and convoy security role (land and water).

h. Naval Monitor Support: For an explanation of fire support provided by naval monitors, see App 4 (Command History for June-July 1967, Commander River Flotilla One).

i. In summary, every effort is made to provide fire support to the ground tactical commander in any manner which he deems necessary. This has been accomplished with minimum friendly casualties while inflicting significant losses to the enemy. Methods for providing fire support and improvements in the type of support that can be provided are under constant revision.

7. Engineer Support

a. General: The 15th Engineer Battalion continued to provide combat engineer support to division operations during the reporting period to include an active civic action program.

b. Intelligence: Increased enemy mining and booby trapping, expansion of the engineer area of operations, and requirements of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) caused the demand for engineer intelligence to remain at a high level.

(1) Enemy terrorist activity in Long An Province for example, included construction of two earthen mounds on Highway 4 approximately 1000 meters apart. One was nothing more than a pile of dirt which obstructed traffic. The second mound, exactly the same in appearance as the first, was mined.

(2) Activation of the MRF generated a need for waterway intelligence (App 4, Command History for June-July 1967, Commander River Flotilla One). In addition to depths, bank conditions and obstructions, widths, in waterways, horizontal and vertical underbridge clearance was also needed. To obtain desired data all US, ARVN and MPW sources were investigated. Liaison with sector advisors to utilize RF/PF outposts located on bridges to collect tide and clearance data resulted in minimal information; however, it is anticipated that this channel will provide needed data in the future.

CONFIDENTIAL

42

5
AVDE-MH

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

c. Engineer Operations: Direct engineer support of division operations continued with Headquarters, A, B, and E/15 Engr Bn based at Camp Martin Cox. Company C remained at Tan Tru in support of the 3d Brigade and support of the MRF. In the Mekong Delta normal close combat support was rendered. Additionally 11 bridges were constructed or upgraded in the Delta. Of significance during the reporting period was combat engineer support (clearing operations) during Operation AKRON³ (paragraph 6, Operations). Basically this included two major trails between Highways QL 15 and LTL 2 south of Camp Martin Cox.

(1) Mission: Task Force Plow commanded by Headquarters, 15th Engineer Battalion, participated in Operation AKRON; providing engineer means of jungle clearing, tunnel destruction, road improvement, bridging, route clearance, preparation of fire support bases and direct support to 1st Brigade.

(2) Organization: TF Plow was composed of a TF Headquarters, A/15 Engr, B/15 Engr (-) and A/86 Engr (+). B/15 Engr was augmented by Hq/15 Engr and Hq and A/709 Maintenance Battalion. Engineer equipment augmentation was as follows:

9 Rome Plows - 79 Engr Gp
4 Bulldozers - 34 Engr Gp
4 Rome Plows - 34 Engr Gp
3 Rome Plows - 159 Engr Gp

(3) Concept: TF Plow organized jungle clearing resources into two jungle clearing teams (A and B). Each team was initially allocated 10 Rome Plows and eight bulldozers. Rome Plows were to cut all vegetation (Firestone Trail - 200 meters wide, Blackstone Trail - 100 meters wide, Brimstone Trail - connecting Firestone and Blackstone - 100 meters wide). Follow up bulldozers were to pile cut vegetation into windrows perpendicular to the axis of the trace.

(4) Execution:

(a) Navigation: For part of the operation, navigation was provided by an existing trail as reference. When no trail existed (as on segments of Firestone and Brimstone Trails), a tank dozer (sometimes accompanied by a Rome Plow) was sent ahead with a compass. The tank dozer would act as a trail blazer with the clearing party behind. Correction of direction were made

³After Action Report (U), Headquarters, 15th Engineer Battalion, Operation AKRON-TF Plow dated 5 July 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

CONFIDENTIAL

52

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

by aerial observation. Checks on location were made by calling for artillery spotter rounds based on known map locations. Initially the cutting pattern was 100 or 50 meter squares. Two primary disadvantages to this pattern quickly became apparent. After Rome Plows initially plunge into the jungle, their control and supervision from any central location was virtually impossible. Secondly the operators had no visible reference and easily became confused and lost their sense of direction. Both of these difficulties were overcome with adoption of a pattern basically paralleling the reference trail. This pattern allowed visual contact between reference trail, supervisor, and Rome Plow operator. The pattern allowed as many as ten Rome Plows to be worked in a single pattern in an echelon formation.

(b) Maintenance: Maintenance bases were moved to be close to the work site. This reduced travel time to and from the work site and provided close-in maintenance support. In addition, B/15 Engr Bn and A/86 Engr Bn operated contact maintenance teams at the work site.

(c) Statistics: Blackstone Trail encompassed 450 acres or 18 lin km; Brimstone Trail, 225 acres or 9 lin km; and Firestone Trail, 940 acres or 18.8 lin km. This totals 1,615 acres or 45.7 lin km or 28.4 miles. This operation was conducted over a period of 20 days, 10-29 June 1967, excluding 2 days of preparatory work done by the B/15 Engr Bn. (App 5, Photographs, Operation AKRON)

(d) Civic Action: Civic Action projects performed by the 15th Engineer Battalion for period May - July 1967 were:

(1) Construction

- a Bridges - 6
- b Culverts - 5
- c Roads - 30 km
- d Leveling/grading - 6 playgrounds
- e Other

1 Kiddie Land Built complete with slides, teeter-totter, swings and sandbox.

2 Concrete rice drying court in Binh Phuoc.

3 Fields of fire were cleared for PF outpost position in Bien Hoa Province (continuing).

(2) Health and Sanitation:

- a MEDCAPS - 24
- b Patients treated - 776
- c Immunizations

CONFIDENTIAL

44

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

CONFIDENTIAL

1 Plague - 636
2 Smallpox - 767
3 Typhoid - 40
4 Cholera - 845

e. In summary, support provided by the 15th Engineer Battalion was greatly improved by receipt of the new D7E Bulldozer during the reporting period. Trails constructed during Operation AKRON have added to the flexibility of tactical operations in Bien Hoa Province and security of Highways QL 15 and LTL 2. Mission requirements are expected to remain unchanged with combat engineer support continuing throughout the Division TAOI during the next reporting period.

8. Civil Affairs

a. General: The Division Civil Affairs element continued ardent support of internal defense and development operations throughout the Division's Tactical Area of Interest. This entailed continuing development and implementation of civic action projects in close liaison coordination with local civilian and military agencies. More important objectives of the civil affairs program during the period May - July 1967 were to develop confidence of the civilian population in GVN by:

(1) Creating and cultivating a desire in the civilian population and RF/PF to make them want to help themselves.

(2) Improving standards of public works, welfare, education and health.

(3) Developing farmland and lines of communication to further the civilian economy.

(4) Increasing efficiency of information exchanges between US and GVN civil and military agencies.

b. Civil Affairs Operations

(1) Cultivating a desire in the civilian population and RF/PF to make them help themselves.

(a) Arrival of materials at the work site of a civic action project normally represents culmination of several weeks of arduous labor on the part of the local civil affairs officer and local advisors. For example, the hamlet or district chief is first approached for recommendations of what is needed in the way of civic action projects to improve the local environment. The province chief and provincial advisor are then approached for approval to initiate certain projects. Action follows to encourage,

CONFIDENTIAL

45

CONFIDENTIAL

54

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

through coordination and cooperation, the Vietnamese to acquire materials for selected projects through their logistical channels. This normally meets with only token success and construction materials must be acquired through US channels.

(b) After needed materials are on site the hamlet, village or district chief must provide the labor. Laborers provided are normally local civilians and RF/PF. The civilians are understandably apprehensive about enemy retaliation to their cooperation in a US/GVN project unless they are satisfied with long term plans for security from such retaliation. Regional and Popular Forces on the other hand feel that they are soldiers and not laborers. In any event, laborers are provided whether voluntary or by order of the local chief. Only after these laborers have received technical assistance needed to learn how they can be most productive and after they have experienced for themselves the worth of a project, can they be expected to volunteer for additional labor.

(c) The most important by product of these endeavors is that the enemy has not interfered with major projects constructed in support of the Division's Civil Affairs Program. This can be attributed to fear on the part of the enemy that he will only alienate the population by destroying something that he himself cannot provide.

(d) One significant example of motivation that can be instilled in a population to make them want to help themselves was evident in reopening the hamlet of An Nhut Tan, Tan Tru District of Long An Province (XS-664674) on 27 June (App 5, Photographs). Prior to 1961 this hamlet was by virtue of its geographic location, a trade center in Long An Province. When the Viet Cong entered and imposed control in 1962, the population dwindled to 20 and the hamlet became a ghost town. Upon entering Tan Tru District in early 1967 the 2-60 Infantry stationed one rifle company in An Nhut Tan on a permanent basis. Within a period of approximately four months Viet Cong influence had been driven out of An Nhut Tan, construction materials had been provided and through a program of US and Vietnamese self-help, the town reopened. The population is now 150 and growing. Of significance during the reopening ceremony was the escape of a water buffalo donated to the local townspeople by soldiers stationed at An Nhut Tan.

(e) In connection with RF/PF outpost construction and improvement, the 9th Infantry Division directed a survey of these positions. Subsequently, MACV Advisors and GVN officials joined the survey team. The purpose of the survey is to make recommendations to responsible ARVN Battalion Commanders for improvement of RF/PF outpost positions. It was noted that an outpost found in poor condition did not necessarily indicate a need for immediate remedial action because the position may have been programmed for abandonment. When improvements or reconstruction of an outpost is recommended, an effort is made to provide materials. However, materials are not provided unless an attempt has been made by the Vietnamese to acquire materials through GVN logistical channels. Outpost positions in Long An for example, were provided with nine tons

CONFIDENTIAL

46

5b
AVDE-MH

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

of posts, screw metal (screw pickets) not available through Vietnamese logistical channels. Other assistance provided included clearing fields of fire with Rome Flows and mechanized flame throwers. All manual labor however, is provided by RF/PF soldiers.

(2) Improving standards of public works, welfare, education and health.

(a) Public works in the main, does not represent a significant problem in the Civil Affairs field. Although the first thing a hamlet will ask for is a well and electricity, the hamlet will probably already have a well that has been in use for years. These wells are normally shallow and therefore do not provide a source of potable water. When possible, projects will be planned to provide deeper wells, sometimes down to 1000 feet. Electricity is provided as power sources can be made available. Within the purview of public welfare, several continuing projects remain in progress. Upon arrival of the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam an Operation KANSAS stockage point was established. The stockage point handles all clothing and commodities brought overseas by the Division and items received through donation from organizations in the United States as well as items received from CARE, Catholic Relief Service, and USAID. At the end of July 630,000 pounds of clothes, health aids, children's items, food, and construction materials had been distributed through Operation Kansas. In other areas of public welfare, several playgrounds have been constructed and projects to improve local conditions undertaken. In one area for example, a foot bridge, large enough to accommodate a Lambretta, was constructed over a sixty foot wide river in the Division's TAOI. Before the bridge was constructed farmers had to walk approximately three miles to work.

(b) The Division's MEDCAP and DENTCAP program continued aggressive support of public health projects which is a vital portion of the Civil Affairs Program. Total patients treated by the Division have reached 117,500 patients. When feasible US units promote integrated US/GVN participation in separate MED/DENTCAP projects. One particularly gratifying facet has been the evacuation of afflicted children to Vietnamese hospitals for correction of cross-eyes, hare-lips, cleft palates and club feet. This is another area open to exploitation because the enemy cannot approach providing this type of medical treatment.

(c) Education: To increase the civilian productivity, the Division Civil Affairs Program is sponsoring classes in agriculture. Additionally English classes are given by Division personnel who speak Vietnamese and by non-Vietnamese speaking Division personnel through an interpreter. One battalion in the Division has provided a Vietnamese school teacher, for a hamlet where the local administration had not employed one, through donations. This was a temporary means of educating the people until the local government was able to obtain a teacher. The average salary is 300 \$VN (approximately \$25.00) per month.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

56

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(3) Developing farmland and lines of communications:

(a) As a demonstration of the flexibility of civic action support which can be provided through the Division Civil Affairs Program, 8,800 square meters of nipa-palm and heavy undergrowth were cleared in Dinh Tuong Province. This project, near Tan Phu Hamlet, was accomplished to provide additional farmland.

(b) Improvement of lines of communications in the Division's TAOI represents a major effort advanced by the Civic Action Program. The benefits of this improvement have been two-fold. First of all the Vietnamese economy has been improved by virtue of their being able to move goods to market. Secondly the lines of communications add to the flexibility of ground employment of tactical elements of the Division. Over 125 kilometers of road have been constructed or improved since the Division's arrival in Vietnam. An unfortunate corollary of the program is that the increase in LOC required increased security over employing RF/PF which the GVN official are unable to provide. This hinders the program to a great degree.

(4) Increasing efficiency of information exchanged between US and GVN agencies:

(a) Area Coordination Centers (ACC) have been established in several districts and provinces to facilitate exchange of information. Each ACC consists of three groups. The steering committee, composed of the province/district chief, the brigade/battalion commander, a Civic Operation Revolutionary Support (CORDS) representative and the sector/subsector advisor comprises the first group. The second group consists of representative of US/GVN organizations who form a combined operations center which concerns itself primarily with coordination of operations and collection of intelligence. The third group called a Civil Military Action Committee, coordinates all civil operations. Thus far ACC have been established at Bien Hoa, Long An, Dinh Tuong Provinces and Rach Kien, Tan Tru, Long Thanh and Xuan Loc (Long Khanh Province) Districts. Because of the nature of duties executed by the ACC, it also concerns itself with coordination of Revolutionary Development activities.

(b) Keeping the public informed of US Activities and explaining enemy atrocities (in conjunction with psychological operations) is an integral part of the civil affairs effort. The overall theme of information disseminated is designed to further GVN influence. Near work sites of major projects signs are displayed explaining the purpose of the project and how it is intended to benefit the community. Loudspeakers are employed to broadcast information either under division control or by the local government. In one hamlet a television set has been provided under US control in the hamlet "square" for the viewing pleasure of the local population.

(5) In summary, the Division Civil Affairs Program was initiated prior to arrival in Vietnam. However, unavoidable difficulties were experienced

CONFIDENTIAL
48

57
AVDE-MH

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

after arrival and it has taken a tremendous effort on the part of commanders and civil affairs personnel at all levels to achieve results which are now ahead of expectation. New areas are still to be explored. Yet to be fully evaluated is attachment of highly qualified and motivated civil affairs trained enlisted personnel to rifle companies operating in remote areas. These personnel are attached to provide recommendations to the company commander on how he can execute short term, high impact civic action projects. This allows the company commander to concentrate on the tactical situation. In this connection, foot bridges are being fabricated at base camp locations. When it is determined that a small hamlet is in need of a foot bridge, the dimension is relayed by radio to the base camp. A prefabricated bridge is flown in, emplaced and the unit moves on. This is but one facet of a successful and expanding civil affairs program.

9. Army Aviation

a. General: The quality and quantity of Army Aviation support provided to the division has been outstanding. Requests for airmobile assets from the Division to II FFORCEV have in most cases been honored out right without undue justification. All reasonable requests for additional assets or extension of assets provided has likewise been honored. The 9th Aviation Battalion provided general support to the division on a daily basis and conducted several airmobile assaults. Normal support requirements consisted of 16 UH-1D (Command and Control aircraft to general officers/brigade-committed battalion commanders and utility/resupply aircraft), two OH23 (Division LNO/utility) and four UH-1C gunships (convoy escort/countermortar/units in contact). The general support mission and participation in airmobile assaults normally averaged 3000 flying hours per month within the 9th Aviation Battalion.

b. Army Aviation Support

(1) During Division controlled operations, the 9th Aviation Battalion established a forward Army Aviation Control and Coordination Command Post. This command post was composed of representatives from the flight operations center, Army Aviation Element, battalion S-3 and a liaison officer from supporting Army Aviation units. The command post proved most beneficial in providing current information on each airlift and assisting Division G3 in planning Army Aviation Support.

(2) Operation ENTERPRISE: The 9th Aviation Battalion with the 118th Assault Helicopter Copter Company attached, supported the 3d Brigade by conducting multiple combat assaults and Eagle Flights. "Smokey" was utilized to screen a river line during the initial combat assault. The battalion flew 65 hours in support of the first days operation, lifted 271 troops, and 3 tons of cargo.

(3) Operations AKRON: The 9th Aviation Battalion with the 128th Assault Helicopter Company attached, supported the 2-39 Infantry by con-

CONFIDENTIAL

58

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

ducting combat assaults into landing zones (LZ) vic YS 3286. Landing zones were prepared by artillery and gunships. A total of 334 combat troops were lifted by the aviation battalion while flying 58 hours in support of the operation.

(4) Operation RILEY: The 9th Aviation Battalion supported 4-39 Infantry by conducting combat assaults on 4 and 25 July in support of Operation RILEY. Multiple LZ's were utilized to facilitate cordon and search operations. A total of 868 troops were lifted during 412 sorties.

(5) Operation PADDINGTON: The 9th Aviation Battalion was the coordinating headquarters for Army Aviation operations during Operation PADDINGTON. During the initial combat assaults, the battalion controlled four Airmobile Light (AML) companies and two Airmobile Medium (AMM) companies. Staging areas were established at Blackhorse and twelve at Nui Dat for refueling supporting aircraft. Approximately 2500 troops were airlifted during the first day of the operation to include two VNBC battalions. The aviation battalion alone flew 101 hours during the first day of the operation.

(6) The following number of helicopter companies (airmobile light) were requested and received from II FFORCEV:

	REQUESTED		RECEIVED	
	Total	Average	Total	Average
May	91	2.93	58	1.87
June	78	2.60	63	2.10
July	82	2.65	69	2.23

(7) The following helicopter support was provided by the 9th Aviation Battalion during the reporting period:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
Hours Flown (Total/Combat Assaults)	3,263/619	3,256/404	3,360/528
Sorties	9,767	8,547	9,578
Cargo (tons)	267	276	215
Troops & Passengers Lifted	10,950	10,180	10,537
Med Evacs	76	116	112
VC KBA	0	16	21
Buildings Destroyed	10	1	22
Buildings Damaged	22	10	21
A/C Destroyed/Damaged	1/5	0/2	0/4

(8) Statistics generated during the reporting period indicated that support requirements and support provided remained relatively constant.

CONFIDENTIAL
50

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(9) During May organic light fire teams flew riverine escort missions totaling 88 hours and 40 minutes. Thirteen hours and 20 minutes were flown intransit to rendezvous points where the escort missions would originate. Several missions were canceled after the aircraft were enroute to the rendezvous point resulting in unnecessary engine time. Additionally, river convoys normally had adequate protection which negated a requirement for support by a light fire team. Requests for this type support are being more closely scrutinized to ascertain that a valid requirement exists before missions are approved.

(10) One 23 May 1967, a Stingray light fire team from Co B, 9th Avn Bn provided direct support to the 4-39 Infantry Battalion. During the attack of a target, the gunships were subjected to enemy fire during the break from their firing passes. The Commanding Officer, 4-39 Inf directed his ground elements to provide suppressive fire for the Stingrays. This action was noteworthy in that it was the first time that a ground element provided mutual close fire support to the Stingrays. This timely, coordinated, mutual fire support protected the gunships during the most critical phases of firing passes.

(11) During July the Pathfinder Detachment had a mission to operate a staging field for a company (airmobile light) tactical troop lift. Using organic means of marking individual touchdown points for each aircraft, the troop lift was greatly facilitated both in lining up troops and from the safety point of view.

(c) Three studies were completed during the reporting period concerning employment of organic aviation assets:

(1) Increasing availability rate of OH23 helicopter through consolidation: A staff study was initiated to determine if the availability rate of OH23 helicopters could be increased by withdrawing aircraft assigned to divisional units (less 9th Aviation Battalion) and consolidating them under control of the 9th Aviation Battalion. The results of this study indicated that deadline rates of helicopters for parts was the primary cause of a low availability rate for the OH23. Therefore, it was concluded that no improvement in availability rates could be realized if all OH23 helicopters were placed under control of the 9th Aviation Battalion. To reduce deadline rates, however, increased command emphasis was directed on acquiring needed parts through supply channels. Additionally, the Commanding General directed that a system be implemented whereby each brigade would be provided with a minimum of three flyable OH23 each day.

(2) Aircraft Priorities: To implement the Commanding General's guidance that three OH23 helicopters be provided to each brigade each day, a recommended priority list was submitted, approved, published and distributed during July.

(3) Employment of UH-1C Helicopters: The third study involved utilization of two UH-1C helicopters assigned to 9th Infantry Division Artillery for general support aircraft i.e., searchlight aircraft/man-packed personnel

CONFIDENTIAL
51

60

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

detector missions/command and control aircraft. It was concluded and approved by the Commanding General that two UH-1C helicopters assigned to 9th Infantry Division Artillery would be laterally transferred to the 9th Aviation Battalion for reasons stated.

d. Summary: An objective appraisal of Army Aviation support from the 9th Aviation Battalion and from non-divisional resources indicates that the division is receiving adequate support to meet mission requirements. Refinements indicated in areas mentioned can be implemented at the local level.

10. Chemical

a. General: The Division Chemical Section continued support of division operations with riot control, defoliation and tunnel contamination operations to complement ground tactical operations. Effectiveness of dispensing riot control agents and the division intelligence collection effort were greatly enhanced by receipt of eight Man Pack Personnel Detectors (MPD) modified for airborne employment from organic helicopters.

b. Man Pack Personnel Detector (MPD): Two MPD's were received by the Division Chemical Section on 27 May for evaluation. Six additional MPD's were received during June and July. These detectors were employed from UH-1B and D model helicopters. The MPD determines the presence of concentrations of personnel by the detection of compounds excreted by the human body. Best recordings are received at altitudes of 200 feet or below. Pilots normally prefer to fly missions "on the deck" at 80-100 knots. Low level flights at high speed make it difficult for pilots to maintain their exact location. Also, the MPD takes readings every 0.5 seconds making it difficult to pinpoint the exact location where a reading was recorded. Pinpointing location was facilitated by following the MPD aircraft with a "chase aircraft" flying at a higher altitude. When a heavy reading is obtained, the chase aircraft is signaled and the location is recorded approximately 200 meters to the rear of the MPD aircraft's position. To provide protection for the aircraft taking recordings and the chase aircraft, two gunships normally accompany the mission. Problems encountered were: 1) Aircraft vibration caused failure of electronic components of the MPD after two-three days employment. 2) Missions flown in rain gave poor results. 3) Dust, smoke and/or haze fouled the MPD by giving invalid readings. 4) False readings resulted in areas where recent bombing, artillery, or demolition explosions had occurred. All problems areas will be included with recommendations in an evaluation of the MPD to be submitted on 15 August 1967 to the Army Concept Team in Vietnam.

c. Operations

(1) The MPD has proven to be particularly effective in verifying agent and visual reports of large enemy concentrations. The MPD is also effective when employed in remote areas i.e., RUMG SAT Special Zone, Plain of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

Reeds, Pineapple Patch etc, because these are not population centers and practically any indication of personnel may be interpreted with validity as being an enemy element. During daylight, Eagle flights have been employed and have made contact as a direct result of MPD readings.

(2) Riot control Agents (CS-1) were effectively employed during the reporting period from orbiting aircraft at the request of the ground commander and in reaction to MPD readings. Although visual sightings of the enemy leaving a contaminated area were made and subsequently engaged by supporting gunships, no positive results were reported.

(3) Defoliation: On 14, 20-22, 24-26 July the Division Chemical Section conducted defoliation operations in Phuoc Tuy Province in support of Operation PADDINGTON. These missions were directed against known enemy garden plots and rice paddies. Some damage was visible as spraying was completed but results are not yet complete.

(4) Tunnel Operations: On 12 June a tunnel complex discovered south of Camp Martin Cox in the Operation AKRON area was contaminated with CS-1 and an attempt was made to destroy the complex with an acetylene generator. On 28 June the tunnel was reentered to assess damage. Blast damage to tunnels was described as light with tunnels still passable. However, the CS-1 concentration was still high enough to preclude occupation of the tunnel for more than ten minutes even while wearing a protective mask.

d. In summary, chemical support of division tactical operations has been effective during the reporting period. The Man Pack Personnel Detector has opened an entirely new area in the intelligence collection effort. While it is no panacea for the problem of locating an elusive enemy, it does hold great potential when employed with other information gathering methods. Destruction of VC garden plots has further complicated the VC logistical effort in Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces. More emphasis will be placed on defoliation of base camp perimeters and selected VC land lines of communications in the Division TAOI in order to enhance observation of enemy movement and limit their freedom of movement.

11. Base Development

a. General. During the reporting period clearing and construction of Division base camps continued despite deteriorating weather conditions. It became readily apparent that construction must be programmed six to eight months prior to actual construction to insure availability of construction materials. Difficulties experienced during the early period of the rainy season dictates that horizontal construction be programmed during the dry season. Development of base camps at Camp Martin Cox and Dong Tam continued to be areas of primary concern in the construction effort.

CONFIDENTIAL

62

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

b. Camp Martin Cox (Bearcat)

(1) During the reporting period an area 2400 X 4000' of jungle was cleared from areas adjacent to the camp. In addition 10,000' of roads were constructed and 360,000 sq ft of vertical construction were completed.

(2) Emphasis was placed on an area for receipt of Royal Thailand Volunteer Regiment (RTVR) during the next reporting period. At the close of the reporting period sufficient billets and overhead cover had been completed to accommodate the advance party contingent.

(3) Local hire and direct hire indigenous personnel continued to supplement the base construction effort. Direct hire personnel are hired in one of two categories i.e., "A" or "E" clearance as determined by the Military Security Service (MSS). For a category "A" clearance a prospective employee must enlist the services of an ARVN Captain or two Second Lieutenants as his sponsor. A category "E" clearance requires sponsorship by two ARVN Sergeants or one Second Lieutenant. Most employees find the cost of sponsorship, which varies from 2,000 - 5,000 \$VN depending upon rank, beyond their means. Daily hire personnel are kept under constant supervision. Each daily hire is paid 80 \$VN (\$.70) per day. A change in USARV policy attributed to the variance in hiring levels during the quarter:

	MAY	JULY
Direct Hire	55	55
Daily Hire	830	390 (200 for RTVR)

(4) Among the major facilities completed during the reporting period was the Main Post Exchange (PX) which was formally opened on 4 July 1967.

The following is a comparison of the old and new facility:

	OLD	NEW
INVENTORY	\$675,375.52	\$1,837,859.44
PERSONNEL TO OPERATE:		
(Military)		
Main Store	1 OFF, 19 EM	1 OFF, 26 EM
Warehouse	4 EM	6 EM
Security	1 EM	4 EM
(Civilian)	6	18
Main Store	3	11
Warehouse	6	11
Maintenance	-	2
MCU Clerks		

CONFIDENTIAL

54

CONFIDENTIAL

AVR-101

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

Customers (daily average)

	2,500	4,000
TOTAL SALES(Main Store)		\$523,983.71
(Annexes)		\$3,339.00
(Class VI)		\$77,156.11
(Food Service)		\$15,195.15
(Concessions)		\$81,338.86

NOTE: The only demand items which are in short supply at the Main PX are assorted electronic equipment, cameras and accessories.

(5) On 18 June a MARS station was opened at Camp Martin Cox. This station completed 343 patches during July. Priority of calls are given to individuals who have been notified of a death in their immediate family, individuals who have been wounded, personnel referred by a chaplain or member of the Red Cross as having a pressing personal problem, and lastly to routine traffic.

c. Dong Tam Base

(1) During the reporting period close coordination between the Dong Tam Base Planning Board and the 1st Logistical Command Forward Supply Area, has assured efficient priorities for construction are established well in advance. This procedure has provided sufficient time to acquire materials before actual construction has begun.

(2) Experience in designating priorities has dictated that first consideration be given to drainage. Second priority has been given to roads and communications, and third priority to vertical construction.

(3) Approximately 4,792,974 cubic meters of fill has been pumped into the base during the reporting period. However, all of the problems of working with super saturated silt are being faced at Dong Tam. Due to the shortages of aggregate rock in the Delta, concrete must be added 10 to 12 percent by volume to sand to stabilize roads. Erosion is also a problem. Ditches must be lined with burlap and continually maintained. Erosion of the airfield is especially noticeable where aircraft impact.

(4) Internal Security:

(a) The base defense perimeter consists of five sectors, four land and one water. There are forty-nine bunkers in the land sectors and nine in the water sector. Each bunker is manned by three men. The following equipment/weapons are employed to defend the perimeter:

CONFIDENTIAL

55

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

CONFIDENTIAL

Perimeter

1 Counter mortar radar
8 106mm recoilless rifle
5 90mm recoilless rifle
2 Quad .50 cal machineguns
2 Twin 40mm Cannons
6 Searchlights
2 Helicopter Gunships (on call)

Per Sector

5 M-60 machineguns
4 M-79 grenade launchers
1 Starlight scope (every third
bunker)

(b) In addition to manning nine bunkers in the water sector, each dredge is secured by a reinforced platoon, drag line security is provided by one reinforced squad and one fire team is required for pipeline security.

(c) Searchlights employed from the berm/perimeter proved very effective to illuminate suspected enemy mortar positions during two mortar attacks when gunships were employed.

12. Organization and Training

a. Organization:

(1) During the reporting period the 9th Infantry Division found it necessary to establish several table of distribution (TD) organizations to more effectively accomplish its mission. The continued need for the defense of its two major camps, Bearcat and Dong Tam necessitated the creation of two austere Task Force Organizations with the capability to command and control allocated combat forces. With a modest expenditure of only 17 Officers and 32 EM the two TD organizations were staffed, thereby releasing two battalion headquarters to combat operations.

(2) The 9th Infantry Division Long Range Patrol capability was significantly expanded by forming a provisional organization which resembles the Long Range Patrol Detachment recently proposed in organization and strength. It effectively will double the Division's ability to saturate its TAOI, as soon as suitable personnel have been recruited and trained.

b. Training:

(1) The 9th Inf Div expanded its replacement training program from a three day training cycle to a five day cycle which will include a 18 hour combat patrol to better acclimate new replacement with the conditions they will encounter during combat. All incoming personnel in grades E-1 through O-3 receiving the training.

(2) A Sniper Training program was instituted with the goal of qualifying two men per each sniper weapon to extend the effective range of

CONFIDENTIAL

4788-88

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

combat power. This program was taught at brigade level to allow maximum use of the terrain peculiar to each brigade's area of operation.

(3) A program of Boat and Basic Water Survival Training was instituted in early July for all replacements for the 2d and 3d Brigades. The one day program of instruction covers basic boat handling procedures of those boats organic to the brigade. It also includes periods on maintenance of the boat and its engines along with basic navigational techniques.

(4) A program of retesting of all 81mm and 4.2" mortar sections and platoon was undertaken to update all mortar men in fundamentals, review basic crew duties and insure continued high performance of all personnel.

(5) Based on a recommendation of the 9th Infantry Division Safety Council, a program of Cal .45 Pistol refresher training was undertaken to provide all personnel armed with the Cal .45 with four hours of mandatory instruction.

(6) In an effort to improve the performance of 9th Infantry Division volunteers at the MACV Recondo School and to prepare them to better receive and utilize the information taught at the school, a Division Recondo Course was established. Not only are the MACV Recondo School volunteers given a one week course, but in the interim week between starting dates of the MACV course, the personnel from maneuver units reconnaissance and scout sections are afforded the opportunity to also participate in the training. This is providing a significant advance in the technical and professional competence of the Division's reconnaissance elements.

(7) Some 400 9th Infantry Division personnel participated in numerous non-divisional courses presented by the New Equipment Training Team (NETT) and other units in Saigon, Cholon, Vung Tau and Camp Martin Cox. Other soldiers traveled to the Philippines and other locations within RVN, to attend Jungle Survival Courses, bridge evaluation courses and computer programming courses.

13. Revolutionary Development

a. General: Basically all Division operations can be classified in one way or another as being in support of Revolutionary Development (RD). "Revolutionary Development", the central theme of the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam today, is a process by which the Government of Vietnam (GVN) establishes

⁵ Draft MACV Handbook, Military Support of Revolutionary Development, Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, dated 9 May 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL
(57)

CONFIDENTIAL

65

REF ID:

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period ending
31 July 1967. (ICS/SPUR-65)

and maintains security in populated areas and integrates the population into the structure of a viable, free non-communist Republic of Vietnam (RVN).⁵ The GVN actively participates in RD by deploying Vietnamese cadre, trained in the process of restoring, consolidating and expanding government control so that nation building can progress to population center. The 9th Infantry Division's primary role in RD is to provide security through the conduct of strike and consolidation operations and to assist the civic action aspect of RD through MEDCAP/DENTCAP and other civil affairs projects.

b. The work of RD teams during May was stymied for a number of reasons although the teams demonstrated a more than willing effort to do what was required of them. To a degree, RD Team projects were hampered by a lack of construction materials. Moreover, Team security while operating in outlying areas represented another of their more serious problems. For example, when a team was provided security by ARVN or RF Forces, they invariably refused to post close in security. When not provided security from an outside source, they refused to remain overnight in hamlets where they were working. Instead the teams would retire to a nearby RF/PF outpost position at dusk. The Division initiated a program of providing patrols and ambushes in Long Thanh District, Bien Hoa Province and Dinh Tuong Province and initiated patrolling in Long An Province to provide increased security for RD Cadre.

c. During June the RD Program remained generally the same overall. An attack on a RD Team operating in the Nhon Trach resulted in death of the District Chief, his wife, a Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support representative and the District S2. This attack undermined the RD effort in the district by instilling doubt in the population that GVN could provide necessary security. The situation was further aggravated when the population asked the RD Team to leave. This attitude could be overcome if the RD Team would use the attack to actively counter VC terror activities. Revolutionary Development activities in Dinh Tuong, Long An and Long Khanh (11th ACE) Province continued at a slow but steady pace. Progress remained dependent upon the degree of security afforded to the team's environment.

d. In July an Area Coordination Committee (ACC) was established in Xuan Loc District, Long Khanh Province. This and other ACC located in Bien Hoa, Long An and Dinh Tuong directed operations which would serve to complement and assist the RD Program through more efficient cooperation and direction of FIMAF and civilian efforts. In addition, three Mobile Advisory Teams were organized; two in Long Khanh and one in Long An Province. Each team was organized with one officer, four enlisted men and an interpreter. Mission of these teams are to retrain RF/PF Forces with priority to those forces supporting RD Teams. An invaluable side effect resulting from employment of these retraining teams is that it allows the Division, through visits and reports, to become intimately familiar with problems in the RD Program.

e. In summary, the 9th Infantry Division is fully cognizant of its

CONFIDENTIAL
(58)

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-WH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSPOR-65)

role in supporting the RD Program. Every attempt is being made to identify and correct all problem areas confronting the RD effort. The success of initial endeavors in this area has been encouraging because it has justified personnel and material resource expenditures required to open areas for Revolutionary Development.

14. Signal

a. General. The 9th Signal Battalion continued diverse operations required to provide the Division with tactical communications. This included land line, VHF, photographic and air courier service.

b. During May the 9th Signal Battalion continued to provide tactical communications while Company C, 36th Signal Battalion concentrated on non-tactical communications support. Major areas serviced by 9th Signal Battalion were Camp Martin Cox (Division), Dong Tam (2d Brigade), Tan An (3d Brigade), Ben Phuoc (5-60 Inf (M)), Tan Tru (2-60 Inf), Rach Kien (3-39 Inf), Ben Luc and the Mobile Riverine Force (2d Brigade). App 10, Switchboard Diagram). Systems were also initiated to support the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment upon its attachment to the division., Within the Division's TACR courier requirements exceed the Signal Battalion's capability to provide ground courier service. To correct this situation, the battalion initiated air courier service to each outlying unit on a once or twice a day basis.

c. Signal support during the month of June remained relatively unchanged. Selected items of PLL continued to be difficult to obtain although the overall picture improved, Revetments to protect items essential to uninterrupted communications, i.e., generators, were improved throughout the division area of operations.

d. Operation PADDINGTON was supported during July with installation of four VHF systems. It became apparent that forward signal center support team training must be continually evaluated during periods of prolonged inactivity when there are few displacements of division forward on field operations (Observations, Lessons Learned). Support of the Mobile Riverine Force continued with excellent results. The value of radio/wire integration (RWI) to operational requirements was re-emphasized and a marked improvement of RWI usage was noted.

e. In conclusion, signal requirements within the Division including support of the Mobile Riverine Force, are within the capability of the 9th Signal Battalion. Refinements in current systems are continually reviewed to improve signal support being provided.

CONFIDENTIAL

59

AVND-08

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/OPCOR-65)

SECTION II (c)

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

1. Observations

a. Personnel and administration

ITEM: Infusion Program

DISCUSSION: Upon closing Vietnam in early 1967 the 9th Infantry Division was immediately faced with a personnel turnover "rotational hump" which would occur during late 1967 and early 1968. Alternatives available to reduce the rotational hump were to infuse Division personnel with personnel in other organizations or in the pipeline, who had rotation dates before or after the Division's rotational hump. Another alternative was to curtail overseas tours through a cross section of the Division to spread the rotational hump.

OBSERVATION: Infusion provided the ideal solution for reducing the rotation hump. Aggressive implementation of the infusion all but negated a need to curtail individuals.

ITEM: Intra-Division Infusion

DISCUSSION: After infusion outside the division had been used to reduce a bulk of the personnel rotational hump it was feasible to use intra-division infusion to achieve final USARV objectives because of the Division's deployment in three major increments.

OBSERVATIONS: An invaluable side effect from intra-division infusion is that it allows personnel who deployed with the division to complete their tour with the division.

ITEM: Mail and Distribution

DISCUSSION: Units which fail to make precise coordination with supporting APO and AG Message Center facilities prior to moving out on field operations will experience delays and in some cases misrouted mail and distribution.

OBSERVATION: Unit SOP must include procedures for coordination with supporting APO and AG Message Center to insure a continuous flow of mail and distribution while operating away from a base camp location.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

60

AVDE-ME

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

ITEM: Casualty Mail

DISCUSSION: Delayed receipt of admission and disposition reports causes unnecessary delay in delivering mail to casualties hospitalized outside the Division area. To correct this situation liaison enlisted personnel were stationed at the three major outlying hospitals to report admission and disposition of division casualties.

OBSERVATION: There has been no significant interruption of mail delivery to casualties as result of implementation of this system.

ITEM: Disposal of Waste Material

DISCUSSION: A joint Military Police/National Police search of a Vietnamese National carrying a box from the division's Sanitary Fill revealed that the box contained 30 field manuals. The manuals dealt with CBR, booby traps, basic weapons, etc.

OBSERVATION: Regardless of the intensity of the indoctrination program, trash disposal areas must be closely scrutinized to preclude loss of sensitive material that has been carelessly discarded through negligence.

ITEM: Indigenous Personnel

DISCUSSION: It is of absolute necessity that daily hire personnel and vehicles transporting daily hire personnel be thoroughly searched upon entering and exiting base camp. An average of one individual per day as a general rule, will attempt to gain access without proper authorization.

OBSERVATION: To date no incidents of sabotage or terrorist activities have occurred as a direct result of constant surveillance of indigenous personnel.

ITEM: Contraband Items

DISCUSSION: The problem of contraband items being transported on and off base camp will be prevalent at all times unless positive remedial action is taken to preclude it. Indigenous personnel will attempt to introduce marijuana and other drugs onto the base camp and remove Military Payment Certificates, field manuals, candy, electrical wire, batteries, maps pipe, tools, clothing and etc.

OBSERVATION: A more emphatic program of information and indoctrination is being established to preclude an exchange of contraband items between US and indigenous personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

61

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

ITEM: Missing Financial Data Record Folders (FDRF)

DISCUSSION: Of every 1,000 replacements arriving at the Division, approximately 250 arrive prior to receipt of individual FDRF. Two hundred FDRF will subsequently arrive within 20-30 days. Of the remaining 50 FDRF, approximately 20 will eventually be recovered.

OBSERVATION: In order to preclude congressional and inspector general complaints and proceeding on the theory that the men are victims of an archaic system over which they have no control, temporary FDRF are initiated and the men are paid. Reconciliations are effected either upon receipt of the FDRF or upon verification from FCUSA.

ITEM: Casualty Evacuation by Dust-Off

DISCUSSION: The principal of the chain of evacuation of casualties from unit medic to battalion aid station to Division clearing station to army level evacuation or surgical hospital is time-honored. In a guerrilla war and with the advent of helicopter evacuation, the casualty many times goes directly to the hospital from the battle field where he was injured. There is no question that many lives have been saved because of their rapid transportation to an army hospital. Experience has shown, however, that in many cases it was detrimental to both the man and the mission when clearing station facilities were over-flown in order to get the man to an army hospital. The following points substantiate this argument:

1. Many casualties have not been seen by medical personnel prior to pick up by dust-off, and must be taken to the closest facility, i.e., clearing station, where resuscitative treatment is given and the patient stabilized prior to further evacuation. Further, those patients that are treated by the tourniquet, require immediate professional medical care. The risk of DOA is much greater when clearing stations are by-passed and additional time is spent flying to a more distant medical facility.

2. Seriously injured casualties and slightly wounded casualties are placed on the same evacuation helicopter. At THE CLEARING station the slightly wounded casualty can be treated, held for a short period, and returned to duty directly without leaving the division area.

3. Evacuation can be coordinated at the clearing station, thereby, preventing a situation where a helicopter takes a single patient to a hospital which may require 40 to 60 minutes, plus refueling time; at the same time other patients in the AO are awaiting evacuation. Further, patients are brought to the clearing station by "slick ship" or ground vehicle. If the evacuation helicopter by-passes the clearing station enroute to a hospital, other patients awaiting evacuation are held an undue length of time.

CONFIDENTIAL

(3)

62

71

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

4. Clearing stations have the necessary equipment and professional personnel to provide resuscitative medical care and to stabilize the patient so that further evacuation will not jeopardize his health.

OBSERVATION: Whenever possible, combat operations should be supported by a clearing station in the FSB, with a dust-off helicopter co-located with the clearing station. Casualties should be brought directly to the clearing station for initial treatment, and then further evacuation to army level hospitals coordinated by the clearing station.

ITEM: Riverine Medical Support

DISCUSSION: For riverine operations an ATC with an emergency medical team consisting of 1 MC and 7 Medical Corpsmen moves with the assault forces to a point near the area of operations. Emergency medical care is provided here and then casualties are further evacuated. On several occasions casualties were unable to be evacuated from the medical ATC due to closeness of enemy contact. To counter this and to provide a more efficient service as well as to eliminate urgent cases taken to the APB's where closeness of spaces and dangers of moving patients up and down decks with narrow passages exist, an LCU with helipad has been requested.

OBSERVATION: A LCU will provide quicker response to urgent cases and ability to move to area of operations for medical service.

ITEM: Medical Clearing Station

DISCUSSION: Setting up of Medical clearing station in field operations. A clearing station normally is located where security is provided, and where it can best support the mission. This invariably means the brigade trains area. The medical clearing station area must have adequate space as well as area for a dust-off helicopter landing zone. To make maximum use of the clearing station it is advisable to locate the clearing station near or in a FSB area. By this means, the medical company can be more responsive to battalion aid stations as well as more effectively support the operation.

OBSERVATION: Medical clearing stations should be used as much as possible and located as close to the AO as feasible. The capabilities of the medical clearing station are the same for initial life saving procedures as an evacuation hospital.

ITEM: Intelligence Collection Worksheet

DISCUSSION: The flow of information into G2 is voluminous and each separate piece of information must be thoroughly evaluated in light of the complete intelligence picture. Basis for organizing the essential elements of information

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

63

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(EEI) should be predicated on what is needed to confirm or complete intelligence on hand.

OBSERVATION: A collection worksheet file, tabbed to separate intelligence EEI and input by specified geographic or political area (i.e. province, Special Zone, etc) and by intelligence subject within that area (i.e. installations, lines of communication, infrastructure, tactics, etc) will enable the G2 planner to focus on one area and subject at a time when building an intelligence picture to accurately portray enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and possible courses of action. On the worksheet are columns for: EEI, Sources, Date and Time (EEI) Due, Feedback and Dissemination. Thus on one form (worksheet), the user can determine the timeliness of the answer, see the answer, maintain a record of its dissemination and/or action taken, and develop additional EEI to more fully develop the intelligence picture for that particular enemy activity within the designated area.

ITEM: Utilization of Order of Battle information derived from captured documents.

DISCUSSION: Captured documents are a valuable source of order of battle information on VC units from the highest to the lowest level. However, volume of information derived from these documents presents problems in filing and analyzing and disseminating the information to using units.

OBSERVATION: The most important step in the utilization of information derived from captured documents is in passing the information on to the using units. Much of the information obtained deals with the composition, strength, weapons, equipment, and personalities of a particular VC unit. All personality information is extracted and passed to the Counterintelligence Section for inclusion in the blacklists. Other information is analyzed and disseminated in Order of Battle briefs, passed directly to the interrogation section to be used in cross checking PW statements, or disseminated to units having primary interest.

ITEM: Evacuation of Enemy Documents and Material

DISCUSSION: When the IPW Team is not located in close proximity to Brigade Headquarters because of tactical considerations, the utilization of an air-mobile command post, or any other reason, units should use every available means to rapidly evacuate enemy documents and material directly to the IPW Team, bypassing intermediate headquarters. Since tactical units rarely have the capability to make more than a cursory examination of such items, failure to rapidly evacuate these items of possible intelligence value may result in delaying proper evacuation beyond the point where quick exploitation of such intelligence would be fruitful.

CONFIDENTIAL

(5)

64

23

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

OBSERVATION: Since the IFW Team will normally be located in the trains area when not with the CP, every effort should be made to utilize resupply helicopters, helicopters returning to trains area for refueling, or any other type vehicle to rapidly evacuate captured documents and materials.

ITEM: Map Supply

DISCUSSION: S2 personnel should anticipate that on any operation the AO may be enlarged to include additional areas in any direction. In the event this occurs, map coverage becomes an immediate necessity. It is realized that although transporting large numbers of maps may be difficult and impractical a definite plan for additional coverage over and above the assigned AO must be implemented..

OBSERVATION: That S2 sections have their possession or at a minimum readily available in the trains area, sufficient maps for normal distribution of each map sheet bordering the assigned AO. Prior to each operation, the S2 must ascertain that he has such coverage, and if not submit a requisition for immediate issue.

ITEM: Debriefing of Combat Action

DISCUSSION: Frequent erroneous spot reports are submitted by subordinate units as a result of confusion, following an engagement. During one operation contact reports indicated that the VC forces encountered was from half a squad to platoon size, and that several VC claymores were detonated. Debriefing of personnel indicated that the unit commanders impression differed from the platoon leader involved.

OBSERVATION: Platoons should be debriefed as soon as possible following contact. The platoon leader should debrief his entire unit, reconstructing the entire event. When applicable, the company commander or battalion S2 should participate in the debriefing.

ITEM: Interrogation of PW and Chieu Hoi

DISCUSSION: To facilitate rapid dissemination of intelligence gained from interrogation of PW and Chieu hoi, a system of speedy translations and reporting needs to be established. The present system requires evacuation from the field location to the battalion PW cage. No field interrogation can be made due to the lack of trained interrogators and interpreters. At battalion and brigade level an interrogation is made and then the PW is evacuated to the Division PW cage for more intensive interrogation. At each level a formal interrogation report is prepared and disseminated to the S2 or G2 at the appropriate level.

CONFIDENTIAL

(6)

65

CONFIDENTIAL

74

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65)

The formal written report takes time to prepare, edit and distribute. A system of informal reporting should be established to permit immediate dissemination of intelligence information. In particular local force and main force personnel should be interrogated and information expedited to the capturing unit to gain maximum exploitation and value of the intelligence derived.

OBSERVATION: All IPW teams should be alert to disseminate intelligence information as rapidly and expeditiously as possible. At lower level interrogation should be geared to combat intelligence for immediate use (of the troops on the ground) at company/battalion level.

ITEM: Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ) Studies

DISCUSSION: It is necessary to have all HLZ studies as comprehensive as possible in order to provide the commander and the pilots a complete orientation prior to conduction of an operation.

OBSERVATION: All HLZ should be plotted on an overlay with a narrative description of the area and supported by individual photos (preferably hand-held photos) of each HLZ.

ITEM: VC/NVA Booby Traps

DISCUSSION: A high percentage of US casualties have been attributed to VC/NVA mines and booby traps. Too often mines and booby traps go undetected until after detonation. When discovered, mines or booby traps should not be destroyed unless trained personnel are available to disarm them. The only VC/NVA marker sign reported encountered has been "TU DIA" (Kill Zone). MACV G2 recently published a handbook with several illustrations on VC/NVA mine and booby trap indicators being employed in I Corps.

OBSERVATION: All personnel must make a thorough and continuous search of local terrain in order to detect VC/NVA mines and booby traps. The average soldier does not possess the necessary knowledge to disarm mines or booby traps without great danger to himself. Signs should be reported to higher headquarters for compilation and distribution to all units. Any unusual employment of mines or booby traps should be sketched or photographed prior to destruction.

ITEM: VC Made Mines and Booby Traps

DISCUSSION: During Operation AKROM a small ordnance cache was located that substantiates the local manufacturing of hand grenades, mines and booby traps. Two hand grenades confiscated were constructed from US chocolate milk cans, with an explosive filler and standard fuse.

CONFIDENTIAL

(9)

66

75

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

OBSERVATION: Command emphasis at all levels must be placed on the destruction or removal of all waste items, cans, batteries, communications wire, foil, plastic bags, to preclude their use by the enemy.

ITEM: Highway Obstructions Constructed by the Viet Cong

DISCUSSION: The Viet Cong are very tricky in their mining and obstruction of locally travelled highways. One instance occurred on Highway 4, during a time when the Viet Cong were extremely active in their terrorist activities and tactics. The VC set up two earth obstructions approximately 1000 meters apart, on Highway 4. The first obstruction was found to be no more than a large pile of dirt blocking traffic. This was checked for mines, using the mine detectors, and removed from the road. The second obstruction was found to be exactly like the first pile of dirt, except it was mined.

OBSERVATION: Anything less than a 100% effort by the mine detector team would have resulted in overlooking the mine. Moving the pile before thoroughly check it out for booby traps would most likely have resulted in an explosion, inflicting damage and casualties to friendly troops.

ITEM: Coordination Requirements of Mobile Riverine Force (MRF)

DISCUSSION: The nature of operations (strike primarily) conducted by the MRF necessitates rapid and continuing coordination. For example, at one anchorage the MRF employed security forces in three separate provinces while conducting operations in two provinces. As evidenced by this example, the MRF is a transitory force which continually crosses GVN boundaries of political and military responsibility. This requires extensive liaison and coordination which has been routinely handled by the brigade command and staff with exception of purely US Navy advisory matters.

OBSERVATION: Two liaison officers authorized by brigade TC&E cannot meet requirements for all required coordinator and liaison, consequently the S5 and command group have had to assume a portion of this responsibility. To effect full and continuing coordination, a liaison section of four officers, preferably Captains, is warranted. Provisions for assignment of these officers has been addressed on a proposed revision to the Table of Distribution.

ITEM: Airmobile Feint as Economy of Force

DISCUSSION: Areas of operations assigned for strike operations often exceed a units capability to attack and simultaneously block likely routes of escape.

CONFIDENTIAL

(e)

67

CONFIDENTIAL

AVUE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

OBSERVATION: Airmobile feints to include full airstrikes, artillery and gunships landing zone preparations can often be employed along likely enemy escape routes to deter enemy use of those routes. Moreover, by deterring enemy use of a route, he may remain in a fixed position or attempt to escape along routes blocked by maneuver forces.

ITEM: Waterborne and Airborne Command and Control Craft

DISCUSSION: Both brigade and battalion commanders have found the helicopter an invaluable tool in command and control. The Delta environment, flat, open and free of vegetation canopy presents a challenge to ground navigation and a great advantage to the airborne commander and observer. Delineation of objectives, routes and obstacles and, to a smaller degree, enemy fortifications is a very difficult task to the commander on the surface and a relatively easy task for the airborne commander. Both troop and assault craft maneuver is facilitated 100% as a result of the generally unobscured view of the airborne command group. With the limited visibility of darkness and marginal flying weather experienced during the southwest monsoon season, the command and communications boats (CCB) provided by TF 117 are essential to continuing command and control by brigade and battalion commanders in their forward positions of the area of operations.

OBSERVATION: The combined use of command and control helicopters and the CCB by brigade and battalion commanders permits close supervision and control of the joint combat power deployed by the MRF with cooperating and supporting forces.

ITEM: Individual Touch-Down During Airmobile Operations

DISCUSSION: During July 1967, the Pathfinder Detachment had the mission of operating the stage field for a three company UH-1D Helicopter Tactical Troop lift. The requirement was to mark the touchdown points for the lead aircraft of each company. (Operation PADDINGTON)

OBSERVATION: The practice of marking only the touchdown point for the lead aircraft of each airmobile company is not desirable if there is sufficient time to properly employ the organic Pathfinder team to mark individual touchdown points.

ITEM: Coordination with ARVN

DISCUSSION: Close coordination with ARVN Forces working in the same area must be accomplished down to and including company level to make sure US and ARVN have exchanged call signs, radio freqs. points of origin, overlays and operations orders.

CONFIDENTIAL

(9)

68

77

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MR

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

OBSERVATION: The use of a liaison officer to ARVN units working with or in conjunction with US units is a must for proper coordination.

ITEM: Employment of AA (SP) Artillery to Augment Fire Support/Patrol Bases

DISCUSSION: The twin 40mm and quad .50 cal proved to be a definite asset in securing FS/PB. By using these items at FS/PB the infantry elements securing FS/PB are allowed to conduct extensive patrolling in the AO during daylight hours. The only restriction being routes into FS/PB, since the 40mm weapon is not air transportable and cannot accompany 105 batteries that are airlifted into position. However, the quad .50 cal can be dismounted and easily airlifted into Air Head.

OBSERVATION: The use of twin 40mm, and quad .50 cal machine guns in defense of FS/PB lessens the requirements for infantry security during the daylight hours and increases the ability of the infantry elements to conduct S & D operations. These weapons also increase the firepower and defensive capability of the FS/PB when secured by infantry units and allow for more ambush patrols to be established during the hours of darkness.

ITEM: Incentives for Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Members

DISCUSSION: The LRRP Detachment consists of volunteers who often operate in five man patrols in VC occupied areas over extended periods of time, beyond the range of friendly artillery and with limited radio contact with other friendly forces. To participate in these missions requires a special type of infantryman who is intelligent, calm under stress, resourceful, aggressive, and willing to forgo normal comforts for days at a time.

OBSERVATION: In order to recruit the desirable LRRP member, and retain him as an enthusiastic energetic member in spite of the risks and discomforts of his missions, special incentives are required. Such incentive may include the recognition he receives from press releases, wearing a distinctive uniform, having neat and presentable living quarters, scheduling time for sports and other worthwhile activities. Such incentives, together with strong leadership, will go far to obtain and motivate desirable LRRP candidates.

ITEM: Resupply Helicopter

DISCUSSION: A resupply helicopter available twice daily, improves the effectiveness of ground units in two ways; (1) due either to morale and/or increased energy from two hot meals daily, units move much more effectively, (2) The individual pack is reduced.

CONFIDENTIAL

(10)

69

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

78

OBSERVATION: Troops performed better when given two hot meals a day. Troops were more alert and could move more effectively due to reduced pack load.

ITEM: Maintenance during Field Operations

DISCUSSION: On several occasions, supported units have left all their organizational maintenance personnel in base camp, depriving themselves of all maintenance capability. Consequently, forward support companies were requested to perform such jobs as changing a flat tire. Normal workloads will not permit support personnel to perform the organizational maintenance of supported units.

OBSERVATION: Emphasis must be placed on the need for organizational maintenance personnel to accompany their units on field operations.

ITEM: Logistic Planning for Airmobile Operations

DISCUSSION: One of the most important aspects of a successful airmobile operation is an adequate and organized logistics base for helicopters participating in the operation. In addition to forecasting fuel and ammunition requirements, detailed plans must be made as to the type(s) of refueling system to be used, method of providing ammunition to armed helicopters, physical layout and organization of refueling and rearming areas in consideration with staging and helicopter parking requirements, vehicular transportation requirements and personnel requirements. Logistics personnel must have sufficient time to complete detailed planning of the logistics base and operations prior to beginning an airmobile operation.

OBSERVATION: a. Successful logistics support for helicopters participating in airmobile operations require detailed planning.

b. S4 personnel must be notified immediately of pending airmobile operations, and must work closely with S3 and Pathfinder personnel through all phases of planning.

c. Thorough ground reconnaissance of refueling and rearming areas must be conducted by S4 and Pathfinder personnel as early as possible.

ITEM: Hardstand for Work and Equipment movement and Storage Area

DISCUSSION: In the Long Thanh area, the monsoon rains begin in strength in early May. Partially constructed hardstand, roads, vehicle storage areas, and maintenance areas deteriorate and become useless quagmires with the onset of wet weather. This is aggravated by vehicle movement in such areas. Prepared, packed, graded hardstand is needed for all such areas to prevent deterioration of working area.

CONFIDENTIAL

(11)

79

79

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

OBSERVATION: Properly prepared hardstand work and storage area should be afforded maintenance units in orders to prevent a loss of mission capability in rainy weather. During wet spells, vehicle movement, particularly tracks in prepared and unprepared areas must be kept to an absolute minimum.

ITEM: Demand rate for Contact Teams

DISCUSSION: Contact teams have been provided for major operations and normal support mission work. The primary advantage gained was the prevention of the necessity for evacuating all downed tracks in need of 3rd echelon repair. This represents a substantial savings in time, manpower, fuel, lives and equipment.

OBSERVATION: Maintenance support units should continue employing contact teams to work with supported battalion maintenance sections on field operations and normal mission work.

ITEM: Smoke Grenade Use in Flooded LZ's

DISCUSSION: During the monsoon season most areas of South Vietnam are flooded, thus reducing the effectiveness of smoke grenades. Experience of the past month has shown that, in most cases, several attempts had to be made to successfully mark with smoke. What was needed was a smoke grenade that could be dropped from an aircraft into wet or flooded areas and remain on the water surface. Since no such grenade was immediately available in the supply system, an effective and economical solution was attained through use of 2.75" rocket warhead carton and a standard M-18 smoke grenade. These modified grenades were 100% effective (4 out of 4) during an operation on 25 July 1967.

OBSERVATION: Using the M-18 smoke grenade inside of the cardboard shipping carton of the 2.75" rocket warhead will provide an effective and economical marking device for use in flooded terrain.

ITEM: Psychological Exploitation of VC Attacks

DISCUSSION: Subsequent to a VC attack on an isolated hamlet or RF/PP installation, assistance should not be limited to fire support and or other tactical support. A MEDCAP should be organized to deploy to the location of the attack to help treat the wounded and give other aid as required. In conjunction with assistance should receive some type of publicity to portray and install in the population the idea that the US is always available to provide any assistance possible.

CONFIDENTIAL


(12)

71

ITEM: Smoke Grenade Use in Flooded LZ's (Con't)

1. Remove pull ring from safety pin leaving safety pin (cotter) in place.
2. Attach two feet of light wire (aircraft safety wire .040 is ideal) to the safety cotter pin as in diagram twist double strand for about 3".
3. Break off safety spoon by bending back and forth just below safety pin.
4. Puncture a small hole in the side of cardboard (A) see diagram. Thread loose end of wire thru the hole and slide grenade into carton as in diagram. Pull up slack and attach pull ring outside as shown.
5. Punch several (3-4) smoke exits holes in top of canister.
6. Add three nails to carton, one to keep smoke grenade pressure from popping the top off the canister (C) a small knife cut with the nail pushed thru will work.

NOTE: These smoke grenades with exits holes in the top (i.e., white, red) work best although any color will work satisfactory.



81

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

OBSERVATION: VC attacks on isolated hamlet or RF/PF installations can be employed to the advantage of US Forces when exploited in a thoroughly planned and programmed MEDCAP.

ITEM: Mutual Fire Support

DISCUSSION: Gunships are vulnerable when making approached to and exits from areas where they fire in support of troops in contact.

OBSERVATION: Coordination of mutual fire support has a definite application when planning employment of helicopter gunships in support of troops in contact. Suppressive fires from ground elements during a helicopter gunship firing pass will provide an invaluable degree of protection for the gunships.

ITEM: Control and Coordination of Aircraft and Supporting Fires in a Mobile Riverine Force Area of Operations.

DISCUSSION: The variety of air transportation and firepower available to the commander must be judiciously employed to achieve tactical success without endangering one element by indiscriminate employment of another. For example, the MRF must on occasion employ land and barge based artillery, mortars organic to Navy craft, fires of maneuver battalions, close air support, gunship support, command and control aircraft, observer aircraft, troop lifts, aerial resupply, medevac, etc.

OBSERVATION: The senior headquarters exercising command and control of aircraft and supporting fires in an Area of Operation can facilitate execution of this task by observing the following:

1. Use every means possible to remain continually abreast of friendly locations.
2. After contact is established, employ supporting fires to block enemy escape routes which cannot be covered by ground elements.
3. "Lean into" supporting fires by complementing its effect with employment of maneuver battalions.
4. Avoid the necessity of registering indirect fire weapons after contact has been made.
5. Employ close air support on either flank of the gun-target line of indirect fire support or beyond the impact area.
6. Vary the type of ordnance on a target by alternating air and artillery, one immediately following the other.

CONFIDENTIAL

(13)

73

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons for Quarterly Period Ending 31
July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

7. Maintain direct fire on targets by employing armored troop carriers one monitors with their armored protection, from other-wise open water escape routes in conjunction with air and artillery fires.

8. Gunships can best be employed against machine gun of other crew-served weapons emplacement when, by virtue of their close proximity to friendly positions or lack of friendly cover, artillery and airstrikes cannot be used.

9. To provide continuity of gunship support, designate one team leader to remain on station and brief relief teams when the original team is forced to depart for rearming or refueling.

10. As air, artillery, and gunship fires defoliate fortified areas, bunkers becomes definable to indirect fires, especially those of the 155mm howitzer.

11. When it is necessary to withdraw the senior command and control helicopter for refueling, insure that a subordinate command group is prepared to oversee the battle until refueling is accomplished.

12. Although dustoff may be called by commanders at company level, the senior commander must retain approving authority for entrance and exit times and routes of dustoff helicopters so that the momentum of the attack will not be lost because of an unexpected requirement to cease fire.

ITEM: Protection from Demolition Blast

DISCUSSION: During an airmobile operation one man was killed by flying debris from a tree which he had blown in preparing a landing zone. He was neither far enough away from the tree nor did he have cover.

OBSERVATION: Members of demo teams must constantly be reminded of safety in protecting themselves and others when handling explosive materials. If not closely supervised they become too familiar with the explosive materials involved and tend not to exercise sufficient caution in handling and detonating. That all demolition team personnel receive close supervision in their work. Adequate cover and distance should be chosen in advance. This protection should be easily and quickly obtained.

ITEM: Protection of Demolitions from Moisture

DISCUSSION: On a recent operation in which demolition teams had to move on foot through wet, muddy terrain, demolition fuses and blasting caps got wet. Misfires on subsequent use of fuses and caps were encountered.

CONFIDENTIAL

(14)

74

83

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

OBSERVATION: Caps, fuzes and explosives must be kept as dry as possible to insure against misfires or delayed detonation. If possible, these materials should be airlifted to projects where demo teams have been on foot moving through streams and rice paddies. This would eliminate wet demolitions and therefore cut down on misfires and safety hazards.

ITEM: Bridge Training

DISCUSSION: Repeated contact with the line companies show that their personnel have limited knowledge of construction and operation of bridges.

OBSERVATION: Instruction provided by the bridge company has increased efficiency of the line companies, but further training is a necessity.

ITEM: Incoming Infusion Personnel

DISCUSSION: Many of the new personnel entering a unit of the infusion program have little or no bridge experience. Many of these individuals fill important command slots.

OBSERVATION: Intensive platoon training is required on a large scale basis to familiarize individuals with bridge equipment and its capabilities.

ITEM: Mission Readiness of infrequently Used Equipment

DISCUSSION: On a recent operation pneumatic assault boats were required. The boats were loaded and without prior inspection taken out on the mission. After arriving at the river site it was found that the pneumatic pumps were missing. Also, it was discovered that one of the boats was unable to hold air.

OBSERVATION: Equipment should be maintained in a state of mission readiness. All accessory parts and equipment be made to assure they are operable. This is especially true for infrequently used equipment and accessories.

ITEM: Base Camps in the Delta

DISCUSSION: The majority of the base camps were not prepared properly prior to the units arrival. This resulted in congestion and acute drainage problems. The reasons for the inadequate preparation may be summed up in the following points:

CONFIDENTIAL

(15)

75

84

AVDE-MH

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

1. Lack of detail layout plan.
2. Not enough time allowed for engineer effort.
3. Lack of engineer heavy equipment.

OBSERVATION: Units moving into the Delta should plan their base camp and install it with proper drainage prior to their moving into it.

ITEM: Rome Plow Maintenance

DISCUSSION: Any improvements that can be made on the D7E tractors or HD16M tractor to make them easier to maintain while working as Rome Plows will help any clearing operation. Tractor down time is the biggest problem in this type of operation. By doing maintenance and repairs at night, whenever possible, this situation can be greatly improved. However, several characteristic weaknesses of the tractors could be improved by modifications. The greatest repair problems are caused by broken radiators, broken belly pans, and broken hydraulic lines on blade lift cylinders.

OBSERVATION: By fabricating a grill from a 1/2" steel to cover the radiators this problem can be drastically reduced. Belly pans can be reinforced by welding dozer blade edges over the existing pan or as a replacement pan. 2" angle iron should be welded to the blade lift cylinder over the hydraulic lines. (EIR initiated)

ITEM: Moving Unit Headquarters with Clearing Operations

DISCUSSION: As jungle clearing operations proceed, the distance from bivouac to work site increases. Travel time is essentially lost time. A maintenance base near the work site is essential and POL and water requirements are high. Constant travel on previously cleared trails also creates a security problem.

OBSERVATION: It is desirable to move a base consisting of maintenance personnel, communications capabilities, one cook, operators, mine detector teams, and supervisors every two days. Fly rations, POL and water into the work site daily and take only essential wheeled vehicles.

ITEM: Chain saw systems fouling up.

DISCUSSION: Several chain saws have been highly inefficient, and sometimes even deadlined, due to the spark plugs and engine becoming fouled up.

CONFIDENTIAL

(16)
76

15

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

OBSERVATION: It appears that the wrong type oil is being used in many chain saws - due to the lack of information - in the case of most of the personnel involved with chain saws. A non-detergent oil should be utilized - according to the lube order - in all of our chain saws, also operators and maintenance personnel be thoroughly indoctrinated with the importance of using the proper type of oil in chain saws.

ITEM: Road Maintenance

DISCUSSION: A great deal of road improvement can be accomplished by ripping up the existing road with a dozer grader and then reshaping it. The existing roadways are hard pack and readily wear out scarifier teeth. An ample supply of scarifier teeth is suggested if a project such as this is undertaken.

OBSERVATION: A great deal of time is saved by not hauling unnecessary fill.

ITEM: Information Posters

DISCUSSION: Engineer units should put up billboards on project sites to inform local people of the work being done in their behalf. Whenever possible, play up the part of the local Vietnamese effort.

OBSERVATION: By posting project information posters, the US military effort will be more closely associated with the local natives.

ITEM: Local ARVN Advisors

DISCUSSION: When conducting a construction project within the range of Vietnamese military units or local population of the local US Advisor should be informed of the project arrangements with Vietnamese officials when necessary. Also, by informing the US Advisor he will seem well informed to his counter-part.

OBSERVATION: Insure that the local ARVN advisor knows about any work being done in his area concerning the local people.

ITEM: M8A1 Matting

DISCUSSION: M8A1 matting can be used effectively as a road surface, surfacing a motor pool, storage area, etc., with a great deal of effectiveness if two precautions are taken.

1. The ground on which the matting is to be placed has a good bearing capacity under all conditions.

CONFIDENTIAL

(17)
77

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

2. The ground on which the matting is to be placed is well graded for drainage.

OBSERVATION: If the matting is placed over poor soil such as clay or silt (rice paddy fill) T-17 membrane should be placed between the matting and the ground. The T-17 will prevent the failure of the matter as a result of the ground washing, or being super saturated.

ITEM: Brake problems in Wet, Sandy Areas

DISCUSSION: Vehicles that are utilized extensively in wet, sandy or mucky area have had problems with muck and sand seeping into the brake shoes, wearing them out in an unbelievably short time.

OBSERVATION: That a program be set up to check and replace brake shoes, if necessary, at least once a month on all vehicles utilized extensively in wet, sandy, or mucky area.

ITEM: Fires in Radiators and Belly Pans of Rome Plows

DISCUSSION: Leaves and branches collect in the radiators and belly pans of Rome plows during extended jungle clearing operations. The heat of the engine ignites the debris, causing damage to electric wires and hydraulic hoses. If leading fuel injectors are present, the fire then becomes a diesel fire.

OBSERVATION: Insure that an air compressor is available to blow out debris from radiators and engine belly pans. In addition, a good water supply and fire extinguisher should be readily available to reduce damage in the belly pans.

ITEM: Supervision of Rome Plows

DISCUSSION: The Rome Plow works best when the operator works with fresh jungle on his left and previously cleared jungle on his right. By cutting in a counter-clockwise fashion the operator accomplishes this but he cannot be effectively controlled by the supervisor while on the back side of the square. If the Rome Plows are clearing along a road they are safer and more easily controlled as the supervisor can keep them in view.

OBSERVATION: It was found that Rome Plows work more effectively in tandem by cutting up the left side of the road, returning down the right side and by continuing to widen the area the area in this round-robin fashion. Depending upon the jungle density, an initial cut of 100 to 300 meters in length works best.

CONFIDENTIAL

(18)

78

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

ITEM: Pilot Trails on Clearing Operations

DISCUSSION: Rome Flow operators need a pilot trail to follow through the jungle on clearing operations. In thick jungle the trees fall back over the Flow cab, obscuring the vision and direction of the operator. If he cuts into new jungle, he can easily become lost. When there is no road to orient on or to follow, a new road must be cut.

OBSERVATION: Cut pilot trails with a Rome Flow. It has been found that the lensatic compass will work inside the Rome Flow cab, reducing the possibility of straying off the planned course.

ITEM: 155mm Gun Pads

DISCUSSION: Firing positions were constructed for 155mm towed howitzers during the dry season by pushing up dry rice paddy fill and constructing a wooden firing platform. Trail logs were utilized to contain the howitzer during firing. With the arrival of the rainy season the paddy fill became too soft to support the trail logs and the guns could not fire due to the failure of the soil.

OBSERVATION: The solution was the construction of a retaining wall to support the trail logs. This was accomplished by placing concrete filled 55 gallon drums in an octagon around the gun pad. A one inch cable was strung around the barrels and PSP was placed on both sides of the barrels. (The PSP was added due to overturning action of the barrels). After one month of firing, only minor repairs have been necessary. Square 12X12 timbers have been substituted for round trail logs as they tended to turn or slide under the trail spades.

ITEM: Outboard Motors

DISCUSSION: The 25 h.p. Chrysler outboard motors used to provide propulsion for LTR pontoons have been utilized nearly 24 hours a day. This extensive use is resulting in increased maintenance problems. The gear box in the lower housing of the foot has been freezing up and wearing out at an extremely rapid rate. No amount of preventative maintenance seems to reduce the trouble encountered in the gear box, except for daily greasing of the component parts of the box. This is a very time consuming operation and leads to excessive down time for the motors.

OBSERVATION: If a thicker, more viscous lubricant were available for specific use in situations such as this, much unnecessary maintenance could be avoided. Most civilian outboard motors requires a special type of hypoid grease for use in the lower gear housing and should be available for use. (Equipment Improvement Recommendation Initiated)

CONFIDENTIAL

(9)

79

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

CONFIDENTIAL

88

ITEM: Soil Stabilization

DISCUSSION: Soil stabilization has proven to be a major problem at Dong Tam base camp. The heavy rains are causing extensive erosion of roadways, the temporary airfield and even company living areas.

OBSERVATION: Roadways and shoulders have been stabilized by mixing cement with the soil and allowing proper curing and wet up time. A large quantity of cement is used, but this and a coating of peneprime have helped reduce the erosion of the roads. Ditchlines have been stabilized somewhat, by covering them with burlap and coating the burlap with peneprime to help it shed water. Retaining walls are also used to a certain degree, but require extensive construction time.

ITEM: The half-pontoon Float Bridge

DISCUSSION: For one operation in the delta the bridge company of the 15th Engineer Battalion received a mission with certain special requirements. The design criteria and requirements were:

- a. 1/2 pontoon limitation
- b. Air transportable
- c. Ready to use in 3 hours

The bridge and adapters for it were constructed in the motor pool at Camp Martin Cox. Two typical loads, an off set load and an H-frame ramp load, were flown by a Chinook helicopter and presented no aerodynamic problems. The bridge was then taken by truck to Tan An where two predesignated groups split. One group stayed at Tan An while the other went to Binh Phouc, the staging area for this operation. The group from Binh Phouc then proceeded to the bridge site at Xom Cau to prepare the site. The first section arrived assembled, by Chinook. The bridge assembly was completed in 3 1/2 hours, with partial anchorage, and a convoy of APC's was able to move across it. All anchorages were in and the bridge was ready for full operation in less than 5 hours. At the completion of this operation the bridge was easily disassembled and airlifted back to Tan An.

OBSERVATION: The following lessons were learned:

- a. The air mobility and ease of handling is outstanding.
- b. A half-pontoon bridge can be placed in a tight location where a full pontoon would be impractical, such as close to another bridge which has been blown.

CONFIDENTIAL

(20)

80

89
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

c. The light weight of the bridge allows the bulk to be assembled on the pontoon and then flown to the bridge site.

d. The class of the bridge with all floats in the water is 18, but tidal conditions result in the shore floats being grounded, occasionally, lowering the class.

e. The ramp section cannot be safely married together by helicopter because of high downdraft.

f. The site has to be prepared prior to arrival of the bridge to fully utilize rapid placement capability.

g. Anchorage should be prepared and placed prior to arrival to cut down on construction time.

ITEM: Starter system for Chain Saws

DISCUSSION: The major failure component of chain saws appears to be the rewind spring on the stater. In many instances the starter cord has pulled clear out of the chain saw.

OBSERVATION: Starter assemblies are not sturdy enough to withstand continued use and restarts in the field. A stronger rewind spring be used in the starter assembly. Operators should be cautioned about the danger or damaging starters by pulling too hard. Also an additional two feet of cord might eliminate the possibility of the operator pulling the rotar against the stops, alleviating much of the present problem. (EIR initiated)

ITEM: Limited Application of Tunnel Destruction Kit

DISCUSSION: On two occasions, the Tunnel Destruction Kit was used in an attempt to destroy VC tunnel complexes. Because both had more than eight (8) feet of overburden, the kit failed to destroy them; however, it was most effective in the dissemination of CS which was placed in twenty pound bags throughout the complex and which exploded simultaneously with the acetylene.

OBSERVATION: In that the majority of tunnel complexes encountered have more than eight feet of overburden, the Tunnel Destruction Kit is of limited use. Its capabilities must be know by those who employ and operate it.

ITEM: Fragility of the Mine Detectors

CONFIDENTIAL

(21)

81

90

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

DISCUSSION: Mine detectors are receiving heavy use under adverse conditions. This is resulting in a high deadline rate due to the sensitive nature of these instruments. Broken handles and cracked heads are the major deadline items of the detectors.

OBSERVATION: The extension handle and the detector head are not durable enough to withstand the typical shock flexure which they receive. In many cases operators are not fully aware of the fragility of the mine detector. That a more durable handle and detector head be designed for the mine detector. Secondly, that operators be more fully trained at unit level in the care and maintenance of mine detectors. (EIR has been submitted)

ITEM: Road Clearing

DISCUSSION: For road clearing operations, where command detonated mines are often used, a track vehicle on either side of the road pulling a rake (plow like) would pull out wires to command detonated mines. If this method is used, the tracks should be ahead of the road clearing party by at least 75 meters. Road clearing precautions that should be employed at all times are:

1. Do not set up a pattern in time. A unit was ambushed by a .50 cal 300 meters outside the base camp.

2. When clearing a road, clear all of it, the shoulders of the road included.

3. Do not take for granted that a road is cleared when it passes through a friendly village or an ARVN or HF-PF outpost. On several occasions mines have been found within 50 meters of a friendly outpost.

OBSERVATION: When proper techniques in road clearing operations are used, there will be a minimum of personal injury and property damage.

ITEM: Completion of Aerial Photography Missions

DISCUSSION: Completion of aerial photography on a timely basis is of utmost importance. The most significant problem area is the inability to take aerial photography during the rainy season because of overcast.

OBSERVATION: Completion of aerial photo missions have been reduced by approximately 75% since the onset of the rainy season, thus anticipated requirements must be completed before the monsoon season begins.

CONFIDENTIAL

(22)

82

41

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

ITEM: Photographic Processing

DISCUSSION: The TO&E structure of the 9th Signal Battalion Photographic Section provides an AN/TFQ-7 mobile laboratory to process the photographs taken in support of the Division. The capability of the AN/TFQ-7 is 75 each contact prints per day. However, the amount demanded of the section exceeds 400 prints per day. The 9th Signal Battalion was authorized a quonset hut to provide the additional laboratory space needed to process the increased demand. Since the quonset hut was not readily available, immediate action was required to temporarily alleviate the situation.

OBSERVATION: The Photographic Section obtained a 30-foot semitrailer from the Long Binh salvage yard and modified it with electricity and plumbing to accommodate the task of photographic printing. By moving the photographic printing operation from the AN/TFQ-7 into the semi-trailer more space and facilities became available for both the necessary operations - photographic printing and negative processing. The result was a three fold increase in previous laboratory capabilities. This field expedient measure enabled the 9th Signal Battalion Photographic Section to accomplish its mission in a more satisfactory manner until the quonset hut laboratory facilities could be completed.

ITEM: Frequency Interference on VHF Systems

DISCUSSION: Frequency interference has become a constantly recurring problem of VHF systems. Helicopter VHF equipment as well as harmonics of push to talk frequencies have caused unnecessary harassment to communications systems. In a combat zone such as exists in RVN, it is impossible to isolate systems in such a way so that this problem is avoided. The density of communications equipment within a limited area necessarily causes a high degree of interference.

OBSERVATION: The 9th Signal Battalion is presently testing the higher frequencies employed in Delta Band of VHF equipment. It is hoped that the amount of interference will decrease significantly in this new range of megacycles. Further training of personnel in diagnosing interference problems. This recommendation has been made to a COMARC team who recently visited the Division probing areas where increased training is needed. With more training in this area operators will be able to initiate prompt action when difficulties arise and better communications will be the result.

ITEM: Switchboard Facilities Within Division TOC

CONFIDENTIAL

(23)

88

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

DISCUSSION: The total amount of sole user circuits terminating within a Division Tactical Operations Center makes it almost impossible to have a telephonic device at the end of each wire. If this were done a total of 20 or more phones might be necessary within DTOC and it would be extremely difficult to discover which phone were ringing at any one time.

OBSERVATION: Within the Division TOC a switchboard has been installed which terminates all sole user lines destined for the DTOC. These circuits correspond to trunk lines on a normal switchboard. Each staff section within the DTOC then has a subscriber phone off the switchboard. Therefore a party calling DTOC can ask for a number of section instead of being limited by one specifically located section. It also gives flexibility to subordinate TOC's by allowing one TOC to talk to another using DTOC switchboard for the connection. In addition to terminating sole user circuits the DTOC switchboard also has trunk lines to Reliable Main which gives access for DTOC personnel into the tactical common user circuits or into the administrative switching system. This arrangement also decreases the number of telephones necessary within the DTOC area.

ITEM: Radio Wire Integration

DISCUSSION: Unnecessary administrative delays in gaining staff approval have been resolved through the implementation of a radio wire integration system. Through the use of this system, the commander while airborne can initiate a staff action or accomplish other administrative and tactical matters without returning to his headquarters or risking misinterpretation through relay stations by contacting radio wire integration station on the ground. The radio wire integration station takes the incoming radio call and completes the call through a switchboard to a telephone subscriber after cautioning the party on the telephone that he must use radio procedure on the incoming call. The reverse procedure can be initiated by a telephone subscriber.

OBSERVATION: To insure success of the radio wire integration system the use of the system must be widely disseminated and understood by all.

ITEM: T 195 Transmitter

DISCUSSION: The T 195 transmitter in the AN/GRC-46 has been a constant source of downtime of the RTT equipment due to its failure. Continuous usage of the transmitter in the dust, humidity and heat of the enclosed shelter has caused it to be unreliable on prolonged operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

(P. 4)
84

13

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

OBSERVATION: During periods of listening silence, the transmitter and teletype machines should be turned off and watch maintained with only the receiver on. This cuts down on the actual "on" time of the transmitters and teletype machines and provides less wear on critical parts.

ITEM: Installation of VHF Communications

DISCUSSION: During the critical time of displacement of a CP and the establishment of a VHF circuit, it is imperative that VHF team chiefs at the distant ends be able to communicate via FM while attempting to establish the system. This is twice as important if any difficulty is encountered in making VHF contact.

OBSERVATION: VHF personnel at the controlling headquarters should be given access to an FM radio (VRC-46) and frequency to be used until the VHF system has been established. The team at the field location can be supplied a radio by the supported element. This FM should be used between the two stations until the VHF system has been properly aligned and good voice contact established.

ITEM: Uses of Red Haze and Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR)

DISCUSSION: Red Haze and SLAR readouts are, in most cases, received too late to allow immediate reaction. Also readouts from these sources of intelligence are not comprehensive and conclusive enough to warrant commitment of resources unless their findings are verified by more positive intelligence information.

OBSERVATION: Red Haze and SLAR are best to establish patterns over an extended period of time. Therefore, all readouts should be plotted over a period of time, as on a monthly basis, and filed for future reference. Patterns, when established, and when integrated with other intelligence provides a more comprehensive intelligence picture.

ITEM: Evaluation of "People Sniffer" (Manpack Personnel Detector) Operations

DISCUSSION: The "People Sniffer" has been found to be highly accurate in determining the presence of people. It has been most effective when employed in a helicopter at tree-top level, moving cross-wind, on a day with low humidity. For accuracy in selecting the location of the reading, winds should not be too brisk and an overhead aircraft must at all times associate the flight of the "People Sniffer" with the terrain over which it passes. As readings are read from the "People Sniffer" device, the information is radiced to an overhead aircraft which plots the locations and can direct the flight of the "People Sniffer" mission.

CONFIDENTIAL

(25)

85

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

OBSERVATION: Since the mere presence of people does not necessarily represent the enemy, the device should logically be employed in areas where innocent persons are not normally located; this precludes the "People Sniffer's" effectiveness in populated area of the delta region. Also during rainy weather, the "People Sniffer" can be employed more effectively some two hours after rain has fallen.

ITEM: Communications for Airmobile Assaults

DISCUSSION: Aviators flying on combat assaults monitor three different radio frequencies, FM, UHF and VHF. The flight leader monitors the supported ground units FM frequency, the airmobile company UHF command frequency, and supporting armed helicopters on VHF. The theory behind the flight leader monitoring the supported ground units FM frequency was to increase the reaction time should any changes occur. Experience has shown that all large scale airmobile assaults, (company size or larger) are controlled by the ground commander from a command and control helicopter. Instructions from the command and control helicopter are transmitted to the flight leader over UHF radio. The volume of traffic over the ground units FM net has caused confusion and distraction of the flight leader and necessitated several transmissions of UHF to insure that instructions were properly received by the flight leader.

OBSERVATION: That on a large scale airmobile operations, all troop carrying helicopters use the airmobile company FM frequency for command and control, and a common chatter frequency. That the flight leader be controlled by the command and control helicopter over UHF radio frequencies, and armed helicopters leader is also mission commander the requirements to monitor the supported ground unit commander's FM frequency is valid.

ITEM: Weather Effects on Aircraft Mission Accomplishments

DISCUSSION: The monsoon season and the amount of rain increase daily. This increased rain will hinder missions due to additional humidity, lower ceilings, occasional IFR flights and flooded LZ's and PZ's. Periods of ground fog with greatly reduced visibility will hinder most early morning operations, periods during the day of low ceilings will cause aircraft to be flown in the danger zone, i.e., 100 feet to 1500 feet, and the sudden rain showers causing IFR conditions, brings out the importance of instrument training.

OBSERVATION: a. A review of aviator's files reveals that 50% of the instrument tickets have expired. USARV Regulations do not require renewal of these tickets in-country.

b. Aviators maintain proficiency in instrument flight via use of good time while on administrative type missions.

CONFIDENTIAL

(26)

86

95

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

c. Aviators should be made aware of holding in some power while sitting in flooded LZ's and PZ's to prevent sinking into the mud.

d. USARV has no known minimums for VFR flights. A battalion policy should be initiated in this field to prevent flying in the danger zone, except in tactical emergencies. A Go-No-Go rule should be established, i.e., 1000 and 3. No mission other than tactical emergencies require undue exposure of aircraft and crew to enemy ground fires.

e. Isolated rain showers may at times build into large type rain showers precluding return to home station. An Approach Control System should be trained and utilized at Bearcat or alternate locations for landing should be selected and used.

f. The Aviation Battalion has at the present time one Instrument IP and one Instrument Examiner. These personnel will be utilized in an Instrument Training Program to maintain aviator instrument proficiency.

ITEM: Integrated CH-47, UH-1D Helicopter Tactical Troop Lift

DISCUSSION: Whenever CH-47's are used in conjunction with UH-1D's on airmobile operations, the landing zones must be secure. Therefore, Chinooks can only be employed on subsequent lifts once the initial assault has been conducted by UH-1D's. In order to fully integrate CH-47 and UH-1D tactical troop lifts, prior coordination is required.

OBSERVATION: a. For an integrated tactical troop lift, CH-47's must either be attached to the airmobile company, or as a minimum, liaison personnel from the CH-47 must attend the briefing by the airmobile company.

ITEM: Frequency Designators in Aircraft

DISCUSSION: During the past quarter it became increasingly necessary for supporting resupply or airlift helicopters to change frequencies to go in support of another brigade element on a change of mission. This generates the requirement for the pilot to contact that unit on its frequency. Quite often the pilot does not have an SOI or cannot find the unit in his SOI which causes the NCS to give him the frequency in the clear or by a plus or minus from the frequency in use, either of which are security violations.

OBSERVATION: The pilot of each aircraft should as a minimum, carry the current frequency designator code. When it is necessary that he be directed to change frequency, the radio call word can be given in the clear with the associated frequency designator, eliminating the need to transmit it by other methods.

CONFIDENTIAL

(27)
87

96

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

ITEM: Airmobile Liaison

DISCUSSION: When conducting multiple battalion airmobile assaults the lift commander should provide a liaison officer to the ground commander to keep the commander informed of the status of the aircraft unit and to implement any changes in the aircraft schedule caused by the tactical situation or weather.

OBSERVATION: An airmobile liaison officer has proved invaluable in multi-battalion airmobile assaults in keeping the Ground Forces informed of the status of aircraft and to implement changes due to tactical situation or weather.

CONFIDENTIAL

(28)

88

97
AVDE-MH

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

b. Commander's Recommendations

(1) General. The 9th Infantry Division maintained a high state of combat readiness during the reporting period and was not significantly hampered by either administrative shortages or lack of non-divisional assets provided by II Field Force, Vietnam. The following recommendations are based on six months combat in support of internal defense and development assistance and two months of extensive mobile riverine operations.

(2) The success of strike operations is dependent upon a well integrated intelligence collection system. Whereas the individual soldier provided two-thirds of intelligence in previous wars, the Area Coordination Center, National Police, Hoi Chanh, agent reports, etc, in Vietnam constitute the primary sources of intelligence, and produce raw intelligence at a phenomenal rate. Tactical unit commanders are faced with the problem of ^{processing} every piece of raw intelligence for fear of not reacting to the one piece of valid information which will lead to a solid contact.

RECOMMENDATION: Action must be taken at all levels to weed out duplications of the same low level intelligence report which, when circulated through separate channels, tends to confirm the presence of a non-existent enemy force.

(3) Certain demands placed upon the Division to conduct training are considered inherent and valid requirements. For example, pipeline personnel and certain other training lends itself to the operational environment e.g., mines and booby traps, mortar testing, sniper training, etc. The requirement to train junior non-commissioned officers who have by necessity received accelerated promotions to compensate for division wide shortages, is not considered valid. To maintain performance standards in their assignment and after reassignment from Vietnam, these junior non-commissioned officers need to receive advanced training.

RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to establishing a non-commissioned officers school at Army or Force level.

(4) The effectiveness of strike operations is dependent upon accurate intelligence. By programming available combat power commensurate with developing intelligence in a proposed area of operations, overall success of strike operations is assured. Procedures for planning strike operations as outlined by the Division (App 14, LOI, Planning Procedures), have facilitated the judicious employment of combat power on a continuing basis. Through the medium of long range planning, all assets are immediately responsive to current, as well as unexpected tactical requirements.

RECOMMENDATION: The success of strike operations can best be assured through systematic development of intelligence while simultaneously programming combat power well in advance.

CONFIDENTIAL

(29)

89

98

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-ME

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65)

(5) Deployment of the Division throughout a large Tactical Area of Interest has necessitated organization of two provisional commands to conduct base development and security operations.

RECOMMENDATION: When security and base development become overly complex and present a burden to a tactical unit commander, 2 provisional headquarters should be established and provided necessary resources to perform security and base development missions.

(6) As base camps develop and material and ammunition storage areas begin to expand, vulnerabilities to enemy attack have a tendency to be overlooked.

RECOMMENDATION: Vulnerabilities of equipment, installations, fuel and ammunition storage area must be continually evaluated to insure that excess stockpiles are not allowed to accumulate and that all passive defense measures are fully implemented.

(7) Opportunities to mass a multi-battalion size force in one of the many known enemy base areas occurs rather infrequently. Upon termination of an operation it is normally not feasible to leave a sufficient force in the base area after the main force has withdrawn to preclude the enemy's reentry.

RECOMMENDATION: During the course of an operation, note areas where the enemy is most likely to attempt to resume operations. Based on careful analysis, plan and implement a long range post operation program of defoliation, H & I fires, chemical drops, and planned airstrikes in selected areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

(30)

90

AVFBC-RE-H (7 Nov 67)

1st Ind

13 NOV 1967

99
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967. (RCS/CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDFU TO)

DA HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96370

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.
2. This command has reviewed the attached report and concurs with the comments and recommendations with the following exception:

Section II, p(29), b(3), Recommend that consideration be given to establishing a noncommissioned officers school at Army level only.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as


R. E. WAMBSGANS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

91

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (7 Nov 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDFU TO)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 5 DEC 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division (DFUA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning integrated intelligence collection system, section II, page (29), paragraph b(2): Concur. This problem exists in all US tactical units. Much information is available concerning the enemy. The current strength of intelligence staffs and supporting MI units is inadequate to establish the collection management and analysis system to positively identify the original source of all information and determine whether reports are confirming or a duplication from the same source through different channels. USARV is currently preparing a program to augment MI supporting units which includes increased collection management and analysis capabilities.

b. Reference item concerning noncommissioned officers school at Army or Field Force level, section II, page (29), paragraph b(3) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2: Nonconcur. Establishment of such schools at the Army or Field Force level could not adequately fulfill the requirement. Unprogrammed construction of physical facilities and increased personnel overhead at those levels is unacceptable. In addition, such training conducted solely at the Army or Field Force level would require too large a school base to support the troop strength in Vietnam.

c. Reference item concerning provisional headquarters for base development and security, section II, page (30), paragraph 1b(5). Under certain conditions, this may be the best solution, however the establishment of two provisional commands will not always be desirable or required. Under the provisions of USARV Regulation 10-4, dated 16 November 1966, subject: Area Coordination, and II FFORCEV letter, dated 2 January 1967, subject: Area Coordination, the 9th Infantry Division Commander, as sub zone coordinator of the 9th Infantry Division TAOR, is required to appoint installation coordinators for each installation within his TAOR. Responsibilities of installation coordinators include:

3

92

*Downgraded at 8 year Intervals
Declassified after 18 years
DOD DIR 5900.10*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (7 Nov 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (RCS/CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDFU TO)

- (1) Physical security.
- (2) Defense.
- (3) Installation security.
- (4) Housekeeping functions.

Resources of the installation coordinator's staff should adequately accomplish assigned tasks.

d. Reference item concerning vulnerability to enemy attacks in base camps and storage areas, section II, page (30), paragraph 1b(6): Concur with recommendations. Subject should be considered by unit commanders in improving base defense measures.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



1 Incl
nc

C. S. Nakatsukasa
Cpt, AGC
Asst AG

cc: HQ, 9th Inf Div
HQ, II FFORCEV

93

4

CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT(7 Nov 67)

3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, 9th Inf Div (UIC: WDFUAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558


2 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Substantive comments regarding intelligence collection aspects
of this report are being prepared for forwarding to Headquarters, USARV
and Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division. A copy of that correspondence,
keyed to this indorsement, will be provided to DA at a later date.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



HEAVRIN SPITZER
CPT, AGO
Asst AG

1 Incl
nc

94

103
A CAPTURED VC PLAN TO ATTACK THE BRIDGE LOCATED AT BEN LUC.

GENERAL

The following is a plan prepared by the Viet Cong to attack the bridge located at Ben Lua. The plan was captured by the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry at Binh Trinh Dong Village (XS 652656) on 30 March 1967. The plan is included in this report to show the amount of detail which is normally indicative of the detail employed by the Viet Cong prior to initiating any operation of this nature.

COMBAT PLAN

RAIDING

1. ENEMY SITUATION -

The enemy forces camped at Ben Luc area is 1 Bn, consisting of 395 men, commanded by Captain Gian & 4 US Officers. They are the 3rd Bn, 50th Regt, 25th Div, their Hqs is located at the end of the bridge in the direction of Binh-Nhut.

Weapons: 1 81mm mortar
1 57mm recoilless rifle
4 60mm mortars
4 50 cal machine guns
26 submachine guns

Individual weapons: rifles

There are 4 combat boats armed with 16 machine guns

There are local forces and popular forces deployed in this zone especially to protect the bridge, 4 outposts, and a tank at each end of the bridge.

There are 6 soldiers deployed to protect each support of the bridge. They are armed. They will shoot at any suspicious object floating close to the bridge. There are also 2 soldiers patrolling each span of the bridge. On both ends of the bridge and under the bridge there are 4 outpost about 250 meters away located near the bank of the river. There are 2 squads in each outpost. There are soldier's barracks on both sides of the bridge. There are 3 men guarding each end of the bridge. The generator is located about 30 meters from the bridge on the Binh Nhut side of the river. Combat boats patrol the river every 1 or 2 hours from the bridge out to 700 meters. They use searchlights on the river and on both banks. On each span of the bridge there are 4 searchlights. Both sides of the river are also lighted for 250 meters by lamp posts. The bridge is very

104

brightly lighted. When they see something suspicious, they also electrify the water around the bridge. This Bn has deployed 1 company on each end of the bridge, the rest of the Bn is camped all around the bridge area. The Bn also patrols Binh Nhut & Binh Duc Strategic Hamlets. These forces sometimes attack our perimeter. The 4 combat boats are docked next to the bridge supports. There is 1 guard in each boat when they are docked. There is 1 company stationed in Binh Nhut Strategic Hamlet now.

II OUR SITUATION -

Both Binh Duc and Binh Nhut are Strategic Hamlets. These are enemy controlled areas. The enemy has firm control of these areas. The houses are crowded very close together. 2/3's of the people are neutral and 1/3 are families of VC and are working for us in propaganda missions. We have a few secret cells in these hamlets but they are weak.

III TERRAIN AND TOPOGRAPHY -

The Van Co Dong river begins in Tay Ninh and flows into Van Lang river which flows into the sea. The river is about 350 meters wide at the bridge, the current is very fast. This river has a bridge at Ben Luc on highway 4. Ben Luc Bridge is about 518 meters long. Maximum load for the bridge is 36 tons. The bridge is strategic for the enemy since highway 4 links Saigon and the Mekong Delta. This highway is usually patrolled and well guarded. There are ARVN outposts along the highway and Americans are camped from Ben Luc Market to Go Den along the highway. On the Long An side of the bridge there is a road which runs through Binh Duc village and leads to Ben Da, then runs past the outpost at Ba Dong stream. Natural obstacles - on both sides of the river at Binh Nhut village there are many coconut trees that can be used for cover and concealment. So movement is very easy.

The Binh Nhut side of the river from Binh Duc to Cho Tao market is a liberated area. On both sides of the river there are many bushes, but sometimes there are sampans filled with people fishing along the riverbank from Binh Chanh to the Ben Luc Bridge a distance of about 150 meters. The natural obstacles will aid us when we approach the objective. On the river there are no sampans, on the banks of the river the enemy has a double barbed wire fence which surrounds this area. This is a heavily populated area, the houses are very close together. There are ruins of a large shrine on the river bank 800 meters from the bridge. Sometimes during the night the enemy sends Recon patrols which come to the shrine. There is a river in this area that passes through Binh Chanh and Binh Nhut outpost a distance of 2 kilometers. This river has 4 small branches that run along side the Van Co Dong river, Rach Dinh stream and Rach Tua stream. The distance from Thu Doan canal to the Binh Duc side of the river to Ben Luc bridge is 5 kilometers. On the river Ben Luc bridge to Ba Dong Stream is 300 meters. This area is clear of brush from Ba Dong

163
Stream to Thu Doan canal the terrain will aid in seizing the objective. The distance from Ong Thong stream to Ben Luc bridge is 180 meters on the river bank. There is a new life hamlet along this distance. There are 5 barbed wire entanglements surrounding it. 700 meters from the bridge next to the river bank, there are several houses and gardens and a saw mill, where enemy forces usually camp. In the area of this strategic hamlet there are 6 small streams which run from the Van Co Dong river into the ricefields. Cho Moi canal is 250 meters from the bridge. The Ba Dong stream is 300 meters from the bridge. On the Saigon side of the river there is a Ben Luc market has many people, this side of the stream, which has good natural concealment. There are sampans of migrating people located 500 meters from the bridge toward An Thanh Village.

IV MISSION -

Our cell mission is to investigate and study point L.I. which is on VC. Our Commander has decided that our cell will raid and destroy point L.I. in order to defeat the enemy's attempt at rural pacification and cut the highway connecting Saigon with the Mekong Delta. When we attack them we will meet many hardships and advantages such as:

A. Advantages:

1. We have studied the whole enemy situation from the inside.
2. We have kept informed on the enemy's defenses.
3. We know the terrain and natural obstacles well.
4. We are ready to fight.

D. Disadvantages:

1. Our explosives are very heavy to transport.
2. Its very difficult to transport explosives to the objective because of the bright lights and swift current.
3. In order to seize the objective we must cross many streams and pass through many strategic hamlets and travel across many swamps; this will be very difficult.

V. RESOLUTION -

Accordin to the situation above, our cell will have many advantages and disadvantages.

We must try to overcome all obstacles. We must try to affix a pulley on the objective. Even if conditions are difficult we will carry out our mission. We will destroy the L.I.

point in order to disrupt the transportation of the enemy who plan an offensive against us in the dry season.

106

VI COORDINATION. -

a. Prior to Combat.

1. The 1st spearhead consists of 4 elements.
 - a. The Destruction element consist of 2 comrades. Re is in charge of the 1st stage, Anh is in charge of the 2d stage.
 - b. The 1st Medic Section has 4 laborers commanded by Rong.
 - c. The deployment element is commanded by Sau Minh and is responsible for the avenues of approach and withdrawal.
 - d. The sampan element will transport the explosives and place them in the water. It consists of 6 comrades commanded by Anh.
2. The Attack Element Consist of 5 Cells:
 - a. 1st cell- Comrade Nam is #1, Comrade Ie is #2, they will carry 2 pulleys, 1 pistol and 1 grenade, and will hold the wire from the riverbank to the objective.
 - b. 2d Cell- Trang is #3, Anh is #4 they are in charge of paying out the wire from the riverbank to the bridge in support of the 1st cell.
 - c. 3d Cell- Is comprised of 3 comrades - Van is #5, he will attach the wire to the explosives, Thien is #6 he will pay out the electric wire, Xuan is #7, he will pay out the electric line at 5 meter intervals.
 - d. 4th cell- has 2 comrades Dun is #8, Xien is no. 9, mission is to carry the batteries to the firing point, then stay their and await further orders.
 - e. 5th Cell- has 2 comrades, Ut is #10, Phuong is #11, mission is to pull the wire for the 2d cell after it has been connected to the explosives. The explosive transportation element which will transport the explosive from the departure point to the water position must be on time.

3. The 2d spearhead consists of 2 elements: the support element & the medical service element, which are divided into 3 cell each.
 - a. 1st Cell- Thno & Tao, armed with 2 CKC rifles, mission to stand at the mouth of the Da Dong stream to observe enemy activity.
 - b. 3d Cell- is the mortar cell, will be deployed at Da Su and the medical service element is comprised of 1 medic and 4 laborers with 2 sampans. They will be deployed at Ong Pho stream.
4. The sabotage device consist of two mines, each one is 1,000 kilograms, 1200 meters of electric wire, 200 batteries, 2 pulleys, 2 (illegible) 600 meters nylon rope and 400 meters of rope.

B. During Combat:

1. To transport the explosive A element must travel along waterways. They will travel by 2 motorized sampans to Dinh Nhut, there they will turn off the motors, then they will paddle to the "water position" which is located at the mouth of the Binh Chanh river where there will be men waiting for them. They must arrive at the mouth of the Binh Chanh river at exactly 8 o'clock. The attack will move by land to the water position and wait there for the deployment element to report on the situation. The deployment cell and the medical service must come to the predetermined position, if they come early they must await for the other elements to deploy.
2. No. 1,2,3, and 10 will carry 2 rolls of nylon rope and 2 pulleys to the "fire position", Nos. 4,5,6,7,8,9,11 will go to the "water position" and tighten the mines. The end of the rope will be passed from man to man by their numbers. They will push the 2 mines to the "firing position" then wait there. No's 3 and 10 will play out the roll of nylon rope to no 1, then No 2 will tie it to the object. After this has been accomplished No 10 will tighten it to No. 3. Then No 3 and No 4 will take the rope and tie it to No 5's explosives. Then 3 & 4 will take another rope and tie it to the bottom of No's 6 & 7 explosives. Then prepare to play out the electric wire and tie the wire to the bottom of all the explosives. After this has been done No 3 & 4 step by step will pull No's 5 & 6 explosive and play out the rope and wire at the bottom of the explosives coordinating with 7 & 8, then they will pull the battery box to the side of the river and wait for orders. No 1 & 2 will seize the objective and tie a rope to it, they will float something on the river to Da Dong Stream. 6 comrades will go by sampan

108

to the "water position" and give them to the attacking element. Then 5 of them will return to Dinh Nhut factory and wait there. The 6th man will join the attack element. If no 1 & 2 cannot seize the objective they must drop No 3 & 4 pulleys. They must then continue their attack in the 2d stage, and No 10 & 11 will play out the rope to No 3 & 4 who will take the end of the rope to the objective and tie it there, and throw the other end into water for the current to carry to Da Dong stream. They will then contact no 1 & 2, the other members will then carry out their missions as outlined above.

3. B Spearhead at exactly 8 o'clock the support element carrying 2 GKC, 1 submachine gun and 2 machineguns must be in position with foxholes prepared and ready. The mortar cell must be present at a predetermined position, and the medical elements with 4 laborers must be at Ong Pho stream. The support cell must seize the river. Thuc & Tao carrying 2 CIC must stand at Da Dong stream to watch the activity at enemy cement pillar.

C. After Combat-

1. A spearhead: When the explosives blow up No 6 & 7 will draw up the wire and reroll it, No 3 & 4 will draw back the rope, No 8 & 9 will tighten the battery box, then all elements will withdraw to Dinh Nhut factory, check the soldiers and withdraw to a safe area.
2. B spearhead: After the explosion the support element will not fire and withdraw to Ong Pho stream then with the medic and other elements withdraw to safe areas.

VI. MEDICAL

A. Element:

1. One medic and 1 nurse and 4 laborers with stretchers, led by Rong are located at Dinh Chanh stream with local cadrenan.
2. B element: 1 medic and 4 laborers with stretchers, led by Phu are located with 2 sampans and local cadrenan at Ong Pho stream.

VII. WITHDRAWAL

A. SPEARHEAD-

1. Will reassemble at Dinh Nhut factory to check their strength.

- 109
2. B Spearhead - Will reassemble at Ong Pho stream with the machinegun team and Recon team and will check their strength.

Estimate of the Situation:

1. A SPEARHEAD:

When Nos 1 & 2 carry the rope toward the objective, if they are discovered the CKC cell should open fire at the combat ships in order to signal the machinegun cell. When the CKC cell opens fire this is the signal for the machine gun cell to open fire on the bridge and the mortar team will start firing on the soldiers camped next to the generator in Dinh Nhut which is about 80 meters from the bridge. Nos 1 & 2 must quietly attach the pulleys to the iron pillar, Nos 3 & 4 must quickly attach the explosives then withdraw to the firing point.

2. B SPEARHEAD:

In case they are discovered by the enemy everyone must find another way to get to their positions on time. If the explosives are not blown up they should be withdrawn after receiving the order to do so.

3. A & B SPEARHEAD:

If someone is wounded they should go to the aid station where medical aid will be available.


4. If the explosives don't blow up Comrade Anh is in charge of recovering them.

5. If the nylon rope gets snagged Comrade must swim over and free it and put it in the river where the current will carry it to Miss Tu's house where Comrade P will see it.

6. The situation is quiet the ship will go down Rach Tao river, turn into Oe Dong river, and then come to Dinh Nhut where there is a dump truck.

When the situation is not quiet and there are ships on the river, us will have to move toward Dinh Chanh.

7. Although the Dinh Nhut post is deployed we will still move to be at the mouth of Van Dinh Chanh river at exactly 8 o'clock.



CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-MH

6 July 1967

SUBJECT: Command History, River Assault Flotilla One

TO: Addressees of Operational Report - Lessons Learned

GENERAL: The following is a reproduction of the Command History of River Assault Flotilla One for periods indicated. These reports have been included to provide an overview of U.S. Navy activities associated with the Mobile Riverine Force.

COMRIVFLOT ONE/COMRIVSUPPRON SEVEN

COMMAND HISTORY - JUNE 1967

The Mobile Riverine Base moved on 1 June from Vung Tau to Dong Tam, Vietnam and on 2 June, two battalions of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division embarked on ships of the Mobile Riverine Force at Dong Tam. The 2nd Brigade Staff embarked on USS BENEWAH (APB-35). River Assault Divisions of RIVFLOT ONE embarked as follows:

RIVDIV 91	APL-26
RIVDIV 92/COMRIVRON 9	COLLETON
RIVDIV 111	BENEWAH
RIVDIV 112/COMRIVRON 11	DONG TAM

Additionally, RIVFLOT ONE Detachment Dong Tam, consisting of two officers and four enlisted men, debarked from BENEWAH.

The RIVFLOT ONE boat overhaul commenced on 2 June when the first two boats commenced their overhaul at Dong Tam. The crews departed on R&R and the overhaul work was completed in their absence.

On 6 June, T-112-3, while minesweeping in the Xang Canal, was subjected to a command detonated mine explosion on the starboard side in the vicinity of the engine compartment. The starboard engine was lifted off its foundation and dropped into the bilge. Both engine foundations were broken. Further, both sea strainers were ruptured, fans were sheared off the bulkhead and the reduction gear housing on the starboard engine was broken with parts being scattered over the engine room. Vertical stiffeners on the starboard side were buckled. Starboard shell plating was also buckled and split in several places. The forward bulkhead of the engine room was buckled on the starboard side near the overhead. All four batteries were broken and power was lost

103

1

TAB4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

112

completely. The dead batteries also immobilized the ~~ammunition~~ previously fitted for electric fire. Fuel lines were broken close to the tanks and damage control plugs had to be used to prevent further fuel leakage into the bilges. The port .50 Cal turret mount was blown over the side shearing off the top of the pedestal where the turret bearing support connects. The armored turret, the .50 cal gun and the M16 grenade launcher were lost. Both the remaining turrets are distorted around the same connection points. A salvage search in the area of the mining was conducted by Explosive Ordnance Demolition personnel with assault boat escort and Army bank security on 7 and 8 June. Only one plastic turret top and a wye-gate for the salvage equipment was found. On 10 June, COMNAVFORV provided a salvage unit from Harbor Clearance Unit One Team Five to continue the search for the missing ordnance.

One ATC has been fitted out as a casualty and clearing boat and the two battalion Aid Station boats have received whole blood refrigerators to improve their capability. The medical casualty and clearing boat, in addition to the refrigerator, has received surgical lighting and fittings for a surgical table. The boats participated in their first operation on 10 June.

On 17 June Visitors Information Bureau (VIB) was set up by the Army and Navy Administration and Public Affairs Offices. With a high-level visitor coming almost daily and press people coming at least three times a week, the VIB will make the visits more profitable through advanced planning.

In addition to troop carrying, the Armored Troop Carrier (ATC) has demonstrated its versatility in many areas. They have been used as 81MM mortar boats, afloat battalion medical aid stations, medical clearing stations, hydrographic survey boats, tugs for AMMI pontoons, and as support for barge-mounted artillery fire support bases.

The Riverine Survey Team has begun to provide significant services in collecting riverine hydrographic data. They are not only fulfilling many immediate requirements, but are simultaneously collecting considerable additional data valuable for COMUSMACV, COMNAVFORV, NAVOCEANO and other requirements. They are an important organic asset for current operational commitments.

The first resupply of the MRB, by the USS HOLMES COUNTY took place on 16-17 June. No particular difficulties were encountered. The cargo handling on the Self Propelled Barracks Ship (APB) is extremely slow due to the limited deck space although the 542 class Tank Landing Ship (LST) matches very well with the base ships.

The move of Mobile Riverine Force/Mobile Riverine Base (MRF/MRB) from Dong Tam to Nha Be on 10 June was unevenful as far as the Navy was concerned, though the Army had difficulties with the artillery barges. Originally 5 Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM-8) and four barges were to make the trip. Upon sortie from Dong Tam, two of the LCM-8's had casualties and returned to Dong Tam with one barge. As the remainder turned to go up the Soi Rap, two LCM-8's received holes at the water line, and one of these became inoperative due to contaminated fuel. The barges were anchored, River Assault Squadron (RAS) boats were ordered

2
CONFIDENTIAL

104

CONFIDENTIAL

1/5

to stand by, and an Army Tug was ordered out to provide assistance. The remaining LCM-8 and barge were sent to Vung Tau. As this LCM-8 was passing through the anchorage area, her tow line parted and the barge drifted out to sea. The Army tug was diverted to pick up the drifting barge and tow it to Vung Tau. It then towed the remaining units to Vung Tau, where ASKARI repaired the LCM-8's. The barges were finally towed up to Nha Be with the RIVEFLOT ONE YTB on 13 June.

Bridges with restrictive underbridge clearances are a troublesome operational problem in the Delta. Established CTF 117 underbridge clearance requirements are 15 feet of vertical underbridge clearance and 25 feet of horizontal underbridge clearance--both under conditions of wet season high tide. According to a recent MACV policy bridges will henceforth either be built high and wide enough underneath, or a specific COMNAVFORV waiver will first have to be obtained for all permanent or semi-permanent bridges built (or rebuilt) over Armored Troop Carrier (ATC) navigable waterways.

When the MRB moved to the Soi Rap on 18 June, the artillery fire support base was located close to the MRB and a 155mm battery was attached to the organic Second Brigade artillery. To provide them with services, some new methods of support were developed. Ammunition for the 155mm guns was brought up from Vung Tau by Landing Craft, Utility (LCU) while the 105mm battery was supplied from the Support LST using LCM-8's. Hot meals prepared on APB's and carried to the Fire Support Base in thermos cans. The mess runs were made to coincide with requirements to replenish ammunition and potable water. Limited laundry and shower services were also provided. Repairs to LCM-8's are accomplished at ASKARI with the army providing the repair parts. Gasoline to operate the artillery battery's generators was supplied by the refueler.

Present MRF operations utilize barges as floating platforms for artillery. Army LCM-8's are assigned the tasks of towing and positioning the barges. Although these functions fall with the general Navy support tasks, they are a recent development and were not included in the original concept. Thus, no Navy LCM's or similar craft have been programmed for this mission. Since present in-country LCM and other boat assets are fully committed it has been determined by COMNAVFORV that it is not feasible for the Navy to assume this mission for 6-12 months due to personnel lead time required. Present COMNAVFORV plans are to request nineteen LCM-8's with crews to provide prime moves for artillery barges in the MRF. The Army will continue to meet LCM-8 requirements for 6-12 months until arrival of Navy units.

The Riverine Survey Team (RST) of 10 marines and NAVOCEANO civilians has performed yeoman service. In one recent 3-day period, for example, they obtained over 260 miles of river soundings while accompanying TF-117 ATCs on combat operations. These soundings not only met urgency CTF-117 requirements but also requirements from COMUSMACV/COMNAVFORV's listing of number one priority hydrographic needs for SVN as well.

Two of four DECCA Track Plotters have arrived for installation in the OCB's.

3
CONFIDENTIAL

105

CONFIDENTIAL

114
Technical assistance from the DECCA Navigator unit in-country has been requested to supervise the installation. Also, the first copies of a chart with DECCA grid lines on a 1/25,000 scale map have been received. If these are found to be useful, a production printing will be requested.

The Parracks Ship (non-self propelled)-26 (APL) and VERNON COUNTY, with maximum personnel loading and operating in a salt water area, have experienced a short fall of about 15-20 thousands gallons of potable water per week. Once in fresh river water, the APL-26 can use its filtration system and will have no difficulties. The present plan is to install a potable water filtration plant on the Support LST. This will provide a fresh water source when in the river environment and give increased efficiency to the evaporators by removing suspended solids before processing in salt water.

The procedures for the receipt and transfer of sensitive chilled produce have smoothed out very well. The material arrives by CHINOOK sling load three times weekly direct to the LST. The Supply Officer of the Support LST has been designated as the receiving officer. The ships provide a small working party to break down the load, transfer it to the boats, and deliver it to the ships. The rapidity of handling has increased and spoilage from exposure has been reduced to a minimum.

For the first at the MRB, the Army has initiated air resupply directly from the support LST. Previously, the material was transferred from the LST by boat to a landing zone ashore, for helicopter transfer to the field. This required four separate transfer operations and consumed most of the day with just resupply. With the new operation, loads are broken down to unit size on the LST. Each helicopter is loaded directly from the LST deck and the material was provided to the troop landing zone. To resupply two battalions required only one hour and ten minutes. This time can be bettered as the crew team work and landing cycle on the LST's smooth out. The Army is quite happy with the LST resupply arrangement now that they have tried it.

COMRIVFLOT ONE/COMRIVSUPPRON SEVEN

COMMAND HISTORY - JULY 1967

A significant new capability has been added to the ever-expanding horizons of the Mobile Riverine Force. On 4 July an H-23 helicopter landed and took off from the first ATC(H) - an ATC with a helo platform mounted over the well deck. The helo platform, designed by COMRIVFLOT ONE and Mr. SHEPPARD, NOL White Oak, constructed locally by USS ASKARI (ARL-30) (Landing Craft Repair Ship) is portable and can be mounted on any ATC of the MRF. On 5 July an HU-1D helo successfully completed 3 landings and takeoffs from the flight dock of the ATC(H). The ability of the ATC(H) to operate the HU-1D greatly expands the MRF capability for command and control, personnel transfer, reaction force lift, resupply, liaison in the field and MEDEVAC in areas where no landing zones are available.

Riverine Survey Team (RST) operations are blending in very well with riverine

4

CONFIDENTIAL

106

CONFIDENTIAL

1/5
combat maneuvers. During Operation CORONADO (CONCORDIA III), four units deployed separate ATCs for the three day operation. This was the first data collected within Go Cong Province. The Rach Go Cong was well covered as far as the city of Go Cong. Many of its tributaries were also surveyed in the course of patrol actions and troop reinsertions. The RST used the staff's KE-26B 70mm aerial camera to obtain photographs of bridges in Go Cong Town, obstructions, and waterways. This camera was previously used by a staff member in Operations CORONADO (CONCORDIA I), and it yielded excellent photographs.

The first increment of mine protective flooring and searing were installed in ATC 112-11. Thirty-two seats are provided with standing room for eight more troops. Each seat has been equipped with a life preserver cushion and a seat belt. The final effect is similar to a well appointed air line. To make the installation, all but two of the bunks had to be removed. The remaining bunks will be relocated within the boat. The chairs and matting take up about 2/3 of the well deck of the ATC. The installation can be removed in about two hours. The present plan is to test the installation for a few operations to determine its suitability and make any rearrangements required before going into full scale installation in the remaining boats.

Disposal of waste from the ships of the Mobile Riverine Base is a problem when anchored near a port city or inland on the rivers. Loose boxes, released by ships upstream, are a source of concern to the ships down stream as possible explosive carriers. A suggestion has been forwarded that a machine (like a automobile scrapping press) be installed on each ship to compress this trash and make it dense enough to sink. This would eliminate the requirement for a trash incinerator and would be a cleaner way of disposing of waste. The recommendation will be examined for the feasibility and a formal request will be forwarded if the unit is desired.

On 6 July, COLLETON suffered a serious casualty to number 1 A/C diesel generator. When the diesel exploded and a piston and rod were thrown through the crank case. Loss of the A/C generator reduced the COLLETON's power capacity to the point where her ability to support the MRB was marginal. A request to COMNAVFORV resulted in two portable 150 KW generators which were installed on the COLLETON as back up support. This is the third casualty of this type on English made Fairbanks-Morse engine. A new type of generator or a modification to the present diesel is urgently required.

COMNAVFORV representatives visited the flagship on 15 July to discuss assignment of National Police to CTF-117. It was agreed at this meeting that COMNAVFORV would request the Chief of National Police to assign 12 personnel from the River Police Branch to CTF-117 on a permanent basis. Addition of National Police will measurably increase visit and search effectiveness of River Assault Craft both in the vicinity of the MRB and in the area of operations.

The following boats received VC fire on 11 July 1967 supporting CORONADO CONCORDIA (PHASE II) in Can Giouc District of Long An Province:

At 110945H, a claymore mine was triggered when T-112-4 dropped her ramp

5

CONFIDENTIAL

107

CONFIDENTIAL

116

to land elements of "A" Company 4/47 (7 UEN and 4 USA WIA).

At 110950, M-112-1 and M-111-2 both hit by RR rounds, no personnel casualties. Both boats continued mission.

At 1116220, T-112-7 received a B-40 round on starboard side of bow ramp. No personnel casualty resulted.

At 111758H, M-112-1 took a B-40 round in the conning station killing the Boat Captain and claiming six USN wounded in action. The monitor returned to the MRB for repairs and was back in the area of operation (AO) at 121700H.

Also receiving fire (SA mostly) during the operation without personnel casualties were:

M-91-1
T-91-3
T-112-12
T-112-4
T-112-13

The MRF is rapidly developing a well-rounded psychological warfare program. While Army elements to the MRF have a greater portion of the assets and the program itself, Navy elements are increasing the Navy commitment to these operations. The concept receiving current emphasis is that of developing a Chieu Hoi leaflet featuring the ATCs as floating Chieu Hoi centers. The leaflet will give a standard Chieu Hoi appeal, will contain a picture of an ATC, and will urge the VC to Chieu Hoi to the "green boats." These leaflets will be passed out to sampans which ATCs stop for search and will be air-dropped in riverine operation areas. Other concepts under development are taped broadcasts, additional materials for handing out to indigenous personnel during stop-and-search, and other leaflets.

The onset of the monsoon season with the resulting wet weather has made the boats much less habitable. Personal belongings are being damaged by the rain and dampness. In order to reduce the damage to personal gear, small water proof duffle bags have been ordered for each member of the boat crew.

The first helo barge for MRF use was delivered to Nha Be on 20 July 1967. Large Harbor Tug (YTB) 784 towed the helo barge to the MRB on 22 July. This helo barge will further expand the growing capabilities of the MRF by providing an afloat landing area for two additional helicopters with an emergency refueling capability.

As additional defense against the RPG 2 (B-40) missile, bcr armor has been extended up around the coxswain's platform on one ATC. The armor has been hinged so that the armored doors can be opened. A slot has been left in the side to permit firing the 7.62mm guns from the pilot house. Minimum interference occurs with the .50 cal mount while firing forward. Based upon this prototype installation, present plans are to install this on all boats.

6
CONFIDENTIAL

108

CONFIDENTIAL

117
To date we have suffered one killed (monitor boat captain) and seventy-six wounded in action, including a Squadron Commander and three Division Commanders (one permanently evacuated to the U.S.). The majority of casualties have been caused by shrapnel from recoilless heat rounds. The worth of helmets and body armor cannot be overstated. The majority of wounds have been in face, arms, and legs not so protected. The general reaction of the assault boat crew to this rather high percentage of wounded in a short period of time is that it is an inescapable part of the type of war we are fighting. One cannot detect any trace of apprehension other than a healthy regard for the danger involved and an appreciation of the VC will to fight and of his cleverness.

Vietnamese Marine Corps proposed participation in MRF operations on 20-21 July was delayed until 24-25 July. River Assault Division 91 provided close support to the 3rd Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps during the operation which was conducted in the northern Can Giouc District of Long An Province. The Marines were picked up in the vicinity of Nha Be by riverine assault craft and transported to the landing beaches in the AO. River Assault Division 91 remained in close support conducting numerous troop landings and pick ups on streams within the AO, providing fire support, command and control facilities, and resupply of water. CTF-117 and the VNMC Brigade issued a joint movement and embarkation order for the initial phases of the operation - probably a first in U.S. Naval history in Vietnam.

COMRIVDIV 91 was enthusiastic in his report of the excellent cooperation and coordination between his task unit and the Vietnamese Marines. He stated that the battalion was a well organized force and a pleasure to work with. Conversations with members of the VNMC Brigade staff subsequent to the operation indicated that they were equally pleased with this initial operation and are anxious to join the MRF on future operations.

CTF-117 received word at 1300H on 25 July that the MRB would relocate from the junction of the Soi Rap and Vam Co Rivers to the vicinity of Dong Tam on 27 July, a distance of 61 nautical miles. At this time the MRF was conducting a search and destroy operation in the Can Giouc District of Long An Province. In addition to the Army riverine ground forces, TF-117 was providing close support to the 3rd Battalion VNMC. During the afternoon of 25 July ground forces were picked up by the Mobile Riverine Force craft and returned to the MRB. Planning began immediately for relocation of the MRB and was promulgated on the morning of 26 July. Commencing at 0200H on 27 July riverine assault craft began departing the MRB to proceed to minesweeping and patrol stations along the track of the MRB. At 0550H the last ship of the force was underway and proceeding toward the entrance of the Soi Rap. Because of the relatively slow speed of the APL tow and the fact that the ships were steaming against a flooding tide while proceeding out the Loi Rap River and an ebbing tide while proceeding up the Mekong River, the move required eleven and a half hours to complete. This did not delay, however, the commencement of the strike operation in Dinh Tuong Province on 28 July. The first units of TF-117 were underway escorting 3/34th Artillery Barges at 0030H. Thus in just a little over 48 hours the Mobile Riverine Force was able to relocate a base supporting 3900 personnel over a distance of 61 nautical miles and to shift its combat

7

CONFIDENTIAL

109

CONFIDENTIAL

118

area of operations a total of 85 nautical miles. This relocation proved the ability of the MRF to react rapidly to a changing situation and through its great mobility to effectively redirect its combat power over substantial distances. This mobility enables the MRF to apply assault forces in the Delta very rapidly, and this capability permits a fast reaction to intelligence of VC locations. Our experience with regard to the available intelligence on VC locations upon which to react with assault forces is that such intelligence is for the most part one to two and sometimes three days old. Our ability to react to this less than timely intelligence has resulted in the MRF having contact with the VC on every one of our CORONADO operations. Each VC contact has been company size or larger. The sad part is that this one to three day old agent intelligence is that most reliable. Heretofore, the VC have been able to maneuver away from the reported position within the intelligence time lag coupled by slower reaction forces. We could do even better with a reconnaissance assigned the Force. Contrary to the belief of many, the Army does not have covert or for that matter overt reconnaissance capability in any way comparable to the Navy SEALs or Marine Corps RECON companies.

During the action on 29 July, several boats were hit with small arms fire, rocket and recoilless fire. The most seriously damaged was Monitor 91-3, which was hit by a possible claymore, one 56mm recoilless rifle, and four B-40 missiles. Shrapnel was received through the 40mm sight port, damaged the 81mm mortar to the point where it had to be replaced, destroyed the 20mm ammunition box and loader, and damaged the .50 cal barrels. No major structural damage to the boat was sustained. Hits and minor damage were received in M-91-1, M-91-2, T-91-6, T-91-8, and T-91-10. Once again the ability of the boat to absorb punishment and remain in operation was demonstrated.

TIDAL DATA

1. Tidal data is the single most important consideration in the planning and conduct of any riverine operation in South Vietnam.

a. Planning: Many small streams in the AO will be navigable only at high tide. This must be taken into consideration in planning troop landings and waterborne blocking and support stations.

b. Enroute to the AO: Tides and currents are frequently the primary determinants of SOA. Fighting a 3-knot ebb current enroute to the AO will significantly affect the element of surprise necessary to a successful operation. Conversely, utilizing a 3-knot current to proper advantage will not down transit time significantly, thus increasing the possibility of successful surprise landing.

c. In the AO:

(1) Combat operations have indicated that landings in the RSSZ and the Mekong Delta are best conducted at high tide. If conducted at any other time, troops are required to plod through mud which is frequently waist-deep.

8

CONFIDENTIAL

110

CONFIDENTIAL

119

(2) There is an average 10-foot tidal change in the area. This allows transit of numerous streams at high tide, but extreme caution must be used by the unit commanders to avoid being trapped by a rapidly falling tide.

(3) Numerous bridges exist over the Mekong waterways. In many cases, these bridges severely limit the accessibility of these waterways to riverine assault craft. Frequently, however, passage can be effected with caution at low tide.

(4) Care must be taken in the beaching of boats in the AO. With a rapidly receding tide, a boat may find itself fast aground with no possibility of refloating until the next high tide.

(5) At low tide, the river banks occasionally are above the level of most of the guns installed on the riverine assault craft. During a recent operation in Long An Province, the elevated 20mm gun was the only weapon which could be employed successfully during periods of low tide.

RADIUS OF OPERATIONS

1. Riverine assault craft of the MRF can operate most effectively within a radius of 40 kilometers from the MRB. Operations have been conducted beyond this radius but have been accompanied by the following problems:

- a. Length of movement time in excess of four hours.
- b. FM Communications reliability is questionable beyond this range.
- c. Surface resupply requires excessive time. Any immediate resupply requirements must be met by helicopter.

LENGTH OF OPERATIONS

1. Two to three days operations with one to two day stand down time have proven most effective. This allows for "dry out" time for ground troops and necessary maintenance time for the boats. This schedule can be continued almost indefinitely.

2. Operations have been conducted for periods up to 5 days, but commensurate time is required for maintenance and troop rest.

LANDINGS AND EXTRACTIONS

1. Text landings and extractions, with the boats about 50 meters apart, are usually impossible due to inadequate beaching space, tidal conditions, or dense undergrowth. Crowding of boats is dangerous, but the danger can be limited by utilizing monitors as fanking units at the beaching site, providing security and fire support.

9

CONFIDENTIAL

///

CONFIDENTIAL

120

2. A prep of the beaching site by air, artillery, and/or organic boats' weapons makes for a more secure beaching. A light helo fire team, when available, also strengthens security, particularly during extraction.
3. Beaching must be accomplished in most cases at high tide to provide a hard landing area for the troops. The boats must exercise extreme caution to prevent being trapped on the beach by a rapidly receding tide.

COORDINATION WITH GROUND FORCES

1. Coordination with ground forces is required from the highest to the lowest echelons. Co-location of commanders at every level makes for greater coordination, lessens communication requirements, increases effectiveness and limits delay in any follow up action required.
2. A joint Navy/Army briefing of all units involved prior to commencement of an operation is extremely valuable. By way of this briefing each element involved is made aware of the objectives and possible problem areas of all other elements. All aspects of the operation, including intelligence, must be covered to ensure maximum coordination.
3. It is a must to have a joint system of check points and objective numbers for quick position reporting and plotting of intended movement. This system must be disseminated to each boat as well as Army and Navy commanders.
4. Each Navy unit must have the ability to maintain communication with Army units being supported. Normally the Navy unit supporting company size operations is controlled from a monitor. This points out the need for an additional VRC-46 on the monitors.
5. Past experience indicated that when boats are acting in close support of ground troops they become very vulnerable when artillery is called in close. All topside personnel must seek shelter below and at times boat are forced to move to a different location to prevent serious damage to boats from shrapnel.
6. Artillery and close air support procedures are effective and are improving but still need to be refined further. Also the technique of using the installed 81mm mortar on the monitors in the role of indirect support of ground troops is being refined.
7. It is felt that ground clearances from Navy elements as well as Army units should be obtained prior to the use of artillery in close support.
8. When moving in small streams, troops should maintain visual contact with the support boats and check out any bunkers or other type defensive positions along the bank. The speed of advance of the entire force should be governed by the pace of the troops along the waterway. The best method of movement in support of ground elements along a waterway is alternate beaching of boats on

10

CONFIDENTIAL

112

CONFIDENTIAL

121

right and left banks moving in leap frog fashion by moving the rear boats to the front.

BOAT UTILIZATION

1. Use of Command and Communication Boat (CCB) as a command and control unit and a close support unit at the same time is not desirable. This has been done in past operations due to insufficient numbers of monitors in a given AO. The result has been considerable loss of efficiency in command and control function. When used as a C & C unit, the CCB should be kept well out of the action.
2. Space on board the CCB is at a premium. Radio circuits installed have proven inadequate to fill all the needs of a battalion/squadron command and control installation. The use of additional PRC-25 radios has become necessary. It has also proven unworkable to co-locate battalion/squadron, and division command and control on a single CCB.
3. The mortar has proven an effective offensive weapon. It must also often serve as a division command unit due to use of the division CCB as the battalion/squadron command unit. There is not sufficient radio equipment installed to allow the division commander to guard desired circuits. The addition of one VRC-46 is indicated. Also a minimum of three monitors per division are considered a must.
4. The ATC performs very well in the mission for which it was designed, transportation of troops. When used as a minesweeper or an offensive weapons system it falls short of the mark.
5. In general all squadron boats are performing their designed mission and in addition are called upon to act as offensive vehicles with increasing regularity. If this trend is to continue, weapons with increased penetration and anti-bunker capability will have to be added to the squadrons arsenal.

PATROL AND BLOCKING

1. One of primary duties of riverine assault craft in combat operations is to block and patrol exfiltration routes which the enemy might employ to escape from the AO. An aggressive patrol is the best deterrent to VC attempts to use the waterways for escape. This was shown most recently in the joint US/GVN operation conducted in Dinh Tuong Province from 27 July to 4 August. Intelligence sources indicated that the VC were confused and disorganized by the size of the operation, and that many considered escape across the Mekong River into Kien Hoa Province. The report further states that the VC were deterred from this by the aggressive patrols of TF 117 and TF 116 units in the Mekong/Nam Thon Rivers.
2. Operations to date have shown the necessity for utilizing starlight scopes, crew-served weapons sights and infra-red devices while on night patrol and blocking stations. In addition, radar would be a valuable asset to the ATC

11

CONFIDENTIAL

118

CONFIDENTIAL

122

for night navigation and acquisition of waterborne contacts on patrol and blocking stations.

3. Stationing of Blocks:

a. While on blocking stations, boats should be in sight of each other at all times for mutual support, especially at night.

b. On narrow waterways boats become very vulnerable and the decision to use them to block here should be considered with respect to Army support from ground elements.

c. If at all possible, night blocks should be set up on the larger waterways where boats can maneuver to defend themselves.

d. If blocks are necessary on small streams, ground ambush sites are probably more effective than the use of boats.

e. Navy commanders in the field should be notified of intended areas of night illumination. In the smaller waterways illumination can be useful, but could be very dangerous to boats.

MINESWEEPING

1. The total effectiveness of our minesweeping efforts can not be evaluated. Boats sweep on all operations. The only successful mining attempt to date has been on the sweeping unit. Thus our sweeping efforts can be evaluated as effective assuming that the VC are employing mines.

2. It has been learned the the practice of using an ATC for minesweeping duties is not desirable. The ATC is by itself a choice target for a mine with or without troops embarked.

3. The chain drag type anti-mine device has proven to be a very workable drag type mine countermeasure. The chain drag works well at all speeds and in various depths of water.

4. The present quick release system on the chain drag will work. It has the following disadvantages: (1) It requires the full scope of cable, allowing no method to control the length. In some small streams it would be very dangerous if not impossible to have the boats towing the full length of cable. (2) It is complex in design and requires unnecessary exposure of personnel to set up and actuate.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Sufficient circuits are required to allow each commander an uncluttered tactical net to his subordinates, a net for administrative reports and request that would clutter a tactical circuit, and a coordinating net for use by various commanders to effect maximum coordination.

12

CONFIDENTIAL

114

CONFIDENTIAL

123

2. Each boat must have the capability of guarding its boat comcom, unit command set, and frequency of the Army unit with which the boat is operating. Additionally, a dust off frequency, artillery and other coordination nets stretch the radio equipment available to its utmost capacity.
3. The 292 type antenna is a requirement for communications reliability. In areas of dense foliage, this is the only antenna that will allow long range communications.
4. A sturdier, weatherproof radio headset is needed. The present headset is too vulnerable to damage from both rough handling and excessive moisture. During the monsoon season, it is virtually impossible to keep all radio equipment dry, as weather-proofing is required to cut down on frequent headset failure.
5. A device for telescoping radio antennas is required due to low under-bridge clearances and dense foliage extending over the banks of rivers and streams. The present method of banding the antenna back by hand can only lead to antenna breakage and failures.
6. The CCB as a primary communications and command post must be placed so as to maintain communications with the rear base, riverine assault craft and ground companies. Since it is the major command link in the field, it must be protected. Consequently, it should not be committed to direct combat support unless attacked.
7. CCB (HF) Capability

The three AN/GRC-106 HF transceivers installed on the CCB were initially allocated to the Army for use; however, since the ALO does not operate at battalion level, one of these units is now being utilized by the U.S. Navy when operations are conducted outside the FM ranges. This extra communications range capability has been found to be a necessary requirement.

MRB SHIP TO SHIP ORESTES

The Ship-to-Ship Orestes circuit has proved to be a mandatory requirement when operating as a Task Force in the Mekong Delta area where communications by Ship-to-Shore has proven to be unreliable. Utilizing this circuit the ships of the Mobile Riverine Force have been able to send outgoing traffic to the Flagship for relay. All inter MRB traffic requiring security is passed via this circuit.

INTRA COMMAND SHIP TELEPHONE SYSTEM

Shortly after arrival of AFB-35 in-country, it was realized that the installed shipboard sound-powered telephone system would be inadequate for support of the ARMY/NAVY Staffs embarked. Utilizing a SB-86 switchboard and Army field telephone, a system was installed which would give the two staffs the quick response time necessary for the type of operations being conducted. This

13

CONFIDENTIAL

115

CONFIDENTIAL

124

system is relatively maintenance free and requires a minimum of personnel to operate it. It also gives the added capability of direct communications to all other commands without having to go to the tactical operating spaces to make the required telephone call.

MOBILE RIVERINE BASE SHIP-TO-SHIP TELEPHONE SYSTEM

The installation of a four channel inter ship telephone system has increased the effectiveness of the Force considerably by reducing the number of radio transmissions previously required over the various circuits. Besides inter-linking within this system, the APB's, support LST, ARL, and APL; each ship can also utilize the ship-to-shore capability installed on APB-35 for conducting official calls.

USE OF JMWI DIRECTIONAL ANTENNA WITH AN/TRC-24

In late May, two "U" band omni directional antennas were installed for utilization with the AN/TRC-24 to allimate the signal fading caused when the ship swung at anchor. Satisfactory results have been achieved out to 30 kilometers with these antennas, however, their omni capability increases the noise level of the circuit when working in the vicinity of other VHF shots.

AMBUSHES

1. Ambushes cannot always be avoided, but their effect can be neutralized by proper procedures.
 - a. Reconning by fire, using both automatic weapons and fragmentation projectiles can pre-trigger an ambush. Not only river banks, but trees and promontary land marks should be taken under fire to eliminate lookouts and snipers.
 - b. A light helo fire team escort, in direct communication with the boat unit commander is useful in discovering and destroying ambushes.
 - c. Artillery support of boat transits, utilizing a forward observer in one of the land boats, is also effective.
2. Despite advice to the contrary, the same route must often be used for transit to and from an operation area. Minesweeping is particularly important in those cases. If the route is short, the boats plentiful, and the operation is of short duration, stay-behind boats strategically placed can help keep the return route secure.
3. In general, a high volume of accurate fire is the best ambush suppressant.
4. The land minesweeper in a formation is frequently the target for an ambush. Minesweeping to date has been done by ATC's, pending the arrival of the Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB) in country. Either the VC believe that this ATC is carrying troops or they consider it to be a lucrative target regardless of its mission.

14

CONFIDENTIAL

116

CONFIDENTIAL

125-

a. The most serious mining to date occurred in June on the Xang Canal. The lead minesweeper was involved.

b. During operations in Long An and Dinh Tuong Provinces the land minesweeper was the target for recoilless rifle and 8-40 rounds.

NAVIGATION

1. Radar is required on all craft for night navigation. Lack of radar necessitates inordinately slow speed and the "groping" method of navigation.

2. Constantly shifting mud banks and sand bars pose navigational problems for assault craft even in the larger streams and rivers. If a boat goes aground on one of these mud banks, it can usually free itself by use of low RPM and rudder actions. High RPM will cause the boat to sink into the mud, creating a suction which will make removal of craft extremely difficult until high tide.

RIVERINE SURVEY TEAM

1. The Riverine Survey Team contributions to date have been significant. The team has been embarked on TF 117 assault craft for each combat operation and major transit.

2. In addition to the numerous small canals and streams in the area of operation the team has conducted surveys of the following major waterways:

- a. Long Tam River
- b. Soirap River
- c. Song Cua Tien
- d. Song Tien Giang/Song My Tho complex
- e. Xang Canal
- f. Nha Be anchorage area
- g. Dong Tam anchorage area
- h. Song Vau Co/Song Tra/Kinh Cho Gao complex
- i. Cau Dai entrance to Song My Tho

3. Initial transit of a river or stream in the area of operations is made by riverine assault craft at high tide. The Riverine Survey Team is able to give an immediate indication of navigability at low tide. This on-the-spot

15

CONFIDENTIAL

117

CONFIDENTIAL

126

information is extremely valuable to the on-scene commander in deciding where his waterborne patrols can be established, and therefore how much support his boats can provide for the ground troops. Without this immediate information the on-scene commander would have to rely solely on outside sources for trafficability data. In general these outside sources have been found to be unreliable in regards to water depth, width and obstructions. TF 117 riverine assault craft have regularly transited streams described by outside sources as navigable only to "small sampans." The continuing efforts of the Riverine Survey Team will assist in developing the mobile riverine assault force concept to the fullest extent.

4. It is expected that the ASFB will prove to be a more satisfactory riverine survey vehicle than the ATC due to its higher speed and better maneuverability.

ARMAMENT AND SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

1. The armament aboard the riverine assault craft has been proven effective in most areas. However, some problem areas still exist and will require further evaluation and modification.

a. Due to the type of ammunition employed, the use of the .50 cal machine gun has been severely restricted. Since the ammunition is hot point detonating, ricochets are a hazard to civilians and friendly troops in the area. The dense civilian population of the Delta has virtually eliminated the use of the .50 cal for other than emergency situations.

b. The 40mm Cannon has shown itself to be potent for point and area fire using HE ammunition. A mixed clip of AP/HE rounds is being considered for penetration of bunkers.

c. Use of the 81mm mortar in both direct and indirect fire has become more common with the increased confidence of the Army units. When used against bunkers, a delay fuse should be used for maximum penetration. A mortar round in a rice paddy is ineffective, and a time fuse should be used for an 18-20 foot air burst.

d. An effective "bunker neutralizer" is still needed. Frequently the 81mm mortar cannot be used due to the short range involved. To counter this deficiency, intentions are to install and evaluate a recoilless rifle, bazooka, and flamethrower to determine their effectiveness for bunker neutralization.

e. The feasibility of utilizing hull-mounted claymore mines as a counter-ambush weapon is under investigation.

2. Safety Precautions.

a. Personnel in a wartime environment become careless in their adherence to the fundamental safety precautions regarding the handling of weapons and ammunition. They must be reminded constantly of the dangers involved, particularly the danger of carrying a firearm with a chambered round.

16

CONFIDENTIAL

118

CONFIDENTIAL

127
b. The indiscriminate use of the M-79 grenade launcher should be avoided in narrow streams due to the danger to friendly units in company.

HELICOPTER C & C SHIPS

1. Helicopters provide the optimum platform from which to observe and correct boat dispositions, correct beaching sites, assist in boat navigation, and scout ahead during transits. If a Navy representative is co-located in the helicopter with an Army representative, better coordination and faster response to any given situation would be possible.
2. With the advent of the ATC(H), the requirement for a hole landing area ashore has been eliminated. The Navy and Army on-scene commanders can now utilize both the flexibility and speed of the helicopter and the extensive command and communications facilities of the CCB.
3. Extra AN/PRC-25 radios for communications links between helos and boats is a continuing requirement.

RESUPPLY

1. The two-day basic boat resupply load of food, water and ammunition had proven effective in both the Rung Sat and the Delta area.
2. Salvage boats have also proven worthwhile in supplying needed spare parts in the area of operations.
3. The MRF resupply LST has proven successful in conducting resupply of the MRB on a weekly schedule.
4. On one occasion a CHINOOK helicopter was used to resupply the MRF Support LST, USS VERNON COUNTY. Although the CHINOOK could not land on the LST, transfer of supplies was effected while the helicopter hovered over the ship. This appears to be a feasible system for rapid emergency resupply of the Mobile Riverine Force.
5. The possibility of using pre-loaded pallets of ammunition for transfer from the Support LST to the AO is being investigated. This pre-loading will considerably reduce the time required to load the resupply craft prior to transit to the AO.

MEDICAL AID BOAT

1. The battalion and brigade medical aid boats have undoubtedly saved lives and have proven themselves to be extremely valuable. With the addition of a flight deck, the problem of MEDEVAC has been eased considerably. During recent operations, both day and night helo MEDEVACs have been accomplished from the flight deck of the medical boat.

17
CONFIDENTIAL

119

CONFIDENTIAL

SALVAGE BOAT

128

1. For each operation an ATC has been fitted out as a salvage boat. In addition to the required repair personnel, the boat has carried additional pumps, DC plates and plugs, spare parts for commonly recurring failures, and a repair kit for other minor repairs. The use of this salvage boat concept has resulted in keeping boats fully operational in the AO rather than sending them back to the MRB for necessary repairs.
2. For the ATC MK II, a salvage module has been suggested. This will allow the rapid conversion of any ATC to a salvage/repair boat with the insertion of this module.
3. The feasibility of designing a Light Lift Craft on an LCM-6 hull should be employed. If a boat is sunk during an operation, it could be towed by this Light Lift Craft to a secure area for refloating and necessary repairs. Without this Light Lift Craft, the sunken boat would have to remain in place protected by a large security element until the operation was completed.
4. A resuscitator would be valuable aboard the salvage boat or medical boat. Combat operations conducted in a riverine environment are bound to involve accidental drainage. A resuscitator would most probably reduce fatalities resulting from those incidents.

INTELLIGENCE

1. Sources of Intelligence.

a. A very important source of riverine intelligence in Vietnam is the NILO. In each riverine province, there is normally at least one NILO whose function is to be collector/disseminator of riverine intelligence on enemy order of battle, enemy commo-liason routes, waterway trafficability, and related matters.

b. An extremely important source of waterway trafficability intelligence for riverine operations off the major rivers in the Mekong Delta is that of aerial photography, particularly if taken at low tide. Such photography will in particular, reveal waterways which are not navigable to riverine assault craft. (This source is more fully discussed under "Photography Information.")

c. Agent sources among the native populace in a counterinsurgency environment are a good source of intelligence. Underdeveloped countries however tend to have poorly developed communications and transportation systems. Literacy standards are low. Intelligence information from agent sources will therefore seldom be timely, as it will likely have been walked in and will likely be by word of mouth.

d. SLAR (Side-looking Airborne Radar) may be an important source of intelligence in a riverine environment. This will be particularly true for areas known to be enemy-dominated. Then, patterns of enemy activity can be documented and studied.

18

CONFIDENTIAL

120

CONFIDENTIAL

129
e. Red Haze, like SLAR, can under certain conditions be very useful. However, in a riverine environment it, too, is more useful for pattern analyses, locations of enemy base camps and other facilities, and spotting of enemy waterborne movement when utilized over enemy-dominated areas, particularly if these enemy areas are also sparsely populated. Its sensitivity is greater when red haze is obtained at low altitude.

f. Note: In the paragraph on "Sources of Intelligence," it is recommended that, in the second line, "the main source" be amended to read "an important source." The paragraph further actually speaks of three sources of intelligence information: The friendly civilian population, the NIOs, and the Coastal group advisors.

2. Photography Information

a. Considerable waterway trafficability data may be available to planners and operators in riverine assault operations from simple photo interpretation of low-tide aerial photography. This lesson learned in riverine operations in the Mekong Delta may also have a wider application to riverine operations in other counterinsurgency environments in general.

(1) In some riverine counterinsurgency environments, it is conceivable that interpretation of aerial photography may be the only valid source of waterway trafficability intelligence to support riverine operations prior to the time operations commence.

(2) An important factor in such photo interpretation in the Delta is that the tidal range generally exceeds 8 feet. Thus, low-tide photography will clearly reveal, even to an untrained eye, obstructions in waterways which will, at higher tidal stages, deny passage to riverine assault craft with drafts of approximately 4.5 foot.

(3) A scale of about 1:5,000 for such aerial photography has proven to be ideal for the purpose. Ideally, vertical photography, supplemented with forward obliques, is needed. Vertical photography accurately reveals waterway widths and the nature of numerous types of waterway obstructions. Forward obliques help in proper identification of footbridges, fish stakes set vertically in the water, and other objects difficult to identify and describe when seen only from directly overhead. Forward obliques can be similarly essential for determining underbridge clearances for assault craft passage, if other sources of this information are unavailable.

3. Viet Cong Swimmers.

a. Recommend following paragraph be added to present commentary on swimmers: For naval units at anchor in a riverine or coastal environment, the greatest danger would appear to be from swimmers, bearing mines or other explosives.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND CIVIC ACTION

19
CONFIDENTIAL

124

CONFIDENTIAL

1. The paywar/civic action program of COMBIVPLOT ONE is still in the developmental stage. Therefore, lessons learned in these areas of endeavor must be awaited until a later date for meaningful commentary.

130

20

CONFIDENTIAL

122

131

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 709TH MAINTENANCE BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-SO-M

29 July 1967

SUBJECT: Results of M16 Rifle Lubricant Test

THRU: Commanding Officer
Support Command
9th Infantry Division
APO US Forces 96370

TO: Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-GL
APO US Forces 96370

1. At the direction of the Commanding General an evaluation was made on the effectiveness of the two principal lubricants used with the M16 rifle.

2. Variables:

a. Lubricants

- (1) Lubricating Oil, Semi-Fluid (LSA)
- (2) Lubricating Oil, General Purpose (PL Special)

b. Cleaning frequency.

- (1) Clean weapon daily.
- (2) Weapon not cleaned throughout three day test.

c. Thickness of lubricant coating.

- (1) Heavy coat.
- (2) Light coat.

3. Conduct of test.

Eight weapons were utilized covering all variables. Sixty rounds were fired through each weapon for three consecutive days, twenty rounds of which were semi-automatic fire and forty rounds automatic fire.

TAB 9

123

AVDE-80-X
SUBJECT: Results of M16 Rifle Lubricant Test

29 July 1967

132

4. Results of test:

LUBRICATING OIL

	LSA Heavy Light	PL Special Heavy Light	Cleaned Daily	Condition	Malfunctions
#1	X		Yes	Excellent	None
#2		X	Yes	Good	None
#3	X		No	Good	*
#4		X	No	Poor	**
#5	X		Yes	Excellent	None
#6		X	Yes	Good	None
#7	X		No	Excellent	None
#8		X	No	Good	***

- * Working parts showing signs of rusting. Excessive carbon in chamber.
- ** Excessive carbon on bolt.
- *** Rust starting to form on barrel, Carbon starting build up on bolt.

5. Conclusions.

- a. The heavy coat of LSA offered the best protection.
- b. Weapons should be cleaned daily.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/K. A. FOSS JR.
K. A. FOSS JR.
CPT ORDC
Adjutant

124

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~Security Classification~~

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexes annotation must be entered - even the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Confidential	
		2b. GROUP 4	
3. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1967			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CG, 9th Infantry Division			
6. REPORT DATE 7 November 1967		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 125	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 670801	
8. PROJECT NO. N/A		8b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
c.			
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

125

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.